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Preface
The history of the question of alliance, integration, and unification of Eu­
ropean states along different lines reaches far back. We only have to men­
tion I. Kant and J. C. Bluntschli, who saw the future of Europe in establishing 
a union of its states based on the rule of law. It was on the grounds of freedom 
and republican democracy that J. Lorimer of Edinburgh envisaged the possi­
bility of uniting European states. Much like him, Polish thinkers too, inclu­
ding A. Mickiewicz, B. Limanowski, and K. Kelles-Krauz, believed that Eu­
rope would unite as soon as its constituent states were driven by shared ideals 
of freedom and republican democracy.1
1 For more information, see: Z. A. Maciąg, Probleme der Anpassung der polnischen Verfassungsordnung an 
europäische Standards, [in:] Europäische Integration und nationale Rechtskulturen, Hrsg. Ch. Tomuschat, 
H. I<ötz. B. v. Maydell, Köln-Berlin-Bonn-München 1995, pp. 181,182, and literature quoted there.
2 W. B. Jastrzębowski, Traktat o wiecznym przymierzu między narodami ucywilizowanymi. Projekt Kon­
stytucji dla Europy jako ustawy mającej zapobiec wojnom. Warszawa 30IV1831, [in:] W. B. Jastrzębowski, 
Traktat o wiecznym przymierzu między narodami ucywilizowanymi. Konstytucja dla Europy, opracowa­
nie i zarys dziejów myśli pacyfistycznej F. Ramotowska. PWN, Warszawa-Łódź 1985, pp. 183-196.
This idea, together with the principles of special protection of life, free­
dom and property and of principles of equality and the rule of law, became the 
foundations of history’s first draft Constitution for Europe, developed as early 
as 1831 by a Pole participating in the January Uprising, W. B. Jastrzębowski.1 2
The principles of the inalienable and inviolable character of human rights, 
freedom, equality, democracy, and the rule of law were acknowledged by the 
law of the communities and expressed in the Treaty establishing a Consti-
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tution for Europe of 2004. Yet the rejection of that Constitutional Treaty in 
France and the Netherlands resulted in withdrawal from further-reaching le­
gal regulations and even rejection of the name “Constitution” itself. Following 
the work conducted in the years 2006-2007, the European Council determined 
the final text of the treaty, which only changed the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty establishing the European Community at a session held in Lis­
bon on 18th and 19th October, which was signed also in Lisbon, on 13th De­
cember 2007. This treaty, much like the Constitutional Treaty of 2004, defi­
ned the idea of human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of 
law as its grounds. Thus the date for polishing up the text of the reforming 
treaty in Lisbon preceded - by just two days - the session of the International 
Conference on European Constitution and National Constitutions, which was 
held from 21 to 24 October 2007 in Krakow. It is therefore fully understan­
dable that the speakers and participants in the discussion could not refer to 
norms and standards that were not yet known when the Krakow Conference 
opened. This is why the individual addresses presented during the Conference 
as well as the texts sent in at later dates refer only to the Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe as well as to a variety of questions pertaining to the 
constitutionalisation of the European Union, its individual institutions, and 
legal solutions; most of them also in relation and reference to national consti­
tutions. This is also why the notion of “European constitution” is understood 
not only formally as a uniform and coherent text but also - much like in the 
United Kingdom - in a material way as encompassing numerous acts regu­
lating basic matters of the political system, and the court judgements in the 
matter. The latter, material understanding of the constitution is more proper 
for the legal order existing currently in the European Union, and shall conti­
nue to remain in force after the potential ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon.
Thus the organisers of the Conference, and especially its Programme 
Council, aimed to develop an opportunity for a broader exchange of ideas in 
the international dimension concerning the constitutionalisation of the Eu­
ropean Union and appropriate changes in the constitutional systems of its 
Member States. For this reason, this general subject area was divided into 
three interconnected problem groups. The first of them, entitled Treaties - 
Constitutions, covered questions related to the reform of union treaties, le- 
gitimisation, and model solutions for the European Constitution, its ratifi­
cation, overcoming the “democracy deficit”, and increase in the importance 
of the European Parliament, as well as joint policy-making. In this problem 
team, emphasis was laid mostly on the treaty regulations and resultant con­
sequences for the Member States.
The second problem team, working under the name Citizen and Human 
Rights and Liberties, covered the questions of guarantee and protection of hu­
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man rights through the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and especially the 
questions of freedom, flow of capital, social rights, and citizenship in the EU.
The third and last problem team, known as European Union and State 
Political Systems, placed its emphasis on questions resulting from the deci­
sions contained in national constitutions towards the European Union, and 
the EU’s impact on the legal and systemic changes in the Member States.
Conference materials were complemented not only by the additional texts 
that greatly expanded and enriched the content, but also by the eminent con­
tribution of the Honorary Patrons of the Conference: Professor Jean-Paul Co­
sta, President of the European Court of Human Rights, and Professor Hans- 
-Gert Pottering, President of the European Parliament. Another extremely 
interesting position was presented by Professor Danuta Hiibner, European 
Commissioner for Regional Policy. The question of reform and démocrati­
sation of the House of Lords in the United Kingdom was the subject of the 
interview with Professor Philip Norton, Lord Norton of Louth, the Chair­
man of the House of Lords Constitution Committee. For this reason, I would 
like to take the opportunity to express great gratitude, and thank in a special 
way these distinguished personalities of the world of European politics and 
science for their precious material contribution to the discussion covered by 
the subject range of this book.
It must be emphasised that the Conference was organised by the Jagiello- 
nian University (Poland), the University of Hull (United Kingdom), and An­
drzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University College (Poland, now Andrzej 
Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University). The sessions took place at the Cam­
pus of Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University College and at the Ja- 
giellonian University Conference Centre in Przegorzafy. The efficient running 
of the conference was significantly helped by the contributions of members 
of the Organising Committee: Professor Jo Carby-Hall from the University of 
Hull as well as Honorary Consul of the Republic of Poland in Beverley, Pro­
fessor Bogdan Szlachta of the Jagiellonian University, Diane Ryland of the 
University of Lincoln, Professor Zdzisław Mach of the Jagiellonian Univers­
ity, the administrative staff of the University of Hull represented by Alexan­
der Ward, and Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University College repre­
sented by Agata Krawiec, Jerzy Marcinkowski and Katarzyna Banasik.
The organisation of the Conference was significantly supported by the 
funds of the Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Beverley (United King­
dom), and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. I hereby thank them very warmly 
for their support.
I extend my thanks to Radio Krakow, TVP3, Rzeczpospolita national daily, 
Przegląd Sejmowy and Przegląd for media patronage of the conference.
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Separate words of thanks go to the Jagiellonian University for its financial 
support in publishing this book.
Let me express my gratitude also to all of those who, through their work, 
supported the success of the Conference and publication of this book.
As honorary titles of the professors of Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Kra­
kow University College were awarded for the first time in the university’s hi­
story during the Conference to three of its participants, namely Professor Jo 
Carby-Hall of the University of Hull and Honorary Consul of the Republic of 
Poland in Hull, Professor Rolf Grawert of Bochum University, and Professor 
Harald Kundoch of Gelsenkirchen University of Applied Sciences, the Appen­
dix of the book contains brief information about the contribution of these dist­
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INTRODUCTION
HONORARY PATRON OF THE CONFERENCE, 
PROFESSOR JEAN-PAUL COSTA,
PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Record of an extraordinary meeting with 
the President of the European Court of Human Rights 
Jean-Paul Costa at Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski 
Krakow University College (AFM-KUC)1
• Dean of the Faculty of International Relations,
Professor Bogusława Bednarczyk, PhD
Ladies and Gentlemen, distinguished Guests! Dear Students!
On behalf of the Rector and the academic community of Andrzej Frycz 
Modrzewski Krakow College I have the privilege to welcome Jean-Paul Costa, 
the President of the European Court of Human Rights.
The European Court of Human Rights was founded in 1959. It guarantees 
individuals all over Europe the right to seek legal protection of freedoms that 
their governments have signed up to uphold. In a week's time we will cele­
brate the 10th anniversary of the entering into force of Protocol No. 11 to the 
European Constitution Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This Pro­
tocol amended the Courts, structure and procedures by establishing a full- 
time court and opening direct access to the Court for the people of all Mem­
ber States of the Council of Europe. In order to help the Court to deal more 
quickly and efficiently with its ever growing list of pending cases the Protocol 
No. 14 was opened for signature in May 2004. However, this protocol is still 
awaiting ratification. Today we have a rare and unusual opportunity to ask 
questions and listen to the opinions of the President of the European Court 
of Human Rights. The floor is open for your questions.
• Student 1 (AFM-KUC)
Human dignity is commonly defined as the source of human rights. Why is 
it so difficult to find a comprehensive definition of human dignity in judgements 
of the Court?
• Professor Jean-Paul Costa
Before answering the question, let me thank you for being invited to Po­
land, Krakow, and to this university. I have been to Poland several times, but 
this is my first visit to this beautiful city and - of course - my first visit to this 
university.
1 The meeting took place on 25 October 2008.
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Your question is a very relevant one, but the answer is rather simple. We 
in the European Court of Human Rights are dedicated to ensuring respect 
by the Contracting States of the rights and guarantees which are defined and 
contained in the European Convention on Human Rights, an instrument 
which was signed in 1950, just after the second world war. Even if the con­
cept of human dignity, of course, underlies many articles of the Convention, 
it is not as such protected by a specific article. If you take for instance Arti­
cle 3 of the Convention, which prohibits torture and inhuman and degrad­
ing treatment and punishment, it is clear that it is very close to the concept of 
human dignity, but human dignity is not as such, I repeat, protected by a spe­
cific article of the Convention. This is the reason why in our judgments and 
decisions, although we do not ignore the concept of human dignity, we try 
to keep more to the text of the articles of the Convention. I must add that of 
course we adopt an evolutionary approach to the interpretation of the Treaty, 
i.e. the Convention and its Protocols, and we try to integrate new concepts. 
Maybe I will have the opportunity to develop this idea when answering other 
questions. But again, our Bible, in a sense, is the text of the Convention and 
of the Protocols thereto.
• Student 2 (AFM-KUC)
My question is about the case of Emmanuelle B. vs France, concerning 
adoption of a child. The point at issue was the sexual orientation of the appli­
cant. I have two questions. First, when the European Court of Human Rights 
considers cases, does it pay attention only to the legal aspects or does it also 
consider the ethical aspects? And the second one: would the solution in the 
case have been the same if two men had wanted to adopt a child?
• Professor Jean-Paul Costa
Thank you. I know this case very well. As you know, we have a rule in the 
Convention according to which each judge elected in respect of the respon­
dent country in question, for instance Poland for my friend Lech Garlicki, 
or myself for France, has the duty to sit on the bench - 7-judge Chamber or 
17-judge Grand Chamber - when the application is brought against his or her 
State. So I sat in Emmanuelle B. vs France, and some years previously in Frette 
vs France, which dealt with the same type of problem, namely, is a man or wo­
man - a man in the case of Frette, a woman in the case of Emmanuelle B. - is 
he or she entitled to adopt a child, or is it possible for the State to prohibit such 
an adoption based simply on the homosexual orientation of this person. First 
of all, to answer your second question: it is clear for the Court and in its jud­
gments in Frette and in Emmanuelle B. cases that there is no distinction be­
tween a man and a woman. It does not matter whether the homosexual per­
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son who would like to adopt a child is a man or a woman. The answer to your 
first question is more difficult, because of course we have not only to apply 
legal reasoning but in some cases - of course, this is not true for all matters 
- we have to consider also the ethical aspects of the problem. In the B. case, 
there was an ethical aspect. But the case raised a simple question of law, na­
mely non-discrimination. Put simply: the case was against France, and we 
had to consider first the French Law. And according to French civil law, the 
Civil Code, it is possible - it is relatively recent, but it is possible - for a sin­
gle person, who is not married, to adopt a child under certain conditions, for 
example provision of guarantees of a good education and material support 
for the adopted child. And the reasoning of the Court in the case you mentio­
ned was as follows: in so far as the State - France - has given the possibility 
not only to married couples, but also to a single person, to adopt a child, it is 
contrary to the Convention, and more specifically to Article 14 of the Con­
vention - which prohibits discrimination - to discriminate against a per­
son simply because she is, or she alleges to be, or she appears to be, homose­
xual. Again, the same reasoning would have applied had the applicant been 
a man. Let me draw your attention to the fact that in the Frette case, the ear­
lier case, which was a Chamber case, the solution given by the Court was 
different because it was simply concluded that there was no right under the 
Convention to adopt a child, and so the Convention was not engaged. Article 
8 of the Convention in particular was not engaged, and we rejected the appli­
cation of Mr Frette. The E.B. or Emmanuelle B. case is not only a more recent 
judgment but it is also a Grand Chamber judgment, adopted by the most im­
portant formation of the Court, namely the Grand Chamber - and in a sense, 
it did not uphold Frette but reversed the solution given in Frette.
• Student 3
I represent Krakow Internet TV and I would like to know what why some 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe very frequently violate human rights. 
Is the answer a political matter, a historical matter, or lack of education?
• Professor Jean-Paul Costa
It is difficult to give a brief answer to such a question, because there are 
various countries in Central and Eastern Europe and all of them have in com­
mon the fact of being in a transitional stage. The progress achieved in the tran­
sitional period is not the same in all countries: they move at different speeds. 
These countries are catching up very quickly with European standards of pro­
tection of human rights, for instance in the area of freedom of speech, free­
dom of assembly and association, etc. Yet even those countries that are best- 
ranked, if I may say so, have some problems with violations of human rights, 
19
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for instance as regards procedural matters, criminal procedure, civil proce­
dure, and so forth. A very common violation of human rights which is found 
also in West European countries is the excessive duration of legal proceed­
ings. The reasonable delay requirement is not respected. This is one of the 
problems of Poland, by the way. When we were discussing yesterday and the 
day before with the judicial and political authorities of Poland this was one 
of the main items. In some other countries, you find more serious violations 
of human rights. Excessive delay in obtaining a judgment is serious for the 
persons affected, but it is even worse when you are facing violations of hu­
man rights such as the right to life, prohibition of torture, or even arbitrari­
ness in judgments. And for instance in the case of Poland, there are not too 
many serious violations of human rights, but there are still big problems, and 
we drew the attention of the authorities to them in our discussions. They say 
they are aware of the problems. First of all, the conditions of detention in 
prisons, mainly due to overcrowding in prisons, too many detainees for the 
space available. This amounts or may amount to a violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention: inhuman or degrading treatment. Another problem that is seri­
ous in Poland is the excessive duration of pre-trial detention. You are accused 
of a crime and you are put in pre-trial detention for a period of time that is 
excessive. On many occasions the person is eventually acquitted, but even if 
this person is convicted and sentenced to prison, it is not normal, it is not in 
accordance with the European standards of protection of human rights that 
he stays too long in pre-trial detention. First of all, it is contrary to the pre­
sumption of innocence, and secondly it contributes to the problem of over­
population in prisons. Let me use an example of two countries which are not 
exactly Central or Eastern European, but which are both problematic: Russia 
and Turkey. In Russia, mainly due to the Chechen situation or war, we have 
found on many occasions violations of very important human rights, Article 
2 and Article 3 of the Convention. This is connected with the “civil war” - and 
I say this in inverted commas - which has taken place in Chechnya. Several 
years earlier the same situation occurred in Turkey during the conflict with 
the Kurds. This allows a remark that may seem obvious, but I do insist on this 
point: there is of course a very strong connection and correlation between 
peace and human rights. External peace, for instance the war situation now 
in the Caucasus, is evidently giving rise to violations of human rights, prob­
ably on both sides, but it is premature to assess this. Conflict within coun­
tries such as the one in south-east Turkey between the Kurds and the central 
power, or in Chechnya, or in certain other places gives rise to human rights 
violations. If peace is missing, there is obviously the risk - and not only the 
risk: the certainty - of violations of human rights. Whereas on the contrary, 
if a country is peaceful, you see a progressive disappearance of the problems.
20
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When I visit countries and when I exercise a kind of “judicial diplomacy”: 
I insist very much on this link between peace, or peaceful situations, and 
good protection of human rights.
• Student 4
What if the country does not want to obey the jurisdiction of the Euro­
pean Court? I would like you to comment on cases where judgments were 
not obeyed by countries, as in the case of the Kurt vs Turkey.
• Professor Jean-Paul Costa
In general, the judgments of the Court are enforced. They are executed by 
the countries, by the defending States. We in the Court are not directly re­
sponsible for supervising the proper execution of our judgments. There is 
another organ of the Council of Europe, namely the Committee of Ministers, 
which under the Convention has the responsibility of pushing and pressing 
States in the direction of “obeying” - as you said - our judgments; of enfor­
cing them. This means, by the way, not only paying financial compensation to 
the victims of human rights violations, but also taking steps, individual and 
general steps or measures, sometimes of legislative nature, for redressing the 
violation and preventing new analogous violations of human rights from be­
ing committed in the future. I would not like to comment on the Kurt ver­
sus Turkey case, because it is a recent case, but I can give you three historical 
examples of non-execution or non-enforcement of the judgments of the Co­
urt. By the way, these examples are nearly exhaustive in the sense that, I re­
peat, most States do execute our judgments.
The first case I am thinking of is the famous case of the Greek Refineries 
against Greece, which concerned a problem of property rights and fair trial 
under Article 1 of Protocol 1 and Article 6 of the Convention. In this case, 
the Court found that Greece had violated the rules of fair trial, because pro­
ceedings were underway in Greece in which the Greek State and some im­
portant Greek refineries were the opposing parties. The financial interests at 
stake were really high. In order to avoid, to be rid of the case before the do­
mestic courts, the Greek government prepared a bill which was passed by the 
Parliament, which retroactively, or retrospectively, interfered with the pro­
ceedings, and gave the possibility to Greece to escape, to skip its responsibil­
ity before the domestic courts. We found that this was not in conformity with 
a fair trial, because it was an interference of the legislative branch and the ex­
ecutive branch of the government with judicial proceedings. The main prob­
lem was financial, because the Court said that under Article 41, former Ar­
ticle 50, of the Convention, Greece had to pay in material damages the sum 
which normally the refineries would have won had it not been for the inter­
21
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vention of the Parliament. Greece for many years refused to pay, saying “We 
have no money”. Then the Committee of Ministers said to the Greek gov­
ernment “Well, you have to pay anyway, you have of course the choice of the 
means, you can increase taxes, you can save on expenditure, you can increase 
the deficit in your budget, but anyway you have to enforce the judgment of 
the Court”. Finally, I do not know how this was achieved, the Greeks did en­
force the judgment.
The second case is more political than financial. It is the famous case of 
Loizidou vs Turkey. In this case, there was a problem of violation of human 
rights, again property rights, in the northern part of the island of Cyprus. The 
applicant, Ms Loizidou, was living in the southern part. She is a Greek Cyp­
riot. The Turkish government was accused by this person of having violated 
her property rights in the northern part of Cyprus. The Turkish government 
stated before the Court “It may be possible, but we are not responsible, be­
cause there is a Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and this state is re­
sponsible, if the violation is proven” At the time - it was in the mid-1990s 
- the Court said “Well, this state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 
is not recognised by the international community, the only state which has 
recognised it is Turkey, and Turkey, besides, has civil servants and a military 
presence in the northern part of Cyprus, so Turkey is exercising control or at 
least partial control over this part of the island. As a consequence, if a state 
has to be responsible, then it is Turkey.” In this way, the Court finally found 
that the violations were established, and that Turkey was responsible. Before 
the Committee of Ministers, Turkey again said “Well, we do not want to pay 
financial compensation to this person, because we are not responsible”. Even­
tually Turkey gave up, because the Committee of Ministers explained to them 
that the judgment of the Court was clear-cut, crystal clear, and they had to 
pay, and finally they did.
The last case, which is the most critical in a way, is the case of Ila§cu vs 
Moldova and Russia. Again it was a problem of territorial jurisdiction of the 
Court and territorial responsibility of the States concerned, because it dealt 
with detainees who were prisoners in Transnistria, a part of Moldova which 
is legally under the State responsibility of Moldova, but which is at the same 
time controlled by some remnants of the Soviet Army which at the time of the 
civil war, in the early 1990s, stayed on in Transnistria and exercised power. In 
the Ilascu case the Court decided that both Moldova and Russia, with some 
differences as to the grounds for responsibility, were responsible for keeping 
the applicants in prison. What happened then was that Moldova for its part ex­
ecuted, or tried to execute, the judgment, but Russia did not. Finally the appli­
cants were freed, but they were freed simply because the term of their impris­
onment had ended. This is the most serious case to my mind, because it shows 
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the willingness of a country not to recognise the force of a judgment of our 
Court and simply to allow time to pass in order not to enforce a judgment.
• Student 5
Right after you were elected President of the Court, Mr Costa, you said in 
an interview that Poland was in the top of the league of the countries that are 
provoking cases against them. What did you mean by “provoking cases”, and 
is Poland still among those so-called “bad students”?
• Professor Jean-Paul Costa
Yes, it is true that Poland was at the time one of the States against which 
there were the greatest number of applications. Probably I did not say “pro­
voke cases” but “provide cases”, yet the idea is the same. If you have many 
applications against a State, this means first of all that this State is not pro­
tecting or defending human rights enough, and secondly that the workload 
of the Court is of course increased insofar as the applications against this 
country are concerned. I must say, and I do not say it because we are in Po­
land, but because it is really the truth, that the relative rank, the classifica­
tion of Poland, on the list of all the States, has improved. It has improved 
greatly and now Poland is in the fifth or maybe the sixth place, and does not 
produce as many cases. This is due to many factors. The number of applica­
tions is clearly more or less dependent on the overall population of the coun­
try. You have necessarily more cases against Poland or France or Italy than 
against Liechtenstein or Andorra or San Marino. Obviously the more people 
there are in the country, the more cases there are, and that goes for all coun­
tries. Yet if the situation of Poland has improved, it is thanks to several factors. 
One of them is that Poland has really become aware of the need to remedy 
violations of human rights, and this is more and more clear. Some catego­
ries of cases could and should be dealt with at national level, for instance 
length of proceedings, but there are also other systemic problems. I just re­
cently mentioned the problem of excessive length of detention on remand. 
Three weeks ago a delegation of senior members of the Registry went to Po­
land in order to discuss with the authorities if it was possible to introduce 
legislative reforms and to reach friendly settlements with applicants where 
the cases are obviously well-founded. It is not necessary for Poland (it is actu­
ally the same for other countries!) to wait for a formal judgment of the Court: it 
is possible to settle a case beforehand by recognising the State’s responsibility 
under international law and by affording the applicant compensation. This is 
a process which will certainly continue. For instance, you know that the Court 
decided seven years ago, at the beginning of this century, the famous Kudla 
versus Poland case, which was a signal not only for Poland but also for many 
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other States that it was necessary in excessive length of proceedings cases to 
introduce domestic remedies giving people ways of reducing the length and 
compensating them in the domestic courts for the damage they suffer. Af­
ter this judgment, Poland adopted its first legislation in order to abide by 
our judgment, but our Court rapidly arrived at the conclusion that this leg­
islation was not effective enough: it did not provide sufficient compensation, 
sufficient ways of reducing this problem. I heard when I arrived here in Po­
land two days ago that a new draft bill has been recently approved by the gov­
ernment and will be very soon sent to the Sejm and then to the Senate in or­
der to improve protection. There is another reason why the number of cases 
against Poland is probably decreasing, not in absolute figures but in relative 
figures. It is the question of better information and education. We have to re­
member that many cases brought in Strasbourg before our Court are hope­
less cases which finally result in rejection of the applications by 3-judge com­
mittees. This shows that many people in Europe think that the Convention 
and the Court can provide them with a solution to the problems in their daily 
life. By that I mean their happiness, health, love, such kinds of good things. 
I would like, as the President of this Court, to be a kind of Santa Claus and 
provide everyone with love, happiness, health, beauty, etc. Yet we cannot, and 
we are not of course conceived for that purpose. Nevertheless, many people 
simply hope that they can - or that the Court in Strasbourg can, or the Eu­
ropean Convention on Human Rights can - remedy all the problems which 
affect their lives. This also raises the question of information. We are not 
a fourth instance court, we cannot review... We can of course review the judg­
ments of domestic courts, even in penal matters, in criminal matters, but 
only from the angle of respect for fair trial requirements. We receive many 
applications from people saying “I was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment, 
and I should have had 2 or 3 years”. Still, we cannot re-judge it! It seems to me 
that a very important role has to be played at the national level by the Om­
budsman or Ombudsperson, for example, to explain what the Court is actu­
ally able to provide and what it does not provide. Probably, we ourselves in 
the Court have to increase the level of information and education of lawyers, 
of NGOs, of representatives of applicants, and of potential applicants them­
selves, in order to avoid having such a huge amount of cases rejected. This is 
frustrating for applicants, but it is also a supplementary burden for the Court. 
We would be better to concentrate either on the very serious violations of hu­
man rights or on new problems, such as the issue mentioned before: adop­
tion by homosexuals, rather than reject thousands and thousands of cases by 
3-judge committees, which probably - most of them, not all of them - could 
have been avoided through better information and education.
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• Student 6 (Krakow Internet TV)
Could you tell us what strategy you would suggest for the Polish society to 
improve the protection of human rights?
• Professor Jean-Paul Costa
The global strategy in a sense is simple, but it is difficult to be really spe­
cific. The strategy is simply the following one. First of all, States are never 
obliged to ratify international instruments such as the European Convention 
on Human Rights. When they decide, on the basis of sovereignty, to ratify 
such an instrument, they solemnly undertake the responsibility of protecting 
human rights such as defined and guaranteed by the Convention. This im­
plies that all the authorities of such States - executive, legislative, the Parlia­
ment, courts, and so forth - (which may also apply in some cases to individ­
ual relationships) are committed to executing in good faith the engagements 
and duties they accepted by signing and ratifying the Convention. The Stras­
bourg machinery places reliance on the subsidiarity principle, which means 
in international law that the Court is simply a subsidiary court. This obvi­
ously does not mean a secondary court. It is a very important jurisdiction, 
but most of the problems should be either prevented or redressed at national 
level. And we have more than 800,000,000 potential applicants in Europe in 
the 47 Contracting States, and let us imagine that in their lives - of 80 years 
each - every one of the 800,000,000 (let me tell you: Europe is big!) brings 
a case to Strasbourg. That would mean ten million cases a year, once we di­
vided 800,000,000 by 80 years. This is why we cannot simply be a court of first 
instance or fourth instance for all the people in Europe. Therefore, the mes­
sage we convey, and I do it when I am on a mission with the national judges 
of the Court, in this case my friend elected in respect of Poland, Judge Gar­
licki, is simply to say to the countries: help the Court, not in order to help 
the Court itself, but to help your own citizens. You are not obliged, I repeat, 
to ratify the Convention, but if you do so, take it seriously. This message will 
hopefully be followed. It will take many years, but it is the only way of im­
proving protection of human rights standards in Europe and to have a more 
efficient Court, one more able to give guidance to the States. Our role is not 
to unify the law, because the law is different from country to country accord­
ing to their legal traditions, different legal cultures and so forth. Our role is 
to analyse the solutions, and to serve - as I said - as a guide, providing guid­
ance to the various European States. It goes without saying that in some cases 
the Convention is binding without exception. For example, the abolition of 
the death penalty, which was decided in an additional Protocol to the Con­
vention, Protocol 6, is certainly binding. And we know that in the world there 
are many large states: China, Japan, most of the United States, and even In-
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dia, even if they apply a kind of so-called moratorium - there are many con­
tinents in the world where the death penalty is still in force. But as far as Eu­
ropean states are concerned, when they ratify Protocol 6, they have to take it 
seriously and not re-introduce the death penalty. This is just an example, and 
I hope you can see now my point.
• Student 7
What do you think about limiting personal freedom, which is obviously 
a basic human right, in order to provide more homeland security?
• Professor Jean-Paul Costa
I would need at least an hour to answer your question! Simply, all States are 
facing the same dilemma between more security, and keeping and maintain­
ing - and if possible improving - freedom. This is particularly true in a period 
like ours, the beginning of the 21st century, when we have such phenomena as 
terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking, trafficking of human beings, etc. 
The need for security at national and international level is greater than before. 
Our simple answer in the Court - and this is the philosophy of the Council of 
Europe - is that we have to reconcile security and liberty. I will use just one 
example: terrorism, called so since the 1970s and the interstate case of Ireland 
vs the United Kingdom. We have had many occasions to state and to repeat 
that the fight against terrorism is not only legitimate but it is even a duty for 
States, because States are obliged under the theory of positive obligations to 
protect as far as possible their populations against phenomena such as ter­
rorism. At the same time, we have always said that it is necessary to limit - 
within the framework of freedom, equality and justice - the ways in which 
or through which the States combat terrorism. For instance, at the beginning 
of this year we issued a very important judgment of our Grand Chamber, 
a unanimous judgment, in the case of Saadi vs Italy, which concerned the ex­
tradition of a Tunisian citizen living in Italy, who was accused of having links 
with terrorist organisations. At the end of the day, he was convicted in Italy 
of a less serious crime. Extradition was requested by Tunisia. In the examina­
tion of the case, the Court had asked the Italian authorities to seek diplomatic 
and political assurances from Tunisia, which they did. However, they did not 
obtain serious guarantees. For this reason, the Court said “If this person is to 
be extradited to Tunisia, Italy will be responsible for a violation of Article 3 of 
the Convention, because this person runs a very serious risk of inhuman and 
degrading treatment in Tunisia, if returned to Tunisia”. This was in a sense 
a confirmation of former caselaw of the Court, but with more emphasis and 
importance in the context of the growing threat of terrorism. It is very diffi­
cult to reconcile liberty and security, freedom and security, but it is the duty 
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of democracies to do so. I draw your attention to the fact that many articles of 
the Convention and the preamble itself refer to the notion of democratic so­
cieties, things which are necessary or legitimate in a democratic society. Our 
guidance, more moral and political than purely legal, even if the legal conse­
quences are important, is that democracies must not lose their soul, even if it 
is for very understandable and good reasons.
• Student 8 (AFM-KUC)
Is it within the European Court’s legal capacity to decide about shooting 
down a hijacked airplane?
• Professor Jean-Paul Costa
Well, I cannot answer your question for a very simple reason. We as judges 
avoid as much as possible speculating on theoretical situations. If I am not mis­
taken, we have never had this problem in the Court. Believe me, it is already 
very difficult to find a good solution in actual cases, in specific applications that 
are brought before the Court. It is very difficult to speculate on possible future 
applications. I am sorry not to be able to give as full an explanation as I should, 
but again it is difficult for me to give you an answer. First of all, because we are 
a collective court, so the decisions we make are based on collective decisions, 
which themselves are based on majority decisions. Moreover and more impor­
tantly, because it is impossible to speculate on theoretical cases.
• Professor Bogusława Bednarczyk
Thank you very much. The question session is over although - as I do un­
derstand and I realise - there are many additional questions and problems 
still facing us, especially the famous Protocol 14 and the so-called fast track 
procedure, and other issues. Therefore, I do believe that perhaps in the fu­
ture, perhaps even in the foreseeable future, we will have the honour to host 
you here for a longer time. Then there might be more opportunity to ask you 
additional questions concerning the issues of human rights in the 21st cen­
tury which we are faced with.
Mr President Costa, thank you very much for finding the time and com­
ing to our College. We are all honoured very much. My deep thanks also go 
to Professor Lech Garlicki for accompanying Judge Costa. I also extend my 
thanks to all the students and professors who have come here today. Con­
cluding, I do believe that the occasion has been truly worth it. Thank you all 
very much.
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HONORARY PATRON OF THE CONFERENCE, 
PROFESSOR HANS-GERT POTTERING, PhD 
PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Message from the President of the European Parliament 
Professor Hans-Gert Pottering, PhD
Ladies and Gentlemen, distinguished Guests! Dear Friends and Colleagues!
Let me start by expressing my gratitude for the invitation that was exten­
ded to me to participate in the International Conference “European Consti­
tution and National Constitutions” organised by the Jagiellonian University, 
the University of Halle, and the Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University 
College, and to address the participants of this distinguished gathering.
Unfortunately, due to prior commitments, I cannot be present. Fortuna­
tely, however, with the aid of modern communication technology I have the 
chance to address you from Strasbourg, where the European Parliament is 
having its regular monthly plenary session by means of this video message. 
For this opportunity, I thank the organisers.
It also gives me pleasure that I have granted my patronage, as President of 
the European Parliament, to this important event.
Ladies and Gentlemen, dear Friends, your meeting takes place at a crucial 
time for Europe, and concerns a topic of utmost importance. Only a few days 
ago in Lisbon, the heads of states and governments together with the presi­
dents of the Commission and the European Parliament finalised the agree­
ment on the new Treaty setting for the European Union of 27 member states. 
After several long years of discussions, we are on the right track to overcome 
the institutional crisis, to consolidate the Union, and give it the capacity to 
act. We in the European Parliament, and I myself as president, consider this 
issue the priority of priorities. The Union can now move forward and con­
centrate on tacking the challenges of today and tomorrow: climate change, 
globalisation, energy security, migration, or the dialogue of cultures, just to 
mention some responsibilities and challenges.
Ladies and Gentlemen! As president of the European Parliament I have to 
express my deepest satisfaction that the codecision procedure in which we, 
the elected representatives of the European citizens, decide on equal foot­
ing with the Council of Ministers, on legislation, will be extended to nearly 
100% of policy areas. We consider this a great achievement, making the EU 
more democratic and transparent. Not without pride I would like to inform 
you that the Charter of Fundamental Rights will be formally proclaimed by 
the heads of the three institutions, Council, Commission and Parliament, in 
Strasbourg in December, one day before the Treaty is signed in Lisbon. The 
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legally binding character of this Charter we consider as a significant step for­
ward for European institutions, and citizens especially.
Ladies and Gentlemen! I would like to conclude by extending my best re­
gards to you all, and wish you a successful and fruitful conference in the beau­
tiful city of Krakow, which I had the pleasure of visiting only last month. 
I hope that your meeting will bring positive results in a scientific analysis of 
our new Treaty, setting its relation to and with our national constitutions in 




Professor Barbara Stoczewska, PhD
Speeches of the representatives 
of the organisers of the conference
• Professor Barbara Stoczewska, PhD - Vice-Rector, Andrzej.Frycz
Modrzewski Krakow University College
It is my great pleasure to welcome you all. Maybe for some of you this is 
your first visit in Krakow. I am sure you will find our city and its sights both 
interesting and beautiful. I also sincerely hope that this conference will meet 
your expectations. And I would like to wish all our participants a nice time in 
our city and I am sure you will find the conference stimulating, thought-pro­
voking and rich in ideas. I have the privilege and honour to say that the con­
ference has been organised under the honorary patronage of Professor Hans- 
Gert Pottering, President of the European Parliament, and Professor Jean-Paul 
Costa, the newly elected President of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg.
This year’s conference commemorates the 10th anniversary of adopting 
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Now I would like to say a few 
words about the conference, about a certain tradition that comes along with 
it. Today’s conference expresses a continuity of a series of conferences on the 
issues of constitutionalism and its relationship to the European Union. The 
first conference took place two years ago, in 2005. It was co-organised with 
the University of Hull and was devoted to the issues related to Poland in the 
European Union and the social dimension. The following year the Jagiello- 
nian University organised a conference focusing on the problems of applying 
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland from 1997 also in a broad Euro­
pean Union context, taking into consideration the past experience and look­
ing to the future.
Let me now present and recommend the materials from last year’s confer­
ence, hot off the press, edited by Professor Zbigniew Maciąg. This is the ad­
vance copy. You will have a chance to take a closer look at the materials and 
receive a copy during the course of the conference. And finally, today’s con­
ference, which I have the pleasure of opening, is the third one in the series. It 
is organised by the Jagiellonian University and the University of Hull, and co-
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organised and hosted by Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University Col­
lege. After this short introduction, may I ask Rector Professor Jerzy Malec to 
officially open the conference.
• Professor Jerzy Malec, PhD — Rector, Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski
Krakow University College
Thank you, Vice-Rector. First, please rise for the anthem of the European 
Union. Thank you very much. Ladies and Gentlemen! Before I officially open 
the conference, f would like to welcome our noble guests, ft is my pleasure to 
welcome Minister Krzysztof Szczerski, Undersecretary of State in the Office of 
the Committee of the European Integration. You’re most welcome, Minister. 
1 would also like to welcome Dr Rafał Trzaskowski, Advisor to the Chairman of 
the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee. 1 am pleased to welcome 
two judges of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal: Professor Marian Grzybowski 
and Marek Kotlinowski. A warm welcome to Professor Osman Achmatowicz, the 
Secretary of the Central Commission for Academic Degrees and Titles. 1 would 
also like to welcome Michalina Nowokuńska, Head of the District Chamber of 
Legal Counselors, as well as Janusz Sobczyk, Head of the District Bar Council in 
Krakow. Welcome to Mariusz Maziarz, representing the Chief Education Officer 
in Małopolska region. A particularly warm welcome goes to numerous scholars, 
both from Poland and abroad. Let me begin with Professor Karol Musioł, Rec­
tor of the Jagiellonian University and co-organiser of the conference, ft is a great 
pleasure to welcome the professors who have been nominated to receive honor­
ary degrees of the Krakow University College. The ceremony will take place this 
afternoon, and the details will follow shortly. And so 1 have the honour to wel­
come Professor Jo Carby-Hall from the University of Hull in Great Britain, who 
also represents David Drewy, the Chancellor of the University of Hull, the other 
organiser of today’s conference. Welcome to Professor Rolf Grawert from Bo­
chum University and Professor Harald Kundoch from the University of Ap­
plied Sciences in Gelsenkirchen.
I would also like to welcome other foreign guests, Professor Manfred Weiss 
from Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt, Professor Dieter Kugel- 
mann from Harz University of Applied Sciences, Professor Ian Barnes from the 
University of Lincoln in Great Britain, as well as Associate Professor Allan Ta- 
tham, representing the Catholic University in Budapest. I would like to wel­
come Professor Alessandro Anastasi from the University of Messina in Italy, 
and Diana Ryland, representing the University of Lincoln, Great Britain. We 
are delighted you were able to make it to the conference. Welcome to Pamela 
Barnes, also from the University of Lincoln, Great Britain, as well as Dr Anneli 
Albi from the University of Kent, Great Britain, and Alexandra Hennessy from 
the University of Rochester in the USA.
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I would like to welcome representatives of Polish academic centres from al­
most all major universities in Poland. Welcome to the professors and students 
of our Alma Mater.
Ladies and Gentlemen! The idea of the European Union has a history 
which goes back hundreds of years. Thoughts about a community of the Eu­
ropean nations have always met with heated debate on its shape, and the sit­
uation today is no different. The conference in Krakow picks up on an in­
credibly important issue of establishing a relationship between the European 
Constitution and the national constitutions. It is important, among other rea­
sons, because of the continued lack of unanimity in accepting the European 
constitution. Although as a principle it cannot give rights in the areas of free­
doms, security or justice, it could be a step forward, a bridge between an eco­
nomic union and a union of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The 
constitution could simplify issues relating to the system of justice, foreign af­
fairs, and at the same time assure greater transparency of the decision — mak­
ing process. It has been initiated by the biggest and the strongest countries. 
One should remember, however, that it is an expression of only one vision of 
further integration of Europe and its development. Is it the best one, though? 
As we are all aware, the European Constitution gives rise to much debate and 
controversy. Being a compromise, it never satisfied anyone in full. Its partic­
ular stipulations have been questioned, as has its claim to being called a con­
stitution, rather than a set of legal regulations.
Another subject of heated debates were the accusations that it requires 
member states to resign from national sovereignty, by stipulating that the 
Constitution will have primacy over national laws, including national consti­
tutions. The national constitutions would still exist, though not entirely in­
dependently. The guests of today s conference, highly acclaimed specialists in 
the fields of constitutional law and political systems from academic centres 
in different countries, will attempt to find answers to the crucial problems re­
lating to the law-making process and the importance of the European Con­
stitution for the future of the European Union and the entire continent. They 
will also present issues to do with harmonisation of European national laws 
with EU law.
In the sessions to follow we shall listen to presentation on the current state 
of affairs and the perspectives of the development of the European Union. We 
will deal with the structure of the European system and the concerns of mod­
ern constitutionalism. Finally, we will look into the hotly debated relation­
ship between the European Constitution and the national constitutions in the 
light of particular legal systems. I believe many dilemmas which run parallel 
to the process of creating the common European fundamental statute will be 
resolved in the course of this conference. At the same time I would like to re­
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mind you that it has been ten years since the current Constitution of the Re­
public of Poland was adopted and that a year ago we ran a session entitled: 
“The Constitution of the Republic of Poland after 1997. Experiences and per­
spectives.” I hope this year's meeting will be as fruitful and rich in reflection. 
I also hope you will enjoy your time in Krakow, a special city. Many of you 
have been here before. We are particularly pleased you were kind enough to 
visit both the city and the university again. I hope you have a fruitful and in­
tellectually inspiring conference. I declare the international conference, “The 
European Constitution and the national constitutions” open. Thank you very 
much.
• Professor Barbara Stoczewska, PhD - Vice-Rector, Andrzej Frycz
Modrzewski Krakow University College
Thank you, Rector. Now I would like to invite Professor Karol Musiol, the 
Rector of the Jagiellonian University, to take the floor. Please.
• Professor Karol Musiol, PhD — Rector, Jagiellonian University
Ladies and Gentlemen! I think the conference had precisely the appropri­
ate opening - the anthem of the European Union - for this puts us all on one 
platform. We remember the words of the original text, Allé Menschen werden 
Brüder, and we all agree with them. But since we started building the common 
European edifice, we have discovered that there are different stones. Some 
of the stones we are using fit perfectly, which means the building is grow­
ing fast. However, there are a few that do not quite fit. Such stones need to be 
smoothed and an agreement has to be reached as to how we smooth them; 
this, I believe, is the problem with the European Constitution.
But let us be frank. Although the constitution will probably never exist in 
the form proposed by Giscard d’Estaing and his team, I am among those who 
believed that the proposal needed amending. I remember conversations with 
friends in France and being amazed at how many objections they had. I also 
remember the first conference in the Council of Europe after the European 
Constitution was rejected in the constitutional referendum by the French 
and the Dutch. I can now recall the shocking effect the news had on an au­
ditorium consisting mostly of European university chancellors. The unan­
imous reaction was that such a rejection must spring from ignorance, that 
maybe the way we have taught and talked about Europe has been wrong. And 
it would be difficult not to agree.
Then a new project emerged, one which encouraged universities to go back 
to some sort of European-oriented education and teach the principles that unite 
Europe. We said it should be treated like philosophy - a prerequisite for all edu­
cated individuals. Are we doing it? Yes, but not well enough! That’s why the im­
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portance of conferences such as this cannot be underestimated. Even if we can 
decide nothing, certain solutions can be brought to our attention and maybe one 
day we will be able to vote for them. If not, then maybe we will get a chance to 
convince our families and friends, our students, that these solutions are good for 
the future of Europe. I would like to mention just one issue we rectors discuss fre­
quently, both in Poland and abroad - university tuition fees. This is a problem that 
needs a solution, and the matter is treated differently in various national consti­
tutions. Some critics say there is not a single country in Europe which could af­
ford free university tuition for everybody. Others claim that providing free access 
to university-level education is one of the state’s responsibilities. The problem 
is perhaps worst solved in a couple of countries, including Poland, where the 
system shows symptoms of schizophrenia in that some students pay for tuition, 
while others do not. There is an enormous desire in young people to educate 
themselves, yet there is no social justice in this particular outcome. Let me re­
mind you that we have four times as many students as fifteen to seventeen years 
ago. This is an amazing phenomenon, and the fact that the system has been able 
to accept all those young people into universities is a great success indeed. It was 
made possible partly thanks to the emergence of private universities, and partly 
due to low-fee universities based on German models.
This is a short summary of our reality. I hope it will feature in your discus­
sions, as it is up to us to find good solutions. It seems to me that the creation 
of a common educational space and common research space are the two 
most impressive, most crucial projects in the entire European Union pro­
gramme. For those concepts to be realized successfully, students need to able 
to choose where they want to study and be sure that the level of education 
is equal across all member states. Once free movement is here, and students 
can receive world-class education in their homeland or anywhere within Eu­
rope’s boundaries, we can finally agree that Europe has been built.
How we educate our youth will have an enormous influence on the future 
of the European Union. Let me therefore stress, again, how pleased I was to 
hear the anthem of the European Union at the very beginning of the confer­
ence. Let us not forget our goal, but let us also remember we all have to work 
together. I am optimistic about the future, and if we have not yet been educat­
ing correctly about the European issues, then this conference is surely a very 
good place to start. Thank you very much.
• Professor Barbara Stoczewska, PhD - Vice-Rector, Andrzej Frycz 
Modrzewski Krakow University College
Thank you, Professor. Now I would like Professor Jo Carby-Hall, the Honorary 
Consul of the Republic of Poland, to take the floor. The professor is speaking on 
behalf of Professor David Drewy, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Hull.
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• Professor Jo Carby-Hall, PhD - The University of Hull
In the absence of the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Hull, it is my 
great pleasure to speak on behalf of the University of Hull, which is one of the 
organisers of this conference. It is also my pleasure and joy to do so because 
of a number of factors which I shall explain in the next few minutes.
First, Rector Magnificus of the Jagiellonian University, Professor Musiol, 
I have had the privilege of having had a long-established contact with your 
prestigious University, dating back to 1986, when I recall I was invited by Pro­
fessor Tadeusz Zieliński to give a paper in your magnificent Senate room in 
Collegium Novum. As one of Tadeusz Zielifiski’s friends it was a honour also 
to have been invited to write a chapter in a book dedicated to him, and pub­
lished just before his death. Since 1986 I have had many friends at the Jagi­
ellonian University and collaborated with some of them in various research 
and publications programmes. So we have a pedigree between Hull and your 
University, Rector Magnificus.
The second reason why it is my joy and pleasure to speak, Rector Mag­
nificus of Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University College, Professor 
Malec, is that, although my contact with your University has been more re­
cent, in the last three and a half to four years, initiatives carried out and about 
to be carried out have been numerous, ambitious and intense. They consist 
of an active collaboration agreement in international conference organisa­
tion of which this is one, an Erasmus programme (exchange of students) be­
tween our two universities, research and publication programmes, exchanges 
of students and staff, and so on. The list is long. Three master’s dual degrees, 
in international, European and legal studies, are currently being set up, and 
other initiatives are also being planned.
The third reason for my pleasure to speak to you today is that the Con­
sulate of the Republic of Poland has been active in the organisation of this 
conference, as a sponsor of this conference, not an organiser this time, and 
some other conferences as well, not only here but also in other countries. It 
is appropriate to mention that this consulate has a branch, the only branch of 
a Polish consulate in the world, and maybe the only branch of any consulate, 
although I am not sure of that, which specialises in scientific, research and ed­
ucational cooperation. And this branch is situated in the University of Hull. 
We have got two consulates: the main consulate in Beverly and the branch in 
Hull. And it is a very active branch in a variety of educational activities, and 
more recently there has been founded in the University of Hull, through the 
branch consulate, a Polish research fellowship, and we have got our first re­
search fellow coming in November, next month.
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Finally, I need to say a word about the University of Hull. Founded in 1928, 
it is not as old as your University, Rector Magnificus. We have 18 000 stu­
dents, which by British standards is quite a large university. We don’t have 
now such universities in Great Britain, apart from London University, Oxford 
and Cambridge. So it is a large university, attracting students from all over 
the world. This university is headed by a very able, energetic and experienced, 
Vice-Chancellor - Rector, in your terms, who unfortunately cannot be here 
because although he is in Poland at another conference, he is giving a paper 
this morning at that other conference in Wroclaw, I believe. So there we are: 
my joy to have dealings with three universities and a consulate.
Let me speak briefly now on the Treaty Establishing the Constitution for 
Europe, which is part of our discussion during this conference. The Treaty 
was signed, as you all know, on October 24, 2004. The status of the Treaty is, 
to put it at its best, in great grave doubt, and to put it at its worst, it is in the 
waste paper basket of history. Referenda in France and the Netherlands re­
sulted in a “no” vote. The respective governments accepted the vote and ac­
cepted that outcome. Although these two member states voted against rati­
fying the Constitutional Treaty of 2004,18 member states had in fact ratified 
it. Because of the “no” votes in the two countries, the process of ratification in 
the remaining countries had stalled. And the politicians, taking the “no” votes 
as an opportunity, avoided difficult and awkward debates in their own coun­
tries. Mine, the United Kingdom, was a very good example of this hot potato 
issue with British voters. The European Union has thus entered, and I use the 
official term, into a period of reflection. Not stagnation, ladies and gentlemen. 
Reflection. To consider how best to proceed with the Treaty. Should the con­
stitution be revised? Should it remain in its current form? Should it change 
in form and in content? Three important questions which were asked at the 
time. The answer lies in the draft Reform Treaty, signed in Lisbon on October 
19th this year, three days ago. The word “constitution” has disappeared from 
the Reform Treaty. It is not popular among the European Union states. It has 
been dropped, but the original provisions mainly have reappeared in a cha­
meleon, transformed form, in the Reform Treaty.
It is your task as experts, authorities, scholars of constitution law, in your 
respective countries - and we have many countries represented here to­
day - to analyse, to appraise, to constructively criticise and make valuable 
suggestions as to how best to proceed with regard to a constitution for Eu­
rope. The conference papers will be published and we will look forward to 
reading your materials, giving solutions to the complex and controversial 
issue of the European constitution. This conference will be instrumental, 
will be telling, in the kind of content we need in a constitution for and 
of Europe. Vaclav Havel, then president of the Czech Republic, said this:
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“A concise, clearly formulated and universally understandable constitution 
is needed”. He went on to say: “It must be made easier for the citizens of the 
integrating Europe to recognise what the European Union stands for, to un­
derstand it better and to consequently identify with the European Union.” 
Will this conference achieve this? Hopefully, ladies and gentlemen, it will. 
The results of your deliberation on the European constitution and national 
constitutions could become the benchmark, could become the blueprint for 
a fertile and imaginative debate in the European Union and in its member 
states. Together with my two Rector colleagues we wish you and all of us 
good luck, much inspiration, and all success and progress in your delibera­
tions on the Constitution.
• Professor Barbara Stoczewska, PhD - Vice-Rector Andrzej Frycz
Modrzewski Krakow University College
Thank you very much for your very interesting speech, and we ask for more 
during the next parts of our conference! Ladies and gentlemen, now we will 
listen to Danuta Hübner, the European Commissioner for Regional Policy.
• Professor Danuta Hübner, PhD - European Commissioner
for Regional Policy
Message to the participants of the conference
Ladies and Gentlemen! I am pleased that technological advances enable me 
to participate almost in person in the conference devoted to the discussion of 
the future development of the European Union. I wish to congratulate the con­
sortium of splendid European universities which combined their efforts to or­
ganize this conference, not simply because it is held in Krakow, which has been 
a European academic centre since its establishment, but also because the Euro­
pean academic centres contribute significantly to the debate about the essence 
and the future of the European Union. Each and every forum where ideas and 
opinions are exchanged not only facilitates the process of reforming the Union, 
but also helps the citizens understand it better. The start of the conference coin­
cides with some fascinating events. This debate is probably the first one to fol­
low directly after the end of the convention in Lisbon. This convention should 
definitely go into history books on European integration as one of its greatest 
achievements. When I say these words to you, I am not yet aware of the course 
of the history. I do believe, however, that the determination of the member 
states is equal to their involvement and that we will have had enough strength, 
solidarity and trust in the future, to agree the text of the Reform Treaty. I be­
lieve we can be proud of it and that today we're beginning the next stage on the 
road to the better and more effective Union of the future.
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This is the message I'd like to communicate to all of us who make this Eu­
rope happen every day: the process of uniting Europe is continuous and is 
happening exactly every day. We are witnesses to gradual European integra­
tion, which brings along constant challenges to member states, European in­
stitutions and all citizens of the European Union. It is only natural we want to 
make the process smoother and easier. The new treaty will help us cope with 
the fundamental challenges resulting from the largest expansion of the Euro­
pean Union in its history.
On the other hand, in times of globalisation and dynamic change around 
the European Union, it should facilitate the enforcement of strategies and 
achievement of targets in areas crucial to us all and the European Union as 
a partner in the world. I'm thinking about security, justice, immigration, fun­
damental rights, the environment, energy policy, scientific research and tech­
nological advancement, but also about economic, social and territorial cohe­
sion. Combining the tools of European foreign policy in the areas of creating 
and implementing political strategies will allow us to raise the profile of the 
European Union internationally and will ensure greater unity of European 
foreign policy.
Today I would like to draw your attention to one issue in particular, one 
which is of fundamental importance for the European project and to whether 
this project gets the necessary support in society. One of the most important 
challenges the united Europe is facing today is undoubtedly the democratic 
deficit. We should appreciate the fact that the Reform Treaty deals with this 
challenge with all diligence. We have a chance for enhanced and improved de­
mocracy and transparency in Europe by strengthening the role of the European 
Parliament and the national parliaments, the option of civil interventions in the 
form of legislative initiative of a group of one million citizens, and clearer di­
vision of tasks and competences between the European and national authori­
ties. The Reform Treaty proposes a number of solutions which ultimately are to 
reduce the democratic deficit in the European Union. One of the examples of 
these solutions is broadening the scope of applying the procedure of codecision 
with the participation of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe 
to almost fifty areas, including areas of great sensitivity, such as freedom, se­
curity and justice. The Reform Treaty will increase the importance of national 
parliaments, including Polish MPs, in the decision-making process, for exam­
ple by ensuring that the subsidiarity principle is observed. The Reform Treaty 
will strengthen the union of law and values, solidarity and security and clearly 
define its values and objectives. The Charter of Fundamental Rights includes 
a clear definition of citizens’ rights, political, economic and social. The Treaty 
will also ensure greater solidarity and security of energy policy, climate change, 
protection of citizens, humanitarian help, public health.
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It will also help increase the Union’s potential in the areas of freedom, secu­
rity and justice.
I’m always pleased to visit Jagiellonian University. I come here often and 
we have always discussed the future of the European Union. I could say I will 
pop in before the beginning of the academic year. I visited in September this 
year and the year before. Last year I said Europe was a beautiful, but not an 
easy project. Europe does not just happen, we make it happen and we are re­
sponsible for its future. And I think these words have kept their validity and 
I can safely suggest them as a motto for further discussion. I hope you have 
a fruitful debate on the Europe of our dreams. Thank you very much.
• Bogdan Klich - Member of European Parliament
Current State and Future Perspectives of the Reform of the 
European Union Treaties
I have a slight problem here. Namely, when I was talking to professor 
Maciąg about the subject matter of this presentation, it was, if I remember 
correctly, May. Therefore, it was before the Brussels summit which took place 
in June and which made the decisions regarding the Reform Treaty, as well as 
before the final decisions which took place three days ago in Lisbon. Conse­
quently, we are all clear about the current situation. For this reason, I will only 
focus on in-depth analysis of a certain aspect thereof.
As for the perspectives - they are of a strictly political nature. What they 
really reflect, or what they really stem from, are the abilities of European lead­
ers to mobilise the electorate in the countries where a referendum will be 
necessary, or to prevent a referendum in the countries where it is not obliga­
tory under the ratification procedures.
Let me therefore focus on comparing two things: the first of them is what 
the European leaders left Lisbon with after the recent summit, i.e. what has 
been signed as the Reform Treaty, and the second one is the decisions from 
the June summit in Brussels - especially in the light of what already consti­
tutes the subject matter of the Reform Treaty - and the present state of Eu­
ropean Union treaties.
As we are all aware, after the constitutional fiasco the European Union de­
cided to give up the constitutional approach to its new fundamental legisla­
tion and to limit itself to a reform of the existing legislation.
This was achieved by adopting the idea of a simple revision treaty. This is 
a strictly political solution. It allows for the elimination of a referendum wher­
ever possible, and moreover, it makes it possible to bring the Reform Treaty 
into force before the next election to the European Parliament, which is due 
in June 2009.
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It also opens the way for the reform of the European Commission in 2014, 
even if it is rather late compared to the original intentions.
The solutions of the Constitutional Treaty form the point of departure for 
the reform of the fundamental legislation and for the Reform Treaty itself. The 
modifications and provisions of the Reform Treaty are to a large extent lim­
ited to the departure from the constitutional character of the treaty. Frankly 
speaking, this is legally rather insignificant. The significance is much rather po­
litical and symbolic. It appears that it was precisely the constitutional charac­
ter of the intentions that led to the fiasco of the constitutional treaty. Thus we 
see a departure from the name, from the term constitution’. We see a retreat 
from terms such as a European statute, a European framework statute, to de­
note statute-like legislation, and a return to terminology such as regulation, di­
rective, decision. We see a retreat from symbolic references in the constitution, 
such as a flag or anthem of the European Union.
Finally, we see cosmetic corrections such as replacing the name ‘minister of 
foreign affairs’ with ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy’. This is quite interesting, given that since the Amsterdam Re­
form there has been a position in the European Union of a High Representa­
tive for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Lastly, we also see a with­
drawal from one of the articles which spell out the principle of primacy of 
European law over member state regulations. Instead, the new treaty includes 
a declaration which expresses the primacy of the treaties and the legislation ad­
opted by the Union of the basis thereof. Nonetheless, Article 1.6 of the Con­
stitutional Treaty was removed in its expressis verbis version. There is also the 
issue which has been handled very emotionally in Poland, for reasons that re­
main quite unclear, namely the issue of taking a decision by qualified majority 
in the Council, and more precisely speaking the modification of how this mech­
anism can be used in the interim period 2014-2017, as proposed by the consti­
tutional treaty, and then after 2017 according to rules which make it easier to 
launch the procedure.
I would like to say a few words also about the application of the Char­
ter of Fundamental Rights. If you compare at first sight the Constitutional 
Treaty with the proposed Reform Treaty, you notice that the Charter is miss­
ing from its position in the second chapter, which may seem dangerous and 
surprising. It is true that as a consequence of limitations to the length of the 
Reform Treaty, the Treaty only includes a provision stipulating the legally 
binding character of the Charter. The Charter itself is annexed to the Reform 
Treaty, together with the opt-out clauses which apply to three member states, 
namely the United Kingdom, Ireland and Poland.
I will not dwell here on less significant matters, such as for example the so­
lution to a seemingly unsolvable dilemma: how to observe the regulation which
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limits the number of the members of the European Parliament to 750, while at 
the same time satisfying the expectations of Italy and its prime minister Ro­
mano Prodi that the number of Italian representatives should reflect the po­
tential of this country. I will also not discuss here the problem of the advocates 
general of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, because it seems 
to be a modification of lesser importance compared to the principles adopted 
at the Brussels summit, which on the other hand seem rather important.
I would like to speak mostly about the changes that were introduced into 
the fundamental law of the European Union already by the constitutional 
treaty and which have been retained in the Reform Treaty. What seems to be 
most significant is giving the Union legal personality. It is an important step 
forward. On the one hand, it makes it possible for the Union to be a member 
of international organisations, and on the other hand gives it the ability to be 
a party to international agreements, such as for example the European Con­
vention of Human Rights. Another such change is the inclusion of the Charter 
and giving it a legally binding character, as opposed to simply a political decla­
ration, which the Charter used to be.
Another point of great importance is definition of the Union, according to 
which the Union exercises competencies conferred to it by the member states 
following the principle of subsidiary and proportionality, i.e. in accordance 
with the old maxim “as much of the Union as is necessary and no more”. The 
Treaty re-states the guarantees of respect for national identities, cultural di­
versity, and linguistic variety, i.e. the aspects which had been raised with anx­
iety during debates not only in Poland, but also in other countries. One must 
concede that the constitutional attempt at first, and now the attempts to re­
vise the fundamental regulations, may lead to blurring and dissolving the na­
tional, cultural and linguistic differences between the member states.
There can be no doubts that the Treaty introduces greater order and simplic­
ity into both the institutional framework and the legal instruments of the Union. 
A fortunate consequence of the Treaty’s provisions is the abolition of the division 
into Communities, which introduces a unified system of legal acts into the entire 
legal procedure of the Union. What is uncertain is the clarity of the division of 
competencies of the Union into exclusive, shared and subsidiary. It is also uncer­
tain whether the list should be open or closed. However, the sheer fact of the in­
troduction of the division into these three categories seems significant.
An objective which most certainly has been achieved in the Treaty is the 
démocratisation of the Union, which had been indicated as a necessity dur­
ing the Laeken summit in 2001 where political objectives for the fundamental 
reform of the Union had been discussed. Démocratisation is achieved through 
the strengthening of the role of the European Parliament as one of the three 
chief institutions as well as through the strengthening of the role of national 
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parliaments. Personally I have my reservations as to whether it is a good solu­
tion that national parliaments should participate in the law-making process, 
through the assessment of law-making proposals of the European Commission 
in the light of the subsidiary principle. I believe that the coherence of the Union 
should be increased through the strengthening of the role of the European Par­
liament in the law-making process, rather than through supporting national 
parliaments. This is a decentralising tendency, diminishing the role of commu­
nity institutions to the advantage of national ones. In any case, this is what the 
constitutional treaty stipulated and what the Reform Treaty stipulates now.
From the point of view of those who believe that the Union should be ad­
vanced, that it should increase inward solidarity as well as outward efficiency, it 
seems that the most important development is the strengthening of the commu­
nity method, both through widening the scope of majority voting and through 
acknowledging the codecision procedure, i.e. the procedure in which the Parlia­
ment plays a greater role than in other procedures. This codecision procedure 
now has the status of a normal legislative procedure.
Now let me say a few words about the widening of the scope of majority vot­
ing. Firstly, it is important that the number of areas in which the Union will 
make decisions by means of a qualified majority vote is increased by about 40. 
Secondly, one should realise what these areas are, and which areas have been 
reserved for a unanimous decision of the Council. The unanimous procedure 
will still apply in sensitive areas such as tax policy, social policy, common for­
eign and security policy in terms of strategic decisions, defence policy also in 
terms of strategic decisions, as well as issues of accession and amendments to 
the treaties. This seems to be a sensible decision. I am not certain whether it is 
a fortunate decision that this procedure will soon apply also to structural funds. 
It would seem that structural funds should gradually be moved into the area of 
majority vote. Of course, one must think here about what is in the best interest 
of Poland. As a country which is influential in the European Union politically 
and in terms of its population, but which is economically weak (only 4th from 
the bottom among the 27 member states, if we measure economic potential by 
gross national product per capita), it should be interested in having a situation 
where as many areas as possible are moved from the intergovernmental method 
to the community method. It is therefore in our interest to widen the scope of 
application of the community method of law-making in the European Union.
Another underlying concept of the constitutional process discussed in 
Laeken was bringing the Union closer to its citizens. The two methods pro­
posed were through popular statutory initiative (where a million citizens may 
put forward a draft of a legal act) and the obligation to sustain dialogue with 
non-governmental organisations. It seems that the current version of the Treaty 
fulfils these expectations.
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Let me now focus on foreign and security policy and defence policy. As 
I mentioned before, from the Polish point of view it is highly satisfactory 
that the unanimity principle has been retained in these areas, even though 
the qualified majority principle was introduced at the subsequent stages of 
implementation of fundamental decisions undertaken by European leaders. 
This consolidation of the common foreign and security policy, as you are well 
aware, will be exercised through the function of the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This function will also work 
to bring close the Commission and the Council, and it will eliminate the un­
fortunate dualism where there is a separate scope of responsibility of the Eu­
ropean Commissioner for External Relations and of the High Representative 
for Common Foreign and Security Policy. Giving the Representative the rank 
of Vice-President of the Commission should additionally fortify and align the 
foreign policy of the EU. With the backing of the External Action Service, this 
policy should be enforced efficiently under the Treaty. Of course, the ques­
tion remains open whether there is the political will to do so. Naturally, even 
the most efficient institutions will be useless if there is no political will to use 
them for the common good. I am however deeply convinced that no treaty 
could possibly instil this will in European leaders. This must flow from the 
community of interest of the member states. It is therefore a favourable cir­
cumstance that the reform ensures the efficiency of the institutions which 
will be at the disposal of the leaders.
As far as defence policy is concerned, two or maybe three elements are 
important. Firstly, the introduction of the solidarity clause. This is the clause 
which compels the Union to react if the security of one of the member states 
is under threat, for example due to a terrorist attack. Secondly, the introduc­
tion of the principle of mutual assistance, which does not collide with NATO 
obligations but strongly resembles Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Of 
course, the European Union will only be able to enforce the mutual assistance 
principle if it has the appropriate, sufficient, at least minimal military po­
tential, and this is not going to happen immediately. The European Defence 
Agency will not work in a vacuum, which is important too; it was established 
in 2004 but only now is being placed in the European treaties.
Another novelty is the provision on energy solidarity. This is a consequence 
of the Ukrainian and Belarusian crises of 2005 and 2006, as well as of a certain 
change in mentality in the member states and of the coordinated efforts of the 
government and the opposition to see this kind of provision introduced.
And finally, to conclude this overview of the changes, the change in the dou­
ble majority voting system, i.e. the departure from the system negotiated in Nice. 
I believe this is not a good time to return to the old disputes. Suffice it to say that 
the prolongation of the application of this system until de facto 2017 has its im­
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portance to Poland, and the eventual introduction of the double majority system 
after 2017 is just an addition to what has been decided earlier. Poland’s interests 
should be well-protected by both of these mechanisms. Of course, as a mem­
ber of the party which very strongly supported the “square root of the popu­
lation” system, I deeply regret the fact that this system failed to win sufficient 
support among the other member states. Frankly speaking, in the tough world 
of European Union politics it matters very much how the proportion of votes 
is shaped, and for Poland, the square root system would have generated much 
more favourable results.
To conclude: First of all, the Reform Treaty, as opposed to the constitu­
tional treaty, does not have constitutional character. It is also not revolution­
ary in terms of the legal system of the European Union. It does however make 
things more efficient, it modifies them, introduces a sense of order. From the 
Polish perspective, the adoption of the Treaty, with its provisions, structure 
and contents, is advantageous. Undoubtedly Poland wins more than it loses 
as a consequence of adopting the Treaty. The new Treaty will certainly de­
mand more from the Polish political elites than the previous Treaties did.
From the European perspective, does the Reform Treaty satisfy the re­
quirements set out in Laeken in 2001? It certainly brings the Union closer to 
its citizens, makes it more democratic, more transparent. Whether or not the 
Union will be more efficient and whether it will gain greater significance in 
the world, will have more impact on global matters? I do not believe this de­
pends on the Treaty. What it does depend on is the potential of the European 
Union, its political potential. This potential in turn stems from the shared po­
litical will of the leaders of the European countries to act together on the in­
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The Structure of the European System and the Legitimization 
Process of the European Constitution
The problem
Due to the constitutional crisis in the European Union caused by rejecting 
the Constitution which was accepted and signed by 25 member states and on 
the account of stopping the process of ratification, it is worth drawing atten­
tion to the problem of legitimisation of the European Constitution.1 This issue 
has been thoroughly discussed in the literature of the subject. I strongly believe 
that such analysis is necessary in order to explain the existing paradox and the 
misunderstandings. In this short essay I aim only at presenting the direction of 
a possible explanation of the problem and not at an explanation, which would 
require, at least in the most fundamental points, a thorough justification.
1 In this essay I use the notion “European Constitution” as an equivalent for the Treaty establishing a Consti­
tution for Europe, Official Journal of the European Union, C 310 Volume 47,16 December 2004. The use of 
this equivalent term is not only a mere simplification. In this way I emphasise “a constitutional character of 
this legal act” I fully agree with Rainer Arnold’s standpoint on this issue expressed in the monograph The Dif­
ferent Levels of Constitutional Law in Europe and Their Interdependence, [in:] Challenges of Multi-Level Con­
stitutionalism, ed. J. Nergelius, P. Policastro, Kenji Urata, Polpress Publisher, Krakow 2004, pp. 105-106.
In my deliberations, I concentrate mainly on two issues which seem to 
be of utmost importance for the problem under discussion. The first prob­
lem concerns excluding the Constitution from legitimising analysis. It is only 
a part of a broader issue concerning legitimization of law. The second is con­
nected with structural interdependence of a constitution from the existing 
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system, which is a feature of the European system. The hypothesis which is 
under analysis in these deliberations is as follows: the legitimisation of a po­
litical system as well as the legitimisation of constitutional solutions is in­
terdependent. The development of the European system determines consti­
tutional solutions. The elements of the system that gain the highest social 
approval potentially influence the process of legitimising a relevant constitu­
tion. Such constitution grants a legitimising support to the system.
/. Constitution and the problem of legitimacy
The answer to the question of whether the European Constitution needs 
legitimisation depends on settling a broader issue, namely if any constitution 
needs legitimisation. Both of these notions, namely constitution and legiti­
misation, have many meanings, and combining them results in even greater 
interpretative problems. The problem concerning the circumstances and 
factors of a constitution’s legitimisation process depends on how one under­
stands the term “constitution”.
In the traditional interpretation, a constitution is characterised by proper­
ties which are considered indispensable for a constitutional act - a feature well 
visible in many perspectives. Two such properties are subject sovereignty and 
the power derived from the sovereign subject. Apart from these fundamen­
tal qualities, there are additional specifications which allow for a more ample 
characteristic of the constitution by accepting a particular definition, such as, 
for instance, the one stating that a constitution is: “The organic and fundamen­
tal law of a nation or state, which may be written or unwritten, establishing the 
character and conception of its government, laying the fundamental princi­
ples to which its internal life is to be conformed, organising the government, 
and regulating, distributing, and limiting the functions of its different depart­
ments, and prescribing the extent and manner of the exercise of sovereign 
powers. A charter of government deriving its whole authority from the gov­
erned.”2 Other fundamental features of a constitution emphasise its following 
aspects: a constitution is the absolute rule of action; any official act in breach 
of it is illegal, and the constitution frequently lists the rights of the individual 
and guarantees their protection.3
2 P. Jean-Claude, Does the European Union have a Constitution?Does it need one? (available at www.jean- 
monetprogram.org/papers/00/000501.html).
3 Ibidem.
Beside this traditional perspective, many interpretations appear, not only 
historically changeable, which point to the evolution of a constitution from 
a set of institutional decisions to an anthropocentric approach that places an 
individual in the centre of a normative constitutional order. These approaches 
52
PARTI
also come as a result of putting the focus on various aspects of the constitu­
tion. As Dario Castiglione observes, “from this perspective, we can distin­
guish between four general meanings of the constitution, referred to here as 
the positive, the absolute (either in the normative, the positivist, the volunta­
rist, or the organic sense), the functional and the instrumental.”4 Nevertheless, 
the main focus in this approach is placed on constitution as a complete act, 
“constitution in the true meaning of this word”. Castiglione emphasises that 
the most fundamental meaning of the constitution is the absolute concept 
of the constitution. The use of “absolute” does not indicate any transcenden­
tal quality, but the sense in which the constitution itself provides the basis for 
a normative order. “In its absolute sense, the constitution, or the constitutional 
meta-text, needs to be distinguished from individual constitutional laws and 
even from the sum of them. As the source of legitimacy, it must possess a cer­
tain unity and internal coherence, so that appeals to it may be meaningful and 
capable of carrying conviction. The purely formal characteristics of a consti­
tutional text - such as written form, its aggravated amendment procedures, 
etc. — cannot by themselves be the basis for such a coherent normative order, 
so that the constitution must either have or stand for some more substantive 
norm-engendering principle.”5
5 Ibidem, pp. 7-8.
Both approaches to a constitution, namely the traditional one and “con­
stitution in the true meaning of this word” to a large extent complement and 
supplement each other. A constitution in such meaning is primarily the source 
of legitimisation, and it is only to a very limited extent subjected to a legitimi- 
sation process. It is the act of emanating the general will, which does not re­
quire any explanation or justification because of its nature. The way a given 
constitution is legitimised derives from the constitution itself.
In this sense, the constitution is making stands, above all, for a choice be­
tween the possible versions of the organisation of a social and political order. 
The creation of the constitution understood in this sense is a specific process 
requiring both a certain amount of social support regarding its content and 
clearly regulated procedures of its acceptance. Most of all, however, the is­
sue concerns appointing a subject that can and should be given the authority, 
that is the competence, to become involved in constitutional activity, as well 
as appropriate representation. It should also be assigned an object - a clearly 
determined sphere subject to constitutional power (pouvoir constituant).
The process of applying this meaning of a constitution is closely connected 
to the political and social situation of a given entity. It concerns two paral-
4 C. Dario, The Political Theory and the Constitution, [in:] Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and 
Theoretical Perspectives, ed. R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, Blackwell, Oxford 1996, p. 6. 
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lei processes, namely the creation of a constitution and formation of a po­
litical system which starts “from the basis” This is a particular period in the 
life of any political community (demos). It is a special political time in which 
the opposition against the old, destroyed order is a strong motive justifying 
the assumed values, expressed in the principles and norms which constitute 
the normative basis of a new social and political order. The same causes and 
forces have a decisive influence on this process. As Urlich K. Preuss writes:
“The power to make a constitution is the power to create a political or­
der ex nihilo. Of course, in reality there is no such thing as a nihil, therefore 
new constitutions are empirically instituted on the ruins of an order which 
has collapsed after a revolution, a lost war, or similar catastrophic event. In 
modern terms, constitution means the active making of a new order, as op­
posed to its gradual emergence in the course of a continual historical devel­
opment. Constitution - making involves the idea of an authority and an au­
thor whose willpower is the ultimate cause of the polity. This is an idea that 
could only spring from the natural law assumption that “all men are by nature 
equally free”, since only the voluntary acts of free men could justify their duty 
to comply to any kind of human rule. Hence, only the collective acts of free 
men could be accepted as the legitimate source of political rule.”6
6 U. K. Preuss, Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the Relations between 
Constituent Power and the Constitution, [in:] Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theo­
retical Perspectives, ed. by M. Rosenfeld, Duke University Press 1994, p. 143.
7 It is seen in the Constitutional acts, e.g. the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997. Arti­
cle 1 states: “The Republic of Poland shall be the common good of all its citizens” and Article 2: “The Repu­
blic of Poland shall be a democratic state ruled by law and implementing the principles of the social justice.” 
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997 as published in Journal of Law, No. 78, item 483, 
in: Polish Constitutional Law. The Constitution and Selected Statutory Materials, Bureau of Research Chan­
cellery of the Sejm, Warsaw 2000.
It should be emphasized in the context under discussion that such a mean­
ing of the constitution occurs not only in scientific research. Such a stand­
point, based on the findings from the history of the constitutionalism, is 
clearly seen in commonly shared social attitudes to a constitution, its signifi­
cance and function. A constitution understood in such a way has the meaning 
of a symbol in social consciousness and is treated as a sui generis act of excep­
tionally creative force. The reality is “created” by a constitution and is per­
ceived through the prism of constitutional assumptions.7
2. Questioning the universality of modern constitutional visions
In the abovementioned situation, it is hardly possible to do away with a dom­
inant, or to simplify, a modern vision of a constitution, closely connected with 
the notion of sovereignty, which also has a well-established meaning. The con­
cept of sovereignty constitutes the basis of fundamental theoretical construc­
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tions. “Sovereignty is, or has been, an important component of the conceptual 
apparatus not only of jurisprudence, but also of legal philosophy, political sci­
ence, sociology, and political praxis.”8 In the classical view, sovereignty is “the 
ultimate source of absolute, inalienable, indivisible political authority within 
a realm.”9 On the other hand, the problem of sovereignty in the modern world 
makes it easier to question the traditional conceptions of a constitution.
8 A. Jyranki, Transferring Powers of a Nation State to International Organisations: The Doctrine of Sove­
reignty Revisited, [in:] National Constitution in the Era of Integration, ed. A. Jyranki, Kluwer Law Internatio­
nal, London-Boston 1999, pp. 61.
9 C. W. Morris, An Essay on the Modern State, Cambridge 1998, p. 178.
10 D. E. Litowitz, Post-modern Philosophy & Law, Kansas 1997, University Press of Kansas, p. 113.
11 A. Jyranki writes: “There is a growing tendency in the world which has been called the ‘erosion of all el­
ements of the classic concept of the state’. This all belongs to the world of facts. What about the normative 
world? What has happened to the constitutional doctrine of sovereignty in our time? Soon after the end of 
World War II, a new trend was seen in international constitutions adopted particularly in Western Europe: 
in certain constitutions provisions were included, which in various ways linked together constitutional law 
and international law. These were provisions which explicitly established the supremacy of international law 
over the national legal order or empowered transferring sovereign rights to international organizations or 
limiting state sovereignty in favour of such organizations”. A. Jyranki, op. cit., p. 63.
The critique of the dominant paradigm of sovereignty takes two forms. The 
first one is of a philosophical nature, typical of post-modern thinkers. The idea 
of sovereignty is a part of the “grand narratives” of the Enlightenment philoso­
phers and later thinkers of the modern era. The postmodernists reject founda­
tional concepts of sovereignty. They are sceptical about the modernists’ claims 
for the use of reason as a way of solving social and political problems. The ju­
ridical-political model of sovereignty must be rejected on the grounds that 
people are not free and autonomous but, instead, they are determined by the 
narratives in which they are situated.
They are critical about foundational concepts of the theory of sovereignty, 
such as justice, the social contract, and autonomy of individuals, natural laws, 
and consensus. “Consensus is a legitimating myth that has been used as an ex­
cuse for state tyranny, a way of rationalising the accumulation of knowledge that 
only enslaves us but does not lead to the emancipation promised.”10
The second form of criticism has a different point of departure. This point 
is a question of whether the classical model of sovereignty is still adequate to 
the contemporary world and useful in a theoretical approach. The contempo­
rary world is changing, and the changes of political organisations are extraor­
dinary.11 The globalisation of the community of states, the erosion of all the el­
ements of the classic concept of the state, the transferring of sovereign rights 
to international organisations, the supremacy of international law over the na­
tional legal order - all these facts are important and decide that sovereignty 
has been constantly eroded in the contemporary states of Western Europe.
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The changes taking currently place in the forms of a political organisation 
of a society, the process of diminishing the sovereignty in a classical under­
standing, result in the fact that the concept of a constitution, used for a long 
time in different meanings in political and legal discourses, should be much 
more closely connected with development tendencies taking place in modern 
times. Such interconnection makes discussions on the subject of a constitu­
tion not only more clear but also closer to real problems. When we pay atten­
tion to the development of a modern polity, including the European Union, 
which differs from the state and international organisations,12 we can find new 
bonds in relations between a political system and a constitution. These rela­
tions point to the necessity to reach an “adequate” conception of a constitu­
tion. Among numerous suggestions, the one which deserves our attention is 
to differentiate three conceptions of a constitution, namely a formal, material 
and normative one.13
12 “While it is easy to give a negative definition of the European Union - it is not a state, not even a federal 
state, it is not a traditional alliance of states, it is not a confederacy - it is impossible, at least up until now, 
to define it positively”. N. MacCormick, Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-sovereign State, [in:] Consti­
tutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives, eds. R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, 
Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 1996, p. 137.
13 A. J. Menendez, Three conceptions of the European Constitution, (available at http://www.sv.uio.no/ 
arena/presentation/Menendez.htm).
14 Ibidem, p. 4.
15 Ibidem, p. 5.
16 Ibidem, pp. 8-9. The basic insight underlying the normative conception of the Constitution can be de­
rived from Article 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. Any society in 
These suggestions are as follows: “The formal constitution can be defined as 
the set of legal norms contained in a document (or compilation of documents) 
that is referred to as the constitution in social practice.”14 The idea of a formal 
constitution is intrinsically modern. Modernity came hand in hand with the 
identification of law with written law. The second type is “the material con­
ception of the constitution”. “The material constitution can be defined as the 
norms of social interaction that are regarded as fundamental norms according 
to social practice. Legal scholars tend to refer to the material constitution in 
a more narrow sense, namely as the norms that can be considered as the fun­
damental norms of the legal order of a given community according to the 
social practice of the legal actors of the said community.”15 The third type is 
“the normative conception of the constitution”. “The normative constitution 
is composed of those norms that present certain properties which are norma­
tively relevant” (...) “The concrete ‘ideal’ standards to be considered vary with 
different normative conceptions of the Constitution. There could be as many 
normative conceptions of the constitution as there are normative theories, 
that is, theories about what is right.”16
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The differentiation, which has been introduced, seems to be justified from 
an analytical point of view; what should be emphasised, however, are the exist­
ing relations and the interdependency of particular types. In practice none of 
them exists in pure form; however, the value of such differentiation lies in the 
possibility of choosing a more adequate type regarding the problem of consti­
tutionalisation of the European system and the process of legitimisation. From 
the point of view of the European system’s character ‘the material conception 
of constitution’ seems to be more adequate, although it creates more difficul­
ties in the analysis of the legitimisation process.
3. The problem of legitimacy
Real problems with legitimisation of a constitution arise when we ques­
tion this type of legitimisation process that is based on the assumptions of 
sovereignty and general will. I am far from the opinion that legitimacy is the 
myth and that: “Politicians talk about legitimate government, but people feel 
that the government is a joke. Lawyers speak of justice, yet the country is 
torn apart by race and class divisions. We plunder third world nations in or­
der to ‘liberate’ them, and we harm indigenous peoples and deprive them of 
their right to seek redress. Finally, we talk about consensus, but nobody re­
ally believes that we actually give ourselves laws; instead we feel that laws are 
imposed on us from above.”171 would like to stress that legitimacy has sig­
nificant importance for the functioning of social and political system and its 
elements. However, in the case of determining the concept of “legitimacy” 
attention should be drawn to the relation with reality, which is more compli­
cated than it could be inferred from even such deeply grounded theories as 
the theory of a social contract. In fact, these theories employed for research 
of reality pose more questions than give answers.18
which the protection of rights is not guaranteed and the separation of powers is not established, has no 
Constitution. According to the said article, what is the constitution is not something to be determined by 
mere reference to social practice. 'Ideal' standards (in the sense of counterfactual) play a major role.
17 D. E. Litowitz, Post-modern Philosophy & Law, University Press of Kansas, Kansas 1997, p. 125.
18 Legitimising processes are in the centre of attention. On the one hand, legitimisation is perceived as an in­
dispensable basis of a system’s proper functioning. On the other hand, lack of legitimisation is perceived as 
a phenomenon characteristic of modern forms of a society’s political organisation. The fundamental problem of 
changing the ways in which the legitimisation process is carried out is caused by many reasons. Some of the lat­
ter are as follows: questioning legal justification, legality of a system as a synonym of legitimisation; questioning 
democratic procedures as sufficient for legitimising the creation of authority and law-making; questioning and 
rejecting the creation of political reality based on grand narratives and ready-made projects worth realising (the 
thesis of post-modernism). The most crucial issue is formulated in the following way: “From the principle ofpop­
ular sovereignty derives, most obviously, the electoral authorisation of government, and the criteria of representa­
tion, accountability, and soforth, that comprise the manifestly democratic aspects of legitimacy. At the same time, 
however, the legitimating belief that the people constitute the ultimate source ofpolitical authority raises acutely 
the question ‘Who constitutes the people?’ and makes issues ofpolitical identity, of territoriality, of inclusion and 
exclusion, equally crucialfor political legitimacy”. D. Beetham, and C. Lord, Legitimacy and the European Union,
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Even more difficulties appear in the case of determining the concept of 
“legitimacy”. It requires precise determination of this notion, because a ru­
dimentary form of a legitimacy theory is always included in this meaning. It 
is the place where the problem appears, namely which understanding of the 
term ‘legitimacy’ is relevant to the question under discussion. Differences be­
tween occupied positions are fundamental.
I. The first and most popular understanding of legitimacy is preferred 
in connection of the two notions: “democracy” and “legitimacy,” which 
give “democratic legitimacy” This suggests that “non-democratic legiti­
macy” is possible. Are both of these manners equal?
II. Legitimacy as a consequence of efficiency.
III. Legitimacy as synonym of legality.
IV. Legitimacy as a form of social acceptance.
V. Legitimacy as a form of social consent.
I did not reject any of the different abovementioned “ideas.” Each of them has 
its “own truth” and is important in the recognition of socio-political phenomena: 
the basis of social relations. In my suggestion of legitimisation process analysis, 
I focus mainly on its dynamics. The principles of the proposed analytic model 
rely on the thesis that the legitimisation of the social object, or the social area 
in general, is related to the independent individuals who accept and justify the 
existing social reality from the viewpoint of their own autonomous orientation. 
Such autonomous orientation means a permanently renewed process of recog­
nising the social reality, understanding, and sense attribution. The suggestion of 
research paradigm is derived from the following fundamental issue: whether, and 
in what conditions, the process of legitimisation is analytically possible. It is de­
fined as a gradual legitimating situation. It is determined by the “normative min­
imum,” which, at present, is usually law-based in nature. This normative mini­
mum is the one that could be found in principles of democracy.
According to the proposed model, legitimisation is a kind of game played 
by a social agent with different aspects of the social and political system (first 
of all, political power) if he or she is able and interested to do so. We use well- 
known patterns in this game, such as what is moral, correct, legal, right, etc., 
but we do not have a prescription to tell us what is legitimate as a whole. On 
each level of a political and legal system, processes of legitimisation are still 
exercised.19 Additionally, the dynamics of a political system is the reason why 
the problem of legitimacy is so complicated.
[in:] Political Theory and the European Union. Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice and Citizenship, eds. A. Weale 
and M. Nentwich, Routledge, London and New York 1998, pp. 16.
19 T. Biernat, Legitymizacja władzy politycznej. Elementy teorii, [Political Power Legitimisation. A Theoret­
ical Approach], Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 1999.
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The effect of the legitimisation process is to stabilise justified and socially 
explained institutional and legal system solutions which are socially accepted 
and supported. In this context, searching for the sources of legitimisation is 
vital and can also refer to a constitution. What is also of utmost importance, 
I believe, is seeking such constitutional solutions which would be adequate 
for the whole system.
4. Adequate constitutional solutions in respect to the European system
Why do I consider the type of a constitution characterised above as a ma­
terial constitution to be more adequate and why there is a bigger opportunity 
for it to gain legitimisation? The answer is in the characteristics of the system. 
The core of the issue is the distinctiveness of the European system. Since the 
very beginning, the European system was more legal than political, and de­
veloped as a “Community of Law.”20
201 present this problem in my book Community of Law. On Particularities oftheEuropean System, Wydawnictwo 
Adam Marszalek, Torun 2002. The term ‘Community of law’ is often used as ‘a polity under the rule of law.’ “The 
EU’s ability to establish itself as a 'Community of law,’ i.e. as a polity under the rule of law, has been critically im­
portant for propping up its fledging legitimacy.” V. Roben, Constitutionalism of Inverse Hierarchy: the Case of 
the European Union. I use the term ‘Community of Law’ in a broad sense, as a base of the polity.
The formulation of the thesis that the European system has been based on 
law as its foundation, and that this basis constituted an original and unique 
solution in comparison to the previously known forms of social organisation, 
raises the following question: was the establishment of the Community an un­
dertaking limited to the economic sphere, or was it expected from the very start 
to expand its scope of interest from a purely economic to a political one, and if 
so, how does this affect the process of legitimisation? It is, thus, a very specific 
kind of system-making process, which begins to develop and expand, compris­
ing more and more spheres of economic, at first, and then social life from the 
very moment of its creation. This system, which escapes any sort of definite 
classification (it is neither a state, nor an international organisation), manifests 
a range of exclusive characteristics. Let us examine some of the fundamental is­
sues pertaining to the above-mentioned unique features of the system.
Apart from the position of law as its basis, other significant features are 
the characteristics of the legal system itself, the legal sources that create this 
system and the law-making procedure. However, the most important quality 
results from the fact that the system is created not only by states but also by 
nations. Consequently, there is no central source of political authority. The 
system comprises a unique structure of institutions.
However, the essence of the problem is not only that the above-mentioned 
features of the system form a particular category of issues that require solu­
tion, or that are meant to be regulated on the level of the constitution. It refers, 
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above all, to the fact that the system, which has been developing for over fifty 
years, has worked out particular solutions, and created certain practices, which 
were the objects of the legitimacy or were under the pressure of legitimacy.
Considering the fact that the European system was for many years more an 
economic than a political form of organisation, it is possible to venture the the­
sis that it was much easier to reach legitimacy referred to its elements. Numer­
ous contradictions appear in the frame of the political system, and it is more 
difficult to use proper arguments and measures. This system is ‘open’ and, as 
a consequence, transformed according to the extension of the political domain.
Changes in the European system, particularly its development and widen­
ing the field of the decisions which were taken, have resulted in a visible move­
ment in the direction towards a political system, from economic to political 
community. It is worth emphasising that these changes were forced rather 
than planned and implemented according to the assumed plan. The process 
of enlarging the domain of community’s authorities has been manifested 
in the regulations included in the treaties and has caused, or more strictly 
speaking, has made possible the discussion on the future and the European 
Union’s Constitution. The events that were of a crucial effect were the polit­
ical changes in the 80s and 90s. This was the time when two problems which 
have been the subject of heated academic discussion arose, that is “lack of 
a constitution” and a “democratic deficit”.
The question whether the European Union has a constitution or not is 
very complex. First of all, it is a political problem. Jean Claude Piris, Legal 
Adviser of the intergovernmental conferences which negotiated and adopted 
the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam, observes that "(...) 
the debate about a ‘Constitution for Europe’ is mainly a political one. To be 
or not to be in favour of such a Constitution often means to be or not to be in 
favour of the establishment of a Federal or a Confederal European State. This 
political debate is legitimate. Lawyers, however, should try to frame their re­
flections, as much as they can, on a more legal and institutional basis.”21 Dif­
ferences between opinions represented by various scholars are significant. It 
is stressed, on the one hand, that the Communities already have a constitu­
tion. On the other hand, the lack of a proper European constitution is some­
times said to be an essential part of the legitimacy deficit of the Union.22
21 P. Jean-Claude, Does the European Union have a Constitution?Does it need one?
22 A. J. Menéndez presents the following opinion: “The European Union already has a material constitu­
tion, both in a structural and a substantial sense, but it cannot be said to have a formal constitution or 
a democratic constitution”, op. cit., p. 14.
Another significant element is the phenomenon manifested in a defi­
cit of EU citizens’ participation in its political sphere of life. As a result, 
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a problem appears of lack of sufficient legitimisation in regard to both the 
whole system as well as particular EU institutions. It is an essential feature 
of the system which not only characterises the system but which also deter­
mines the field of a clearly focused discussion concerning the mode of con­
stitutional regulations, legitimisation of the system and its constitution. Its 
participants express the standpoint that special attention should be paid 
to the deliberative democratic conception of constitution, e.g. normative 
concept of the European constitution. The deliberative democratic concept 
is the most adequate theory in order to reconstruct most of the constitu­
tional traditions of the member states of the EU and the Union itself. What 
is more, the fact which is emphasised and taken advantage of is that the de­
liberative-democratic concept of the constitution defines as constitutional 
such norms that have met the highest standards of democratic legitimacy. 
Thus, the democratic principle is clearly associated with the idea of the for­
mation of a common political will in a way which is respectful for the au­
tonomy of all citizens.23
23 Ibidem, p. 10.
In such an approach, similarly to the abovementioned issue of traditional 
understanding of a constitution, the concepts of a constitution and legitimi­
sation visibly complement each other. The question whether a constitution 
needs legitimacy is not justified in this context because the outcome of a gen­
eral will, expressed in conditions ideal for a political discourse and reflecting 
shared values, is legitimised by itself. Moreover, a constitution of such legit­
imisation force and reached in such a way constitutes the basis of the whole 
system of legitimacy and the system of making political decisions.
5. A false dilemma
This way of directing the discussions has determined the process of making 
particular attitudes common, both in the circle of politicians and in European soci­
ety. These attitudes have caused a failure of the efficiency and legitimacy of the Eu­
ropean Constitution. To simplify, the problem consisted in formulating alternative 
visions: either a constitution and then we deal with a certain threat like the Euro­
pean federal state and the loss of sovereignty of the member states, or rejecting the 
constitution irrespective of its content. The notion that the material constitution 
is relevant in the European system finds confirmation in the constitution-making 
process. The process of forming the European constitution was an act of adjusting 
fundamental legislative solutions to an already existing system; it was neither an act 
of creation, nor did it introduce changes as deep and significant as to be called an 
act of transformation. In a case like this, a constitutional act has more of a stabilis­
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ing or modifying than revolutionary function.24 Stressing this feature, I am empha­
sising a particular dependence of the constitutional process on facts and on the ex­
isting reality, rather than on ideological or doctrinal choices. In consequence, the 
particular features of the current Communities and the existing legal solutions de­
limit the boundaries of the European systems changes. These features and solu­
tions restrict provisions concerning the constitution, and, in doing so, they exert 
a predominant influence upon their content. Such dependence marks that the cre­
ation of the European constitution was rooted in the type of system which limits 
the European Constitution.25 For that reason the thesis that legitimacy ‘anchored’ 
in a deep structure of the system can play a significant role in renewing the pro­
cesses of legitimising new norms or institutions has a particular meaning in rela­
tion to the European Union. These legitimated elements of the system are a funda­
mental source of legitimacy of the European constitution.26
26 This is the reason why the problem of legitimising a constitution cannot come down to the way it is created. 
Neither convening the Convention nor its composition or course of activities was of importance in this context. 
Similarly, we cannot attach too much importance to the charges that the creation of the constitution did not meet 
democratic standards in the period of discussing the content of the created law. It is primarily the question of par­
adigms of constitutionality. See P. Policastro, On the Reconstruction of the Legal Strength of the Constitution in 
a World in Transition. Multi-Level Constitutionalism Towards Multi-Level Democracy, [in:] Challenges of Multi­
Level Constitutionalism, ed. J. Nergelius, P. Policastro, K. Urata, Polpress Publisher, Kraków 2004, pp. 59-60.
I am not carrying out here a detailed analysis of the content of the Treaty Es­
tablishing a Constitution for Europe from the point of view of the changes im­
plemented to the European Unions legal order. However, the abovementioned 
opinion about a stabilising and modifying function has been manifested in the 
legal solutions included in the document submitted to the member states for 
ratification. It should be noted that a number of solutions, not perfect, but posi­
tively modifying the current state by its clarification, have appeared in this docu­
ment. The examples of such solutions are, first of all, clarification and classifica­
tion of the Union’s powers, and simplification of the Union’s legal instruments.
I refer to what took place in May 2005 as a legitimising paradox. On the one 
hand, we are dealing with an accepted system, developing naturally, in which 
a successful economic integration, turned systematically into more exten­
sive unification that concerns political aspects of the social order, has become 
a self-constituting process. On the other hand, the attempt to create a legal 
basis of the existing system without implementing revolutionary changes is 
blocked in the French referendum.
24 See Volker Rôben’s opinion: “The Nice Declaration, the Laeken Mandate, and the Draft Constitutional 
treaty as it has emerged from the deliberations of the Convention are best read as aiming at reformation, 
not at revolution, of this model of constitutionalism.” V. Roben, Constitutionalism of Inverse Hierarchy: the 
Case of the European Union, Jean Monnet Working Paper 8/03, NYU School of Law, (available at http:// 
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/papers03.html).
25 For more on this issue see: T. Biernat, The Origins and the Limits of the European Constitution, Archi­
wum Iuridicum Cracoviense, Vol. XXXV-XXXV1, 2002-2003.
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An explanation of this paradox is possible in many ways. Discussing even just 
the crucial ones would require a separate monograph. Starting with such explana­
tions that “the ‘no’ vote also had more to do with emotion than reason,” and finish­
ing with an opinion expressed by a constitutional expert that “this no’ was about 
everything.”27 If we look at this problem from the perspective of “the conditions of 
legitimisation” one reason seems to be of utmost importance. This reason is a fail­
ure to perceive certain changes in the process of constitutionalisation. The Laeken 
Declaration was, beside the Declaration on the Future of Europe annexed to the Fi­
nal Act of the Nice Intergovernmental Conference, a cornerstone of the constitu­
tion-making process. Justification of the assumed activities has been given the label: 
“Europe at the crossroads.” The steps which were taken meant a proper choice of di­
rection. The fact that the assumed goal has not been reached does not result merely 
from the strategies employed by the politicians of the member states. Some disori­
entation has appeared, partly as a result of the abovementioned misunderstandings. 
Debate about a constitution in the material sense, about legitimisation of the solu­
tions which were adopted,28 and about whether they can be popular in the Euro­
pean community, can contribute to finding a good solution.
27 Dilemma for Chirac as voters say No to everything, Financial Times, Europe, Tuesday May 31, 2005.
28 This problem has been pointed to from the very beginning in the documents of the Convention: “The 
first and most important condition is the legitimisation of the consensus that would need to be embodied 
in such a constitution regarding the form of the ‘European Union’ as a political entity or polity.” Convention 
Bulletin Edition 09 - 13.06.02. Constitutional - convention.net.
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European Constitutional Law as an Example 
of Contemporary Constitutionalism
My subject is more general: European Constitution Law as an example of con­
temporary constitutionalism Last week in Lisbon the Reform Treaty was accep­
ted by the European Council. Can we go on to reflect on a European Constitution, 
or on European Constitutional Law? The Reform Treaty avoids the term “constitu­
tion” and makes believe that it is not a constitution, nor a constitutional treaty, but 
a simple treaty, similar to the Treaties of Nice, Amsterdam and Maastricht, some­
thing very usual, which does not need approval by the peoples. And this despite 
the fact that the Reform Treaty is perhaps a disguised constitution, as it takes over 
most of the contents of the former Constitution project. Analysing the substance 
of this Reform Treaty, we can nevertheless state that its basic concept is of a consti­
tutional character. Yet, it is not a formal constitution, as it was planned before, but 
a document of substantive or functional constitutional law. I do not want to re-open 
the old debate on whether the terms “constitution” and “constitutional law” can be 
transferred from state to multi-state entities I think this is possible because an im­
portant shift of competencies, and with this implicitly, of the functions of a consti­
tution from the State to the supranational level, to the European Communities and 
the European Union, has taken place. What I want to do very briefly is to compare 
some aspects of contemporary European constitutionalism1 with this supranational 
constitutionalism.
1 See R. Arnold, Interdependenz im Europäischen Verfassungsrecht, Essays in Honour of Georgios I. Kassi- 
matis, Athens-Berlin-Brussels, pp. 733-751.
2 See R. Arnold, The Emergence of a European Constitutional Law, General Reports of the XVIIth Congress 
of the International Academy of Comparative Law, ed. K. Boele-Woelki, S. van Erp, Brussels-Utrecht 2007, 
pp. 763-769.
Does the substantive constitutional law of the EC, as expressed by the Reform 
Treaty and existing even before as Community Law, correspond to modern 
European standards of constitutional law? Where can these standards of mod­
ern constitutional law be found? I think in the constitutional orders of the Euro­
pean countries, influenced by the European Convention on Human Rights, and 
exposed in many respects to EC and EU law. If we extend the term of constitu­
tional law, there are three levels of constitutional law in Europe: firstly, the consti­
tutions of the member states, not only of the European Communities but also of 
the Council of Europe; secondly, the EC law in its basic normative concepts; and 
thirdly, the European Convention on Human Rights.2 Which are these standards, 
or maybe better: tendencies that have developed to some extent common stan­
dards in European constitutional law? First, I think it is the existence of effi­
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cient, comprehensive fundamental rights protection, based on the respect of 
human dignity, mostly assured by constitutional jurisdiction. The most striking 
feature of the modern European state constitutionalism is what I would call the 
anthropocentric, human being-related approach of state power. This tendency 
common now in Europe can be called individualisation, the growing emanci­
pation of the individual. I want to state that this is a common tendency in con­
stitutional law, as interpreted by the constitutional courts in Europe, even in 
particular by the new member states of the EU. I am aware that these rights of 
course are not always observed. This however is not an obstacle to state that this 
anthropocentric approach is the most striking feature of contemporary European 
constitutionalism. As to the Reform Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights to 
which the Treaty refers3 and which will be accepted by all the member states, be­
sides Great Britain and also Poland, is a clear sign for this approach. It is compre­
hensive, combining classic and modern, new rights, traditional liberties and social 
rights. The Charter disposes of safeguard mechanisms against excessive restriction 
by legislation, it introduces the principle of proportionality, and it is confirmed by 
references to the European Convention of Human Rights and to national constitu­
tional traditions.4 The scope of application of this Charter is wide, and it is binding 
for the European Communities and the EU as well as for the member states when 
they execute or apply Community Law. So I can state for this first point that this an­
thropocentric approach which is characteristic for the European state constitution­
alism of today is clearly taken over also by the Reform Treaty. A second standard 
is the emergence of a modern value-oriented rule of law concept, closely linked to 
fundamental rights, which is based on legality and constitutionality often assured 
through constitutional courts. The European Court of Justice has developed a con­
cept of the rule of law, communauté de droit,5 which clearly corresponds to the con­
cepts of the European states. In part rule of law aspects have been expressed in the 
mentioned Charter, which subjectivises such aspects, transforming them into fun­
damental rights. An example is the right of good administration, Article 41 of the 
Charter,6 which is, in the understanding of German constitutionalism, an objective 
element of the Rechststaat, of the rule of law, but which is taken over, through the 
intermediary of the ECJ jurisprudence, also to the Charter. As to these two points, 
individualisation and the emergence of the modern concept of the rule of law, 
I would name this second tendency the constitutionalisation of law. A third charac­
teristic can be stated: the supranationalisation and the internationalisation of con­
stitutional law, which means that even national constitutions are more and more
3 See Article 6 §1 of the EU Treaty.
4 See Art. 52 of the Charter.
5 See R. Geiger, Commentary EU/EC Treaties, Munich 2004, pp. 737-738.
6 See K.-D. Classen, Gute Verwaltung im Recht der Europäischen Union, Berlin 2008.
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filled up by supranational concepts, have to observe the primacy of EC law and ex­
tend their scope of protection more and more to supranational matters. The supra­
nationalisation of constitutional law is rapidly growing and is completed by a sec­
ond tendency in this context, internationalisation, which is expressed in the required 
conformity of national constitutional law to the European Convention on Human 
Rights.7 This Convention is an international treaty, maybe it is also constitutional, 
but in its form it is international, so we can speak also of internationalisation in this 
respect. The fourth tendency is the differentiation of power in the vertical and hor­
izontal sense. It is a tendency to introduce or to strengthen regionalism, maybe 
also to create federal systems, a common tendency with some certain exceptions 
in Europe. I think that this vertical power differentiation is clearly visible on the 
Community level. If you look at the Reform Treaty, taking over what had already 
been written in the constitutional project or even in the previous Community law, 
you will find the principle of subsidiarity, which shall be sharpened in its func­
tion. A political alarm system will be introduced to make this principle of subsid­
iarity more feasible.8 You will also find a vertical competence distribution system.9 
This shows clearly the growing idea to introduce clearer differentiation of power 
between the EU and member states. And you will find a more detailed clause on a 
national identity guarantee. All this shows that an equilibrium should be realised 
between the supranational power and the power of the member states. This is im­
portant and indispensable for the stability of 27 and maybe even more member 
states in the future. The national identity guarantee embracing the constitutional core 
concepts of the country10 has an important function also in this process of vertical 
differentiation of power, by strengthening the competencies and the functions of the 
member states. And the right to secession, to leave the EU, which is more theoretical 
than practical, has now been introduced, which is something unthinkable in former 
times: this is also an issue which shows clearly the idea and the concept of vertical dif­
ferentiation. Four characteristics have been mentionedr: firstly, the individualisation, 
the emancipation of the human being, a very striking feature; secondly, the constitu­
tionalisation with the emergence and confirmation of a modern rule of law concept 
where the constitution is recognised as supreme law; thirdly, the supranationalisation 
and internationalisation of law, especially of constitutional law; and the fourth feature 
- the differentiation of power. I would say that the EU Reform Treaty, or more gen­
erally speaking the EU constitutional law, clearly conforms to this modern constitu­
tionalism in Europe and contributes itself to its development.
7 See Fundamental Rights in Europe. The ECHR and its Member States, by R. Blackburn, J. Polakiewicz, Ox­
ford 2001.
8 See Article 6 of the Protocol on the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, as an annex to the EU Treaty.
9 See Articles 2-6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.
10 See Article 4 §2 of the EU Treaty.
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I. Government-level Background of the Problem
1. The "Hybrid" Nature of the Union
Let us start with an anecdote. One day two men approached a sage to settle 
their argument. The sage had heard one of them and said: “You are right” The se­
cond one protests: “But you still have not heard me!” The sage replied: “It does not 
matter. You are also right”. The men left dissatisfied. Then the sage’s disciple ad­
dresses him: “Both of them could not be right” The sage: “You are quite right”
This anecdote fully reflects the relationship between the law of the European 
Union and that of the member states.1 Unfortunately, the founding treaties contain 
no collision norms. More to the point, the “hybrid” legal character of the Commu­
nities, especially that of the European Union, additionally contributes to those dif­
ficulties.2 Is it a federation, confederation, international or supranational organi­
zation? In the literature of the subject there is an agreement that the Union is an 
unprecedented, unusual and novel solution.3 The closest - which does not mean 
close - qualification of this structure seems to be a ’’transnational organization” 
provided that “transnationality” shall be conceived as “a common exercise of some 
functions by the states being a consequence of transferring some competences to 
the international organs”.4 However, the European Union also shows some featu­
res of confederation. Nevertheless, there is still no adequate name either for the 
Communities, or for the Union.5 This is the price of originality.
3 K. Michafowska-Gorywoda, Podejmowanie decyzji w Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2002, p. 40; J. Jaskier- 
nia, Wpływ integracji z Unią Europejską na funkcję ustawodawczą Sejmu RP, “Studia Prawnicze” 2006, 
No. 3, p. 22.
4 See R. Kwiecień, Suwerenność państwa w Unii Europejskiej: aspekty prawnomiędzynarodowe, "Państwo 
i Prawo” 2003, No. 2, p. 30. By the way, the French Constitutional Council found in 1976 that the European 
Communities are not a supranational but an international organisation like others, while the Communities’ 
law in substance is the international law (decision 76-71). A. Sulikowski, Francuska koncepcja suwerenności 
i jej ewolucja w procesie integracji europejskiej, „Państwo i Prawo” 2002, No. 8, pp. 81, 82. Yet, J. Kranz be­
lieves that regarding the European Communities supranationality denotes three characteristical features: 
a) independence of members of some organs (issuing valid legal decisions) from the member states; b) trans­
fer of some competences made by the member states on behalf of an organisation (its organs); c) a direct 
binding effect and application of legal norms of an organisation toward the members states and their legal 
subjects (natural and legal persons), including primacy of those norms over the norms of a national law. Su­
werenność państwa i prawo międzynarodowe, ed. J. Kranz, Warszawa 2001, pp. 112,113.
5 P. Saganek, Orzecznictwo sądów krajowych państw członkowskich dotyczące Wspólnot Europejskich, [in:] 
Wymiar sprawiedliwości w Unii Europejskiej, ed. C. Mik, Toruń 2001, p. 175.
1 When writing “European Union” I usually mean both the Union itself as well as the European Communities.
2 This problem resembles controversies on the legal nature of the Holy See which in the light of truly Tal­
mudic deliberations of the canonists is neither a state nor an international organisation.
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In general, a consequence of the fact that lawmaking is embodied within the 
competences transferred on behalf of a transnational organisation (whatever 
its name and legal nature) is the necessity to fix the rules of applying that law 
to the legal orders of the member states. An integrative character of the orga­
nisation established by the Union requires its law to be equally and uniformly 
applied upon its whole territory. Thus, from the Union perspective, the consti­
tutional principles of the application of international law cannot be automati­
cally transferred onto the European law, since the particular states accept dif­
ferent rules of application of this former law. As was already mentioned, a lack 
of relevant precepts in the very founding treaties makes this situation more 
difficult. These treaties contain no provision expressing their superiority over 
a national (internal) law. It could therefore be assumed that fixing a rank for 
the European law to incorporate it into a national legal order belongs to each 
particular state.6 The problem is, however, that some national courts began to 
issue decisions that, in the case of conflict between an European and natio­
nal norm, the one issued later ought to prevail. Such an approach offered the 
member states an opportunity to actually repeal the European acts through 
passing national provisions of higher or equal legal efficacy with European pro­
visions. Nonetheless, no national court yet has declared a piece of Union se­
condary legislation invalid.7
6 D. Mouton, C. Soulard, Trybunał Sprawiedliwości Wspólnot Europejskich, Lublin 2000, p. 101.
7 A. Albi, Supremacy of EC Law in the New Member States. Bringing Parliaments into the Equation of “Co­
operative Constitutionalism”, “European Constitutional Law Review” 2007, No. 3, p. 30.
8 In. al., in already quoted case Stork and in Präsident Ruhrkohlen- Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH v. High Au­
thority, 40/59; J. Planavovä-Latanowicz, Trybunał Sprawiedliwości Wspólnot Europejskich i ochrona praw 
podstawowych, Warszawa 2000, pp. 28, 29, 64.
The problem is that in the 1950s and 1960s the member states fretted that the 
European organs could remove those civil rights which had been granted before 
by the provisions of national laws. The courts of those states in the relevant cases 
sometimes followed the constitutional norms of their countries where the Euro­
pean provisions were inconsistent with the mentioned rights. This is quite clear in 
Friedrich Stork and Co. v. High Authority of 1958 and other cases where the Eu­
ropean Court of Justice (ECJ) refused to examine the conformity of an organ’s de­
cision with the civil rights ensured by the German fundamental law of 1949 (das 
Grundgesetz) and dismissed the complaint.
In its opinion the ECJ took the position that its task does not consist in inqui­
ring whether the Communities’ acts are compatible with the internal law of any 
member state, including its constitution. Likewise the ECJ is entitled neither to in­
terpret nor to apply the constitutional principles of those states during examina­
tion of the legality of the Communities’ acts.8
68
PARTI
Nevertheless, at the end of the 1960s and start of the 1970s the ECJ was forced 
to change its position under the influence of the argumentation of the German 
courts9 (see p. III.l).
’ It was the following cases: Stauder v. Stadt Ulm, 29/69 and Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Ein- 
fuhr- und Vorratstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, 11/70.
10 True, the first decision left major gaps within the principle of primacy of the European law over a na­
tional one, but they have been gradually filled up. A. Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Par­
ties in EC Law, Oxford 2000, p. 4. Instead, in the second case the ECJ while construing the Treaty of Rome 
declared: "If the member states have set up the Community for an unlimited time, being equipped with its 
own institutions, legal personality and capacity, the capacity to international representation, and particu­
larly equipped with real powers being an outcome of constraining or transferring the powers of the par­
ticular states, then they have also confined, though in some matters only, their sovereign rights, thereby 
creating the system of legal norms binding both their citizens and themselves” See also K. Wojtowicz, Kon­
stytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a członkostwo w Unii Europejskiej, [in:] Konstytucja dla rozszerzającej się 
Europy, ed. E. Popławska, Warszawa 2000, p. 159; M. Drobysz, Stanowienie prawa przez Europejski Trybu­
nał Sprawiedliwości - studium zasady ogólnej, [in:] op. cit., ed. C. Mik, p. 70.
11 L. Garlicki, Członkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej a sądy, [in:] op. cit., ed. E. Popławska, p. 197; M. Ma- 
taczyński, Kto jest ostatecznym arbitrem konstytucyjności w Europie?, [in:] op. cit., ed. C. Mik, pp. 122,123; 
S. Majkowska, Rola sędziów w procesie integrowania prawa wspólnotowego z wewnętrznym porządkiem 
prawnym, [in:] op. cit., ed. C. Mik, p. 181; A. Whelan, Specyficzne unormowania konstytucyjne Wspólnoty 
i ich wpływ na systemy konstytucyjne państw członkowskich, [in:] Zmiany konstytucyjne związane z człon­
kostwem w Unii Europejskiej, ed. K. Wojtowicz, Łódź 1998, p. 24.
2. The Principle of Primacy of the European Law
The ECJ quickly excluded an opportunity to “nullify” the European law by 
the member states. It did has done so particularly explicitly in such cases as 
Algemene Transporten Expeditie Ondermining van Gend en Loos v. Neder- 
landse Administratie der Belästigen of 1962 and Costa v. ENEL of 1964. It set 
up there the rule of primacy of the European law over the national one as well 
as the principle of direct effect of the European law upon the legal orders of the 
member states.10 In its jurisdiction the Union (the Communities), while exer­
cising its competences, can make commonly binding norms, general and abs­
tract, invoking direct effects upon the legal orders of the member states without 
any action of the national parliaments; the regulations are acts of this sort. Mo­
reover, in certain situations a direct effect may also be attributed to directives 
and decisions being addressed to the member states. The Union (the Com­
munities) can also issue some individual acts (decisions) which bind natural 
and legal persons in the member states. It means that to make the European 
norms binding in the internal legal order of the member states neither trans­
formation nor approbation of those norms is necessary. They automatically 
become effective in the member states in the moment of their adoption by 
an organ of the Union. Therefore, all organs of the aforesaid states are obli­
ged to apply them likewise as their national norms. For the European law is 
a common law of the European countries. It regulates the legal situation of the 
citizens of the member states, and thereby it becomes their own law.11 The con­
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sequence of that is the precept of uniformity of Union law. It denotes the ne­
cessity of identical understanding and application of its norms in all the mem­
ber states. Hence follows a monopoly of the ECJ on its exegesis.
The aforementioned issues belong to constitutional matters; more to the 
point, they regard the exercise of sovereignty.12 3  Small wonder that in San Mi­
chele et al. v. High Authority of 1962 the ECJ not only had underscored the au­
tonomy of European law, but also confirmed its primacy even over the consti­
tutional norms of the member states. This is one of the rules underlying the 
entire edifice of the European law. The same position was taken by the ECJ in 
Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt of 1968. It was reiterated in the already fa­
miliar for us case Internationale Handelsgesellschaft,ii later in Amministrazione 
delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA of 1977, and likewise in Tanja Kreil 
v. Germany of 2000. In this last case a citizen of Germany had sued her coun­
try for the refusal to employ her in the military forces. The said refusal was cau­
sed by the then Art. 12a(4) of the German fundamental law prohibiting women 
to serve in armed formations. This prohibition reiterated some legal acts of lo­
wer ranks, e.g. the law on the soldier’s profession and the regulation on the ser­
vice of professional soldiers.
12 K. Wojtowicz, op. cit., p. 161.
13 In this case the ECJ stated, in. al.: “The validity of the Community’s means and their efficiency within an in­
ternal law cannot be disproved by the statements that they are allegedly contrary to the fundamental rights 
having been formulated in the constitution of a member state or to the precepts of its constitutional struc­
ture” See also W. Czapliński, Akty prawne Wspólnot Europejskich w orzecznictwie Trybunału Sprawiedli­
wości, [in:] Prawo międzynarodowe i wspólnotowe w wewnętrznym porządku prawnym, ed. M. Kruk, War­
szawa 1997, p. 190-197, 201, 202; P. Winczorek, Konstytucja RP a prawo wspólnotowe, “Państwo i Prawo” 
2004, No. 1, p. 10.
14 L. Garlicki, op. cit., p. 199.
Meanwhile, the European directive No. 76/207 had provided for the im­
plementation of the principle of equal rights for women and men. This is why 
the ECJ declared all the above German legislation to be inconsistent with that 
principle. In response Germany changed its constitution the very same year. It 
was an unprecedented case because for the first time a constitutional norm of 
a member state had been treated this way.14
The ECJ stressed many times that the primacy of the European law is of 
an absolute character. What this means is that the said primacy depends ne­
ither upon the chronological sequence of provisions - i.e. a posterior na­
tional provision cannot nullify an European provision due to the maxim lex 
posterior derogat legi priori - nor upon their rank in the national legal or­
ders. So a statute must give way not only to provisions of the founding tre­
aties and to the other sources of the primary law, but also to each norm of 
the secondary law. To put it differently, a member state cannot justify an in- 
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fringement of the European law by some provisions of its internal law nor 
by the fact that another state also breaches its obligations.15 This supremacy 
stems from the very nature of the Union, not from the constitutions of the 
member states.
15 J. Plańavova-Latanowicz, op. cit., p. 149; D. Mouton, C. Soulard, op. cit., p. 102.
16 A. Whelan, op. cit., p. 23; K. Dziatocha, Podstawy prounijnej wykładni Konstytucji RP, “Państwo i Prawo” 
2004, No. 1, pp. 31, 32.
17 K. Wojtowicz, op. cit., pp. 169-171.
18 D. Mouton, C. Soulard, op. cit., p. 81, 82.
Therefore the said states ought also to obey some general legal rules being 
recognised by the ECJ, so far as they interfere with European law. However, 
solely in such cases where they are under obligation to respect those rules.
The ECJ has no competence to interpret national law, and even less so to ad­
judge its validity (Art. 234 of the Treaty on the European Community). However, 
according to Art. 226 of the Treaty it is entitled to examine the conformity of this 
law with the European one. This is a control of “unfulfilling the obligations” 
stipulated in that treaty. It consists in a multistaged negotiating procedure 
with a member state and may result in a declaratory judgment finding an in­
fringement of an obligation ensuing from the Treaty. Nevertheless, its im­
plementation is entirely the responsibility of the member state (Art. 228.1). 
In the light of the ECJ jurisprudence, if a national law is not concurrent with 
the European one, it cannot be applied by the national courts. The sole ex­
ception is a situation where a member state is empowered to derogation, that 
being accepted by the very founding treaties for the sake of safety and public 
order as well as health protection. Such exceptions can be met among the pro­
visions of various treaties; nonetheless, even they come under examination by 
the ECJ.16 It still may be remarked that although the rules of application of the 
European law constitute a product of the ECJ jurisprudence, they are a part of 
the acquis communautaire and to date the states acceding the Union have tre­
ated those precepts as an inherent part of their own obligations.17
Some authors dealing with European law also point out that if the Union 
has no constitution, the ECJ cannot transform itself into a constitutional tribu­
nal on its own. However, considering that this organ is to secure the uniformity 
of the system of European law, to watch over the competences of the particular 
Union organs and their distribution, as well as to contribute to moulding an au­
tonomous and hierarchical legal order, it creates a constitutional system sui gene­
ris. In Les Verts v. Parlament of 1983 and other cases the ECJ had declared the fo­
unding treaties to be a “constitutional charter of the law Community”18 Thus, as 
a genuine law community it undertakes to protect the fundamental rights of in­
dividual subjects. This denotes an observance of the hierarchy of norms by the 
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organs which, in turn, requires a norm of quasi-constitutional status. In this way 
for a number of years the gap mentioned at the very beginning, concerning 
a way to treat collisions between the law of the Union and that of its mem­
bers, is being filled by the ECJ. But do the members states accept this state of 
affairs with no objections?
3. A Constitution - the Supreme Law
In the European states a tradition prevails that a constitution enjoys supre­
macy in the system of sources of law, or to put it with a note of pathos is the su­
preme law of the land. This principle is frequently expressed explicitly in statutes 
or rooted so deep in theory and constitutional practice so as to become an unsha­
kable legal canon. The said canon is respected by constitutional jurisprudence 
and the courts, which obey and strengthen it. This particularly affects the Central 
and Eastern European states due to the newly regained sovereignty, that being 
closely connected with a peculiar reverence for their own fundamental laws.19 
A field of potential conflict arises here against the background of the current 
stage of integrative processes. Anyway, no fundamental law thus far voices the 
supremacy of the European norms over their own, at least explicite.
19 See W. Sokolewicz, Nowa rola konstytucji w postsocjalistycznych państwach Europy, “Państwo i Prawo” 
2000, No. 10, pp. 21 ff. From the debates held by the Constitutional Committee of the Polish National As­
sembly ensues unequivocally that its participants have rejected the supremacy of the European law over the 
fundamental law - see R. Chruściak, Miejsce umów międzynarodowych i prawa stanowionego przez orga­
nizacje międzynarodowe w krajowym porządku prawnym, [in:J Wymiar społeczny członkostwa Polski w Unii 
Europejskiej, eds. T. Mołdawa, K. A. Wojtaszczyk, A. Szymański, Warszawa 2003, pp. 352-354; A. Albi, op. 
cit., p. 32.
20 M. Kruk, Konstytucja narodowa a prawo europejskie: czy Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej wymaga 
zmiany?, [in:] op. cit., ed. E. Popławska, p. 175.
Referring to the national legal acts situated below a constitution in the 
hierarchy of norms, the problem of their accommodation to the European 
law arises in due course and the member states possess relatively efficient 
mechanisms to solve it. On the one hand, they are based upon the precept 
recognising the primacy of the European norms, and upon the fixed forms of 
their adaptation correspondingly to their character and the national system 
of sources of law, on the other.20 Instead, within the scope of constitutional 
norms the issue is not always and not everywhere clear as witnessed, e.g., va­
rious difficulties connected with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty; the 
question of its constitutionality have addressed, in. al., the German Federal 
Constitutional Court and the French Constitutional Council.
A factor of a less legal but more practical nature is the statement, banal in 
essence, that the European law potentially can encroach upon the sphere of 
matters being regulated by the national constitutions. Such a situation may oc­
cur at least for this reason that there is no distinct division of competences be-
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tween the Union (the Communities) and the member states. Likewise, both the 
minuteness and the depth of constitutional regulation in the particular countries 
know no limits. This is why the greater degree of minuteness of a national funda­
mental law, the easier an European norm can encroach upon its matters.21
21 Ibidem, p. 176.
22 Oddly enough sounds Art. 91.3 of the Dutch fundamental law of 1983 which states: “Each provision of 
a treaty being contrary to the Constitution or leading to an inconsistency with it, can be confirmed by the 
Houses of Parliament with at least 2/3 majority of the votes”. So also in this case - in spite of a general rule 
that the European law “comes into” a fundamental law, in other words, amends it, it is not being made au­
tomatically.
//. Integrative Norms of the Constitutions of the Member States
1. Implicit Norms
Unlike the European founding acts, a basis to solve the competence confli­
cts is found in the norms contained in the member states’ constitutions. These 
norms may be divided into two types. The first type are the norms which ex­
plicitly name the Communities and the Union; that emphasizes their specifi­
city in contrast to a classical international legal order. The second type, in turn, 
are the implicit integrative norms, i.e. expressing an opportunity to join some 
undefined international organizations. To illustrate, the Italian constitution of 
1947 comprises solely a general clause which, provided that the equality of sta­
tes and peace safeguards are at stake, allows a limitation of the state sovereignty 
within an international organisation (Art. 11). Nevertheless, since the Consti­
tutional Court’s decision in Granital of 1984 this clause is being construed as 
a provision that opens Italy’s fundamental law to European law. Since 1989 (La 
Pergola law) it is the cabinet which transposes the European directives into the 
internal law; the cabinet is authorised to do that each year by the so-called fra­
mework community laws. There is also the cabinet’s statutory responsibility to 
inform the parliament in the matters of Union politics.
Likewise, one can read in the Greek constitution of 1975: “Greece may dis­
cretionarity agree, while passing statutes with an absolute majority of the votes of 
the common number of deputies, to the limitation of the national sovereignty to 
such an extent as it is required by an essential national interest; such measures 
can restrain neither human rights nor the foundations of democratic govern­
ment and may be implemented upon the base of equality and on the condition 
of reciprocity” (Art. 28.3). Analogical formulas embrace the constitutions of 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands22 and the states admitted to the 
Union at the summit of Copenhagen in 2002, including Poland.
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Referring to the proper provisions of the Polish constitution of 1997 it 
needs to be considered that the fundamental norms of the primary law of 
the Union are expressed in the form of international agreements, and Art. 
188.1 requires their conformity with it. This obligation stems also from Art. 
91.3, which reads: “If it results from an agreement constituting an internatio­
nal organisation, ratified by Republic of Poland, the law made by this organi­
sation shall be applied directly, having primacy in case of collision with statu­
tes” There is a mention of statutes only, not of the Constitution. Likewise, the 
European secondary law must also comply with this document. The accuracy 
of this inference may be additionally confirmed by the proceedings of the Po­
lish Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly. At first the Commit­
tee proposed a provision stating the supremacy of European law “in case of 
collision with norms of the national law”. The term “national law” obviously is 
broader than the notion “a statute” Nevertheless, the Committee had finally 
dropped this formula due to some fears of the supremacy of the fundamental 
law in the Polish legal order.23
23 L. Winczorek, op. cit., p. 11.
2. Explicit Norms
The are some constitutions in force, however, which explicitly deal with 
the problems of the Union problems. Thus, the German fundamental law 
Art. 23 reads that “to create a united Europe, Federal Republic of Germany 
participates in the development of the European Union which respects the 
rules of democracy, legal, social, and federal state as well as observes the prin­
ciple of subsidiarity and guarantees the protection of the fundamental rights 
which can be compared with the rights assured by this Fundamental Law. 
To achieve this purpose the Federation may transfer the sovereign rights by 
a statute confirmed by the Bundesrat. Art. 79 shall be applied accordingly to 
the creation of the European Union and to making changes in its treaty foun­
dations or other comparable norms which change or supplement the content 
of the Fundamental Law or allow such changes or supplementations”. What 
this means is to refer to the provisions concerning a change of the fundamen­
tal law, which require a stipulation that the constitutional provisions do not op­
pose the agreements at issue and provide that the precepts of federation will 
remain unchanged.
To the French Constitution of 1958 title XIV “On the Communities and the 
European Union” was inserted. It embraces, in. al., Art. 88, which allows them 
to exercise some competences of the government, while Art. 88.4 enlarges the 
enquiry and control powers of the parliament so as to strengthen its influence 
upon the European policy. Nonetheless, a relationship between the national 
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and European was not clearly determined. The Constitutional Council, howe­
ver, is authorised to control in advance the integration treaties. Provided that 
no inconsistencies have been found, the primacy of provisions included in the 
mentioned treaties cannot be objected to in the future.24 Moreover, Art. 54 of 
the constitution unequivocally requires its change if it comes to a conflict with 
the content of the European treaties or their ratification.
24 See A. Sulikowski, op. cit., pp. 85-87.
25 For Art. 29.4 (10) of the fundamental law of this country - added by the Amendment of June 8, 1972 - 
provides: “No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the 
State which are necessitated by the obligations of membership of the European Union or of the Communi­
ties, or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the European Union or by the Communi­
ties or by the institutions thereof, or by bodies competent under the Treaties establishing the Communities, 
from having the force of law in the State”
In the Spanish constitution of 1978 Art. 93 permits in general transfered of 
the competences of the governmental organs to an international organisation 
or institution. It is a duty of the cabinet to safeguard the consistency of the na­
tional law with the European one. Nevertheless, Art. 95 provides: “1. To con­
clude an international treaty embracing provisions contrary to the Constitution, 
a prior change of the Constitution is necessary. 2. The cabinet or any House 
may demand the Constitutional Tribunal to take a position as to the possible exi­
stence of this contradiction” Hence it follows that in some matters the supremacy 
of the national law is presumed, while in others that of the European one is.
The Irish constitution of 1937 declares that this country can become a mem­
ber of the European Communities, ratify the European treaties and transpose 
them into national law. It also points to the supremacy of the European law 
over the national one, which first of all is manifested by the duty to change the 
constitution so far as it conflicts with European law. It stipulates nothing, ho­
wever, with regard to a transfer of sovereign rights to the Union.25
The Portuguese constitution of 1976 authorises the parliament to conclude 
agreements providing for the exercise of sovereign rights by the Union. At the 
same time (as with the German fundamental law) it includes the right to object 
on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity. It points to the “implementation of 
economic and social cohesion” as a condition of adoption of some further inte­
grative agreements. In that country the primacy of European law over the na­
tional one is recognised, save the constitutional norms. Hence, in the event of a 
possible conflict a change of the fundamental law is necessary.
The Swedish constitution of 1974 - while regulating a suitable procedure in 
detail - permits a transfer of sovereign rights to the Union, provided that Eu­
ropean law assures protection of fundamental rights. Art. 5 (Chapter X) of the 
Instrument of Government reads: “The Riksdag may transfer a right of deci­
sion-making which does not affect the principles of the form of government
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within the framework of European Union cooperation. Such transfer presu­
pposes that protection for rights and freedoms in the field of cooperation to 
which the transfer relates corresponds to that afforded under this Instrument 
of Government and the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. (...) No right of decision-making rela­
ting to the matters concerning the enactment or abrogation of fundamental 
law, the Riksdag Act or a law on elections for the Riksdag, or relating to the 
restriction of any of the rights and freedoms referred to in Chapter 2 may be 
thus transferred”. In this document the integrative clause had been inserted 
prior to joining the Union, because its authors came to the conclusion that 
the previous norm concerning the participation in an international organisa­
tion is insufficient.
The most detailed in this respect is the Austrian constitution of 1920. It 
regulates precisely: the participation of the Austrian deputies in the Euro­
pean Parliament (Art. 23 a-b); the participation of this country in nomina­
ting the officers of the European organs (Art. 23 c) as well as in the pillar of 
“Common Foreign and Security Policy” (Art. 23 f); informing Länder about 
the Union’s activity (Art. 23 d) and the federal parliament by the government 
(Art. 23 e); binding the government by the position of the parliament if a con­
stitutional change were necessary to implement an European act (Art. 23 e); 
the situations required by an European act (Art. 50). By the way, Austria is li­
kely to be a model country in terms of respecting European law. To prove it, 
one can invoke the term Anwendungsvorrang, denoting the primacy of appli­
cation of the said system of law.
3. Other Norms
At present all the fundamental laws of the member states, except Finland, com­
prise special provisions regulating the status of the European law within the internal 
legal order of a given country. However, they can be accompanied by some reser­
vations. They are frequently combined with formulas expressing an idea of partial 
transfer of sovereignty or other forms of its limitation, or transferring the compe­
tences of the national organs upon the European ones, or finally the exercise of the 
mentioned competences by the European organs. This mosaic of formulas prove 
the lack of a common, more uniform and satisfying concept of sovereignty embra­
cing the structure of the Union, nonetheless, everywhere the same content is be­
ing found.26 From those formulas one can infer that in fact a peculiar “core of sove­
reignty” may be isolated, untouched both at the moment of concluding an accession 
treaty and later, with the requirement of an earlier change of the fundamental law in 
a proper scope.
26 M. Kruk, op. cit., p. 178.
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Moreover, some constitutions of the member states receive the rules effec­
tive in the Union. To these belong, in. al., granting the citizens of the member 
states suffrage in local elections or in elections to the European Parliament 
(Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, France), determination of the status of 
the central bank in the Economic and Currency Union (Germany, France), 
determination of the common foreign and security policy (Austria), or deter­
mination of the consequences of the Schengen agreement (France). Nevert­
heless, one may also find examples of silent recognition of some maxims of 
European law, for instance, of the Union electoral law in Italy. So one can see 
that an explicit declaration that the national constitutions are subordinated 
to European law is nowhere to be found.
III. The Jurisdiction of Constitutional Tribunals
1. Germany
On guard of the supremacy of the national constitutions stand the constitu­
tional tribunals, and Germany is particularly vigilant in this respect. As already 
mentioned, according to the ECJ view the supremacy of the European law exc­
ludes the control of the European acts exercised by the constitutional tribunals 
of the member states under the angle of their conformity with their fundamen­
tal laws. This position met with a firm reaction of the Federal Constitutional 
Tribunal of Germany which in Solange I of 1974 stated, that “until the process 
of European integration reaches a stage where the Communities’ law includes 
also a catalogue of the fundamental rights {die Grundrechté) -approved by the 
parliament, of stable efficiency and comparable with the catalogue of funda­
mental rights included in the German constitution - courts will be allowed to 
submit legal questions to the Federal Constitutional Tribunal”
It also pointed out that although the substance of an integration consists 
in transferring the sovereign rights, some limits cannot be transgressed. Par­
ticularly, “it does not open the way to change a fundamental structure of the 
constitution, underlying its identity”.
This reservation was one of the reasons which had led the ECJ to revise its 
position. It had arrived at the conclusion that fundamental rights constitute 
a part of the general principles of law and that their observance is to be en­
forced by the ECJ. In order to determine their content it is inspired not only 
by constitutional traditions which are common for the laws of the member 
states, but also by international organs protecting human rights to which the 
Union states belong or cooperate. The ECJ could not grant the constitutio­
nal tribunals the power to apply the norms of the national constitutions over 
the European law. On the other hand, it could not allow that protection of the 
rights of the Union citizens was to be judged under a double standard. This is 
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why it has established a concept of the general precepts of the European law 
which contain the fundamental rights of an individual. This compromise had 
solved the problem of protection of those rights. At the same time, it did not 
breach the principle of primacy of the European law.2'
27 In his brief in Societa IRCA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, 7/76 the spokesman General War­
ner made a point that fundamental rights recognized and secured by the constitution of any member state, 
must also be recognised and secured by the Communities’ law. This point he founded upon the thesis taken 
from Costa v. ENEL concerning the core of the binding effect of the Communities’ law which, according to 
the ECJ, came into being as a consequence of transferring some powers of the member states on behalf of 
the Community. Likewise, he also referred to the said point in Renato Manzoni Fonds National de Retraite 
des Ouvriers Mineurs, 112/76. He wrote that his position had to be right because no member state could 
transfer on behalf of the Community the power to make laws infringing rights protected by its own consti­
tution - see J. Planavovâ-Latanowicz, op. cit., p. 65.
28 See L. Garlicki, op. cit., pp. 206, 207; M. Mataczynski, op. cit., pp. 129-131; D. Mouton, C. Soulard, op. cit., 
pp. 105,106.
The German Tribunal had taken it into account and as a consequence with­
drawn its reservations in Solange II of 1986. It stated that Art. 24 of the German 
fundamental law made possible the opening of the German legal order for the 
European law, including all the consequences of this step. In view of that “so 
long as the European Community, and the jurisprudence of the ECJ in parti­
cular, secure an efficient protection of the fundamental rights - which can be 
regarded as identical with the minimum required by the constitution - and 
assure a substantial content of the fundamental rights, the Federal Constitu­
tional Tribunal shall not make use of its competence to rule on the applicabi­
lity of the secondary Communities’ law and to inquire into the conformity of 
this law with the constitution’s provisions regarding fundamental rights”.
The Tribunal at issue reflects an evolution of the political system of the 
Communities and the ECJ jurisprudence. However, commentators have 
emphasised that as a matter of fact the Tribunal’s position did not change 
much. For it was still pointing out that a “transfer of the sovereign rights on 
behalf of the supranational organizations cannot amount to an infringement 
of the identity of constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Germany and 
an encroachment upon the fundamental structures of this order”. The consti­
tutional limits still exist - especially with respect to individual rights - which 
cannot be trespassed by the Union organs. However, in the present state of 
affairs the Tribunal sees no need to deal with these questions.27 8  Thus, this or­
gan has not constantly quit its power to control the European acts as regards 
their conformity with the fundamental law. It has reserved for itself such po­
wer for the future, while simultaneously stating that it would not make use of 
it at the moment. This power, however, is still effective and allows interven­
tion on the part of the Tribunal if it considers it necessary. So, the difference 
is important: the ECJ validates the primacy of the European law over a natio- 
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nal one just based upon the first law; while the German Tribunal - as well as 
the Italian Constitutional Tribunal - maintains that this operation of the Eu­
ropean law stems from a national constitution.29 One should also add that for 
the Federal Constitutional Tribunal it was no problem to accept the primacy 
of European law over a national constitutional law from the point of view of 
the further elaboration of the exegesis of constitutional provisions, so as to 
meet the requirements of the European law. Nevertheless, it stated that there 
are some boundaries which cannot be trespassed - the foundations upon 
which the constitution is built - and that it is the province of the national 
constitutional tribunals to decide about that.30
The next essential decision of the German Tribunal concerned the Maa­
stricht Treaty. True, in its decision of 1993 the Tribunal approved its consti­
tutionality, but also restated its opinion about the limits beyond which the 
European integration cannot proceed. It referred particularly to the problem 
of so-called implied powers of the Union and indicated that “if the European 
organs were to interpret and apply the Treaty provisions in a manner incon­
sistent with their letter, being for Germany the basis to accept them, such ef­
fects would not be covered by this Treaty and would not bind the German or­
gans”. Referring to Solange II decision the Tribunal declared that it exercises 
its power to adjudicate on the applicability of the secondary Communities’ law 
in a “cooperation relationship” with the ECJ, which is to say that the ECJ gua­
rantees protection of the fundamental rights in all individual cases within the 
domain of the Communities^ while the Federal Constitutional Tribunal may 
confine its role to general safeguard of the constitutional standards which 
cannot be abandoned. In the “cooperation relationship” so conceived, the last 
word ought to belong to the Tribunal.
In this decision the German judges have expressly emphasised their task 
to protect the German constitutional order against the European law. They 
defined themselves as guards standing on the bridge; the fundamental law is 
located on the one end, while the European law on the other. The European 
law must cross this bridge so as to get to the German territory. The guards 
control whether the “traffic” can reach their country according to Art. 23 of 
the constitution. Therefore, this act obliges the Tribunal to control whether 
the Union works in conformity with law. In other words, it has to see lest this 
organisation shall do more than permitted. It is the national legal order which 
ultimately determines what is permitted, since this is this order which has
25 R. Hofmann, Zmiany konstytucyjne związane z członkostwem w Unii Europejskiej - przykład Niemiec, 
[in:] op. cit., ed. K. Wojtowicz, pp. 47, 48.
30 Ibidem, p. 65. Parenthetically, in 2006 the Czech Constitutional Tribunal has taken the same position - 
A. Albi, op. cit., pp. 53, 54.
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transferred a part of sovereignty upon the Union. In view of that this order 
may find whether the Union did not exceed its powers. To decide about that 
is the province of the national courts, not of the ECJ.31 This position has been 
sustained on June 7, 2000. Yet, in its last decisions the German Tribunal had 
reserved for itself the right to challenge the precept of supremacy of the Eu­
ropean law in case centralistic tendencies occur in the Union.32
31 R. Hofmann, op. cit., pp. 52, 53.
32 See D. Mouton, C. Soulard, op. cit., p. 111; L. Garlicki, op. cit., p. 208; K. Wojtowicz, op. cit., p. 163; 
M. Mataczyński, op. cit., pp. 131-135.
33 M. Mataczyński, op. cit., pp. 123-125; K. Wojtowicz, op. cit., pp. 162, 163; L. Garlicki, op. cit., pp. 202, 
203; A. Albi, op. cit., pp. 26, 27.
2. Italy and Spain
The Italian Constitutional Tribunal stressed in 1973 that the state exer­
cise of legislative, administrative and judicial powers can be restrained - on 
the condition of reciprocity and respect for Art. 11 of the constitution of 
Italy of 1947 - by the foundation of the Communities. However, such a de­
legation shall not result in an infringement of the “fundamental principles of 
constitutional order” or the “inalienable individual rights” by the Communi­
ties' organs. Therefore, the Tribunal reserved for itself the power to control 
the constitutionality of treaties concluded with the Communities (Frontini 
v. Ministero delle Finanze).
What happens however when a provision of the European law collides 
with the national constitution? In Frontini the Tribunal stated that it lacks ju­
risdiction concerning inquiries into the constitutionality of provisions of the 
secondary European law. It stressed that the norms of the Treaty of Rome are 
so precise as to exclude an opportunity to make laws based upon them col­
liding with the Italian constitution. Nonetheless, if it is proved that the pro­
visions of this Treaty had served as a basis to issue regulations encroaching 
upon the “fundamental principles of constitutional order or inalienable hu­
man rights” it would have create a foundation to assess the constitutiona­
lity of the very Treaty. In practice what this meant was a declaration of non­
interference, because to find the Treaty of Rome unconstitutional would be 
tantamount to leaving the European Economic Community. Such a step the 
Tribunal could dare to undertake solely in an extra-ordinary situation. The 
declaration at issue was slightly confined in 1984 (Fragd v. Amministrazione 
delle Finanze), where in fact an evaluation of the constitutionality of the ECJ 
position was allowed. Finally, however, the Italian Tribunal accepted the rule 
that the European norms can prevail over constitutional norms, except a ca­
talogue of some inviolable fundamental principles.33
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The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal, in turn, did not expressly formulate 
such a reservation. Nevertheless, from its decisions it follows that an inte­
gration within the Union cannot violate fundamental rights and fundamen­
tal governmental precepts embraced in the introductory title and Art. 10 of 
the Spanish constitution. Likewise, the Tribunal also stated that some situa­
tions may appear where a conflict between the European law and the Spanish 
constitutional law could not be solved merely with the help of friendly inter­
pretation of the constitution. Especially, when the former infringed the fun­
damental constitutional and governmental principles of Spain, e.g. the rule 
of democracy or the legal state. In such event the Spanish constitution would 
have supremacy over the European law. Hence it follows that the role of an in­
stitution controlling the consistency of both those legal orders will be played 
by the Tribunal. In 2004 this organ made a distinction between the two no­
tions: “supremacy” and “primacy”. The second one regards the exercise of po­
wers conferred upon the Communities, while the first one stems implicitly 
from the Spanish fundamental law.34 The aforesaid distinction is to respond 
to the practice relying upon recognising the supremacy of a national consti­
tution, however, without an open questioning of the superiority of the Euro­
pean law. By the way, the above distinction is also honoured by some Polish 
authors, though, to my mind it amounts only to tautology.
34 DTC 1/2004; op. cit., ed. K. Wojtowicz, p. 87.
35 Ibidem, p. 65.
Parenthetically, the Irish Supreme Court likewise had not accepted the 
ECJ’s dictum that the European law enjoys primacy also over the national con­
stitutions. While commenting on the ECJ’s thesis that it is supposed to make 
a final construction of the first branch of law, the Court said it is deprived of 
such a competence. However, it is its province to ultimately interpret the pro­
visions of the Irish constitution.35
3. France
Another approach was elaborated by the French constitutional practice. 
The French Constitutional Council has formulated a test of constitutiona­
lity concerning the international obligations of the state. The said test took 
the form of the question whether those obligations “violate fundamental con­
ditions of the exercise of national sovereignty”. Having applied this test it ap­
peared that the ratification by France of amendments in the founding trea­
ties of the Communities or the Union would have infringed the constitution; 
in such event an essential condition of ratification is a prior amendment of 
the fundamental law. Consequently, before ratification of the Maastricht Tre­
aty, Art. 88.2 had been added which made possible the transfer of competen­
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ces indispensable to establish the European Economic and Currency Union, as 
well as to prescribe rules regarding crossing the external borders of members of 
the European Community. Another new provision was Art. 88.3, which gran­
ted the suffrage in municipal elections to the citizens of the Union inhabiting 
France. Likewise, in 1999 the constitution was amended before the ratification 
of the Amsterdam Treaty so as to supplement Art. 88.2 with an authorisation to 
transfer the powers “necessary to fix the rules referring to a free flow of persons 
and the precepts associated with it”36 Thus, in France against the background of 
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty the view has been ultimately accepted 
that in the case of conflict between the fundamental law and a newly made Eu­
ropean act, the constitution is to be amended first. Otherwise, in this country 
the problem to adapt the fundamental law to the European law is simpler be­
cause the Constitutional Council exercises a preliminary judicial review, not 
a subsequent one.
36 K. Wojtowicz, op. cit., pp. 163, 164.
37 See cases I< 15/97; K 2/02; I< 11/03; K 26/03; K 33/03; K 15/04. See also S. Biernat, Prawo Unii Europejskiej 
a Konstytucja RP i prawo polskie - kilka refleksji, “Państwo i Prawo” 2004, No. 1, pp. 19, 20.
38 K 18/04; P 1/05.
3917/2004 (V.25) AB.
4. Poland
Due to the short participation of Poland in the European Union, the jurispru­
dence of its Constitutional Tribunal is rather modest, but nonetheless interesting. 
Still before the accession the judges stated that an interpretation of the Polish laws 
“ought to pay respect to the constitutional principle of openess toward the process 
of European integration and cooperation between the states” They also declared 
that the “postulate to take advantage of the European law within the pre-ac­
cession period as an interpretative inspiration for the Constitutional Tribunal 
means first of all to apply this law to reconstruct a constitutional pattern while exer­
cising judicial review” They used in this context the term “an exegesis favourable to­
ward the European law”37 They simultaneously emphasised that application of such 
a construction must be limited, since “in no circumstances it can lead to results 
contradictory to the explicit letter of constitutional norms, being unable to reconcile 
with the minimum of safeguarding functions implemented by the Constitution” An 
inconsistency between regulations of the European law and constitutional provi­
sions may arise only unusually. However, “in the Polish legal system such an inconsi­
stency can by no means be solved by admitting the supremacy of the Communities’ 
norm over the constitutional one”38 Parenthetically, in 2005 the Hungarian Consti­
tutional Tribunal stated that the European act regulating the issue of sugar pile-ups 
is contradictory to the constitution of this country.39
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IV. Practice v. Theory
1. Practical Aspect
From the above deliberations it follows that discrepancies between the Eu­
ropean and constitutional laws in different countries are solved in a variety of 
ways. A common feature of those solutions is striving to avoid a conflict, i.e., to 
avoid a confrontation of a national constitution with the European law, especially 
with the primary law which constitutes a peculiar substantial constitution of the 
Union. This is a mechanism of adaptation of a national constitutional law to the 
European law still before it becomes effective, e. g. before a treaty ratification or 
entering into force of some norms of the secondary law. The point is that it is be­
ing done in order that the European law could consistently be declared consti­
tutional. As already mentioned, in France, Germany, Belgium or Spain the deci­
sions finding the Maastricht Treaty unconstitutional had forced prior changes of 
the fundamental laws. This prompted the idea of making them compatible with 
the Treaty before it had been ratified by those countries. So, an act already con­
sistent with a constitution was ratified. Such action allows to avoid a situation 
where a fundamental law is being amended later, in a sense, under coercion - 
which is of an important psychological significance - or it simply remains una­
mended. It remains as such, however, with the presumption of primacy of the 
European norms as higher ones. This psychologically can be even more incon­
venient and legally unclear.40 Nonetheless, the phenomenon of “constitutional 
amorphousness”41 may be tolerated solely in a limited scope.
40 M. Kruk, op. cit., p. 178. The presumption of primacy of the European law also over the constitutions of 
the member states seems to support, in. al., C. Mik, Zasady ustrojowe europejskiego prawa wspólnotowego 
a polski porządek konstytucyjny, “Państwo i Prawo” 1998, No. 1, pp. 18, 23, 38, 39.
41 A. Albi, op. cit., p. 67.
Biernat, in turn, writes that the multi-centrism of legal order consisting of 
a national and the European law requires not to presume in advance a con­
flict of norms of both law subsystems and to try to minimise it through a su­
itable exegesis. Ultima ratio, however, is the maxim of primacy of the Euro­
pean law. It is not necessary to deduct the said primacy from the supremacy 
of European legal order, inasmuch as to deduct it from the common accep­
tance of the member states is more convincing. On this assumption a source 
of the primacy rule of the European law lies in the legal orders of the particu­
lar countries, if they were to embrace acts authorising them to transfer a part 
of the sovereign power on behalf of the Union. Such an approach would be ea­
sier to accept by the member states - particularly, by their constitutional tri­
bunals - for political reasons. However, the ECJ represents the opinion that 
the primacy principle is an inherent feature of the European law, and its ex­
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tent does not depend upon the national legal orders. If no major disputes in 
this matter have arisen to date, this is due to the pragmatic approach of both the 
ECJ and the constitutional tribunals expressing the will of cooperation.42 It is pro­
per to share the view that federalism offers the simplest and the most efficient way 
out of this dilemma; with its clear concept of distribution of powers, a hierarchy 
of legal norms made upon both levels and a sui generis hierarchy of the systems of 
organs - federal and that of the parts of a federation. All this allows for both sy­
stemic and incidental solving of similar conflicts.43 Nonetheless, federalism - for 
the moment, at least - cannot constitute a basis for elimination of any disputes 
for all the member states, especially in a uniform manner. For this reason the pro­
posals to establish an European constitutional tribunal are unrealistic (e.g. J. H. H. 
Weiler). For, to begin with, the Union would have to become a federation - the­
reby, the independence of national legal orders should be lost - or at least to ad­
opt its own fundamental law. In such a case setting up such a tribunal would be 
more recommended.44 This is why Allott in 1997 called attention to the fact that 
Europe faces the challenge to discover a “constitutional spirit” Calling the Euro­
pean Union into being denotes only a half of the revolution, while moulding it to 
a final shape will need a “return of constitutional imagination”45
42 S. Biernat, op. cit., p. 23.
43 M. Kruk, op. cit., p. 177.
44 See R. Arnold, Perspektywy prawne powstania konstytucji europejskiej, “Państwo i Prawo” 2000, No. 7, p. 39.
45 See J. Jaskiernia, Polityczno-ustrojowe problemy Unii Europejskiej w dobie procesu postnicejskiego, [in:] 
Traktat z Nicei. Wnioski dla Polski, eds. J. Barcz et al„ Warszawa 2001, p. 63.
46 Particularly in the context of Art. 1-5 of the project of the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe: 
“1. The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Constitution as well as their national 
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and lo­
cal self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity 
of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. 2. Pursuant to the principle of sin­
cere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying 
out tasks which flow from the Constitution (...).
47 J. Barcz, Traktat reformujący UE - “mapa drogowa”, forma traktatu, propozycje zasadniczych zmian in­
stytucjonalnych, [in:] Traktat reformujący Unię Europejską (the materials from conference held in Warsaw 
on July 11, 2007), ed. J. Barcz, pp. 15, 16.
One might say that such a return occurred in 2003 when the Constitutional 
Convention prepared a draft of the Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Eu­
rope. Nevertheless, as regards the collision problems this document made lit­
tle progress. Its Art. 1-6 read: “The Constitution and law adopted by the institu­
tions of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it shall have primacy 
over the law of the Member States” Did the term “the law of the Member Sta­
tes” comprise also their constitutions? Such a question can hardly be answered 
unequivocally.46 True, the treaty at issue has been rejected by the French and 
the Dutch referenda. The Reform Treaty, a substitute for the former one, sig­
ned in Lisbon, does not refer to this question at all. However, its authors impli­
citly assume the supremacy of the European law.47
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Another method to eliminate collisions is to make the norms of a fundamen­
tal law compatible with the European one without a constitutional amendment. 
An obligation to follow this interpretation can be for instance deduced from Art. 
90 of the Polish constitution.48 The formula of transferring competences being 
adopted in this act conforms to some solutions being applied by some member 
states: a national law is being adapted to the requirements of the Union. If this 
provision is to be read this way, a formal amendment to the constitution in or­
der to secure in some matters the primacy of the European law over this act is 
not necessary. It is indispensable, instead, in the event of an obvious inconsi­
stency of a primary norm of the European law with the document in question, 
i.e., being impossible to be eliminated by interpretation. This should be done 
before the ratification of a treaty.49
48 S. Biernat, Czy konieczne są zmiany w Konstytucji przed przystąpieniem Polski do Unii Europejskiej?, [in:] 
Czy zmieniać konstytucję? Ustrojowo-konstytucyjne aspekty przystąpienia Polski do Unii Europejskiej, ed. 
J. Barcz, Warszawa 2002, p. 52.
49 A. Wyrozumska, Ratyfikacja traktatu akcesyjnego w drodze referendum, [in:] ibidem, p. 93.
50 Op. cit., ed. K. Wojtowicz, pp. 68, 118-120; A. Albi, op. cit., p. 63, 64. It is noteworthy to quote J. Barcz’s 
position who is an opponent of the individuation within the Polish constitution of a peculiar “core of sov­
ereignty” which, in turn, ought to be inalienable. He thinks that the provisions of this act in their present 
reading properly meet a dynamics of the integration process and, at the same time, constitute a firm bar­
rier regarding a transfer of competences. For all governmental power cannot be transferred; due to the ac­
cession to the European Union the Polish state cannot be liquidated. The height of the mentioned barrier 
should be treated flexibly; such flexibility, if necessary, may provide a jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Tribunal - J. Barcz, Członkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej a Konstytucja z 1997 r„ [in:] Czy zmieniać..., ed. 
J. Barcz, pp. 19, 20.
Another issue worth considering is that some fundamental laws contain 
a clause which protects solely their fundamental principles. Meanwhile, each 
constitution embraces also some detailed regulations which do not consti­
tute the foundations of constitutional order. Thus Wojtowicz seems to sug­
gest that the European law ought to have primacy over those regulations. Yet, 
in the case of encroachment by an European organ upon the fundamental ru­
les of a constitution, a proper national organ could counteract, including by 
putting forward the initiative to begin a procedure to leave the Union by a gi­
ven country.50
So, how should conflicts be solved between national constitutions and Eu­
ropean acts? According to Kumm, first, judges have to be faithful to the content 
of their fundamental laws, because this is what the citizens of their countries ex­
pect them to do; moreover, they take an oath of allegiance to the constitution. Se­
cond, to express an equal respect towards the ideal of rule of law on the European 
level. The ECJ stressed many times that putting this ideal into practice requires 
a uniform application of the European law. In that case only, this law will be 
able to safeguard safety and certainty identified with that ideal.
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Third, always to pursue the implementation of democratic ideals, i.e. to 
respect the fundamental rights and to act within the powers granted to the 
Union by the member states, in particular.51
51 M. Kumm, Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?, “Harvard Jean Monnet Working Pa­
per Series” 1998, No. 10, in: M. Mataczyński, op. cit., p. 134, 135.
52 L. Garlicki, op. cit., pp. 195, 199; M. Safjan, Konstytucja a członkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej, “Pań­
stwo i Prawo” 2001, No. 3, p. 10.
2. Theoretical Aspect
To date it has been the practical aspect which has dominated in our con­
siderations. Various answers have been presented to the question about what 
was the scope of the European law and who should solve possible conflicts. If 
the answers at issue are wanting somehow, the reason is no other than insuf­
ficient respect for the theoretical aspect of the problem. Therefore, one needs 
to take into account the following theses:
The first thesis. The European law is a hierarchical and coherent system, 
built similarly to the systems of national law. It creates a specific legal order, 
existing next to the international law and a national law, or rather between 
them, governed by its own rules of binding and application. It must work alike 
in all the Union states. Its application belongs first of all to the tasks of the na­
tional organs, while its interpretation remains a province of the ECJ. Hence the 
necessity to recognise the jurisdictional exclusion of the ECJ in some areas, 
and by this to deny relevant powers to national organs. Had this function been 
exercised by the national supreme courts or constitutional tribunals, then 
a uniform understanding of this law would have not be preserved; this would 
be tantamount to undermining its integrative sense.52
The second thesis. The European Union is not a federation and the sove­
reign member states are not its parts; this is why their legal orders are inde­
pendent. Furthermore, neither in the European primary law nor in the se­
condary one is there a mention of supremacy of this legal over a national one; 
consequently, there are no collision norms. The thesis of supremacy follows 
in the first place from the ECJ jurisprudence and practical reasons. Thus, it 
can be assumed that legislation of the member states is, in essence, of an au­
tonomous character, save the fundamental laws as wholly independent from 
the European law.
The third thesis. The power to adjudicate on the constitutionality of the 
European law from the point of view of a constitution of a member state is 
equally legitimate as the power of the ECJ to assess the conformity of the acts 
of a national law with the European one. Neither are constitutional tribunals 
subordinated to the ECJ, nor vice versa, since they operate within different 
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legal orders. Those tribunals base their activity upon a fundamental law which 
imposes upon them an obligation to exercise judicial review of all legal acts re­
maining in effect on a state territory. A power to evaluate constitutionality of the 
European law from the point of view of the constitutional law of a member state 
is so natural, as a power of the ECJ to assess validity of the acts of European law. 
In other words, the acceptance of the interpretative autonomy of the Union’s le­
gal order and that of the system of a national law means, that neither the ECJ nor 
any constitutional tribunal can quit the power to adjudicate on its own jurispru­
dence. Accordingly, a possible dispute between the ECJ and a national consti­
tutional tribunal is “normatively unsolvable” not because a solution is lacking 
but for the sake of the “superfluum of an answer” As a consequence a real na­
ture of relationships between the national law and that of the European appe­
als to their dualism.53
53 R. Kwiecień, op. cit., p. 38; A. Soltys, Spór o zasadę supremacji, “Studia z Prawa Unii Europejskiej” 2000, 
p. 22; J. Jaskiernia, Członkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej a problem nowelizacji Konstytucji RP, War­
szawa 2004, pp. 80, 81.
54 See S. Biernat, op. cit., p. 21.
55 P. Winczorek, op. cit., p. 12.
56 See A. Albi, J. Ziller, The European Constitution and National Constitutions: Ratification and Beyond, 
Kluwer 2007, p. 3.
The concept of normative multi- or polycentrism by Lçtowska assumes that 
instead of a coherent legal order based upon a hierarchical construction of the so­
urces of law, a system is perceived where two or more subsystems appear coming 
from various “centres” The relationships between the particular subsystems wit­
hin this order are being determined by cooperation, not by antagonism or revea­
ling conflicts. A distribution of lawmaking powers among the particular sub-sy­
stems does not necessarily consist in granting exclusive competences contained 
in the first or the second subsystem. It relies upon the determination of non-col­
liding with each other means of the exercise of competences within a common 
scope of both sub-systems. A way of solving conflicts ought to be the “mutually 
friendly exegesis” on the part of the European institutions as well as national or­
gans.54 Nonetheless, in Winczorek s opinion, in the light of the said concept not 
infrequently it is hard to decide which norms would be superior. It is therefore 
doubtful whether it would bring reliable effects in every case.55
Some newly coined notions correspond with this concept, such as multi-le­
vel constitutionalism (Pernice), constitutional pluralism (Walker) or intertwined 
constitutionalism.56 As Walker writes in the paper entitled The Idea of Constitu­
tional Pluralism, today the pluralist concepts generally regard the national and 
the European law as no longer being the emanation of two independent legal 
orders, where the sovereign state is the ultimate source of and centre of autho­
rity. Instead, the relationship between those orders “is now horizontal rather
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than vertical - heterarchical rather than hierarchical” Both the ECJ and consti­
tutional tribunals try to prevent conflicts through mutual interaction. If a con­
flict nonetheless occurs, it should be solved on the basis of certain principles. 
On occasion some political action may be necessary.57
57 See A. Albi, op. cit., pp. 31, 65, 66.
58 M. Safjan, op. cit., pp. 9, 10.
59 Ibidem, pp. 10,11 ff.
The fourth thesis. In the event of collision of the European law with the 
constitution of a member state the primacy belong to the latter. The Polish fun­
damental law may serve as an adequate normative background for these reflec­
tions. Under Art. 8.1 of this act the Constitution is the supreme law of the Re­
public of Poland. In the case of inconsistency of an European provision with 
a Polish statutory norm the primacy belongs to the former; however, it does 
not relate to a constitutional norm (Art. 91.2). A binding effect of the European 
law in Poland finds direct legitimacy in the constitutional norms (Art. Art. 90 
and 91), which prescribe the extent and procedure of transferring some po­
wers - especially lawmaking ones - on behalf of an international organisation. 
If the European primary law is concerned, the conclusion is unambiguous: in 
any case international agreements are below constitutional norms, while the 
principle of supremacy of the mentioned law over statutes refers only to treaty 
norms ratified by a statute (Art. Art. 91.2 and 188.2). Moreover, an inalienable 
precept of the European law which is its independence from a national law would 
fall into some discrepancy if this feature is to be treated rigorously, since its status 
of the legal order being in force on the territory of a member state the European 
law derives from an sovereign act of the state power made upon the basis and wit­
hin a constitution, thus, upon a national law. Consequently, an independence of 
the European law cannot be conceived absolutely. This is why to recognise its su­
premacy over a fundamental law is not possible.58
The fifth thesis. The supremacy of a constitution over the European law can­
not be manifested in allowing the control of constitutionality of acts of the lat­
ter branch of law in compliance with the same rules this control is being exer­
cised over all acts of a national law. It should be confined to a sovereign act of 
accession to the European Union, and in the future to an approval of a sove­
reign state to all changes made within the acts of the European primary law. 
Those acts still are subject to the control of constitutional tribunals. Yet, the se­
condary law under an accession treaty to the Union, as autonomous legal order, 
is then excluded from state control. This probably is the best understanding of 
the consequences of transferring the powers of national organs on behalf of the 
European ones. Thus, the supremacy of a constitution over the European law 
relates to the primary law directly, while to the secondary one indirectly.59 
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Let us also take into consideration that the character of relationships be­
tween the European and national laws may lead to conflicts, since the require­
ments imposed by the system of European law must cross a peculiar barrier set 
up with the help of constitutional instruments of a system of national laws. In 
addition, these requirements are subject to limits established just by the afore­
said constitutional system.60
60 See op. cit., ed. K. Wojtowicz, p. 65.
61 S. Biernat, op. cit., p. 22.
62 See A. Albi, op. cit., p. 64.
V. Conclusion
In the light of the five theses we arrive at certain well-grounded conclu­
sions. Settling conflicts between the norms of the European primary law and 
the norms of the constitutions of the member states, in the light of the prin­
ciple of independence of both those legal systems and their jurisdictional au­
tonomy, must rely upon mediation between the ECJ and the national consti­
tutional tribunals (supreme courts). On their part the organs authorised to 
construe national law ought to take into account the ECJ decisions, pursuing 
the neutralisation of differences and elaborating a uniform exegesis of consti­
tutional norms of the member states. They ought to interpret their constitu­
tions favourably, the more so that against the background of the ECJ jurispru­
dence it is a duty of the mentioned organs to construe national law in line with 
the European one; the said duty results from the rule of loyal cooperation (Art. 
10 of the Treaty on European Community). Self-restraint of constitutional tri­
bunals would not be sufficient here.
Under the present legislation it is not possible to construct a symmetrical 
obligation of the ECJ and other European institutions to interpret the Euro­
pean law in a manner favourable toward national laws of the member states. 
True, the ECJ invokes some “constitutional traditions common for the member 
states” as a source of inspiration during the elaboration of the European con­
cept of fundamental rights,61 but it is not much. However, the ECJ in its last de­
cisions seems to be more sensitive to the legal circumstances of the member 
states. It ought to go farther in the process of “judicial dialogue” towards a ge­
nuine exchange of opinions. References made by the ECJ to the national legal 
systems are perfunctory and haphazard, and no constitutional tribunal of the 
member state has ever been cited by it.62 The Court should also foresee and take 
into account a relation toward constitutional norms of the member states, in 
which its decision would remain.
In other words, a settlement of the inconsistencies of both legal orders un­
der analysis has to call attention to a perspective of both the European Ju­
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stices sitting in Luxembourg and the national justices sitting in the capitals of 
the member states. If despite such actions a conflict occurs between the ECJ 
and the constitutional tribunal of a member state, agreement should be found 
through political mediation.
It may occur that the mediation will bring no effects if both parties are un­
willing to make concessions. In that case one or the other remains: either the 
procedure to suspend a “stubborn” state in the rights of a member of the Union 
is to start, or the state will leave it of its own initiative. It seems that tertium 
non datur. Thereby, neither European, nor constitutional (ditto: national) dic­
tate comes is an option. As long the Union is not a federation, its members will 
preserve their sovereign rights. Likewise, so long both parties will be right, like 
those two men from the beginning of our deliberations.
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European Constitution and National Constitutions: How to 
Overcome the 'Democratic Deficit' in the European Union
According to the prevailing concept of “dual legitimacy”, the European 
Parliament, as well as the national parliaments, constitutes a source of legiti­
macy in the European Communities (EC) and the European Union (EU).1 2  The 
importance of involving national parliaments in the legislative activities of 
the EC and EU is recognised in a protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam and in 
the text of the European Constitution? Important rules are provided in this 
field by the national Constitution. So it is worth analysing what role the Eu­
ropean Constitution and the national constitution may play in the process of 
creating the basis for legitimacy of those institutions and in reducing the so 
called “democratic deficit.”3 4
1 See C. Harlow, Accountability in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 36; 
A. Cygan, Democracy and Accountability in the European Union: the View from the House of Commons, 
“The Modern Law Review” 2003, No. 3, p. 399.
2 D. Walsh, Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Criminal Law in Ireland, “European Law Review” 2006, No. 1, p. 51.
3 See B. Kohler-Koch, B. Rittberger, Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union, Lanham, MD 
- Plymouth, Rowman & Littlefield, 2007, p. 34.
4 B. Boyce, The Democratic Deficit of the European Community, “Parliamentary Affairs” 1993, No. 4, p. 476.
5 K. Featherstone, Jean Monnet and the “Democratic Deficit’’ in the European Community, “Journal of 
Common Market Studies” 1994, No. 2, p. 151.
6 P. Norris, Representation and the Democratic Deficit, “European Journal of Political Research” 1997, No. 
2, p. 274.
7 See D. Martin, European Union and the Democratic Deficit, Broxburn: John Wheatley Centre, 1990, p. 6; 
P. Rosanvallon, Le déficit démocratique européen, “Espirit” 2002, No. 288, s. 89; D. Ward, The European
1. The particular circumstances of the early post-war in Europe led to an 
institutional framework which was and is, in democratic terms, inadequate? 
Some authors argue that Jean Monnet established the European integration 
process with a particular character (marked by technocracy and elitism), and 
consequently the Commission has inherited a weak and fragile democratic 
legitimacy.5 In the early years of the European Community, it was assumed 
that there was a widespread consensus about the future development of Eu­
rope, and that decisions by the Council of Ministers were broadly in line with 
public opinion. In recent years, the growth in the powers and responsibilities 
of European institutions has been considerable. The processes of represen­
tation and accountability have not kept pace with this expansion, producing 
a legitimacy crisis.6
An important phenomenon connected with the functioning of the Eu­
ropean Union (European Communities) is known as a “democratic deficit.”7 
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It exposes the fact that the societies of the EU do not have appropriate influ­
ence on the development and functioning of the Union.8 It is widely known 
that those processes are dominated by executives and European bureaucrats. 
The European Parliament (at EU level) and national parliaments (at state le­
vel),9 being theoretically institutions of crucial importance in the process of 
representation of people, do not have an adequate legal position and powers 
to effectively counterbalance the influence of representatives of governments 
and bureaucrats.10 The theory of the democratic deficit is based upon: stan­
dards based on analogy with national institutions, majoritarian standards, 
standards derived from democratic legitimacy of the member states, and so­
cial standards.11
The democratic problem is attributable, on the one hand, to institutio­
nal deficiencies of the electoral and party system; on the other hand, it re­
fers to the absence of a common European identity that would be necessary 
for the acceptance of an at last partially majoritarian system.12 A significant 
proportion of citizens do not manifest confidence in many basic institutions. 
Such a deficit of trust is attested by a wealth of empirical data.13 The cost 
and benefits to the EU’s perceived legitimacy are examined in the scienti­
fic studies with the argument that the putative benefits of consensual deci­
sion-making not obtain are in the EU and that the institution of consensus 
- the lack of voting and thus accountability - actually contributes to the per­
ception of a democratic deficit in the Council.14 Some authors argue howe­
ver that the European Union is suffering not just from the “democratic defi­
cit”, but a “community deficit”. The level and scope of its integration activities 
far exceeded the degree of community that it sustains.15 This raises a question
Union Democratic Deficit and the Public Sphere: an Evaluation ofEUMedia Policy, Amsterdam 2004, p. 11; 
M. Milev, A “Democratic Deficit" in the European Union, “L’Europe en formation” 2004, No. 3, p. 31; M. Gi­
uliani, Il deficit democrático dell’Unione, "II Mulino” 2004, No. 2, p. 342.
8 See D.M. Farrell, R. Scully, Representing Europe’s Citizens? Electoral Institutions and the Failure of Parlia­
mentary Representation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 46.
9 See The influence of National Parliaments on European Policies: an Overview, Brussels, EP, 2002, s. 107.
10 See R.S. Katz, B. Wessels, The European Parliament, the National Parliaments, and the European Inte­
gration, Oxford 1999, p. 45.
11 G. Majone, Europe’s ‘Democracy Deficit’: the Question of Standards, “European Law Journal” 1998, No. 
l.p. 7.
12 F. Decker, Governance Beyond the Nation-State: Reflections on the Democratic Deficit of the European 
Union, “Journal of the European Public Policy” 2002, No. 2, p. 269.
13 M. Dogan, Dissatisfaction and Mistrust in Western European Democracies, "European Review” 2002, 
No. 1, p. 94.
14 D. Heinserberg, The Institution of “Consensus" in the European Union: Formal Versus Informal Decision- 
Making in the Council, “European Journal of Political Research” 2005, No. 1, p. 89.
15 See A. Etzioni, The Community Deficit, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 2007, No. 1. 
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of effectiveness of democratic accountability and proposals for redefining the 
impact of parliamentary scrutiny on EU affairs.16 So it is important to evalu­
ate what steps should be taken to change this situation.17
16 K. Auel, Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of Parliamentary 
Scrutiny in Ell Affairs, [in:] Accountability in EU Multilevel Governance, eds. A. Benz, C. Harlow, Y. Papa­
dopoulos, “European Law Journal” 2007, No. 4, s. 487.
17 P.C. Schmitter, How to Democratise the European Union... and Why Bother?, Lanham, MD, Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2000, p. 36.
18 M. MacCarthaig, Conceptualising the Role of National Parliaments in theEU System of Governance, “Ad­
ministration” 2006, No. 3, p. 70.
19 P. Kiiver, The National Parliaments in the European Union: a Critical View on EU Constitution-Building, 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2006, p. 198.
20 P. Norton, Addressing the Democratic Deficit, “Journal of Legislative Studies” 1995, No. 3, p. 191.
21 R. Vaubel, The Constitutional Reform of the European Union, “European Economic Review” 1997, No. 
3-5, s. 446.
22 T. Beukers, The Barosso Drama: Enhancing Parliamentary Control over the European Commission and 
the Member States: Constitutional Development through Practice, “European Constitutional Law Review” 
2006, No. 2, p. 161.
23 K. Zajączkowski, Role and Position of the European Parliament in the Institutional System of the Euro­
pean Union, “The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs” 2004, No. 2, p. 79.
In this context, some analysts offer a new conceptualisation of the role of 
national parliaments in the EU system of governance18 and in the EU consti­
tution-building process.19 Although the idea of the national parliaments play­
ing a more active role in the EU attracts considerable support, perceptions of 
what this role should be differ considerably.20 They stress that the only way 
to overcome the “democratic deficit” that is compatible with the principle of 
subsidiarity is to strengthen the role of the parliaments of Member States. 
Since democratic legitimacy is a European public good, it is necessary to in­
corporate the national parliaments in the European legislative process.21 Eu­
ropean officials discuss the ways of enhancing parliamentary control over the 
European Commission and the Member States.22
Among several proposals, crucial are those connected with the strengthe­
ning of the role of the European Parliament in EU decision making proces­
ses23 and those suggesting that national parliaments should play a bigger role 
in the process of influencing the decisions of the Committee of Ministers (na­
tional government) connected with the creation of law of the EU and Euro­
pean Communities.
2. Various attempts have been made to increase the involvement of na­
tional parliaments in the European law-making process and reduce the “de­
mocratic deficit”, especially since publication of the White Paper on the Sin­
gle European Market in 1985. There has been however resistance from the
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European Parliament towards such a tendency.24 Additionally attempts to 
strengthen parliaments individually have failed due to constitutional, proce­
dural, ideological and cultural constrains.25
24 J. Marszałek-Kawa, Parlament Europejski a parlamenty narodowe w państwach Unii Europejskiej (pozy­
cja ustrojowa, kompetencje, organizacja wewnętrzna), Toruń, MADO 2005, p. 343.
25 P. Norton, National Parliaments and the European Union, “Talking Politics” 1995, No. 3, p. 169.
26 See P. Raworth, A Timid Step Forwards: Maastricht and the Démocratisation of the European Commu­
nity, “European Law Review” 1994, No. 1, p. 32.
27 See J. Jaskiernia, Political and Institutional Problems of the European Union's Political System in the 
Post-Nice Process, [in:] The Treaty of Nice: Conclusions for Poland, eds. J. Barcz, R. Kuźniar, H. Machińska, 
M. Popowski, Warsaw, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Centre on the Council of Europe, The 
Centre for Europe of Warsaw University 2002, p. 73.
Reforms introduced in the Treaty on the European Union (Treaty of Maa­
stricht) have reduced but not eliminated the democratic deficit in the Euro­
pean Union. The Treaty introduced certain reforms that gave the European 
Parliament a legislative function and strengthen its control over the execu­
tive. The most important of the new powers was the so-called codecision 
procedure and the formalisation of Parliament’s role in the appointment of 
the Commission. At that same time, the Treaty left unchanged the composi­
tion as well as the legislative and executive powers of the Council.26
The role of the national parliaments should be seen, one would think, in 
close relation with the role that executive bodies play in the Communities’ 
decision-making processes. We are dealing here with the principle of exc­
lusivity of national executive bodies in adopting Community decisions. For, 
in the light of the EU system, it is assumed that the bodies of the executive 
branch are legitimate to represent the citizens of their respective states on 
the EU forum. Consequently, it is presumed that the position adopted by na­
tional executive bodies on particular matters corresponds to state policy ad­
opted at the national level by competent authorities, including parliamentary 
bodies. In this system, the role of the national parliaments is limited to deci­
sions on the national level and does not cover EU actions as such.27
After drafting the Treaty of Maastricht an attempt was made to change 
that system, but the idea of amending the Treaty of Maastricht was eventu­
ally abandoned. Finally, two protocols regulating these issues were adopted. 
“Declaration No. 13 on the Role of National Parliaments in the European 
Union” recognises the primary importance of including national parliaments 
in the functioning of the Union. In particular, it stresses the importance of 
intensifying the exchange of information between the national parliaments 
and the European parliaments, and the significance of providing conditions 
for regular meetings between national and European parliamentarians inte­
rested in similar issues. The governments of Member States were obliged to 
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submit the European Commission’s legislative proposals to national parlia­
ments in advance, so they could familiarise themselves and possibly adopt 
a position with respect to such initiatives.
“Declaration No. 14 on the Conference of Parliaments” contained an invi­
tation for the European Parliament and the national parliaments to jointly set 
up the Conference of Parliaments which would be responsible for consulta­
tions regarding the major directions of EU actions, notwithstanding the na­
ture of the appropriate competences of such parliaments. The President of 
the Commission would address reports about the state of the Union to the fo­
rum of such a conference. Thus, it would correspond to the European Coun­
cil, play a consultative role and be empowered to adopt positions on matters 
relating to the major directions of EU actions.
Such declarations were intended to be a factor enhancing the role of natio­
nal parliaments. The fact that the Treaty was not amended gave a signal that the 
proposed solutions were not yet mature for such a level of institutionalisation 
that would qualify as permanent systemic constructions. In any case, the pro­
visions of Declaration No. 13 have been implemented only partially. We should 
note that the European Parliament maintains institutionalised contacts with 
national parliaments which involve, among others, information exchange (par­
ticularly, on the forum of COSAC conference). However, the provisions of this 
declaration on advance notification and review of the Commission’s legislative 
proposals have been implemented only partially. In practice, the Commission’s 
proposals are sent to parliamentary bodies, but only in certain countries this 
refers to issues relating to the second and third pillar. In addition, countries 
whose parliaments are informed by governments about the follow-up of le­
gislative actions based on the presented projects are an exception rather than 
a rule. Although the practice of having parliaments review the Commission’s 
legislative initiatives has become widespread, only some parliaments have the 
possibility of delaying the adoption of the Commission’s proposal on account of 
it being reviewed by national parliamentary bodies. Sometimes, it is the Euro­
pean Commission that makes this task difficult because it sends proposals to go­
vernments so late in the process that their thorough analysis in the national par­
liament is not possible.28
28 E. Popławska, Organy i procedura stanowienia prawa wspólnotowego oraz udział w niej państw człon­
kowskich, [in:] Prawo międzynarodowe i wspólnotowe w wewnętrznym porządku prawnym, ed. M. Kruk, 
Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 1997, pp. 182-183.
Declaration No. 14 on the establishment of a Conference of Parliaments 
was not implemented because attempts to organise a meeting of the European 
Parliament and national parliaments turned out to be unproductive, and the 
function of this forum is in part fulfilled by the COSAC conference. Problems 
with the implementations of Declarations Nos. 13 and 14 are worth stressing.
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It showed, on the one hand, there was no doubt that the “democratic deficit” 
observed in the EU could not be overcome only by way of enhancing the Eu­
ropean Parliament, particularly since there were misgivings whether the "so­
cial not-representation” that characterises this body could be eliminated in 
the foreseeable future.29 On the other hand, members of the European Parlia­
ment are not always well disposed towards the idea of enhancing the role of 
national parliaments since it may lead to the weakening of the role of the Eu­
ropean Parliament as the basic instrument of the political legitimacy of the 
European Union.30
29 See P. Norris, M. Franklin, Social Representation, “European Journal of Political Research” 1997, No. 2, 
p. 185.
30 P.P. Craig, Democracy and Rule-Making within the EC: An Empirical and Normative Assessment, ’’Euro­
pean Law Journal” 1997, No. 2, p. 108.
31 See E. Popławska, Formy współpracy parlamentów w Unii Europejskiej, [in:] Parlamenty a integracja eu­
ropejska, eds M. Kruk, E. Popławska, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 2002, p. 210.
32 J. Smith, Destination Unknown, “World Today” 2000, No. 1, p. 20.
The important step forward was made in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Pro­
tocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union - according 
to art. 311 of the Treaty on European Communities - is an integral part of 
the treaty. This Protocol specifies conditions which enable the national par­
liaments to monitor legislative processes on the Community level. The Eu­
ropean Commission was obliged to deliver to national parliaments such do­
cuments as: green papers, white papers, communications (not including the 
area of foreign policy and security). The European Commission’s legislative 
projects should be submitted in such a time which would enable the national 
parliaments to analyse the projects dealing with the III pillar (judicial and po­
lice cooperation in criminal cases) and they should have at last six weeks for 
consultation before the projects reaching the agenda of the Council.31
Experience connected with the implementation of the Treaty of Amster­
dam indicates that European integration, at its current stage, has become 
both more complex and more flexible and, as result, open to the need to re­
act to those impulses of EU practice which encourage systemic changes whe­
rever the current model needs adjustments, in order to make the Community 
more efficient and, at the same time, capable of reducing the “democratic de­
ficit” more effectively.32
However, the greatest importance will be attached to solving the syste­
mic issue whether, in the context of the Union’s operations, the role of the 
national parliaments should boil down to internal (domestic) political legi­
timacy, or whether there is political will to go beyond this established pat-
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tern.33 Although it is true that national parliaments influence the decision­
making process with regard to European integration at home (though de 
facto the scope of this impact is not satisfactory), only representatives of 
the executive power participate in the Union decision-making processes 
by presenting their countries’ positions.34 This may create an external im­
pression that what we have been observing is an exclusion of the national 
legislative power. This condition gives rise to a sense of a “democratic de­
ficit” on the psychological level,35 which is not always representative of ac­
tual decision-making processes where national parliamentarians play quite 
a big role.36
33 D. Obradovic, Policy Legitimacy and the European Union, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 1996, 
vol. 34, p. 307.
34 See J.H. Matlary, Democratic Legitimacy and the Role of the Commission [in:] Democracy and the Euro­
pean Union, Berlin-Heidelberg 1998, p. 71.
35 K.-H. Neunreither, The Democratic Deficit of the European Union: Towards Closer Cooperation Between 
the European Parliament and the National Parliaments, “Government and Opposition” 1994, No. 4, p. 581.
36 M.A. Pollack, Representing Diffuse Interests in EC Policy Making, “Journal of European Public Policy” 
1997, No. 4, p. 581.
37 See G. Scoffoni, Les Relations entre le Parlament européen et les parlements nationaux et le renforcement 
de la légitimité de la Communauté, “Cahiers de Droit Européen” 1992, Nos. 1-2, p. 22.
38 M. Kruk, Parlament Europejski: traktaty i praktyka, “Biuletyn Informacyjny Biura Stosunków Między­
narodowych Kancelarii Sejmu” 1997, folio 1, p. 44.
39 See F. Jacobs, R. Corbett, M. Shackleton, Parlament Europejski, Rzeszów, Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna 
1996, p. 321.
40 See The European Parliament’s Position on EU Institutional Reform, “Europe Documents” Nos. 2188- 
2189, 28 April 2000, p. 1.
41 See M.-C. Bonnamour, Les relations Parlament Européen at Parlements Nationaux a la veille de la Confé­
rence Intergouvernmentale de 1996, “Revue du Marche de l‘Union Européenne” 1995, No. 393, p. 642.
No doubt, the cooperation of The European Parliament with national 
parliaments can be an important factor creating the Community political 
legitimacy37. This has been interpreted as a tendency to develop Commu­
nity “parliamentarianism” in which the European Parliament and national 
parliaments are to become a systemic institution, where national parlia­
ments play a “full-fledged role of parliamentary performers in the Euro­
pean Union.”38 One reason for this cooperation is that the European Par­
liament has been playing an increasingly important role in influencing the 
directions of institutional reforms in the Union39 pursued by successive in­
tergovernmental conferences.40 Without cooperation with national parlia­
ments, it will not be possible to ensure that these changes have political le­
gitimacy.41
The most important premise of cooperation between the European Par­
liament and national parliaments is that the moment a state accedes to the 
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EU it transfers a substantial part of its legislative powers to the Union (Com­
munity). Estimates indicate that as much as two-thirds of the legislative com­
petences of the parliaments of Member States are handed over42. To lessen 
the democratic deficit, the process of marginalisation of national parlia­
ments in their legislative function has to go hand in hand with the European 
Parliament’s increased influence over the legislative processes in the Union 
and the extension of the controlling function of national parliaments with the 
process of lawmaking in the EU.43 A substantial limitation of the influence of 
national parliaments on European legislation does not mean that they should 
be deprived of the possibility of influencing its construction.44 This appro­
ach was unequivocally confirmed in a resolution of the European Parliament 
concerning this issue45 and in a resolution of the European Parliament ad­
opted following the Conference of the Parliaments of the Community.46 Wit­
hout such institutionalised control by the national parliaments, it will not be 
possible to overcome the “democratic deficit” connected with the declining 
influence of national parliaments on Community lawmaking.47
42 J. Barcz, Parlament a Unia Europejska. Analiza prawna na przykładzie doświadczeń Austrii (including 
source materiał), Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1999, p. 11.
43 D. Quinty, G. Joly, Le rôle des parlements européens et nationaux dans la fonction legislative, “Revue du 
Droit Public et de la Science Politique et a l’Etranger” 1991, No. 2, p. 393.
44 See P. Pandraud, IAssemble nationale et l'Europe. Quelle influence sur la législation communautaire, 
“Assemblée nationale. Délégation pour l’Union européenne”, No. 2459, 20 décembre 1995, p. 5.
45 See Résolution sur les relations entre les parlements nationaux et le Parlament européen (Doc. A2-3488/88).
46 See Résolution sur les relations du Parlament européen avec les Parlements nationaux après la Confé­
rence des parlements de la Communauté (A3-220/91).
47 P. Moreau Defarges, Le déficit démocratique, “Defense nationale” 2000, No. 12, p. 135
48 B. Jackiewicz, Folketing a Unia Europejska. Rola i kompetencje Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych w duńskim 
parlamencie, Warszawa, Zespół Integracji Europejskiej Biura Studiów i Ekspertyz Kancelarii Sejmu, ma­
rzec 2000, Report No. 174, p. 5.
In aiming to increase their influence on the legislative process in the Union, 
national parliaments are facing two basic options. On the one hand, they may 
opt for the “Danish way” which involves guaranteeing the national parliament 
the greatest possible control over the European policy of its government. It 
refers to the system existing in Denmark, under which the competent mini­
ster presents orally on the forum of the Commission for European Affairs, one 
week in advance, the position of the government on matters which are on the 
agenda of the next of the Council of the European Union. This position is then 
debated and the minister is given a mandate which empowers him to partici­
pate in and negotiate all decisions taken by the Council.48
This model is aimed at optimizing the impact of the national parliament at 
a stage where the government’s mandate is being worked out prior to the com­
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mencement of dialogue and formation of a position on the forum of Commu­
nity institutions.
On the other hand, actions can be taken to step up the presence of represen­
tatives of national parliaments in the place where the Union’s most important 
decisions are taken. Some national parliaments, in particular the French Na­
tional Assembly (the proposals of the Senate are especially worth noting here) 
would be prepared to have a presence in Brussels through the intermediary of 
an additional institution representing the parliaments of member states.49 Ho­
wever, it is estimated that “such a mechanism would complicate the decision­
making process so much that it is difficult to find any justification for it.”50
49 See M. Pezet, Raport d’information sur le rôle du Parlamentfrançais dans le processus de décision commu­
nautaire, “Assemblé nationale. Délégation pour les Communautés européennes” 1992, No. 2804, p. 98.
50 K.-H. Neunreither, Zasada subsydiarności a Parlament Europejski, [in:] Subsydiarność, ed. D. Mielcza­
rek, Warszawa, Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego 1998, p. 98.
Notwithstanding those options and searches, the importance of the exist­
ing forum of national parliaments should be emphasised. It is the Conference 
of European Community Affairs Committees of the Parliaments of EU Mem­
ber States and European Parliament which is referred to by its abbreviated 
name COSAC (acronym of the Conference’s French name: Conférence des 
Organes Spécialisés (en) aux Affaires Communautaires). COSAC is a hori­
zontal structure constituting a forum of cooperation between national par­
liaments of EU member states set up in Paris on November 16-17, 1989. It 
consists of 6-person delegations of the European committees from member 
states as well as, on equal rights, a 6-person delegation of the European Par­
liament. Since 1997, representatives of the relevant committees on European 
communities of the parliaments of associated countries have been invited as 
observers. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, COSAC was incorporated into 
the Treaty on the European Union. A protocol annexed to the Treaty of Am­
sterdam “encourages national parliaments to become more involved in the 
work of the European Union”. It further provides that COSAC “can send the 
EU institutions any contribution it thinks appropriate, especially concerning 
proposed acts which representatives of the national governments may jointly 
decide to forward to it in view of the subject matter involved”, but these posi­
tions “should not in any way bind the national parliaments or determine their 
positions”. In connection with such a carefully worded formula, it has been 
noted that these provisions accommodated only half-way the expectations of 
national parliaments willing to get actively involved in the process of control 
over the proper application of the principle of subsidiarity. Despite the limi­
ted nature of COSAC’s powers, it has become associated with the “logic of 
compensation for the weakness of the European Parliament by means of in­
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corporating national legislative bodies in European activities in the areas of 
“sensitive” relations between the Union and Member States.”51
51 E. Popławska, Zasada subsydiarności w traktatach z Maastricht i Amsterdamu, Warszawa, Wydawni­
ctwo Naukowe Scholar 2000, pp. 107-108.
52 J.-V. Louis, La réforme des institutions de l’Union européenne, “Revue du Marche Commun et de l’Union 
Européenne” 2000, No. 4, p. 683.
No doubt, COSAC is an important forum for exchanging views be­
tween parliaments from national parliaments and members of the Euro­
pean Union, in the presence of senior Union representatives. The provision 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam indicates that is not only an informal dialogue 
that is at stake, but an important institutional level of cooperation of par­
liamentarians on Community matters. However, the powers of this forum 
are apparently limited. It is not by any means a decision-making body of the 
Union, but only an advisory and consultative body. These functions com­
prise the right “to send in contributions” in order to draw the attention of 
the Union’s institutions. This may be interpreted as a manifestation of sig­
nalling competences, because de iure it is not even a right to initiative (e.g. 
legislative initiative) which - if it originates from an empowered entity - 
imposes an obligation to review it.
It is also characteristic that against the background of the Treaty of Am­
sterdam, the legal position of COSAC in the Union’s decision-making proces­
ses was not enhanced and, moreover, a disclaimer was provided that the posi­
tions worked out by COSAC should not bind national parliaments and decide 
their positions. This may signal that not only the institutions of the Union 
are afraid of building-up the formal competences of COSAC (for one reason - 
out of concern for the declining role of European Parliament as a source of po­
litical legitimacy in the EU), but also that national parliaments may be unwilling 
to see a body of international cooperation comprising representatives of natio­
nal parliaments imposing its views on national parliaments and speaking on 
their behalf.
Among the important issues postponed until the post-Nice process was 
the role of national parliaments. In the course of drafting the Treaty of Nice 
this issue created a major problem reflective of the long-lasting dialogue 
that had been going on - without producing satisfactory results - since the 
time of drafting the Treaty of Maastricht.52 Some authors challenge, howe­
ver, the opinion that national parliaments are commonly held to have “fai­




On the other hand they emphasised existence of a “dual democratic de­
ficit” within the Union because national parliaments within their own states 
also exert limited control over their own national executives.53
53 D. Judge, The Failure of National Parliaments, “West European Politics” 1995, No. 3, s. 98.
54 See National Parliaments within the Enlarged Union: from “Victims” of Integration to Competitive ac­
tors?, eds. J. O’Brennan, T. Raunio, London, Routledge 2007.
55 S. Weatherill, UsingNational Parliaments to Improve Scrutiny of the Limits ofEU Action, "European Law 
Review” 2003, No. 6, p. 911.
54 See National Parliaments and European Democracy: a Bottoms Up Approach to European Constitution­
alism, eds. O. Trans, C. Zoethour, J. Peters, Groningen, Europa Law 2007.
Objectively, it is not easy to find solutions that would not collide with 
the existing philosophy of the Community decision-making process and 
at the same time broaden the powers of representatives of national parlia­
ments fundamentally, not only through symbolic adjustments. It appears 
that progress in this area will depend on resolving the following dilemmas: 
1) Will the Union be ready, even to a limited extent, to depart from the mo­
del in which the decision-making process is par excellence an intergovern­
mental cooperation and issues are resolved by officials? 2) Will the Union 
be prepared to depart, albeit partially, from the application of the princi­
ple that national representatives of the executive branch of government are 
entitled to represent their respective states, and the role of national parlia­
ments is reduced to a domestic mechanism of influencing this mandate? 3) 
Is the European Union ready to indicate areas where the role of forums of 
cooperation of national parliaments and European Parliament, particularly 
COSAC, will take more commanding forms of impacting the decision-ma­
king processes? 4) Is the Union ready to modify its decision-making proce­
dure so that the proposals from the European Commission are submitted to 
Member States within such a time-frame as to enable them not only to ad­
opt the position by their governments but also to hold appropriate consul­
tations in parliaments, particularly in the respective European affairs com­
mittees?
3. In this theoretical context we may analyse the role of European Con­
stitution in overcoming the “democratic deficit” in this sphere. We may note 
a suggestion that national parliaments within the enlarged European Union 
should change the position from “victims” of integration process to “compe­
titive actors” in decision-making fields.54 They have a role in the process of 
improving scrutiny of the limits of EU action.55 Several studies are concen­
trating on this issue, e.g. demonstrating a bottom-up approach to European 
constitutionalism.56
The “democratic deficit” in the European Union has provoked many am­
bitious proposals for institutional reform in order to bestow greater legiti­
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macy on European governance.57 For the first time in the history of the Eu­
ropean Union, it was decided in 1999 that a convention, rather than usual 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) would be set up to deal with the 
Union’s constitutional matters, namely the drafting of a Charter on Funda­
mental Rights. In December 2001, another convention with the same kind 
of make-up was mandated to draw up proposals for the revision of the tre­
aties. The question was asked whether choosing the “convention method” 
could contribute to solving the Union’s democratic deficit?58
57 See M. Hôreth, No Way Out for the Beast? The Unsolved Legitimacy Problem of European Governance, 
“Journal of European Public Policy” 1999, No. 2, p. 251.
58 A. Manzella, The Convention as a Way of Bridging the Ell's Democratic Deficit, “The International Spec­
tator” 2002, No. 1, p. 57.
55 C. Pinelli, The Powers of the European Parliament in the New Constitutional Treaty, “The International 
Spectator” 2004, No. 3, p. 87.
60 See K.F. Kock, Europan Parliament and National Parliaments in the Draft Constitution for Europe, [in:] 
Parlament Europejski i parlamenty narodowe, ed. B. Banaszak, Wrocław, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Wrocławskiego, p. 38.
61 I. Cooper, The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the EU, 
“Journal of Common Market Studies” 2006, No. 2, p. 301.
62 See C. Lebeck, Art. 308 EC-Treaty, From a Democratic to a Constitutional Deficit? Implied Powers, Ac­
countability and the Structure of European Community, “Europarâttslig Tidskrift” 2007, No. 2, p. 407.
The European Constitution, in the form of the Constitutional Treaty, not 
only strengthened the European Parliament in the decision-making process 
of the Union (Community),59 but also strengthened means and ways of influ­
encing national parliaments in that process.60
The 2004 Constitutional Treaty features an “early warning system” (EWS) 
in which national parliaments will scrutinise European legislative proposals 
to assess whether they comply with the principle of subsidiarity. In constru­
ctivist terms, this procedure effectively sets up the Commission and the na­
tional parliaments as interlocutors in an argument over when and how the 
EU should legislate. At the minimum, this system - which should be expan­
ded to include proportionality - will alleviate the “democratic deficit” by en­
hancing the parliamentary scrutiny of EU legislation. If it works well, it will 
improve the subsidiarity compliance of EU legislation and produce a clearer 
substantive definition of the principle.61
New arrangements involving national parliaments could serve as a better 
response to identified problems if the specifically legal context crafted hitherto 
in EC law were taken more carefully into account.62 In particular, monitoring 
use of the “flexible” provision authorising legislative authority which will suc­
ceed the current Art. 308 should be supplemented by monitoring of the simi­
larly functionally broad competence to harmonise laws.
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Subsidiarity monitoring should be supplemented by its close relative, pro­
portionality monitoring.63
63 S. Weatherill, Better Competence Monitoring, “European Law Review" 2005, No. 1, p. 38.
64 G. Beck, The British Parliament and the Convention of the Future of Europe, “European Law Review” 
2005, No. 5, p. 755.
65 T. Christiansen, B. Vaccari, The 2006 Reform of Comitology: Problem Solved or Dispute Postponed?, “EI- 
PAscope” 2006, No. 3, p. 11.
Some authors suggest however that national parliamentarians are ill-suited 
to play any role at the supranational level, both because they are collectively 
a microcosm of fragmentation and diversity of opinion often rooted in both 
national and ideological divisions and, for this reason, unlikely to reach agre­
ement on key issues, and because of the fact of executive dominance. These 
factors must be addressed in fostering as real contribution by national parlia­
ments at EU level in reducing the much lamented “democratic deficit”64
The issue of parliamentary scrutiny of comitology - the system of im­
plementation committee that controls the Commission in the execution of 
delegated powers - has been contested for some time by the political for­
ces involved. The European Parliament in particular has become increasin­
gly dissatisfied with the exclusive arrangement for Member State represen­
tatives controlling the Commission. Because of the changes to the legislative 
process brought-about by co-decision, the EP has demanded greater invol­
vement in the process. The Comitology Decisions of 1987 and 1999, and the 
inter-institutional arrangements that have been concluded around them, ad­
dresses these concerns in various ways, but they appear not to have settled 
the matter conclusively.65
On 13 June 2006 an agreement was reached between the Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council on a comitology procedure whereby 
MEPs would be permitted to block implementation decisions taken by the 
Commission. In addition, such decisions would be made available in all the 
official languages of the Community and the time available for parliamentary 
scrutiny was extended. The Parliament finally endorsed these proposals. The 
new decision is an important step towards greater parliamentary scrutiny, al­
though this clearly will not be the last word on this issue, since inter alia the 
new arrangements do not go so far as the earlier draft Constitutional Treaty. 
Whilst Parliament has now been put on an equal legislative footing with the 
Commission, areas of disagreement still remain. However, aside from the po­
litical power struggle, one must consider how the arrangements will work in 
practice. Although Parliament did not use its existing powers to any great ex­
tent, this may have been a reflection of their limited effectiveness.
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Whilst Parliament may now have greater powers, the requirement for an 
absolute majority for blocking a decision may prove to be a new hurdle.66
66 D. Pocklington, Comitology under Greater Scrutiny, “European Environmental Law Review” 2006, No. 11, p. 309.
67 G. van der Schyff, G.-J. Leenkgnecht, The Case for a European Senate: a Model for the Representation of 
National Parliaments in the European Union, “Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht” 2007, No. 2, p. 241.
68 R. Grzeszczak, Parlamenty państw członkowskich w Unii Europejskiej, Wrocław, Wydawnictwo Uniwer­
sytetu Wrocławskiego 2004, p. 205.
69 S. Bartolini, Mass Politics in Brussels: How Benign Could it be, “Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawis­
senschaften” 2006, No. 1, p. 31.
70 P. Kiiver, The Composite Case for National Parliaments in the European Union: Who Profits from En­
hanced Involvement, “European Constitutional Law Review” 2006, No. 2, p. 231.
Some analysts suggest that the problem of “democratic deficit” maybe solved 
through creation of a European Senate (second chamber of the European Par­
liament), treated as the representation of national parliaments in the European 
Union.67 Eventually COSAC should be a base for such a second chamber.68 Ho­
wever realisation of such a proposal in the near future seems to be unrealistic. 
The “democratic deficit” can and should be overcome rather through a gradual 
“politisation” of the EU processes without major institutional reforms.69
4. The national Constitutions should provide, if they have not done so yet, 
mechanisms of effective influencing by the national parliament of the deci­
sion of the Committee of Ministers (national government) connected with 
the procedures of creation of law of the EU and the European Communities. 
A crucial role may be played by the parliamentary committee on European 
Union (known as a Grand Committee) which acts in the name of the national 
parliaments. Their effectiveness will be decisive while answering the question 
whether national parliaments, losing approximately 2/3 of their legislative 
competences after accession of the state to EU, retained adequate influence 
on the creation of law in the processes of European integration.
Although scholars examining the impact of the EU on national parlia­
ments have concluded that the European integration undermines domestic 
legislatures, some of them call for more nuanced analysis.70 They turn to the 
EU’s new forms of governance, especially the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC). Their analysis reveals a complex picture. On the one hand, with re­
gard to participation, by empowering governments through executive fede­
ralism the OMC risks further marginalisation of national parliaments. On 
the other hand, when considering its output, the OMC provides national le­
gislators with opportunities that the traditional Community method cannot 
offer. First of all, the OMC gives national legislators access to insights and to­
ols for producing successful laws. Second, the OMC gives those legislatures 
grounds for criticising the policies of government officials. The empirical re-
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cord suggests that some of these contradictory effects are already at work.71 
Reinforcing parliamentary scrutiny and control of the national representati­
ves in the Council of Ministers contributes to a more democratic Europe. Ho­
wever, if parliaments tie the hands of their governments when they negotiate 
at the European level, effectiveness of policy-making is jeopardised and na­
tional interests may be defeated. Realising this dilemma, members of national 
parliaments develop strategies to deal with conflicting requirements of natio­
nal party politics and European policy-making. These strategies and their im­
plications for democracy are influenced by the path-dependent institutional 
changes in parliamentary systems. They, therefore, vary considerably between 
member states.72 So it is necessary to perceive the “European role” of the na­
tional parliaments in the different member states.73
71 F. Duina, T. Uranio, The Open Method of Coordination and National Parliaments: Further Marginalisa­
tion or New Opportunities, “Journal of European Public Policy” 2007, No. 4, p. 503.
72 A. Benz, Path-Dependent Institutions and Strategic Veto Players: National Parliaments in the European 
Union, “West European Politics” 2004, No. 5, p. 877.
73 See H. Haentel (rap.), Devolution du rôle européen du Parlementfrançais, Paris, Sénat 2005, p. 25.
74 K. Auel, The Europeanisation of the German Bundestag: Institutional Change and Informal Adaptation, 
“German Politics” 2006, No. 3, p. 253.
The case of the German Bundestag shows that in reaction to the pro­
cess of European integration the Bundestag acquired a set of comparatively 
strong participation and scrutiny rights in EU politics. It therefore seems rat­
her astonishing that German members of parliament make only very little 
use of these rights. Different explanations have been put forward in the li­
terature for this phenomenon, such as the complicated decision-making sy­
stem of the EU and the government’s gate-keeper position within it, institu­
tional flows of the German scrutiny system as well as the overall consensus 
on European integration and the low electoral silence of EU issues. Some aut­
hors suggest in that context that the formal instruments of scrutiny in EU af­
fairs are incompatible with both the overall logic of a parliamentary system as 
well as challenges of policy-making in the EU multilevel system. On the other 
hand they argue that the exclusive focus on the use of formal parliamentary 
scrutiny rights leads us to overlook more informal means of parliamentary 
influence and, therefore, to underestimate the involvement of German par­
liamentarians in EU affairs. Thus, in order to fully access processes of parlia­
mentary Europeanisation, it is necessary to take forms of informal or strate­
gic Europeanisation into account.74
The Austrian Parliament has at its disposal the strongest participation 
rights enabling it to influence European Union affairs. The original intention 
of providing that parliament with the strongest instrument to contribute to 
the EU decision-making processes has been shattered by party-dominated
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parliamentary life. After a promising start, the use of this device has decrea­
sed significantly. Today, the instrument is mainly used by the opposition par­
ties to obtain information and - to a limited extent - to control the govern­
ment.75
75 J. Polak, P. Slominski, Influencing EU Politics?: The Case of the Austrian Parliament, “Journal of Com­
mon Market Studies” 2003, No. 4, p. 727.
76 Dziennik Ustaw of 1994, No. 11, item 38.
77 J. Jaskiernia, Polish Sejm’s Procedure for Approximating Polish Law to the Law of the European Union, 
“Polish Contemporary Law” 2000-2001, No. 1-4, p. 65.
78 Dziennik Ustaw No. 52, item 515.
79 See J. Jaskiernia, Parlament i procesy integracyjne, [in:] Parlament: Model konstytucyjny a praktyka 
ustrojowa, ed. Z. Jarosz, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 2006, p. 187.
80 See D. Lis-Staranowicz, Komisja śledcza i Komisja do Spraw Unii Europejskiej w systemie organów Sejmu 
[in:] Zagadnienia prawa parlamentarnego, ed. M. Granat, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 2007, 
p. 238.
Dealing with the Polish experience it is worth recalling that the European 
Treaty establishing an association between the Republic of Poland, on one 
part, and the European Communities and their Member States, signed on 16 
December 1991,76 contained, inter alia, important provisions on the approxi­
mation of legal systems. Upon that requirement, the Polish Sejm introduced 
a procedure for approximating Polish law to the law of the European Union 
(European Communities).77 Successful realisation of this goal had a crucial me­
aning for the accession of Poland to the EU on 1 May 2004. The legal require­
ments concerning the influence of the national parliament on the creation of 
law within the EU (EC) was included in the statute of 11 March 2004 on coope­
ration between Council of Ministers with Sejm and Senate on issues connected 
with the membership of Poland in the European Union.78 It states for example 
that the Council of Ministers immediately submits the EU’s documents, which 
are due to consultation with member states, to parliament (especially: white 
papers, green papers, communication of European Commission, positions of 
organs and institution of the EU). Parliamentary opinions should be included 
in the process of building the governments’ position. Formally such an opinion 
is not binding, but if the government disagrees with a parliamentary opinion, 
it should explain its position to appropriate organs (art. 9 and 10 of statute).79 
The parliamentary practice in this field since 2004 has shown that generally 
such cooperation on European matters between government and parliament is 
going well; however, the Commission of European Integration produced only 
a very limited number of opinions critical to government’s proposals and only 
in few instances did the government accept that critical viewpoint.80
There are, as we may see, characteristic similarities in the parliamentary 
practice of Austria, Germany and Poland. It shows that it is not enough to in- 
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troduce formai institutions of parliamentary influence on European integra­
tion issues. The real effects of such an influence, quite important to reduce the 
“democratic deficit,” depend on several other factors, such as: political culture 
of society and their representatives, general effectiveness of a scrutiny process 
in parliament, common understanding of European integration issues, impor­
tance of an European integration issues among other problems of parliamen­
tary activity. Such an observation does not diminish the importance of the 
national constitutions which should offer appropriate constructions for the na­
tional parliament’s influence on European Issues. It is condictio sine qua non for 
creating the basis for effective national parliament influence. However, it does 
not guarantee perse that the real strong involvement of national parliaments in 
the EU’s decision making process of creating the law will take a place.
This analysis leaves no doubt that the European Constitution, if ratified 
in any form, as well as the national constitutions, have great significance for 
creating the legal provisions of the legitimacy process, which could lessen the 
phenomenon of the “democratic deficit” in the European Union. However, it 
is important to understand that the “democratic deficit” is a broader prob­
lem than the competences of the European Parliament and the national par­
liaments. Therefore, it is necessary to seek also other solutions to effectively 
cope with this important issue.
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Treaty on European Union
Introduction
Amongst the most urgent environmental and energy related challenges 
which the Member States of the European Union are facing are those rela­
ting to climate change and energy supply. The legal and constitutional frame­
work for action in these two areas is based on not one but two of the Treaties 
of the European Union. Both of these Treaties were signed in Rome in March 
1957 by the governments of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Luxembourg. One established the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and the other, the EURATOM Treaty, established the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EAEC). The Treaty establishing the European Community has 
been subject to significant substantive changes in its fifty-year history. The 
EURATOM Treaty on the other hand has remained unaltered apart from 
some institutional and procedural changes.
The objective of the EAEC was to support the peaceful use of nuclear 
technology to produce much needed electricity. By creating the conditions 
for speedy establishment and growth in the nuclear sector the governments 
of the signatory states sought to re-invigorate the European economies and 
re-energise the process of European integration. At the time the regulatory 
environment for all forms of power generation was one dominated by pub­
lic bodies, and high levels of long term state investment and provision of sub­
sidies. The underlying paradigm on which the EURATOM Treaty was based 
maintained this approach and the terms of the Treaty provided for elements 
of substantial state support and subsidy for the electronuclear industry. The 
EEC Treaty on the other hand was more expansive in its proposals and based 
on a paradigm of market functionality, providing the legal and constitutional 
framework for the customs union and increased market liberalisation.
The regulatory environment of the modern energy sector has altered and is 
characterised now by increasing market liberalisation. The use of nuclear electri­
city has led to much controversy at national level and the development of highly 
divergent national nuclear energy policies within the EU27 has followed. The 
economics of the electro-nuclear industry have changed. From a new techno­
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logy which required massive amounts of investment, producing electricity by 
nuclear technology appears to be more competitive. It is supported by some of 
the EU s governments as a means of achieving carbon-free generation of elec­
tricity in order to slow the process of climate change. The result is economic 
and political environments, which suggests that there is no longer a need for 
the legal and constitutional framework outlined in the EURATOM Treaty. Ho­
wever, despite recent debates about changes to the frameworks on which the 
EU is now established, no firm proposals have been made to repeal or to intro­
duce significant amendments to the EURATOM Treaty.
In the light of this reluctance of the national governments of the EU 27 
to initiate reforms to the EURATOM Treaty this article analyses its terms 
to determine if there are any aspects of the legal and constitutional frame­
work which may remain relevant fifty years after the Treaty was adopted. Is 
the Treaty as some assert “...undemocratic, out-dated and biased towards 
the electro-nuclear industry,”1 carrying “...the stigma of an undemocratic, 
outdated alien in the world of the liberalised market...”1 2  or is it “...a remar­
kable document that expresses the essential commitments of the parties in 
a flexible and forward-looking language...”3
1 European Parliament (2002,2), The EP and the EURATOM Treaty: Past, Present and Future, "Energy and 
Research Paper ENER” 114, European Parliament.
2 D. Fouquet (2005), The Legal Perspective: the EURATOM Treaty and the new Constitution, presentation 
to Energy Intelligence for Europe conference, 23 September, Copenhagen 2003, http://www.energyintel- 
ligence for Europe.dk.
3 CEC, High Level Expert Group Review of the EURATOM Safeguards Office, (2002, 7). Report by a High 
Level Expert Group, Brussels 15th February.
4 The 1951 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community on the other hand had been time- 
dated and expired in 2002.
5 An idea outlined in the report of the committee established under the chairmanship of Paul-Henri Spaak.
The birth of an 'undemocratic, outdated alien'
The EURATOM Treaty was not time-dated when it was introduced in 
1957 and continues to form an element of the energy acquis which all states 
adopt on their accession to membership of the European Union.4 Following 
the Messina Conference of 1955 the foreign ministers of Germany, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium, the six signatory states of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had concluded that co-ope­
ration on the new nuclear technology provided a viable project to increase 
European integration, particularly as co-operation in the political and de­
fence spheres was not possible.5 It was also seen as a mechanism to provide 
an energy resource, which was fundamental to the progress of the European 
economies and “Before long, the development of nuclear energy for peace-
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ful purposes will open up prospects of a new industrial revolution far beyond 
anything achieved during the past one hundred years”.6 The negotiations for 
the EURATOM Treaty were however more complex than anticipated by the 
original planners of the EAEC, including Jean Monnet.
6 Resolution adopted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the ECSC Member States at their meeting at 
Messina on June l/2nd 1955 paragraph 3. Signatory states France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Nether­
lands and Luxembourg.
7 Following the model of the ECSC and the EEC, the EAEC entrusted the tasks of the Community to four 
institutions - an Assembly, a Council, a Commission and a Court of Justice (Article 3 EURATOM).
The plan for the EAEC was based on solidarity of action in the develop­
ment of the new technology and transference of competence for action from 
the national to the supranational level. It was envisaged that the management 
of the sector would be undertaken by the Commission in the role of a benevo­
lent technocracy acting on behalf of the whole community.7 However nuclear 
energy co-operation was not the depoliticised policy arena that Monnet so­
ught in order to provide a successful project of European integration. By the 
early 1950s national policies for the peaceful use of nuclear energy had alre­
ady begun to diverge. For France and Belgium there were clearly perceived 
preferences to protect and promote national interests in the electronuclear 
industry. On the other hand the German and Italian governments were con­
cerned to improve their links with the United States for both reactor tech­
nology and cheap supplies of enriched uranium. As a result the proposals for 
the EAEC were seen by some as a French Trojan horse intended to promote 
the development of the French nuclear industry.
The outcome of the Treaty negotiations which continued through 1956 
led to a Treaty based on a traditional model of intergovernmental agreement 
between states. As the electricity utilities were predominantly state-owned 
in the 1950s facilitating investment in the electronuclear industry was in ef­
fect to agree to a considerable degree of state aid to the developing industry. 
It conformed to the prevailing regulatory environment for the energy sector 
of the period. Sharing the burden of the costs of the resources required, in­
cluding financial, materials, technical and expertise, between the signatory 
states of the EAEC would ensure the conditions for the growth of nuclear 
energy.
Two aspects of the Treaty underlie much of the current criticisms. Firstly, 
the amount of financial support for the electronuclear industry, both through 
the provision of state aid by the national governments but also in the provi­
sion of funding for research and technology developments (Article 7 EURA­
TOM). Initially the EURATOM Treaty was the only one of the founding Tre­
aties of the EU which made such a provision for research funding - it was not 
part of the ECSC or the EEC Treaties. Although the budgetary lines for nuc­
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lear research have been included in the EU’s more wide-ranging Programmes 
for Research and Technology Development since the 1980s, funding for nuc­
lear research remains subject to the institutional and procedural rules of the 
EURATOM Treaty. The budget is not forwarded to the European Parliament 
(EP) for scrutiny in the same way as other elements of the budget for research 
and technology developments.
The other major criticism of the Treaty is that it is undemocratic. Under 
the provisions of the EURATOM Treaty the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) 
procedures for decision-making are used by the Council of Ministers, but this 
does not include the provisions for co-decision on legislation for the European 
Parliament. The Council of Ministers are required to do no more than formally 
consult the EP on substantive issues. The unelected European Economic and 
Social Committee (EESC) and the Scientific and Technical Committee (STC) 
(with a membership nominated by national governments) have similar formal 
rights of consultation as the European Parliament in the EAEC’s decision-ma­
king procedures. In addition, unlike the competences given to the EP under the 
terms of the EEC Treaty, Article 101 EURATOM excludes the EP from involve­
ment in international agreements.
Whilst the Commission was given a great deal of power to act autonomo­
usly on behalf of the EAEC the areas over which this competence could be 
exercised were circumscribed. Exclusive competence focussed on eight main 
areas of action, outlined in Article 2 EURATOM with prominence being given 
to safety of the workers in the industry and the public in those areas surroun­
ding the nuclear power plants.8 What was missed from the list of competences 
however was that of ensuring the safety of the installations themselves, this was 
retained as a competence for the national governments and authorities.
8 In order to perform its task, the Community shall, as provided in this Treaty: a. promote research and 
ensure the dissemination of technical information;
b. establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public and ensure 
that they are applied;
c. facilitate investment and ensure, particularly by encouraging ventures on the part of undertakings, the 
establishment of the basic installations necessary for the development of nuclear energy in the Commu­
nity;
d. ensure that all users in the Community receive a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear fuels;
e. make certain, by appropriate supervision, that nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other than 
those for which they are intended;
f. exercise the right of ownership conferred upon it with respect to special fissile materials;
g. ensure wide commercial outlets and access to the best technical facilities by the creation of a common 
market in specialised materials and equipment, by the free movement of capital for investment in the field 
of nuclear energy and by freedom of employment for specialists within the Community.
h. establish with other countries and international organizations such relations as will foster progress in 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. (Article 2 EURATOM)
In the light of an American monopoly in the procurement of uranium in the 
1950s the terms of the EURATOM Treaty supported the creation of a com­
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mon market in the trade of nuclear ores and materials to ensure that suffi­
cient materials would be available to the members of the EAEC. Competence 
was conferred on the EAEC for the sole rights of option and ownership of all 
fissile material used for civilian purposes (Chapter IV, EURATOM). The EU­
RATOM Supplies Agency (ESA) was established in 1961 with the statutory 
responsibility for managing this competence.9 However the Supply Agency 
has never taken on its intended role10 1  and is a mere shadow of what was in­
tended11 with 17 employees in 2007.12 (As concerns are growing about the 
availability of uranium as the basic raw material for the electronuclear indu­
stry the role of this agency in monitoring imports could arguably be of more 
relevance in the future). Management of this competence also required a role 
for the Commission to be able to conclude international agreements on the 
common supply of the raw materials for the industry on behalf of the EAEC13. 
The EAEC was as a result “...to establish with other countries and interna­
tional organisations such relations as will foster progress in the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy.”14
9 The EURATOM Supplies Agency (ESA) was established on June 1st 1960 to ensure the equitable and 
regular supplies of nuclear ores and fuels for the EU’s nuclear utilities (Chapter IV EURATOM Treaty). 
The Agency is a common supply agency for ores, source materials and special fissile materials and under 
the supervision of the European Commission. Currently this is within DG TREN.
10 Secretariat of the European Convention (2002), Contribution made by Mr Klaus Hansch, The Future of 
the EURATOM Treaty CONTRIB 121, CONV 344/02, Brussels, 14th October. In 2006 the ESA had me­
rely 17 employees.
11 “The Supplies Agency exists, but is a mere shadow of what was intended” (European Parliament, The 
EP and the EURATOM Treaty: past, present andfuture, (2002, xiii) Energy and Research Paper ENER 114, 
European Parliament.
12 EURATOM Supply Agency (2007), Annual report 2006, ESA Luxemburg.
13 This proviso of the Treaty has enabled agreements to be signed with the main suppliers in the field - 
USA, Canada, Australia, Argentina, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Japan, Kazakhstan.
14 Article 2 para h. EURATOM.
15 DG TREN was formed in 1999 by a merger of the former DG VII (Transport) with DG XVII (Energy) 
and the unit for Nuclear Safety of DG XI (Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection). In the Euro­
The EAEC was established as a response to peaceful collaboration amongst 
the states of Europe. It was not intended to be a commitment by the signa­
tory states to co-operation on the military use of nuclear technology. The EU­
RATOM Treaty therefore contained measures to ensure that the fissile ma­
terials being used in the nuclear reactors of the EAEC were only being used 
for peaceful purposes. The EURATOM Safeguards Office (ESO) was establis­
hed to deal with the measures to ensure all EU states did not divert or acquire 
materials away from their intended and declared uses (Chapter VII, EURA­
TOM). The ESO is now based under the supervision of the Commission (DG 
TREN)15 with more robust mechanisms in place and a much clearer current 
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role and mandate than the ESA. The range of safeguards which are monitored 
by the ESO include measures applied to power stations, fuel fabrication and 
re-processing plants. The type of safeguard measures applied will vary, de­
pending on the nature of the nuclear facility but may include audits of mate­
rial use, analysis of the use of materials, surveillance and on-site inspections. 
For example a power station where there is on-site spent fuel storage will be 
subject to audits of materials, containment and surveillance measures, inclu­
ding closed circuit TV monitoring, and random re-verification procedures 
to ensure that the identified stocks of materials are still present on site. By 
2006 the number of Community inspectors involved in this work had risen to 
180.16 They have 24/7 access to data and personnel who deal with materials, 
equipment or installations subject to the safeguards. As a result of the levels 
of co-operation which have been established between the regulatory bodies 
of the Member States, the Commission and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency a high level of nuclear safety has been developed within the EU.17 This 
is arguably the most successful outcome of the EURATOM Treaty as it has 
resulted in the development of very comprehensive systems which now apply 
across all the EU’s 27 Member States.
pean Commission 2004-2009 two Commissioners held the portfolios for Transport, Jacques Barrot, and 
Energy Andris Piebalgs. (The two directorates responsible for nuclear policy, nuclear safeguards and ra­
diation protection within DG TREN are not based in Brusssels but in Luxemburg).
16 CEC Fifty Years of the EURATOM Treaty, COM (2007, 6), 124 final, Brussels, 20.03.2007.
17 For fuller discussion see P. M. Barnes (2003), Nuclear Safety for Nuclear Electricity: The Search for a Solid 
Legal Basis for Nuclear Safety in an Enlarged EU, “Managerial Law" Vol. 45, No. 5/6, pages 115-143.
A 'resilient alien'
Throughout the history of the European Union the use of nuclear power 
has caused much controversy at national level and widely divergent natio­
nal nuclear energy policies have emerged. Whilst the technology provides 
both an important product for export throughout the European energy mar­
ket for France, and a considerable share of the electricity required in the UK, 
Sweden, Germany and Belgium, in other states there is staunch opposition 
its use. Some of this opposition has its foundation in what is perceived as an 
unacceptable linkage of the military with the peaceful use of the technology. 
Other opposition comes from concerns about the safe use of nuclear power 
for electricity generation. This concern was significantly increased by the ca­
tastrophic fire and explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power reactor in the 
Ukraine in April 1986, details of which continue to be contested more than 
20 years since the disaster occurred.
Some governments in the Member States of the EU responded to public 
pressure in the late 1980s and licensing for the construction of new reactors 
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declined and units were closed. This was certainly the case in Italy and also in 
Austria, where the use of nuclear energy continues to be vehemently oppo­
sed, “The use of nuclear energy is not an option for Austria in the future. That 
choice has now been endorsed as a result of the consensus among the Mem­
ber States.”18 Since the 2004/07 enlargement of the EU the divergence of na­
tional nuclear policies has increased. Those states formerly part of the Soviet 
Empire (FSU) have adopted an approach leading to support for the nuclear 
sector as their governments have sought alternatives to high levels of depen­
dency on Russian energy resources.
18 M. Bartenstein (2006), Austrian Energy Minister, speech following Extraordinary Energy Council meet­
ing held on March 14lh, Brussels.
19 World Nuclear Association ( WNA), The New Economics of Nuclear Power, (2005,10), WNA, London.
During the 1990s the European electronuclear industry was faced by 
a somewhat paradoxical situation. The low costs of alternative sources of energy, 
the high capital costs of new reactor construction and closures of reactors 
meant that the economics of the electronuclear industry did not appear to 
be viable. For some opposing the nuclear sector it appeared that the mar­
ket was operating and would ensure the death of the industry and thus end 
the need for the EAEC and the legal framework of the EURATOM Treaty. As 
a Treaty supporting a declining industry it appeared to be of little conseque­
nce for most Member States during the decade, apart from France. But at the 
same time newer technology developments and increased operating licenses 
in the remaining reactors led to improved efficiency levels. Globally the ca­
pacity of the nuclear power plants to provide for volume base-load demand 
improved by ten points on average during the decade. Nuclear plants in Eu­
rope were able to achieve levels of over 90% operating capacity, 5% above that 
considered to render nuclear power most competitive.19 By the early 2000s 
the electronuclear industry was able to provide one-third of the electricity 
being used within the EU15.
More recently the economic environment for the sector has further impro­
ved. Unlike other major producers of electricity, coal and natural gas, nuclear pri­
ces are not determined by fluctuations in price of the basic raw materials. The 
price of nuclear electricity is mainly from the capital costs needed for the nuclear 
power plants. An advantage of the electronuclear electricity for the consumer is 
the stability of price and availability which may be assured. The costs of the rene­
wable and other alternative sources of low carbon energy remain high. In com­
bination these factors have led to a significant growth in support for the nuclear 
sector, which is further enhanced by concerns about the rising price for oil and 
natural gas. The nuclear option is considered by many national governments as 
the way forward to meet their national energy demands.
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The new competitive environment for the electronuclear industry has 
brought new questions about the use of state subsidy. In the viewpoint of re­
presentatives of the electronuclear industry it has been “...demonstrated that 
nuclear power does not, over the long term, require subsidy”20
20 Note 23 above, 8.
21 A. Piebalgs (2006, q456), House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, sub-committee D, uncorrected 
evidence on the Management of Radioactive Waste and the Safety of Nuclear Installations, given on Mon­
day 20th March 2006, Brussels.
22 CEC, Nuclear Illustrative Programme, (2006, 3), COM (2006) 844 final, Brussels.
Many of the energy utilities in Europe are no longer state-owned enterpri­
ses so maintaining elements of state involvement in the energy industry does 
undermine the market and provide an unfair advantage for the industry in 
comparison with fossil fuel generators of electricity.
This is a situation increasingly acknowledged by the Commission “...if you 
would like to build a nuclear power station it is an investment-based decision 
without any state aid. We are not in a situation where we should provide state 
aid for the nuclear industry... Now you can make a very profitable decision to 
invest in building new nuclear power stations but you need to be sure that is 
clear acceptance because this is an investment for 100 years”21.
By 2005 the EU25 had become the world’s largest nuclear electricity ge­
nerating region.22 In 2007 following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, 
fifteen of the EU’s states produced nuclear electricity from 152 nuclear reac­
tors (c.f. Table 1).
Levels of dependency on the technology varied from 4% of electricity ge­
nerated in the Netherlands, 31% the Czech Republic, 57% in Slovakia, 72% in 
Lithuania and 78% in France (summer 2007) with an overall average contri­
bution of 30% of electricity generated within the EU. The changing economic 
environment for the industry suggests that it is competitive without state su­
pport. Given the highly divergent national nuclear policies which have deve­
loped in the EU T1 it appears there is a strong case to repeal the EURATOM 
Treaty and re-nationalise nuclear energy policy.
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EU 27 + candidates 152 2 11
World (4) 442 28 204 (68 of which are in China)
Source: various European Commission and IAEA.
The future of EURATOM - an unresolved issue of the Constitution?
The most recent opportunity to debate changes to the Treaties of the Eu­
ropean Union began with the adoption of the Laeken Declaration by the Eu­
ropean Council in December 2001.23 As one of the founding Treaties of the 
European Union, the EURATOM Treaty was included the list of Treaties to 
be reviewed during the Convention on the Future of Europe which began its 
deliberations in 2002. Discussion of the EURATOM Treaty was limited within 
the context of the Convention’s debates. The Praesidium of the Convention re­
garded the Treaty as a distinct, complex and technical subject which it was not 
appropriate for the Convention to consider.24 This view went unchallenged by 
most members of the Convention. As Andrew Duff, a Convention member, 
concluded: “Given the essentially controversial nature of nuclear power but 
also because of lack of time the Convention was unable to reach consensus on 
whether to repeal, assimilate or amend the EURATOM Treaty”.25
23 European Council Presidency Conclusions, 14th-IS01 December 2001, Annex 1, Laeken Declaration on the 
future of Europe “The Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and efficient. It has to re­
solve three basic challenges: how to bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European design 
and the European institutions, how to organise politics and the European political area in an enlarged Union 
and how to develop the Union into a stabilising factor and model in the new, multi-polar world”.
24 Secretariat of the European Convention, Suggested Approach for the EURATOM Treaty, (2003), CONV 
621/03, Brussels, 14th March.
25 A. Duff (2006,167), The Struggle for Europe's Constitution, Federal Trust.
26 Protocol amending the EURATOM Treaty CONV 850/03, 236.
Instead it was decided to incorporate any changes which were required for 
the EURATOM Treaty into a Protocol annexed to the Constitutional Treaty26. 
These changes were minimal and related mainly to the adaptation of the Treaty 
to the new rules for institutional and financial arrangements. The Treaty’s le­
gal ‘personality’ was to remain unchanged. The limited role of the EP in the de­
cision-making process was also unaltered. On behalf of the States of Germany, 
Ireland, Hungary, Austria and Sweden however a Declaration was appended 
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to the Constitutional Treaty noting that the EURATOM provisions had not 
been altered since 1957 and supporting the idea of an inter-governmental con­
ference to review it as soon as possible.27 During the IGC which followed un­
der the Italian and Irish presidencies it was evident that deliberations about the 
EURATOM Treaty would not be included in the debates. “...At the IGC, while 
Ireland and some other Member States proposed a more extensive debate on 
EURATOM it was clear that there was no consensus in support of this.”28
27 Declaration 44 annexed to the Constitutional Treaty.
28 Irish Government (2005, 92), The European Constitution - White Paper, Dept of Foreign Affairs, June.
29 CEC (2007) An Energy Policy for Europe, COM (2007) 1 final, Brussels, 10.01.2007.
30 “Annex II point 4
Insertion of amendments agreed during the 2004 IGC and replace the last indent of article 174 by the fol­
lowing ‘...promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental 
problems and in particular combating climate change’, and
Annex II point 5
Insertion of a new title on energy, as agreed in 2004 IGC, with the replacement of the introductory sen­
tence in paragraph 1 of the Article (III—256) by the following ‘In the context of the establishment and fun­
ctioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, 
Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States (to)..European Council 
Summit, Brussels 21/22nd June, Presidency Conclusions.
Failure by all the Member States of the EU to ratify the Constitutional Tre­
aty created a difficult period of reflection and then negotiation on alternati­
ves which concluded with the introduction of a draft Reform Treaty by the 
German presidency in 2007. The EU has also been engaged in a search for 
an Energy Strategy that would ensure a secure, competitive and sustainable 
energy policy.29 This commitment is included in a more explicit manner in 
the Reform Treaty proposals than it has been to date in any of the Treaties.30 
It appears however that the Reform Treaty will bring little change to the legal 
and constitutional framework for energy policy development and measures 
in the EU. Decisions which significantly affect a Member State’s energy cho­
ices and the general structure of energy supply remain subject to unanimity 
vote. The Reform Treaty proposals leave the EURATOM Treaty with a sepa­
rate legal personality as one of the founding Treaties of the EU. In effect they 
preserve the current ‘legal status quo’ and do not address the criticisms that 
this Treaty is undemocratic and based on an outdated economic paradigm.
The EURATOM Treaty - 'a remarkable and flexible document'?
The national governments of the EU have decided to continue to jealously 
guard their rights to choose their national energy resources. There is little 
room for bargaining and consensus-building between the national govern­
ments to transfer more competences over energy developments to the supra­
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national level. It would appear to be unrealistic to expect to reach agreement 
on a new legal and constitutional framework for nuclear energy technology 
in the current political environment. What then is the role for the EURA­
TOM Treaty in the current political and economic environment?
The energy reality would suggest that without nuclear energy the coun­
tries of the EU cannot balance their growing energy demands in a manner 
which would be both competitive and sustainable. Public disquiet about nuc­
lear energy suggests that a strong regulatory framework for safety in the indu­
stry is required. From a practical perspective the impact of failures to ensure 
safe operation of the industry in the geographical area of the EU could result 
in major environmental consequences including damage to human health and 
life. Politically it would be unacceptable for the decisions made about one State’s 
energy policy to carry with it the potential to significantly affect its fellow EU 
Member States. Aspects of safety and disposal of waste from the electronuclear 
industry were included in the EURATOM Treaty. But their significance was not 
as apparent at it has become after fifty years of operation of the industry.
Furthermore “Public opinion surveys conducted by the Commission show 
that while they know little about radioactive waste... (they are) concerned about 
it and have very little trust in the nuclear industry’ and ‘...ninety percent of re­
spondents thought that the lack of a decision on how to dispose of high level 
waste had a negative effect on the image of nuclear energy.”31 Other public opi­
nion surveys show that 53% of the Europeans perceive nuclear power as more of 
a risk than an advantage with lack of confidence in the safe disposal of radioactive 
waste, the protection of radioactive materials against misuse and fear of terro­
rist attacks on nuclear facilities featuring amongst a high proportion of respon­
dents concerns.32 For many people the safe operation of the installations and safe 
disposal of the radioactive waste are apparently the major concerns. It is for these 
issues that the Treaty retains its importance as a legal framework for co-operative 
and co-ordinated action as there is no alternative under discussion.
31 D. M. Taylor, The Management of Radioactive Waste in the EU: Opinions, Situation and Proposals for 
Changes, “Practice Periodical of Hazardous, Toxic and Radioactive Waste Management” 2005, January.
32 CEC, Europeans and Nuclear Safety, Special Eurobarometer Report 271, February 2007.
The urgency in 2007 is to address the challenge of developing a secure, com­
petitive and sustainable energy policy for the EU 27. This urgency is greater in 
2007 than it was for the EU 6 in 1957 as the EU 27 is operating in a very diffe­
rent geo-political and geo-economic world. Solidarity amongst the Member 
States on energy measures appears to offer the most effective way forward to 
meet the challenges the EU 27 faces, but the rhetoric of the national govern­
ments does not match their action and protection of national interests conti­
nues as a constraint to proposed strategies. The commitment to energy soli-
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darity in the Reform Treaty may be nothing more than a political statement 
in response to the concerns of the Polish government and the governments of 
the Baltic States which are heavily reliant on Russian co-operation for energy 
resources.33 The EURATOM Treaty includes a commitment to “...joint effort 
undertaken without delay...” (Treaty Preamble) and thus confirms a commit­
ment (which has not been repealed) to energy solidarity albeit on aspects of de­
velopments relating to the nuclear sector. Not rhetoric but action, establishing 
a precedent for burden sharing of resources, technology and expertise.
33 S. Taylor, Securing EU Energy and Tackling Climate Change - what the Reform Treaty will do to Help, 
“European Voice” 2-29th August 2007, p. 6.
34 CEC (2002) Nuclear Safety in theEU, COM (2002), 605, Brussels, November.
35 The nuclear ‘package) proposed 06.11.2003 by the Commission comprised:
-Framework Dir. on safety of nuclear installations, (not adopted at time of writing)
-Dir. on radioactive waste, (not adopted)
-Decision authorising the Commission to negotiate an agreement with Russia on trade in nuclear mate­
rials (adopted European Council, 06.11.2002).
The EURATOM Treaty framework has enabled the EU to adopt a num­
ber of legislative acts on safety-related issues which have put into place arran­
gements to guarantee the most effective control of nuclear materials in the 
world.34 Two events were the catalyst for more emphasis to be put onto safety 
issues surrounding the nuclear sector within the EU in the early 1990s. Firstly 
the Chernobyl disaster and secondly the prospect of enlargement to FSU states 
where similar technology was also used. A mandate was given to the Commis­
sion, based on the EURATOM Treaty, that enabled the officials of DG TREN 
to play a unique lead role in the investigation, analysis and monitoring of the 
various reactors in the candidate states. Working with the International Ato­
mic Energy Agency and following acceptance of the energy acquis of the EU­
RATOM Treaty in the candidate states, it was possible for recommendations 
to be made by the Commission officials which led to closure of some reactors 
and the introduction of radical measures to improve safety in others. These clo­
sures have been the subject of much heated controversy amongst and between 
all the EU’s member states, old and new, those in which there is support for the 
industry and those where there is opposition to its use. However closure pro­
grammes have been carried out, supported by EU funding.
In 2002 the Commission introduced a Nuclear Safety Strategy including 
a series of legislative measures targeting safety at nuclear installations and 
also national arrangements for funding to de-commission reactors. It was re­
commended that this legislation should be in place before the New Member 
States acceded in 2004.35 The legal basis for these proposals came from seve­
ral articles of the EURATOM Treaty. Article 2b) EURATOM stipulates that the 
Community should establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of 
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workers and the general public and have the competence to ensure that they 
are applied. Article 30 EURATOM gives greater clarity and definition of what 
the expression standards means. Article 31 EURATOM provides for the scru­
tiny of the legislation by a group of scientific experts appointed by the Mem­
ber States and consultation of the European Parliament. Article 32 EURA­
TOM provides for revision of the basis of the safety standards.
These articles do not include the safety of the installations themselves as 
the competence, for this aspect of safety remained a national concern under 
the EURATOM Treaty. However a ruling by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in December 2002 had confirmed that the technical competence of na­
tional authorities to deal with the safety of nuclear installations did not prec­
lude the EU from legislating on the issue.36 In the opinion of the ECJ, it was not 
appropriate for the safety of the workers and the public to be seen in some way 
as separate to the issue of safety of the installations themselves.
36 ECJ Case C-29/99, December 10th, (2002).
37 House of Lords, Managing nuclear safety and waste: the role of the EU, (2006, para. 110), EU Commit­
tee 37th Report 2005-2006, July 6th.
Whilst all the EU’s governments are concerned about the safe operation 
of the industry, strong opposition to the proposed legislative measures came 
from a number of Member States including the British, Finnish and Swe­
dish, and they remain un-adopted in autumn 2007. Based as they were on the 
EURATOM Treaty the legislative proposals do demonstrate how the Treaty 
may be used to raise issues for debate amongst the EU’s 27 Member States. 
In the UK the House of Lords Select Committee on the EU concluded that 
an important role did exist for the EU to take a lead in safe management and 
disposal of radioactive waste because of “...grave concerns that Member Sta­
tes are failing to educate citizens about the use of nuclear power, how the sa­
fety of nuclear installations is maintained and of the action taken and options 
available to Member States to manage the radioactive waste produced.”37
After fifty years of operation of the nuclear industry there is a considerable 
amount of these materials in intermediate storage facilities to be dealt with. 
As EU states de-commission older reactors or respond to the concerns of their 
populations for phasing-out of the nuclear capacity appropriate management 
of spent nuclear fuels and other forms of radioactive waste has become of 
vital importance. Low-level waste is disposed of in shallow burial facilities; 
some waste is stored in ponds in order to reduce its temperature before sto­
rage. How to deal with the long-term management of the most dangerous, al­
beit relatively small, amounts of high-level and long lived intermediate waste 
have still to be addressed.
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Despite media speculation early in 200438 that the UK government was 
considering shooting high-level waste at the sun, the scientific evidence favours 
the more earthbound concept of deep geological disposal. Discussion of the de­
velopment of regional facilities which may be used by more than one Member 
State has begun. Whilst there appear to be no technical difficulties to geological 
disposal the identification of appropriate sites has not yet been made.
38 P. Brown, Shoot it at the Sun, (2004, 3), The Guardian, April 14th.
39 Council of the EU, Presidency Conclusions (2007, para 32), Brussels European Council 8/9th March.
40 CEC, An Energy Policy for Europe (2007,18), COM (2007) 1 final, Brussels, 10.01.2007.
41 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an independent international organization repor­
ting to the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations on issues surrounding the 
compliance of states with their obligations with regard to nuclear safeguards. It was established in 1957.
42 CEC, Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply - Green Paper COM (2000, 31-32) 
769 final, Brussels, November.
Despite its limitations the EURATOM Treaty does appear to provide the 
legal basis for the EU “...to develop further, in conformity with Community 
law, the most advanced framework for nuclear energy in those Member Sta­
tes that choose nuclear power, meeting the highest standards of safety, secu­
rity and non-proliferation as required by the EURATOM Treaty...”39 and for "... 
the Commission to investigate the development of nuclear energy in Member 
States, taking account of both the benefits of that technology (low volatility of 
production costs and no CO2 emissions) and the risks linked to the existence 
of nuclear power stations (failures and waste disposal).”40 To support initiati­
ves on safety the European Council has proposed an EU High Level Group on 
Nuclear Safety and Security and enhanced co-operation with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)41 to discuss issues such as non proliferation and 
nuclear safety and security. The governments of the Czech Republic and Slova­
kia have agreed to establish the EU Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF) which will 
meet twice a year, alternatively in Bratislava and Prague, beginning at the end of 
September 2007 or the beginning of October. The aim of the ENEF is to give all 
the stake-holders an opportunity to engage in an open and transparent debate 
about the risks and the benefits of future use of nuclear energy.
Nuclear energy - '...a source of energy in doubt... tainted by the 
original sin of dual usage - civil and military...'42
The European Atomic Energy Community was established as a response 
to peaceful collaboration amongst the states of Europe. It was not intended 
to be a commitment by the signatory states to co-operation on the military 
use of the technology. This continues to be the commitment of the EAEC 
and in addition nuclear non-proliferation now forms a major element of the 
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EU’s evolving Security and Defense Policy. The EURATOM Treaty is one of 
the two treaties which have an impact on the approach to nuclear non pro­
liferation which the EU States may adopt — the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (1st July 1968) (NPT) being the other.43 Both Treaties contain measu­
res and statutes on safeguards of materials to ensure that those designated 
for peaceful use are not used for military purposes. For some of the suppor­
ters of the EURATOM Treaty this may be seen as the main success of the 
Treaty through time - i.e. that the Treaty created a “...firewall against pro­
liferation of nuclear weapons (through the elements of ownership of fissile 
material and nuclear safeguards)”.44
43 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has 188 signatory states and is the major international Treaty de­
aling with use of nuclear weapons. However the states of Israel, Pakistan and India where nuclear weapons 
have been developed since the 1970s are not signatory states.
44 R. Linkohr, Assessing EURATOM - 50 Years of European Nuclear Policy (2007), Presentation given at 
Public Hearing, European Parliament Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, European Parlia­
ment, Brussels, 01.02.2007.
45 The price of uranium ore tripled in 2007 as a result of increased demand.
Similar types of technologies are involved in both civilian and military use 
of the nuclear materials. Pressure on the availability of high-grade ore45 for 
both types of developments will lead to more emphasis on recovery and re­
processing in turn leading to expansion of capabilities in the states which are 
currently users of nuclear electricity. There is growing global disquiet about 
the access to weapons of mass destruction in some politically unstable states 
and the possibility of terrorist groups gaining access to nuclear materials. In­
dia, Pakistan and Israel are known to have nuclear weapons and have not sig­
ned the NPT and North Korea has withdrawn. France and the UK, of the 188 
signatory states of the NPT are declared Nuclear Weapons States (the others 
being the USA, Russia and China). Some NATO countries, the EU Member 
States of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Greece and the applicant 
state of Turkey, have forces which are trained to use US nuclear weapons. All 
the NPT signatory states (those which are nuclear weapons states and those 
which have agreed to exclusively peaceful uses of the technology) have volun­
tary agreements and protocols with the IAEA for inspection to ensure that 
nuclear materials are not being diverted to military use.
There is overlap in the work of the IAEA and the European Commission 
on nuclear safeguards. The safety regime which has been adopted within the 
EU is based on the 25 safety principles of the IAEA and the International 
Convention on Nuclear Safety. In instances of duplication of effort the IAEA 
procedures are invoked to verify that those of the EURATOM Treaty have 
been adhered to. As the EURATOM Treaty is part of the acquis for all EU 
Member States the measures which are in place are supported through ru-
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lings of the European Court of Justice and a range of implementation mecha­
nisms. Whilst nuclear materials needed for defence are excluded from the ve­
rification procedures of the EURATOM Treaty, the EU states have in place 
a more comprehensive and effectively monitored review of those materials 
which are being used in the civilian nuclear reactors than that of the IAEA. 
Within the EU DG TREN, acting on behalf of the EAEC, is the central contact 
point with the IAEA. For the IAEA, monitoring, through inspection of nuc­
lear power plants to identify instances of possible non-compliance with the 
terms of the NPT is harder in other regions of the world.46
46 For example in Japan monitoring is done at national level, in Canada there are no national or regional 
structures in place, monitoring compliance with the NPT is done by the IAEA through its routine verifi­
cation procedures.
47 CEC, Decision on State Aid which the UI< government is planning to implement for BE Pic. COM 
(2004), 3474 final.
48 Case T-92/02 Stadtwerke Schwäbisch Hall GmbH et al. v the European Commission, 26th January 2006.
EURATOM - an alien in the liberalised energy market
The EURATOM Treaty is based on the paradigm of a high level of state support 
for the development of the new technologies because of the high costs entailed. As 
such the Treaty supports what is deemed an out-dated concept in EU energy 
policy where the paradigm of market functionality appears to have repla­
ced it. But both the EURATOM Treaty and the TEC may be used in dealing 
with questions relating to state aid to the electronuclear industry as shown 
in some recent European Court rulings. In 2002 state aid was agreed for Bri­
tish Energy (BE) (the UK’s privately owned nuclear generator), which had 
been experiencing financial difficulties. The UK government provided BE 
with a credit facility of £410 million and produced a re-structuring plan for 
the company. The re-structuring plan transferred BE’s nuclear waste liabili­
ties to the UK government, a series of measures worth approaching £6 bil­
lion of what was in effect state aid. Following an investigation of the re-struc- 
turing proposals the measure was approved by the European Commission. It 
was agreed by the Commission as appropriate to address the objectives outli­
ned and on the basis of the EURATOM Treaty articles relevant to worker sa­
fety and public protection.47
The TEC was the basis for the 2006 ruling of the Court of First Instance 
(CFI) in the case of a German tax exemption scheme as applied to nuclear po­
wer plants.48 Provisions in German law require nuclear power plants to set up 
reserves to cover the costs of disposing of irradiated fuel and radioactive wa­
ste and closure of plants. These reserves may be counted amongst the liabi­
lities of the undertakings and are subject to a reduction in the tax burden. In 
1999 three German utilities requested that the European Commission should 
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investigate the tax exemption scheme which was being applied to those re­
serves. In presenting its findings the CFI concluded that there was an advan­
tage from lower taxes to the nuclear power plants but that it did not grant the 
specific advantage inherent to the idea of state aid.
Following the licensing by the Finnish government of the construction of an 
advanced Generation III European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR) at the Ol- 
kiluoto site in Finland the European Renewable Energies Federation (EREF) fi­
led an action with DG Competition of the European Commission. The compla­
int was brought using the TEC and calling for an investigation of the new reactor 
development on the grounds of infractions of EU state aid requirements, export 
credits, public procurement legislation and safety. The Commission launched an 
investigation of competition in the electricity sector as a whole in 2006. The ove­
rall objective of the sector enquiry was to address a number of matters impeding 
the development of a functioning, open and competitive EU wide energy market 
by 1st July 2007. Whilst the specific complaint of the EREF was not addressed, it is 
evident that in any investigation of state investment, loans at special rates, or su­
pport for the export of materials the case will not be based on difficulties which 
the electronuclear industry faces in the market. The findings of the Commission 
will be based on the overall impact on the European energy market of the pro­
duction of electricity from the new reactor development.
EURATOM - undemocratic and in need of a 'spring clean'
This criticism primarily relates to the unchanged nature of the Treaty ad­
opted in 1957, prior to the introduction of direct elections to the EP in 1979. 
As a result there is no requirement for the Council of Ministers to do anything 
more than formally consult the EP on substantive issues. As there are a num­
ber of safety related issues considered to be of importance to the public it is 
the view of the EU that “(I)t can be plausibly argued that it is precisely in those 
areas ... relating to safety that the public most feels the need for rigorous de­
mocratic scrutiny, control and accountability.”49
49 EP, The European Parliament and the EURATOM Treaty: past, present andfuture. (2002, 2) Energy and 
Research Paper ENER 114 European Parliament.
50 Proposal for an Additional Act to be added to the Constitution on the peaceful use of Atomic Energy 
In an attempt to address this inconsistency of the role of the EP between 
the EURATOM Treaty and the TEC a proposal for an amendment to the Tre­
aty was made to the Convention on the Future of Europe by the European 
Commission. The proposal was to ensure that the “Parliament is restored to 
the institutional system, as it is given the power to adopt with the Council, 
‘laws’ for basic standards whereas at present it is very much outside the deci­
sion making process.”50 A view which continues to receive support from the 
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Commission but as the national governments have decided to leave the Tre­
aty substantively unaltered the EP continues with few formal powers in EAEC 
decision-making.
Support for new developments -something for everyone?
The work of the EAEC began in the 1950s when the new nuclear tech­
nology was regarded as an important way to meet growing energy demand. 
The requirements of the 1950s were for investment in the state-owned utili­
ties to encourage energy developments and stimulate economic growth. As 
part of that investment and support funding for research into fission techno­
logy developments was included in the EURATOM Treaty (Article 7 EURA­
TOM). Since the 1980s, the EU has developed a successive series of Research 
and Technology Development (RTD) programmes, which now include the 
EURATOM programmes. Funding for the EURATOM Research programme 
was included in the most recent of these the Seventh Framework RTD pro­
gramme (FP7) proposed by the Commission (2007-2013). However the EU­
RATOM budget was not forwarded for scrutiny to the European Parliament 
with the other elements of the FP7 Budget, as this is not a requirement under 
the terms of the Treaty.
Agreement on the EURATOM research budget for the EURATOM was 
difficult to achieve in the Council of Ministers because of the divergent views 
of the national governments about further developments in nuclear fission 
technology. Interest has grown in fusion technology as it is perceived as a less 
hazardous technology than fission as it does not produce as much radioactive 
waste and in using a variety of more abundant fuels reduces dependency on 
uranium.
The Austrian government exercised its veto on the funding for nuclear fis­
sion technology, other than that associated with decommissioning reactors 
and safe disposal of radioactive waste.* 51  Agreement was eventually reached 
in the Council of Ministers on July 24th 2006 with the bulk of available fun­
ding being directed to new fusion technology developments.52 As a result 2.1 
billion euros of the EURATOM budget are to be allocated to fusion research 
and in particular the development of the International Thermonuclear Ex­
perimental Reactor (ITER) under the auspices of the International Atomic
(the 'Penelope Paper( prepared by the Commission task force led by Francois Lamoureux, Director-Ge­
neral DG TREN).
51 Nuclear fission - is the process of splitting molecules of uranium-235 in order to produce energy and 
is the basis of the nuclear technology currently used.
52 Nuclear fusion - is the process of fusing two hydrogen atoms to form a single atom of helium. One 
gramme of the fuel produced can develop the same energy as 45 barrels of oil. However the process re­
quires extremely high temperatures which it is not yet possible to achieve in a reactor.
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Energy Agency (IAEA). The agreement for the ITER development in Cadara- 
che, France, was signed in June 2006 and will include input from partners in 
Japan, China, India, Russia, South Korea and the United States. The ITER de­
velopment is regarded by many as having the potential to make a major con­
tribution to sustainable and secure energy supplies in Europe but is unlikely 
to be at the stage of commercial production before 2050 because of the dif­
ficulties of achieving and maintaining the high temperatures needed for the 
reaction to take place.
Conclusions
It appears unlikely that the EURATOM Treaty which established the Eu­
ropean Atomic Energy Community will be repealed or amended in the fore­
seeable future. It is a Treaty adopted in 1957 and as such has "...at times an 
old-world air.”53 But as the analysis of this article has concluded it does have 
the capacity to deal with a number of issues which are highly relevant in the 
context of the contemporary European Union. It is a Treaty in which the sig­
natory States have agreed to confer a limited competence for supranational 
action. But in some areas of the limited action the Treaty may be considered 
to be a success. In the light of the reluctance of the national governments in 
the most recent debates about Treaty change to repeal or significantly amend 
the EURATOM Treaty this article has concentrated on analysing where it re­
tains value and as a result may make an effective contribution to the energy 
challenges facing the EU.
53 Secretariat of the European Convention, Contribution by Mr. Klaus Hansch The Future of the EURA­
TOM Treaty, (2002, 4) CONTRIB 121, CONV 344/02, Brussels, 14th October.
The lack of action by the national governments to make changes to the 
EURATOM Treaty means that the role for the European Parliament re­
mains unaltered in the decision making process of the European Atomic 
Energy Community. Thus the criticism that the Treaty continues to be un­
democratic and lacking in accountability may be upheld. However a num­
ber of categories of risk have been identified in association with the nuclear 
sector. They include the cost of the technology and in particular de-com- 
missioning of the large number of now-ageing European reactors, safety 
(including safe operation of reactors, prevention of accidents, safety in the 
context of terrorism attack at nuclear power plants), waste disposal, in par­
ticular long-term management of waste and the possibilities of nuclear 
weapons proliferation if the use of nuclear technology is increased. There is 
a danger that if the competence for action in the nuclear sector was to be 
re-nationalised it would be considerably more difficult in a Union of T1 
states with diverse national nuclear policies for co-operative and collabora­
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tive action on these aspects of safety to be developed. It is for these issues 
that the EURATOM Treaty retains its importance as the legal and constitu­
tional framework for the nuclear sector and an essential component of the 
energy acquis within the European Union.
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• Professor Manfred Weiss, PhD - Frankfurt University
I have a question for Professor Arnold. I fully agree with your concept of 
substantial or functional constitution, my problem is only that I have a feeling 
that this constitution is a little bit contradictory. On the one hand, in a situation 
where it has become extremely difficult to legislate, we are facilitating now the 
legislative process by facilitating majority voting. On the other hand, and here 
I think we have a disagreement, the subsidiarity principle is strengthened in 
a way, which nobody knows exactly, but I have a suspicion, will make it extre­
mely difficult to legislate on European level. Do you think that this is a contra­
diction, and do you think that it would have been better perhaps to weaken 
the subsidiarity principle instead of strengthening it?
• Professor Rolf Grawert, PhD - University of Bochum
A question to Mr Arnold: I agree with your concept of a constitution. 
I would say, that is a question actually, is it not a concept for the Court? Be­
cause the Court of Justice declares that the Treaties are the functional con­
stitution. Is it not nowadays a concept for the Court to do what the member 
states did not want to do? To explain and to develop something that we may 
call a functional constitution?
• Professor Kazimierz Dzialocha, PhD - Professor Edward Lipinski
University College of Economics and Administration in Kielce*
* Professor emeritus of the University of Wroclaw, Judge of the Constitutional Tribunal from 1985 to 
1993.
I have a question with reference to the excellent speech by Professor Ar­
nold. The question refers to the principle of subsidiarity and its place among 
those tendencies of contemporary constitutionalism that you have presented 
so clearly. I have not managed in a any direct way to find room for this prin­
ciple which in my opinion seems to be one of the most basic and characteri­
stic rules of contemporary constitutionalism. Maybe you believe it is situated
TREATIES - CONSTITUTIONS
among the four you mentioned: anthropocentrism, rule of law, differentia­
tion of power, and internationalisation of law? I do not know where, but I wo­
uld feel some regret if we missed this principle which is typical also for the 
part of Europe in which we are debating today, namely for the post-commu­
nist countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. All constitutions of these 
countries have adopted, to a greater or lesser extent, the principle of subsi­
diarity. The 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland is very strongly ro­
oted in this principle. We were worried in the last 2 years that there were at­
tempts to undermine this principle, by acting in the spirit of etatist attitudes 
and centralism. Yet one could always say: these practices contradict the con­
stitution, the subsidiarity principle, on which the Polish constitution is based. 
But I perceive it differently. We know that it is also the fundament of the le­
gal order of the EU, so it seems to me that it needs to be taken into account 
somewhere, either among the four principles or tendencies that you mentio­
ned, or possibly in its own positions, taking it to be one of the pillars of con­
temporary constitutionalism, and at the same time an underlying principle of 
the legal order of the EU.
• Professor Reiner Arnold, PhD - Regensburg University
Let me begin with subsidiarity, because this is, well, in a certain contrast­
ing way mentioned by you, Professor Weiss, and by Professor Dzialocha. In 
my system, so to say, subsidiarity is important of course, in this main ele­
ment of vertical differentiation of power. In the state orders subsidiarity is of­
ten not named. It is indeed expressly, explicitly named in the Polish consti­
tution, not in the German one, for example - well, now with Article 23, but 
in fact it was Article 72 until our federalism reform, which was maybe the 
heart of subsidiarity. At the state level, I think regionalism, this means distri­
buting central power is an expression of subsidiarity, I think both in the com­
munity and in the members states it is clear that political and constitutional 
stability cannot be fully maintained and assured by centralised systems. Be­
cause the autonomy of the parts of the community and the state is also a com­
munity, the autonomy and the responsibility and the consciousness to have 
the power to decide I think is very important, and stability can only really be 
assured by such a decentralisation, and I think it is the origin of this princi­
ple of subsidiarity it is taken from the individual, form the personality, that 
it is important that the individual has rights a place to develop his responsi­
bility, and this is by nature something that belongs to a human being. But also 
in other systems, which are not legal person systems, like state or community, 




The other question is, does this principle in the new form hinder too 
much, because of course each principle can be abused or over-accentuated, 
so if the decent realisation would go so far that there is no longer realistic 
central power, this would be a contrasting effect. I think, as to the protocol 
which is here, what is important is that parliaments are now involved, they 
are the addressees of the competencies which are exercised by the communi­
ties, and I think they can take the first step. But of course there must be a cer­
tain number of parliaments, so that it is relative. If it is clear within Europe 
that this is a violation of subsidiarity, then this political alarm process goes 
on. As a whole I would not say that this hinders too much, the way it is con­
ceived. I was always wondering why this principle existing in a written from 
since the Maastricht Treaty has not been much used until now, maybe it can 
be that the Community now refrains more from legislating too much, this is 
maybe an effect. But the ECJ has never annulled a legal act for being contrary 
to subsidiarity. On the other hand in Germany the Bundesraat, the federal 
council, often referred to this, but it was nevertheless maybe in result not so 
efficient. So I would say subsidiarity is something very important. Exaggera­
tion is not good, this is clear, but I do not see at the moment that it could be 
abused, so I would say.
Professor Grawert, yes, indeed, I think it was first the German Constitu­
tional Court which called community law constitutional. It was forgotten and 
rediscovered. It was in some decision of the ECJ which first called it, at a su­
pra-national level, constitutional. And this is closely connected to the idea of 
Costa v. ENEL, because here the specificity of community law was explained. 
I think it is not a big step to say “this is something which we could also name 
constitutional law”. The Union is not a state, but nevertheless many mecha­
nisms are state-like or very close to the state mechanisms, and so the step is 
not so difficult to take with this constitutional concept. It is the peoples who 
are not aware of this, or the states, the Netherlands and France, or Great Bri­
tain even, but you have also nice books on European constitutional law, so it 
is also entering into British, English consciousness, and so it is maybe a pro­
cess that peoples or the academic elites are more and more convinced that 
we can use this word.
On the other hand, the peoples rejected a formal constitution, or some 
peoples, it is a very small margin, the refusal is not so high in comparison to 
the people who through their parliaments for example consented to this term 
of formal constitution. Personally I regret that the term is no longer used, or 
for a while not used. It is for pragmatic reasons, it is indispensable I suppose, 
but the difference is that it is more political integration, politics would have 
been supported and developed and strengthened by this word, it is more psy­
chological, better for creating an identity. Maybe also to some extent legal, but
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I think if it is called basic treaty, or constitution, or basic law, it is maybe not 
decisive. If this reform treaty was called fundamental treaty, we could reflect 
on whether it is a formal constitution or not. Some say that it is not a consti­
tution because it is no longer one document. I am not sure. Maybe juridically 
it cannot be proved in a clear way what is and what is not a constitution, we 
have intermediate phenomena, and I think the terminology is made by the 
society, this means by a convention, this means it is not a legal definition but 
the term is accepted by a part of the academics or the politicians, while others 
refuse it. Those who think there is no formal constitution are currently in the 
majority, this is a new approach, it is clear that it would be very courageous to 
say now "this is not a treaty in substance, it is a constitution”. Myself I say it is 
constitutional law, but in the form of a treaty. So what I want to say is to great 
extent matter of name, the substance is important, it is clear, but nevertheless 
I regret that it is omitted.
• Professor Kazimierz Dzialocha, PhD - Professor Edward Lipinski 
University College of Economics and Administration in Kielce
I would like to say that the participants of this conference were very sur­
prised today to hear about certain changes in the future concept of the Treaty. 
The question arises then what is the legal situation at present in this aspect. 
From what we have heard, Article 10 section 1 part 2 of the draft European 
Constitution, which said clearly that the Constitution and the legislation ad­
opted by the institutions of the EU have supremacy over member states legis­
lation, has been abandoned. What is the situation now, then? Is this principle 
still only visible in the rulings of the Court of Justice (i.e. the previous situa­
tion has been maintained), or is there -1 may not have heard clearly - there is 
a new place for this principle, but not in the Reform Treaty? That was the point 
I was going to raise in my question. I will give up asking it, because I had the 
intention of entering into a dispute with the speaker on this issue.
The second point is: What does Mr Klich think of the suspension of the va­
lidity of the Charter of Fundamental Rights towards Poland? We have been 
told by the press and the politicians about it. I’d like to put forward a point for 
discussion: what is the justification of this position? Other than ideological and 
political, which I can understand, given who makes these statements. But what 
is the legal justification for this course of action? Given that we are a party to 
the Convention on Human Rights, and moreover, and before that, the UN Co­
venant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, a party to the Social Charter, 
etc., and our constitution is not afraid, so to say, of positions that we are afraid 
of now just because they are included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
This matter requires an explanation, because everything we deny when we re­
fuse to adopt the Charter, we already have in our legislation. Maybe not expres-
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sis verbis, but the legal system is of such a nature that all the elements which are 
being questioned today are already binding upon us.
• Professor Rolf Grawert, PhD - University of Bochum
I will not discuss the several lectures but I will look forward. We must discuss 
and decide, decide and discuss, if the Constitution should say only what is the 
stage of the society nowadays, or if it should be a programme. In the history 
it has been both, and we should decide what it should become for Europe. Se­
condly, the democratic deficit. I think we must discuss not only the deficit but 
also how we should develop democracy, for instance common elections: no­
body discusses common elections, only by nationality. We must strengthen Eu­
ropean marketing by media and all the universities and so on, and we lawyers 
must develop something that I would call European dogmatic: how we under­
stand European laws, what principles we follow for interpretation. We have to 
develop a common mentality for European jurists. Thirdly, the problem of the 
federation of the community of Europe. A federation is, like sovereignty, a fluid 
concept (that is a very good expression!): a federation is marked by an open 
process that stems from the Treaty on the European Community. In a federa­
tion the laws of the several states influence one another, and I think we are in 
the process of influencing one another, even if we do not want to know this. Be­
tween the constitution, the normal process of cooperation, even between the 
Court of Justice, Bundesverfassungsgericht (the Constitutional Court of Ger­
many), developed the process of cooperation with the Court of Justice in Lu­
xembourg. But I am a little bit afraid. In former times, the Constitutional Court 
of Germany developed its jurisprudence. Afterwards they said we have a state 
of laws that is sufficient. But in the newest decisions it goes a little bit to natio­
nalism, and I am afraid. Perhaps the court is afraid about the extending compe­
tencies, made by the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, but the Court of Justice 
is the real constitutional institution in Europe, so it has it its hands the functio­
nal constitution of the European Constitution. But the Court of Justice is less 
democratic than the other institutions — they are only lawyers! And finally, the 
concept of sovereignty, that is a great problem in Poland. I know it. In Germany, 
we do not have this problem because after World War II we got our sovereignty 
at the same time when we gave it back to Europe. That’s our mentality after the 
war. We got our sovereignty back from the USA and we gave it back to Europe. 
Therefore, we do not have this problem, even if nationalism now is re-emerging 
in Germany, but I think if we take the concept of sovereignty as a fluid concept, 
than we can work with this. Go step by step forward, not only look back.
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• Professor Manfred Weiss, PhD - Frankfurt University
I think all the presentations were extremely impressive. But they left out one 
dimension which I think is of utmost importance. We can talk at length about, 
let us say, facilitating majority votes and I do not know what else, with the new 
Treaty. But neither the former Constitutional Treaty, which couldn’t be rati­
fied, nor the new Reform Treaty are giving us an answer on where we are going. 
What do I mean by this? The Treaty we had so far, with all its amendments, ne­
ver resolved a basic question. The basic question in my view is: what is the rela­
tionship between the so-called market freedoms, which are stemming from the 
original treaty, which was the Treaty on the European Community, Economic 
Community at that time, and the social dimension. And here we have an open 
area, and it is pretty clear that there is a predominance of the so-called market 
freedoms. And the poor Court of Justice, whom you called undemocratic, al­
ways has the task to make corrections. At the moment we have quite a few pen­
ding cases where everybody expects from this poor Court to make decisions, 
make judgements, against the spirit of the Treaty. And I would say: as long as we 
do not change the Treaty in this respect, and take seriously what we have em­
bedded in the Charter, as long as we do not do this, we should not be talking of 
all these formalities. They are useless.
• Professor Jo Carby-Hall, PhD - The University of Hull
I just want to be extremely brief and answer the question, the very first 
question the learned professor has asked, in the place of the member of the Eu­
ropean Parliament who is not with us. I should be very brief. There is absolu­
tely no doubt, and I shall qualify this statement in a minute, that there is su­
premacy of European law over national laws. There is no doubt at all about 
that. This is not found in any Treaty, not found in any Treaty whatsoever, but 
it is the development of the European Court of Justice. And it is this develop­
ment that has brought out the supremacy of European law over national laws. 
And the reason for that is that in certain spheres European law, not national 
laws, European law must predominate if we are to have a European groups of 
states, member states. And that is the raison d’etre, the reasoning behind this 
concept.
The second part of your question, I will just answer very briefly again. The 
Constitutional Treaty is, as I suggested earlier on, dead, but it will appear in 
a declaration attached to the Reform Treaty. A declaration which will talk 
about the supremacy of European law. And if you want my personal opinion, 
I think that it is not necessary. It is not necessary to put that in the Treaty, it 
is not even necessary to put it in a declaration. Because it is a fait accompli, 
it is well known, that the Court of Justice has pronounced on this in a num- 
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ber of cases, which the MEP, the Polish MEP talked about, Costa v ENEL be­
ing the most important.
• Ewa Popławska, PhD — Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw
I would like to express a remark connected with the paper by Professor Ja- 
skiernia, and ask one question to the professor. It may be surprising, but in 
the Reform Treaty I read, at least fragments of the draft of the 5th of October, 
so we may assume that it is the text which was agreed upon the few days ago, 
in the protocol on using subsidiary and proportionality principles, the provi­
sions about the early warning system were very much expanded. Moreover, 
the period for issuing positions of national parliaments with regard to pro­
posed EU legislation was extended from 6 (in the Constitution) to 8 weeks 
as well, in light of the subsidiary principle. I can see a common characteristic 
of this phenomenon with basic changes introduced by the Reform Treaty, as 
compared to the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. In my opi­
nion, it is a reflection of the same line of thought which resulted in the remo­
val of the quasi-national, quasi-federal symbols of the Union. This is another 
step towards satisfying the national level, particularly the national parlia­
ments, which should play a significant role in struggling with the democra­
tic deficit. I believe this is an action of a symbolic nature, not to say that it is 
just a small detail aimed at distorting the view of the actual character of the 
EU decision-making processes. Why do I have the impression that this boost 
for the national parliaments is mostly of a symbolic nature? This is what Pro­
fessor Jaskiernia raised when he spoke of the low level of activity of the natio­
nal parliaments, and how the opportunities are wasted that these parliaments 
have even now, under the current regulations, to influence European legisla­
tion. The second argument which the character of this regulation regarding 
national parliaments is symbolic is that the question remains open as to how 
the European law-making institutions will react to a protest of a majority of 
parliaments claiming that a draft law violates the subsidiary principle. These 
institutions may still uphold their draft. They may change it too, but uphol­
ding to is definitely an option. Options include an amendment, a withdrawal, 
but they also include upholding the draft.
Moving on to my question now. I understand that this extension of the de­
cision period for national parliaments for up to 8 weeks is connected with 
the conclusions worded in the papers of the Conference of Community and 
European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (CO- 
SAC). COSAC has been advocating an increase in the role of national parlia­
ments in the decision-making process and has been working to improve the 
quality of communication and the flow of information between national par­
liaments. I would be very interested to hear the position of Professor Jaskier-
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nia with regard to this matter. On the one hand, we see activism of some par­
liaments, but on the other hand there is inertia of others who seem to have 
little interest in the opportunities provided for them to influence European 
legislation. I would therefore like to ask, in the light of the intensification of 
contacts between parliaments, is it not likely a tendency will appear for par­
liaments to try to seek unanimity in their opinion on the proposed legisla­
tion? Is there a risk that parliaments who are stronger will take a certain po­
sition while others, having paid little attention to the matter at hand, will 
automatically copy their decisions? While I believe that it is good that par­
liaments try to coordinate their activities, I also realise that, given the imba­
lance of power between parliaments, it is possible that some parliaments will 
dominate while others will adopt a passive approach.
• Professor Jerzy Jaskiernia, PhD - Świętokrzyski Academy
A number of questions have been asked, and I believe it is the duty of 
speakers to provide some kind of answer - otherwise there would be the im­
pression that they are running away from the problems raised. Professor Gra- 
wert asked whether we should speak of a democratic deficit or rather of a need 
to build democracy. I understand the allusion: there is the opinion that the de­
ficiencies are exaggerated while positive aspects are being overlooked. Myself 
I see no contradiction here. When we speak of a democratic deficit, we note 
that it is being lessened. We speak of many flaws, but if we compare the Maa­
stricht Treaty with the Amsterdam Treaty with the Nice Treaty and finally 
with the European Constitution, and the Reform Treaty, we notice constant 
progress. It is small but steady. Of course, one may ask: should not more be 
done in terms of positive solutions? Professor Grawert suggested common 
elections, a common electoral law for parliamentary elections. I believe to­
day it is too early to do so, and I will support this view by quoting the con­
troversies surrounding the elections to the European Parliament. This seems 
to be the obvious area of seeking common solutions. One might say that the 
national parliaments are burdened with their specifics, traditions, historical 
circumstances — this is difficult to harmonise. The European Parliament is 
free from such burdens, but even in this case it has been very difficult to find 
approval for common solutions. That said, it is necessary that common va­
lues exist in the area of the quality and freedom of elections, and I would like 
to add here that these considerations cannot take place in separation from 
other institutions. We keep talking here of the European Union, but it is the 
Council of Europe that by definition is supposed to encourage progress in 
the area of democracy and human rights, and the Council has truly done 
a lot of work in this respect. Secondly, the Organisation for Security and Coo­
peration in Europe. This is the chief organisation which monitors elections.
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In Poland recently we had an incident related to attempts to bar the presence 
of observers. Fortunately now the situation has been resolved. It seems to me 
therefore that the problem of the quality of elections is not one that the Euro­
pean Union is to handle alone. I do however share Professor Grawert’s point 
that it would be desirable to undertake efforts to unify electoral procedures 
across member states.
Let me now move on to the second problem that was raised. Should we 
discuss formalities? I think we should rather address the fundamental dispute 
between free market economy and the social aspect. I believe both are ne­
cessary. The suggestion is legitimate, of course, that a great dilemma resides 
there, but the dilemma cannot be overcome until the public opinion is unified 
on the subject matter. Right now in Europe we have the Christian-democra­
tic approach, the social democratic approach, and the liberal approach. It 
would be wrong to say that the entire Europe is unified in understanding of 
what market freedom is, and even more what the social dimension should ide­
ally constitute, i.e. social cohesion. There is great differentiation in this aspect. 
This is very well visible in Great Britain, where Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and 
Margaret Thatcher all presented differing views on this issue. Thus even wit­
hin one state the electorate decided which of these aspects were preferred. 
Nonetheless, one must realise that the formal questions create a situation 
which is conducive to considering these problems and to seeking a shared 
policy. I believe there is no need to put these two concepts in opposition.
Finally, let me move to the matter raised by Dr Popławska regarding the 
early warning system. First of all, it appears to me that the extension of the 
period is a very good idea, because this makes the mechanism more realistic. 
It had been a clear signal from COSAC that the period had been too short. 
The key problem in my opinion is that the final step has not been taken: what 
happens now to criticism expressed within the early warning system? I think 
this is quite typical for the European approach to national parliaments: it al­
ways gives them something, but it stops short of going the whole way. It rea­
ches out with a carrot, but the carrot is never big enough. This actually stems 
from the approach of governments. It is the governments who believe that 
they themselves represent the member states. The governments are ready to 
listen to what the parliaments have to say, but they want to retain their final 
decision-making powers. The message to the parliaments is as follows: yes, 
you are titled to speak up, to express you opinion, to study the documents, to 
have your say. But the decision belongs to the governments. As long as this 
matter is not resolved, until we have a system where the co-deciding by mem­
bers of governments and parliaments is more realistic - until then, as long as 
the governments prevail, the final step will not have been taken.
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Dr Poplawska’s comment is accurate, there is a crack in the reasoning be­
hind the regulations. I suppose this has been made on purpose. Is there a risk 
that some parliaments will choose a tactical approach? We have been obser­
ving this mechanism in many aspects, not only with regard to the coopera­
tion between national parliaments, but also in the fact that certain countries, 
which I will not name in order not to politicise the discussion, in the process 
of European integration also had adopted the kind of approach where they 
remained silent just in case, or voiced their objections very quietly and in 
a manner ensuring that nobody gets nervous. Germany, France and other key 
players were looked up to. Poland in this respect tended to be the naughty boy, 
which not everybody approved of.
I believe the chief question is this: since the parliament is the representa­
tive of the will of the nation, and since this system has finally been introdu­
ced and there is a degree of coordination, this strengthens COSAC. Let me say 
here that I believe it is not realistic for COSAC to become the second cham­
ber of the European Parliament.
I believe the Union will choose to evolve gradually rather than to take the 
radical step of establishing a second chamber. I think it is too early now to 
speak of such solutions, which are not necessarily useful right now. First the 
decision must be made to use the existing instruments. The time to build new 
structures will come later. New structures mean new costs, new bureaucrats, 
and new threats to the democratic deficit. I would be very careful here.
• Diane Ryland - University of Lincoln
A little bit of bias here, but I would like to congratulate my colleague Pamela 
Barnes for an excellent paper. And it is Pamela that I would like to address my 
questions to. I will make it in the form of comments, but I have three points 
that I would like to add to your excellent paper on the “alien dinosaur” and why 
it will not go away and what we can do about it. The problem of the democratic 
deficit in the EURATOM Treaty. And I have three points. Nuclear waste is now 
being legislated upon under the European Community Treaties, soon to be the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The institution agreement 
between the Commission and the European Parliament that Pamela Barnes 
mentioned had emerged under the EURATOM Treaty. Could this progress to 
a protocol eventually, which is what happened to what was the Inter-Institutio­
nal Agreement on the Application of Subsidiary and Proportionality? A third 
point I would like to make is a question I would like to put forward for consi­
deration: as more and more competencies are being given to the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, energy, autonomy, climate change, could 
this make the EURATOM Treaty - I would like to say progressively obsolete? 
But maybe the term “extinct” would be more appropriate?
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• Pamela Barnes - University of Lincoln
To my colleague's comments: Could this progress to being a protocol in 
the Treaty? Or should we be thinking about getting rid of the EURATOM 
Treaty? I think you are getting to the point where you could have too many pro­
tocols. And I think by far the most efficient way of dealing with this would be to 
actually repeal the EURATOM Treaty and assimilate certain aspects of it into 
the main body of the Treaty, rather than leaving it, because as I said I think 
there are far too many protocols. And yes, I agree with you that there are 
other mechanisms by which you can deal with nuclear waste, and this of co­
urse is where the Treaty does have some relevance but still does not have in 
other areas, it can be used as a more flexible instrument. But as I said: I think 
the most efficient and the most effective way would be to repeal it and assi­
milate articles from it into the main body of the Treaty.
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The Future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy: 
Reform of the EU-Treaty
1. Structures and issues of the CFSP
1.1. Developments and Structures
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is one of the fastest grow­
ing issues in European law. In order to strengthen the security of the Union 
and its member states, the cooperation in this field has accelerated within the 
last few years. The Balkan wars have shown that the European states have to 
fight for peace not only in Africa or Palestine but in Europe itself. They failed 
to enforce peace and security in the Balkan wars of the 1990s and tried to 
learn from their mistakes. This was the starting point for an intensified coop­
eration within the European Union aiming at a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, establishing a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
The Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 implemented the CFSP as part of the 
Treaty on the European Union.1 In the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the po­
sition of the High Representative for the CFSP was created.1 2  Step by step, 
the European Union built up political structures to allow the realisation of 
this treaty law. The progress depended on the interests and on the will of 
the member states. Germany, France, Belgium or Spain promoted a strong 
CFSP and a strong common ESDP including the facilities for military op-
1 Fink-Hooijer, The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, EJIL 5 (1994) 173.
2 Regelsberger/Schmalz, The common foreign and security policy of the Amsterdam treaty: towards an 
improved EU identity on the international scene, in: Monar/Wessels (ed.), The European Union after the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, 2001, p. 249.
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erations. The United Kingdom and Denmark were reluctant and aimed at 
strengthening the European Union, because they did not want to endanger 
NATO and the relationship to the United States of America. In 1995, Aus­
tria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU and together with Ireland formed 
a group of states which have to defend their status of neutrality.3 The enlarge­
ment of 2004 brought Eastern European states like Poland in the EU which 
had fought hard to join the NATO. These states were sure that NATO could 
guarantee their security and therefore were reluctant towards the CFSP, be­
cause it was not evident that this policy could guarantee security as certainly 
as NATO was perceived to be able to do.
3 Cf. Lysen, Some Views on Neutrality and Membership of the European Communities: The Case of Swe­
den, CMLRev. 1992, 229; Hummer, Österreichs Neutralität und die GASP bzw. ESVP in der EU, SZIER 
2001, 443.
4 See in detail Regelsberger/Kugelmann, in: Streinz (Hrsg.), EUV/EGV, Commentary, 1st edition 2003, Art. 
23 EU.
The debate about the future of the CFSP is identical to the debate about 
the future of the European Union. The CFSP does not fall under the system 
of the Community law, the Community method is not applicable. The Euro­
pean Parliament has a certain political influence but it does not have powers 
of decision apart from budgetary aspects (Article 21 EU-Treaty). The Euro­
pean Commission is associated with the CFSP but de facto its influence and 
importance is limited (Article 27 EU-Treaty). According to Article 46 EU- 
Treaty, the European Court of Justice has no competence for Title V, meaning 
for the CFSP. The most important institution is the Council, which can de­
cide on Joint Actions (Article 14 EU-Treaty) and Common Positions (Article 
15 EU-Treaty). The Council acts unanimously (Article 23 para. 1 EU-Treaty).4 
Progress for the structure of the CFSP in the EU-Treaty depends on the mod­
ifications of the organisational and procedural framework.
The CFSP is a cooperation of member states’ governments according to 
the provisions of the EU Treaty. Therefore, the structure of the CFSP is closely 
linked to the fundamental question of national sovereignty in the EU and the 
division of competences. The EU is not a federal state, but a special kind of 
organisation of states. Who acts on the international level, the member states 
or the EU? Who guarantees security, the member states or the EU? The an­
swers have to take into account that no European state is able to guarantee 
security without other states. In the European Defence and Security Policy, 
the relationship to NATO and the relationship to the United Nations are the 
big political questions. In the field of foreign policy, the EU may fulfil certain 
tasks but cannot and will not replace the member states. The fundamental 
question is what kind of role the EU can play in the world.
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British, Polish or German views on those problems may be different. Even 
the view of the government, the parliament, the majority of citizens and the 
academics in a state may be different. First of all, the Foreign and Security 
Policy serves to realise the interests of a state. Defining these interests is an 
ongoing process. Interests may change. But a treaty is concluded at a cer­
tain point in time. The European Reform Treaty is supposed to be concluded 
2007. The provisions on the CFSP will be altered and the future of the CFSP 
depends on the answers to some crucial questions which have to be given at 
least partly by the concrete provisions. These key issues have to be analysed. 
The compromise on the contents of the Reform Treaty was reached by the 
heads of states and governments on 23 June 2007. However, there may occur 
changes in details.
7.2. Key issues
There are some key issues which are of principal importance for the fu­
ture development of the CFSP. The basis of the actual European policy is the 
European Security Strategy of December 8, 2003 (ESS).5 It states that the Eu­
ropean Union “is inevitably a global player”. As a consequence, the EU is ac­
tive in crisis management and preventive diplomacy throughout the world. 
Since 2002, the EU implements military missions within the framework of 
the Common Security and Defence Policy. But the stress of the EU activities 
as a whole lies on measures of non-military character.
5 A secure Europe in a better world - European Security Strategy, Dok 15895/03 (PESC 787) of 8 Decem­
ber 2003, accessible at the website of the High Representative on www.europa.eu.
6 Cf. Bonnen, Towards A Common European Security and Defence Policy, 2003; v. Wogau, The Path to Eu­
ropean Defence, 2004.
However, the Common Security and Defence Policy is crucial because 
nothing else in the CFSP touches national sovereignty as much as the ques­
tion of a European army.6 According to Article 17 par. 1 EU-Treaty, the CFSP 
shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the 
progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a com­
mon defence. Since the Heads of State and Government have taken crucial 
decisions at the Cologne summit in 1999, the development of the CSDP has 
led to a cooperation of unexpected intensity. The European Council restated 
in Helsinki 2002 the common European headline goal of installing a Rapid 
Deployment Force of 60.000 soldiers. One or two battle groups of about 2000 
soldiers each shall be ready to be deployed within 24 hours in a situation of 




Concerning the Common Security and Defence Policy, the relationship to 
NATO was a fundamental issue of conflict between the EU member states. 
The relationship to the United Nations has become more and more interest­
ing because the EU implements missions which are decided by the Security 
Council of the UN under Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter.
In the general context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the rela­
tionship to the system of the European Community describes the character of 
the CFSP. It may be closer to the principles of general international law ruled by 
the sovereignty of states or it may be closer to the Community method with a di­
vision of powers and a network system between member states and the institu­
tions of the EC. The contents of the policy are decided by the member states in 
the national context and then within the framework of the European Council and 
the Council. But the procedures which are applied in this frame are laid down in 
the EU Treaty. As the contents of foreign policy are necessarily highly flexible and 
the necessary measures barely to foresee, the procedures and institutions play an 
eminent role. Therefore, the position and competences of the High Representa­
tive for the CFSP are an important anchor for the structure of the CFSP.
2. Relationship to NATO
As a consequence of a stronger CFSP including a stronger European Se­
curity and Defence Policy, the relationship to NATO had to be clarified.7 In 
1998, the United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared that 
the future development has to take into account “three Ds”: no decoupling, 
no duplication, no discrimination. European decisions must not be decou­
pled from decisions within NATO. Structures and facilities of NATO must 
not be duplicated in the EU. Member states of NATO which are not member 
states of the EU must not be discriminated in operations of the EU.
7 Cornish/Edwards, Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginning of a European strategic culture, In­
ternational Affairs 77 (2001), 587.
8 Cf. www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm.
9 The Alliance's Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999, no. 18, see www. 
nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.
As early as June 3,1996, the Council of NATO decided in Berlin to imple­
ment a European Security and Defence Identity within the framework of the 
NATO.8 However, this decision did not entail far-reaching practical conse­
quences. As part of the general modification of the NATO after the end of the 
cold war, European security was taken into account. The new strategic con­
cept of the Alliance of April 24,1999 approved the implementation of a Euro­
pean Security and Defence Identity within the framework of NATO.9 The idea 
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as to strengthen the European elements within the NATO.10 But the United 
States underestimated the EU. The CFSP was developed with high speed and 
the European Security and Defence Policy was developed even faster. There­
fore, the European pillar within NATO has not gained any real importance. 
The specific European element in NATO is the cooperation with the EU. As 
a consequence, the cooperation needed a reliable fundament. This funda­
ment was created with the Berlin Plus Arrangement.11
10 Croft, Guaranteeing Europe's Security? Enlarging NATO again, International Affairs 78 (2002) 97.
11 Graf von Kielmannsegg, Die Verteidigungspolitik der Europäischen Union, 2005, p. 338 et seq; Dietrich, 
Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, 2006, p. 376 et seq.
12 The Agreement is not published, see the information at www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/index .htm.
A lot of fundamental problems on the operational level have been solved 
by the Berlin Plus Arrangement of December 16, 2002.12 It constitutes the 
link between the EU and NATO in terms of military operations. The Berlin 
Plus Agreement provides for the use of NATO facilities by the EU After the 
conclusion of the Berlin Plus Agreement and some practical experiences with 
the operations Concordia in Macedonia and Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
the cooperation between the EU and NATO seems to work well.
3. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and crisis 
management for the United Nations
The EU is active in crisis management and preventive diplomacy through­
out the world. Nevertheless, the EU concentrates on certain regions in order 
to realise an effective policy approach. In the ESDP, there are restrictions for 
military and police missions, because the given military and police capaci­
ties are limited.
3.1. International security
According to Article 11 of the EU-Treaty, the objectives of the CFSP are 
not only to safeguard the common values and the fundamental interests of 
the Union, to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and re­
spect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also to strengthen the 
security of the Union in all its ways and to preserve peace and strengthen in­
ternational security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.
The relationship to the United Nations is mainly governed by the provisions 
of the UN Charter. The role of the EU in peace-keeping and peace-enforcing op­
erations is growing. Since 2002, the EU has implemented military missions under 
the auspices of the United Nations and mostly in cooperation with NATO.
The EU took over the NATO-mission “Amber Fox” in Macedonia. In Bos­
nia-Herzegovina, the European Union Police Mission (EUPM), which was ap­
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proved by the Security Council of the UN13, is the decisive pillar of the peace­
keeping structures.14 The operation Artemis in the Republic of Congo, which 
ended on September 1, 2003, was the first case of peace-enforcing by EU mil­
itary forces without preparation by NATO and out of Europe.15
13 Res. 1396 (2002).
14 Council Joint Action 2002/210/GASP of 11 March 2002, OJ 2002 L 70/1 of 13 March 2002.
15 Council Joint Action 2003/92/GASP of 27 January 2003, OJ L 34/1 of 11 February 2003.
16 Council Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP of 28 June 2004 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in 
Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS, OJ L 228 of 29 June 2004, p. 21.
17 Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP of 7 March 2005 on the European Union Integrated Rule of Law 
Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX, OJ No. L 62 of 9 March 2005, p. 37.
18 Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004 on the European Union Police Mission in 
Kinshasa (DRC) regarding the Integrated Police Unit (EUPOL Kinshasa), OJ No. L 367 of 14 December
2004, p. 30.
19 Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005 on the European mission to provide advice and as­
sistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), OJ No. L 112 of 3 May
2005, p. 20.
20 Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP of 12 December 2005 on establishing a European Union Border As­
sistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah), OJ No. L 327 of 14 December 2005, p. 28.
The EU is ready to take over international responsibility including mili­
tary operations. In this context, the CFSP requires close cooperation with the 
United Nations. The main objective of the United Nations, laid down in Arti­
cle 1 UN Charter, is to preserve peace and international security. But the UN 
needs support because it does not have own military or police capacities for 
concrete operations. At this point, the activities of the EU may strengthen its 
role on the international level.
3.2. Non-military actions and preventive measures
The strategic concept of the European Security Strategy aims at the preven­
tion of crisis and conflicts and stresses the civilian power of the EU. Defending 
the common values of the EU means to support the realisation of these val­
ues all over the world. Of course, the EU has to concentrate on certain regions. 
Nevertheless, the non-military actions are often smaller and cheaper than mil­
itary actions and can be implemented in a greater number of regions.
The EU has implemented missions to strengthen the rule of law in Geor­
gia (EUJUST THEMIS)16 and in Iraq (EUJUST LEX).17 In 2007, a police mis­
sion in the Republic of Congo is realised (EUPOL Kinshasa).18 Another oper­
ation, which has started on June 8, 2005, concerns the reform of the security 
sector in the Repubic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo).19 The EU BAM Rafah is 
supposed to support the Palestinian Autonomy Administration in the con­
trols at Rafah.20 It started on 25 November 2005 and is continued. Aiming at 
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consulting and supporting the Palestinian Police, on 1 January 2006 the EU 
implemented the police mission EUPOL COPPS.21
21 Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 November 2005 on establishing a European Union Coordina­
tion Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS), OJ No. L 300 of 17 November 2005, p. 65.
22 See H.-J. Cremer, Article 1-28, Article 1-40 and Article 1-41, in: Calliess/Ruffert (ed.), Verfassung der Eu­
ropäischen Union, Kommentar der Grundlagenbestimmungen (Teil I), 2006; Kadelbach, Die Gemeinsame 
Außenpolitik nach dem Verfassungsvertrag, in Hofmann/Zimmermann (ed.), Eine Verfassung für Europa, 
2004, p. 145; Stein, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik nach der geplanten EU-Verfassung - nur virtu­
ell? in Hofmann/Zimmermann (ed.), Eine Verfassung für Europa, 2004, p. 179.
At its core, the European Union is a civilian power, not a military one. 
This does not exclude common military operations in order to fight for the 
common values. The improvement of the international reputation of the EU 
as political and not only an economical global player depends from the abil­
ity to implement peace-keeping missions in cooperation with the United 
Nations. According to the draft text, the Reform Treaty will lay down that 
the Union may use the CSDP for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and 
strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of 
the United Nations Charter. The European Union may be engaged in mil­
itary operations, but the main field of activity shall be peace-keeping and 
preventive action.
4. Developments and the Reform Treaty
The Reform Treaty will have to take into account that the European Union 
law provides for a procedural framework of policy-making in the CFSP which 
has to be adapted to future challenges. The Treaty on the European Constitu­
tion would have integrated the CFSP into the general framework of European 
Union law and in principle would have finished with the intergovernmental 
character.22 The Reform Treaty will be more restrictive with the application of 
Community law and the Community method to the CFSP.
Whereas the range of the Community method will be extended to big 
parts of the area of freedom, security and justice policies, the Common For­
eign and Security Policy will keep most of its special characteristics like the 
unanimous decision-taking. As a consequence of the Reform Treaty, the pil­
lar construction of the EU will be altered into a single construction of a Euro­
pean Union possessing legal personality. However, there are a lot of exemp­
tions especially for the CFSP, which attribute to this area of policy a specific 
character. The most visible element of this character is the decision-making 
procedure, staying as complicated as it is. The CFSP will keep most of its in­
tergovernmental character.
There will be no European Foreign Minister. But the situation of the High 
Representative will be changed. The position of a High Representative of the 
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Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is created who will also be vice- 
president of the Commission. The High Representative will wear a “double 
hat”. His task will be to increase the coherence and visibility of the EU’s exter­
nal action. Representative functions will have to be shared with the President 
of the European Council. An European External Action Service will support 
the High Representative. This construction seems to be not too far away from 
the construction of a European Foreign Minister, only the name has changed. 
The influence of the Commission as an institution will be restricted.23 This is 
a consequence of the position of the High Representative as vice-president 
of the Commission. It will be his or her task to guarantee the coherence of 
foreign activities. However, it should be borne in mind that decisions in the 
Commission are taken by a majority.
23 H.-J. Cremer, in: Calliess/Ruffert (ed.), EUV/EGV, Commentary, 2007, Art. 27 EUV, No. 3.
The Political and Security Committee (Article 25 EU-Treaty) is of enor­
mous practical importance. It monitors the international situation and de­
livers opinions to the Council. On the operational level, there is a chance of 
progress for the CFSP by formally and also practically upgrading the role of 
the Committee.
In the Common Security and Defence Policy, specific decision-making 
procedures will be applied. It should be seen as a success that the way shall be 
paved for an easier reinforced cooperation amongst a smaller group of states. 
The existing possibilities of enhanced cooperation (Article 27a et seq EU- 
Treaty) have not yet been used. They are too formal and complicated. How­
ever, if there is no consensus reached in the Council, an enhanced coopera­
tion of the willing may allow effective contributions to crisis management. 
The Treaty on the European Constitution would have provided for a struc­
tured cooperation of some member states. The Reform Treaty will probably 
bring similar structures. In the process of reform, the member states should 
open the door for actions by groups of member states. This does not weaken 
the EU, but strengthens its capacity of acting.
5. Conclusion
In all member states, foreign policy and security policy are issues of lim­
ited influence of the parliaments and a dominant position of the govern­
ments. The margin of appreciation of the government is wide. According to 
the constitutional order of the states, there are only a few organisational or 
procedural limits, if any. This basic structure also shapes the European For­
eign and Security Policy. The influence of the law of the EU is restricted to 
a general frame. As a consequence, the member State Governments play an 
eminent role in the CFSP. However, the legal framework of European Union
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law is more detailed than in some member states. It is not only a loose co­
operation of governments under international law but an intergovernmen­
tal cooperation within a procedural framework which is influenced by insti­
tutions of the European Union, especially the High Representative and the 
Commission.
The Reform Treaty will have to take into account that the European Union 
law provides for a procedural framework of policy-making which has to 
be adapted to future challenges. The member states will keep their essen­
tial role in the CFSP, especially concerning the contents of the political deci­
sions. However, the European element has to be strengthened in order to al­
low the CFSP to work in a Union of 27 states. Coherence must be established 
by strengthening the role of the European institutions within the CFSP. This 
concerns the High Representative but also the European Commission, both 
defining and expressing the European interests. The reform of the mecha­
nisms of enhanced cooperation should allow for effective implementation of 
measures by a group of member states. A coalition of the willing should be 
able to take joint actions. The majority of the actions should be of civilian 
character, in order to strengthen the role of the EU in peace-keeping and to 
minimise possible conflicts with its member states. Finally, the crux is the 
unanimous decision-making. As long as every member state is able to pre­
vent the EU from acting, there is a sign of the prevailing of member states in­
terests. The Common Foreign and Security Policy will always be a story of 
failure and success. But an ever closer Union should be put in the situation to 
go through failures of its own and to achieve its own success stories.
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EU System of Competences in the Light of the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe: an Attempt at an 
Analysis of Terms
If we applied the formula The King is dead. Long live the King! to the proc­
ess of building constitutional unity in Europe, we should cry out, now that the 
French and the Dutch have rejected in their national referenda the Treaty Es­
tablishing a Constitution for Europe: Long live the Reform Treaty!
The problem is that the Reform Treaty is “dead” too, rejected this time 
by the Irish. We may well set aside the analysis of the reasons for this unex­
pected “death”.
However, we cannot set aside an attempt to study carefully the solutions 
that were proposed in the Constitutional Treaty, since this will allow us to 
gain better understanding of why, even through the Reform Treaty was sup­
posed to be shorter, it was, in fact, in the version that was signed, ten thou­
sand words longer that the Constitutional Treaty.
7. Division of law-making competencies between the EU and the 
member states
The law-making competencies of the European Union and of the Com­
munities (the European Economic Community and the Euroatom) have been 
the subject of much debate, both legal and political, well documented by 
a number of scientific journals. The key issue is, to put it simply, the division 
of powers between the Union and its member states.
Particular difficulties stem from the problem of overlapping competen­
cies, i.e. situations where more than one legal basis can be offered for enact­
ing a law.
Finally, there are also situations where for one law to be enacted it is nec­
essary for a number of legal bases to come together.1
1 The often-quoted example of overlapping competences should be cited here: Article 175 of the TEEC 
(environmental policy) and Article 95 of the TEEC (internal market).
According to Article 249 of the Treaty Establishing the European Commu­
nity (TEEC), a regulation which has general application allows the Commu­
nity to regulate even the entire scope of the subject matter at issue.
On the other hand, a directive makes it possible only with reference to spe­
cific tasks within a scope of subject matter regulated generally by the mem­
ber state. 1
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The same principles apply when a minimum is being enacted as a legal 
norm. The legal dilemma that arises can be summarised in the following ques­
tion: if this type of a Community standard is enacted, does this mean that 
a member state is barred from enacting regulations which guarantee a higher 
level of protection of the right at issue?
The difficulties in selecting the appropriate law-making procedure in the 
Union are hardly mitigated by the codecision procedure, adopted in the Nice 
and Amsterdam Treaties. It is chiefly so due to the exceptions2 remaining in 
the Treaties.
2 These include tax regulations (Article 93 of the TEEC), elements of environmental law with regard to 
the fiscal aspects (Article 175 par. 2a of the TEEC) or to the choice of energy sources (Article 175 par. 2c 
of the TEEC).
3 Although not fully; see also Annex II to the Framework Agreement on relations between the European 
Parliament and the Commission, Attachment XIII, [in:] AB1. EU No L 61/1, March 5, 2003, p. 122.
Since unanimity is required in these cases during a vote in the Council, 
each member state has the power to veto a regulation, and therefore to make 
it impossible for this power to be abused.
A separate issue is the common commercial policy (Article 133 par. 3 and 
Article 300 par. 3 of the TEEC), to which the codecision procedure finds no 
application, to such an extent that a consultation with the European Parlia­
ment is not necessary.3
Given this multitude of options, the European Court of Justice demands in 
its jurisprudence that the choice of the legal basis for the enactment of a law 
be based on reasons that are objective and can be validated by a court.
Such reasons include, according to the Court, primarily the objective and 
the content of the given legal measure.
However, when studying the methods of selection of the legal basis that 
have been either applied or considered, one notices that neither the lex spe- 
cialis principle not the principle of gravity points lead to satisfactory results.
Thus, in order to establish a system of selection of legal bases of cer­
tain powers and competencies, the hierarchy of integration intensity can be 
a useful tool.
Simply speaking, this refers to the intensity which is expressed through 
the assignment of exclusive or shared (to a various extent) responsibility for 
certain scopes of action or certain objectives.
2. Legal coordination as a challenge to the functioning of the EU
It is not very novel to say that the issue of legal coordination in the EU 
has already received a lot of attention. This is best evidenced by a number of 
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provisions to the TEEC,4 by directives5 and by regulations.6 Even the Treaty es­
tablishing a Constitution for Europe7 is not free from provisions referring to this 
subject matter; what is different is that this Treaty lists no new areas where such 
coordination is necessary but rather attempts to establish a separate category 
covering legal coordination.
4 For example Article 3 par. li and Article 125, Article 130 (employment policy); Article 4 (1) and Article 
99 (economic policy); Article 34 par. lb and Article 35 (agricultural policy); Articles 44,46,47 (freedom of 
residence); Article 73 (aids); Article 152 (health protection); Article 165 (scientific research).
5 Just two examples: Directive 89/646/EWG of December 15,1989 on the coordination of laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions 
and amending Directive 77/780/EEC (89/646/EEC); Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordi­
nation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assur­
ance and amending Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (third non-life insurance Directive).
6 Chiefly the regulation 1408/71 of June 14, 1971, which in accordance with Article 42 of the TEEC im­
poses on the member states the duty to coordinate their social insurance systems.
7 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European Union C310, Vol. 47, De­
cember 16, 2004
After perusing the Constitutional Treaty it is hard not to conclude that, 
while the authors did in fact have a certain concept of coordination, the trans­
lation of this concept into specific legal solutions produced no easily compre­
hensible results.
Does coordination in the Treaty refer to a specific competence of the Un­
ion, or is the opposite true? Do the provisions refer to coordination as a com­
petence to undertake certain actions, or does it refer to a specific form of ac­
tion? There is also no clarity as to the coordinating entity either.
In the light of the above, any analysis of the issue raised in the title of this 
paper must commence with a reference to the differentiation between coor­
dination as a competence category and coordination of competences that re­
main outside of the realm of the Constitutional Treaty, the so called open 
competence. The introductory Article Til and Articles 1-12 to 1-17 pertain 
to both exclusive and shared competencies; besides the competence in the 
area of foreign policy and security, also a coordinating competence.
This typology, from a hierarchical standpoint, is not very fortunate. This is 
because the division of competences in economic policy and employment pol­
icy as well as foreign policy and security policy is defined, in opposition to the 
remaining three categories, not through the type of division of tasks between 
the Union and the member states, but through the object of its exercise.
What is surprising is the use of the term coordination in two places: firstly, 
with reference to economic and employment policy, in Article 1-12 par. 3, and 
then in Article 1-15. Similarly, the provision pertaining to coordination in the 
realm of health care, industry, culture, tourism, education, civil protection and 
administrative cooperation appear in Article 1-12 par. 5 and Article 1-17. Is this 
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because each time the provisions pertain to two differing concepts of actions, 
or it is simply careless law-making? There hardly seems to be a clear answer.
One could therefore risk the comment that at a glance, there seems to be 
a difference in how these stipulations are constructed - however, it is only so 
at first glance. While the regulations of Article 1-12 par. 5 and 1-17 open to the 
Union a possibility to coordinate, complement and support the activities of 
the member states, Article 1-12 par. 3 stipulates that in the areas of economic 
policy and employment policy the coordination is not placed with the Union 
itself, but that the Union supports and ensures the coordination through the 
efforts of the member states.
Since Article 1-12 par. 5 states clearly that the Union has competence to 
carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the 
member states but without thereby superseding their competence in these ar­
eas, one has to note that the difference between undertaking coordination by 
the Union itself and by supporting and ensuring coordination through the ef­
forts of the member states on the part of the Union is not of a subtle nature.
3. The need to define the concept of coordination as a category 
of competence
In the light of the above, an attempt to pinpoint the borderlines - or rather, 
border points - of the concept of coordination as a category of competence is 
due. These points are as follows: (a) authorisation to coordinate makes it pos­
sible to refer coordination as a competence to the Union, but only to a lim­
ited extent. The majority of (b) competencies remain with the member states. 
Consequently, the Union (c) is only free to support, and the support (d) takes 
the form of coordination.
Let us move a step forward. What is the answer to the question about spe­
cific measures that the Union can undertake on the basis of the authorisation 
to coordinate? It appears that this matter is open to debate.
Interpretation of Article 1-12 par. 5 and Article 1-17 yields just the result 
that coordination is not the same as support, and neither is it the same as 
complementary action.
This however is not all. Articles 1-12, 1-15 and 1-17 clearly include and 
express the assumption that primarily all competencies lie with the member 
states, but also the idea that the Union has a competence to coordinate.
At the same time, Article 1-1 par. 1 includes a stipulation which, from the 
linguistic perspective, is in opposition with these two theses, since it creates 
a construction of opposition between the powers of the Union and the coordi­
nation of policies of the member states by the Union: “The Union shall coor­
dinate the policies by which the Member States aim to achieve these objec­
tives, and shall exercise on a Community basis the competences they confer 
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on it.”8 This goes against the grain of the border points outlined above. More­
over, it creates the impression that the Union can at least undertake coordi­
nation in each area where it has no other competencies. If this reasoning was 
followed, it would open to the Community a possibility to coordinate in all 
areas in which shared objectives of the Union and member states are men­
tioned. However, it remains unclear how the shared objectives are defined.
8 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European Union C310, Vol. 47, De­
cember 16, 2004
9 For example Article III-238 of the Constitutional Treaty.
10 For example Article III-194 par. la (budgetary discipline in the euro zone), Article III-247 par. 3 (trans­
European networks), Article III-278 par. 2 (public health), Article III-305 par. 1 (action in international or­
ganisations), Article III-310 par. 1 (tasks within the common security and defence policy).
The contradiction between Article 1-1 par. 1 on the one hand and Articles 
1-12,1-15 and 1-17 on the other hand can only be convincingly solved under 
the condition that the stipulations of the latter are accepted. In terms of Arti­
cle 1-1 par. 1 must it thus be said that it is not focused around the concept of 
competence categories, and that therefore the coordination to which it refers 
should not be interpreted as a referral of competence. What is necessary here 
is an independent basis for a competence, whose scope and details can be in­
terpreted from Part III of the Treaty, on the basis of Article 1-11 par. 6.
Two comments are then legitimate. Firstly, that coordination may, on the 
one hand, be a competence category. Secondly, on the other hand, there are 
no obstacles to competence becoming a form of action chosen by the Com­
munity.
Ultimately then the issue boils down to the following interdependence: if 
we accept that coordination is a competence category, then the Union must 
limit its activities; if we agree to understand coordination as a form of ac­
tion, then this gives the Community authorisation to other types of actions 
as well.
Here, another problem arises. The competence norm stipulates clearly 
that the Union may, apart from other forms of action, also undertake coordi­
nation. Is the Union then free in its choice, or is it rather, in accordance with 
the subsidiarity principle, that this norm treated as a referral of competence, 
which makes coordination stand out among other forms?
In order to understand coordination as a competence category it is fur­
ther necessary to establish the scope of coordination: in simple terms, what is 
to be coordinated. With certain exceptions,9 the Constitutional Treaty makes 
room for only three options.
Firstly, activities of the member states towards one another can be coor­
dinated.10 Secondly, activities of the member states towards the Union can be 
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coordinated.11 Lastly, coordination may pertain to mutual relations between 
Community institutions and bodies.12
11 For example Article III-179 par. 1 (economic policy), Article III-203 (employment), Article III-221 (eco­
nomic, social and territorial cohesion), Article III-250 par. 1 (scientific research and technological devel­
opment), Article III-273 par. 1 (judicial cooperation in criminal matters), Article III-276 par. 2b (police co­
operation), Article III-301 par. 1 (common foreign and security policy), Article III-318 par. 1 (development 
cooperation), Article III-321 par. 6 (humanitarian aid).
12 For example Article 1-23 par. 1 (the Council of Ministers), Article 1-26 par. 1 and Article III-318 par. 2 
(the European Commission), Article 1-28 par. 4 and Article III-309 par. 2 (the Union Minister for Foreign 
Affairs), Article HI-223 par. 1 (coordination of structural funds), Article III-228 (coordination of mar­
kets).
4. Between enumeration and subsidiarity
The classification of coordination as competence category demonstrates 
that the authors of the Treaty, when they assigned only certain tasks to the 
Union, at the same time made the decision to leave all the remaining tasks 
with the member states. This includes the tasks that are tacit, not explicitly 
referred to. On the other hand, even in the areas which are not under the 
competence of the Community, the member states are not completely free in 
their actions. The limitations are derived from the very fact that the member 
states are participants of the Union. Consequently, it is viable for the member 
states, in all their activities, to take the interest of other member states into 
account. Cooperation in the areas of development, space research or activism 
in international organisation are good examples here.
The situation however is different in the areas in which competences have al­
ready been referred to the Union, but the member states are having problems 
fully accepting these conditions. Similarly, this can be applied to the new mem­
ber states in the Union that had no competences previously. Under such circum­
stances, it is hard to disagree with the opinions that coordination is rooted in 
compromise. The reasons for this are not material; the key reason is that an at­
tempt to transfer the entire competence in a given area to the Union failed.
The subject matter of the deliberation in this paper is a clear understand­
ing of the division of competences. However, it appears that no either/or in­
terpretation is possible. All that can be observed is exclusive or competing 
competences of the Union on the one hand, and of the member states on the 
other hand. At the same time, the competences of the member states remain 
closely tied to the Union’s competence to coordinate, reflected in Article 
1-1 par. 1 of the Constitutional Treaty. Considering that the Convention's task 
was to actually effect a clear division of competences between the Union and 
its members, it is hard to disagree with the negative opinions on the blurring 
of competences that eventually occurred in the Treaty.
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This blurring is nowhere as clear as in the area of establishing the means 
and measures (or simply speaking, the “how?”) by which coordination is real­
ised in the European Union. Given the conclusions so far, a distinction must 
be made between who coordinates and what is being coordinated.
As far as the coordination by member states is concerned, the Constitu­
tional Treaty includes certain instructions as to the measures, but they are so 
wide in scope that they cannot be imagined in any specific manner, regardless 
of whether they should be applicable to relations among the member states or 
relations of the member states towards the Union. This is illustrated by Arti­
cles III-203 and III-208 of the Constitutional Treaty. An attempt to apply these 
provisions immediately runs into a fundamental question: is coordination in 
the area of employment policy (regulated by these provisions), assigned to the 
member states, to be undertaken by their executives or by their legislatures?
The situation appears different when the Union itself undertakes the co­
ordination. The greater precision of Treaty regulations in this matter is a con­
sequence of negative selection, in which coordination is separated from the 
other three instruments available to the Union. This is well illustrated by Ar­
ticle 1-12 par. 5 and Article 1-17 of the Constitutional Treaty, which lists the 
three competences of the Union (to carry out supporting, coordinating or 
complementary action). However, even in this case it seems clear that coor­
dinating, as opposed to supporting and complementary action, assumes act­
ing towards all member states. Considering that an inherent element of co­
ordination is acting together with others, what then is the relationship among 
the three listed forms of action?
In the light of the above, even if we assume, following Article 1-11 par. 2 of 
the Constitutional treaty, that the stipulation: “Competences not conferred 
upon the Union in the Constitution remain with the Member States” is per­
fectly clear, the fact still cannot be overlooked that nowhere the Treaty are 
the exclusive competences of the member states defined. Since coordination 
as a competence category is not, in the understanding of the Treaty, identi­
cal with coordination as a form of action, it must be also said that this con­
struction not only fails to solve a problem, but rather encourages competence 
clashes in the future.
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The Growing Role of the European Parliament in the EU. 
Two Case Studies - Budgetary Policy and Common Foreign 
and Security Policy
Introduction
The view of the European Parliament shared by most people, includ­
ing some academics and researchers, is quite often outdated. The opinions 
shaped as early as the seventies still seem to prevail in the academic and po­
litical discourse. The European Parliament, however, is no longer just a de­
bating club! It is has become an equal player in the European institutional 
triangle. The Parliament is undoubtedly the very EU institution which was 
strengthened the most in the recent years. If one wants to comprehend the 
mechanics of every day decision-making in the EU, one has to look closer at 
the process of the EP’s emancipation.1
1 R. M. Cutler, A. von Lingen, The European Parliament and the European Union Security and Defence 
Policy, http://www.robertcutler.org/download/html/ar03es.html.
2 D. Judge, D. Earnshaw, The European Parliament, Palgrave, London 2003, pp. 203-213.
Most analyses concentrate on the modifications introduced by the con­
secutive treaties. True, it was through the Single European Act, Maastricht, 
Amsterdam and Nice treaties that the role of the European Parliament in 
the decision-making was strengthened. The EP has progressively become 
a true co-legislator in the Union’s sui generis bi-cephalous system.2 The Lis­
bon treaty, if finally ratified in all of the member states after the Irish fiasco, 
will continue that very trend, to a certain extent changing the nature of the 
relations within the Union’s institutional triangle. The reforms introduced by 
the treaties do not, however, tell the whole story. The EP has been entrench­
ing its power also through formal and informal interaction with the Coun­
cil and the Commission, most importantly through inter-institutional agree­
ments. Thanks to numerous IIA’s the EP has gained clout and influence in the 
fields in which the treaties accord it only limited prerogatives, such as comi- 
tology or Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is high time the research­
ers looked into the European Parliament from a different, more complex per­
spective. For comparative terms we have decided to look at two case studies, 
which would best depict the rising power of the EP. We analyse two very dif­
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ferent policy fields: budgetary policy, in which the Parliament has always en­
joyed a strong role, and the Common Foreign and Security Policy where the 
Parliament’s role, at least on paper, is of very limited nature.
1. Budgetary Policy
The European Parliament, contrary to what many people think, is an equal 
partner to the Council in the budgetary process.3 Of course that does not 
mean that it radically changes the size of the EU budget (the member states 
still are the pay-masters), but it has a crucial influence over its structure and 
the rules governing its application. With every Inter-institutional Agreement 
(as more and more expenditure is progressively being labelled as non-com- 
pulsory) the EP has been gaining in strength.4
3 See: J. Monar, The Finances of the Union's Intergovernmental Pillars: Tortuous Experiments with the 
Community Budget, “Journal of Common Market Studies” Vol. 35, No. 1, March 1997.
4 A. Bendiek, The Financing of the CFSP/ESDP: ‘There is a democratic deficit problem!, "CFSP Forum” 
Vol. 4, No. 6.
5 D. Judge, D. Earnshaw, op. cit., p. 213-221.
6 A. Maurer, D. Lietz, C. Völkel, Interinstitutional Agreements on CFSP, “European Foreign Affairs Re­
view” 2005, No. 10.
7 D. Kietz, A. Maurer, Ch. Völkel, Interinstitutional Agreements in the CFSP: Parliamentarisation through 
the Back Door?, “European Foreign Affairs Review” 2005, Vol. 10, No. 2.
8 R. Trzaskowski, Rola Parlamentu Europejskiego w procedurze budżetowej (The role of the European Par­
lament in the Budgetary Procedure), „Nowa Europa” 2006, Vol. 1, No. 3.
Budgetary powers are important not only in themselves but as a very strong 
leverage instrument.5 The EP has been using them very skilfully in order to ex­
tend its prerogatives in other domains. The CFSP is a perfect case in point. The 
powers offered to the EP by the treaty are very limited. However, through Inter- 
institutional Agreements concerning financing, the EP has secured a steadily ri­
sing influence over that area.6 Through budgetary politics the EP gains influence 
over policies where the treaty does not assign it any formal powers.7
The European Parliament has always defended the principle that the EU’s 
priorities have to be complemented by budgetary means, otherwise the Euro­
pean Union will not be credible. Therefore it has always been defending more 
ambitious budgetary thresholds. The deputies, however, were always trying 
to be realistic. For the first time in history, during the negotiations over the 
current financial perspective, the EP proposed budgetary ceilings lower than 
the European Commission, because it was aware of the budgetary constra­
ints within the member states. Throughout the negotiations over the current 
FP it was the European Parliament, not the European Commission, which de­




Budgetary negotiations as a testing ground for the deputies from the new 
member states. The first success was the election of the president of the very 
powerful budgetary committee (a Pole - Mr Janusz Lewandowski). Through 
successful lobbying of the friends of the cohesion group the Parliament recog­
nised that cohesion has to be defended at all costs. Certain deputies wanted to 
by-pass the budgetary committee through setting of the special ad hoc com­
mittee and leave the negotiations proper largely in the hands of the more expe­
rienced deputies from the old member states. The parliamentarians from the 
new member states, however, reasserted themselves and took an active part in 
setting of the EP’s priorities, despite the very technical nature of the dossier.
In the final negotiations the European Parliament successfully enhanced 
its institutional role. The budgetary negotiations became a leverage used in 
order to strengthen the EP’s prerogatives in the process of reforming of the 
EU policies. The EP managed to secure for itself a significant role in the re­
view of CAP and structural policy, whereas the treaty itself does not assign 
any prerogatives to the Parliament in that very respect. The EP was able to 
match the EU’s political priorities with financial needs in a very modest, yet 
important degree, largely through:
- an increase of EUR 4 billion for concrete policies such as youth exchan­
ges, social policy, neighbourhood policy, energy TEN’s,
- a substantial increase in the EIB reserve of EUR 2.5 billion to be made 
available by the Member States under a new scheme of co-financing between 
the EIB and the EU Budget with a view to reinforcing the leverage effect of 
the EU budget in the areas of Research and Development, TENs and SMEs,9
- the financing of non-programmed needs such as the Emergency Aid Re­
serve (EUR 1.5 billion) and the EU Solidarity Fund (up to EUR 7 billion) out­
side the financial framework by supplementary resources called from the 
Member States, if needed,
- the financing of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (up to 
EUR 3.5 billion) by re-use of cancelled appropriations, outside the financial 
framework.
9 J. Wtorek, Potencjalny wzrost wydatków na Europejską Politykę Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony w budżecie UE, 
“Biuletyn Analiz UKIE” 2008, No. 18, February.
The EP also managed to improve the budget structure through more fle­
xibility:
- an overall amount of EUR 1,4 billion for flexibility over the period, finan­
ced, in case of utilisation, by supplementary resources to be called from the 
Member States with the possibility to carry over the annual amount (EUR 
200 million) in case of non-utilisation and to use the Instrument for the same 
needs for more than one year,
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- the possibility for the newly elected Parliament to assess the functioning 
of the Inter-institutional Agreement and the Financial Perspective by the end 
of 2009 on the basis of a report to be presented by the Commission, possibly 
accompanied by ambitious proposals.
The EP was also successful in improving the quality of implementation of 
EU funding and preserving Parliament’s prerogatives through:
- the principles established in the revised Financial Regulation, the re­
sponsibility of Member States in shared management activities for a better 
internal control. In that manner the Parliament secured a stronger role in the 
process of implementing the EU policies.10
10 Budżet na lata 2007-2013, Ocena decyzji podjętych na szczycie UE w Brukseli w grudniu 2005, “Ana­
lizy Natolińskie” 2006, No. 1.
11 U. Diedrichs, The European Parliament in CFSP: More than a Marginal Player?, “The International Spe­
ctator” 2004, No. 2.
12 B. Crum, Parliamentarisation of the CFSP through informal institution-making? The fifth European Par­
liament and the EU high representative, “Journal of European Public Policy” 2006, Vol. 13, No. 3.
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament’s budgetary powers 
over all EU spending will be strengthened enormously. The new treaty abo­
lishes the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure 
and makes the multi-annual financial framework legally binding. Such pro­
visions of the treaty will in effect put the Parliament on an equal footing with 
the Council. No budgetary decision will be possible without the agreement of 
the deputies, provided of course that the treaty is ratified.
2. Common Foreign and Security Policy
In spite of the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP and limited treaty 
empowerments, for years the EP has been asserting itself1 - most importan­
tly through the means of inter-institutional agreements. The EP is determi­
ned to increase its participation in CFSP decision-making, including ESDP, to 
better contribute to the Union becoming a global actor on the world stage.12
According to the current treaties the European Parliament has a very li­
mited role within the CFSP. Art 21 of the Treaty on the EU obliges the Pre­
sidency to consult the EP on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP 
and ensure that the EP’s views are duly taken into consideration. According 
to TEU the EP should be kept regularly informed by the developments, the 
deputies may also ask questions and ask for recommendations. The EP also 
holds an annual debate on progress of implementing the CFSP.
The new Inter-institutional Agreement (IIA) on budgetary discipline and 
sound financial management (of 17 May 2006) should allow the Parliament to 
improve its scrutiny of CFSP through a constructive interpretation of Articles 
42 and 43 which foresees a structured dialogue on this matter. This dialogue in­
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eludes joint consultation meetings at least five times a year in the framework 
of the regular political dialogue on the CFSP between the bureaux of the two 
Committees concerned (foreign affairs and budgetary) and the Chairman of 
the PSC, with the Commission also being associated to these meetings.
According to the last IIA, each year, the Council Presidency will consult 
the European Parliament on a forward-looking Council document setting 
out the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP, including the financial 
implications for the general budget of the European Union and an evaluation 
of the measures launched in the previous year. Moreover, whenever it adopts 
a decision in the field of the CFSP entailing expenditure, the Council will im­
mediately send the European Parliament an estimate of the costs envisaged 
(in particular those regarding time-frame, staff employed, use of premises 
and other infrastructure, transport facilities, training requirements and se­
curity arrangements).
The European Parliament also uses its potential to project the so-called soft 
power potential and act as a true defender of values on which the EU is foun­
ded.13 Each year, the European Parliament issues a report on the human rights 
situation in countries outside the European Union, and another on respect for 
human rights within the Union. The Council is also bound to inform the Euro­
pean Parliament of any decision taken to suspend an agreement with a country 
on human rights grounds. The deputies can thus put pressure on the country 
concerned to release political prisoners or to subscribe to international under­
takings on human rights protection. At each of its monthly part-sessions, the 
European Parliament holds debates on cases of breaches of human rights, de­
mocracy and the rule of law. It has adopted a host of resolutions condemning 
governments that breach human rights. In 1988, the European Parliament es­
tablished the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. Each year, the prize is 
awarded to individuals or international organisations who - like the Russian 
nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975 - 
have distinguished themselves in the struggle for human rights. (In 2006 the 
Sakharov prize was awarded to Aliaksandr Milinkevich, the leader of the oppo­
sition in Belarus and fighter for democracy and human rights).
13 E. Barbe, A. Herranz, The Role of Parliaments in European Foreign Policy, Barcelona 2005.
14 R. Trzaskowski, Ćwiczenie wyobraźni. Próba oceny Traktatu konstytucyjnego, "Nowa Europa” 2005, Vol. 1, 
No. 1, pp. 150-154.
The Lisbon treaty would open a new chapter in Common Foreign and Se­
curity Policy. Its provisions offer a potential base for a coherent and effective fo­
reign policy. Hopefully the potential will be employed in practice. The Treaty is 
unclear on many points. Certain innovations may, but hopefully will not, cause 
institutional rivalry.14 Therefore it is absolutely crucial that in the process of 
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implementation all institutions - the EP, the Commission and the Council 
work hand in hand. The EP has to display the collective will aimed at envisa­
ging the best possible working relations in the institutional triangle, in which 
no one feels sidelined (for example the team presidency, which needs to con­
tribute to CFSP).
The EP did not remain passive in the period of the Treaty’s implementation. 
It has advocated a number of concrete steps (as enumerated in Jacek Saryusz- 
-Wolski’s report on CFSP). In the report the following points were stressed:
♦ Invitation to the future High Representative I Vice President of the Com­
mission to appear regularly before the Plenary and AFET, as he gets his legi­
timacy from the Council.
♦ The need to review relations between Council and Parliament following 
the transfer of the remaining Western European Union (WEU) competen­
ces to the EU
♦ The establishment of an inter-institutional agreement between Parlia­
ment and Council defining their relations in the field of external action, in­
cluding the sharing of confidential information and the updating of the Fra­
mework Agreement between the Commission and Parliament
♦ Parliament has to be fully consulted on the nomination of the first High 
Representative/ Vice President of the Commission, due to take office on 1 Ja­
nuary 2009, including the establishment of an ad hoc hearing procedure with 
AFET acting as the lead Committee
♦ Parliament has to be to be consulted on the establishment of the Euro­
pean External Action Service.
In the interest of credibility of all external actions of the European Union 
there is an indispensable need for scrutiny of the EP over CFSP/ESDP. In or­
der to carry real weight the policy needs strong democratic legitimacy. In 
the previous year the EP decided to focus on a limited number of well-de­
fined, ambitious, but realistic goals it wants to attain, instead of multiplying 
long lists of postulates, which are repeatedly ignored by the Member States. 
Above all there is a need to avoid expensive and unnecessary duplication, and 
to try to rationalise who does what in the European Union.
The Treaty of Lisbon constitutes a true watershed for both CFSP/ESDP 
(nascent CSDP) and for the EU inter-institutional relations. The new Tre­
aty significantly enhances the external action of the Union and its role in in­
ternational relations, and that it raises the Union’s visibility and profile while 
strengthening its capacity to act effectively on the world stage. One should 
hope that it will be ratified next year.
The new Treaty offers hope and promise of a stronger and more accoun­
table CFSP/ESDP. It also augurs well for the future of new relations with both 
the Council and the Commission.
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There are, however, more steps which could be undertaken. The European 
Parliament should more systematically adopt positions on each successive 
stage of CFSP and ESDP decision-making. Where appropriate, common po­
sitions and joint actions should contain references to these positions of the 
European Parliament.
Even though progress in relations between the Council and Parliament 
has been achieved, especially through the establishment of new and more fle­
xible channels of communication and through the increased number of con­
tacts between the institutions, including regular exchanges of views with the 
High Representative and more frequent appearances of EU Special Represen­
tatives before the Parliament, there is room for further progress.
Even though the value of the current High Representative’s and current 
External Relations Commissioner’s periodic appearances before the Plenary 
and AFET, as well as the more frequent practice of informal meetings should 
be appreciated, the future High Representative/Vice-President of the Com­
mission, should go beyond the current experience and develop regular, and 
much more systematic and substantive consultations with the European Par­
liament.
The Parliament is also of the opinion that the deputies should be given 
a serious role in the process of choosing and nominating the first High Repre­
sentative/Vice-President of the Commission, regardless of the fact whether is 
should be necessary to make an interim appointment.
A special ad hoc hearing procedure for the nomination of the High Repre­
sentative/Vice-President of the Commission should be established. The Eu­
ropean Parliament from the very outset should also take part in the prepara­
tions for the development of the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
as well as be formally consulted on its formal establishment.
Conclusion
The European Parliament has been steadily increasing its role in EU po­
licy-making. Through co-decision it has gained a status of a co-legislator. The 
budgetary politics allows it to expand its formal and informal influence over 
the areas where the treaty does not provide it with strong prerogatives. Even 
within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, where on paper the prero­
gatives of the EP are limited, the deputies have been asserting their role and 
now they make quite an impact on the external policy of the EU. If we really 
want to have a strong common foreign and security policy, we have not only 
to respond to citizens’ preoccupations and objective needs generated by our 
immediate environment, but also to treat our commitments seriously by pro­
viding the necessary means for CFSP effective implementation and under­
taking the crucial reforms.
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The EU should also involve more closely the only democratically elected 
institution - the European Parliament - in the decision-making concerning 




• Professor Kazimierz Dzialocha, PhD - Professor Edward Lipinski
University College of Economics and Administration in Kielce
As a member state of the EU, Poland will not recognise the Charter of Fun­
damental Rights as a valid, binding document. Professor, if you say what you 
have just said here, please also tell us: how should we understand the clearly ex­
pressed norm of Article 11-51 part 2 in the draft European Constitution - I am 
not sure how the situation looks in the Reform Treaty but I suppose the same 
wording is present there which reads as follows: “This Charter does not extend 
the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or estab­
lish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers or tasks defined 
in the other Parts of the Constitution.” This is a provision which regulates the 
matter of powers and as such must be interpreted strictly, and it reads expressis 
verbis just as I have presented it. One might say this is fully in accordance with 
the underlying principle of the Union, i.e. the principle of subsidiarity.
And the second argument, closely connected with the rights to marry and 
found a family. It is said in the provision at issue that the rights to marry 
and found a family are guaranteed in accordance with the national laws gov­
erning the exercise of these rights. The Union evidently wants to keep itself 
clear of any regulation in this respect: other than the general regulation I just 
quoted, which has a significance, but a very limited one, all powers rest with 
the member states. Why then should one want to express the opinion, pre­
cisely in connection with this subject matter, that the Charter offers opportu­
nities for extending competencies of the institutions of the Union?
• Professor Jan Tkaczyriski, PhD - jagiellonian University
Let me start from the end. As far as Article 11-51 is concerned, it is very clear 
and precise and leaves no room for doubts. However, let me repeat one general 
comment: this is just a provision in the third part, and - please note - this is the 
part which originally had been drafted as a charter. For a long time it was not 
considered as a potential part of the constitutional treaty. One must bear this in
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mind. It was only included in the constitutional treaty quite late. Are the solu­
tions in the Charter compatible with the remaining parts of the treaty? I would 
answer rather carefully; I am not sure. Of course I am not able to give you new 
legal solutions off the top of my head, and ad hoc give you a good answer, be­
cause it would be an entire legal opinion. What I can do is give you an answer 
not based in law, but based on my intuition. This lack of compatibility results in 
a situation where, if certain solutions are implied, and always express the idea 
of the supremacy of EU law over national law, no matter what the actual Article 
11-51 in the Charter says, there will always be the possibility to conclude that it 
is possible to rank the national law one level lower than the EU law.
• Professor Kazimierz Dzialocha, PhD - Professor Edward Lipinski
University College of Economics and Administration in Kielce
It is difficult to agree with you here.
• Professor Jan Tkaczynski, PhD - jagiellonian University
But we all agree, and we discussed it earlier today, that there is a danger of 
supremacy — not primacy, but supremacy — of the EU law over national law.
• Professor Kazimierz Dzialocha, PhD - Professor Edward Lipinski
University College of Economics and Administration in Kielce
There is no doubt as to that.
• Professor Jan Tkaczynski, PhD - Jagiellonian University
Exactly! And therefore the danger arises that no matter how the provision 
of Article 11-51 reads, there might always be someone who will say: Yes, that 
is what the Charter stipulates - lets use the term ‘Charter’ for the moment 
as part III - but how does it work with the idea of the supremacy of the EU 
law? Can I or can I not? If the EU legislation allows something, it will be, let 
me put it this way, difficult to oppose this on the basis of national regulations, 
and argue that we cannot do something that others can do. I would be very 
careful here. Let me make myself clear here: I am not arguing that this pre­
cisely is going to happen. All I am saying is that the danger is there. I am play­
ing Cassandra here, and not an expert. I am just warning that it is a possibil­
ity, and the “maybe” here is dangerous. This may have negative consequences, 
and this is what I would like to avoid. That's all I am saying.
• Rafal Trzaskowski, PhD — Adviser to the Chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the European Parliament
One sentence, maybe two. One important thing: the document that the 
professor is using is the Convent version, there were two inter-governmental 
conferences after that. The British have made this language stronger, much 
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stronger. Generally speaking, if the Community has no powers in a given 
area, the Charter does not apply. Moreover, the Reform Treaty introduces 
a qualified majority vote in most of the areas in which the Union makes de­
cisions. For the first time in history this kind of vote will also apply to judi­
cial cooperation. There is however an exclusion: family law. It is a special ex­
ception where unanimous decisions are still required. So firstly the Union 
would have to take the decision that it wants legislation in this area. Nobody 
in their right sense is going to advocate this. Even if, there is the requirement 
of unanimity, plus a special clause which was introduced after the Convent, 
in an inter-governmental conferences, which safeguards against the option 
that a majority decision would be sufficient to change this provision. So if one 
member state opposes this decision, it simply cannot be done, and all fears 
are completely unjustified. Finally, the new government is going to withdraw 
its opt-out with regard to the Charter, so the problem is irrelevant.
• Professor Dieter Kugelmann, PhD - Harz University of Applied
Sciences
I apologise if I abuse the privilege to be up here, to make the remarks on the 
subject of human rights. In my opinion, it is a ghost discussion. It is a ghost 
discussion because 99% of the cases are clear cases. There is no doubt that 
in the Union the rule of law has to apply to human rights. If the institutions 
do something, of course they are bound by human rights. No doubt about it, 
it is already what the European Court says today. So most of the discussions 
are really ghost discussions. Concerning abortion, we had a case in Ireland 
20 years ago when it was about an advertisement for abortion. This is market 
freedoms, where the European Court of Justice said that advertising has to be 
allowed for abortion in Great Britain, and this is inevitable because it is the 
common market, there is no exemption. So what is left? Very few cases where 
maybe by implementing European law in certain areas by national authori­
ties, the question is if the national authorities are then bound if they imple­
ment European law and have no margin of appreciation at all, they are bound 
by the European human rights or bound by the national human rights. We do 
not even talk here about the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
is also applicable. So I think in most of the cases actually we are facing ghost 
discussions, but of course the devil might be in the details, so I do not want to 
exclude the relevant details. However, in most cases there are no details, there 
are only the human rights which is the fundament of the European Union.
• Alexandra Hennessy-University of Rochester
I have a question for Professor Kugelmann. I think you explained the in­
stitutions and structures in a very cogent way, but I have a question about 
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the political factors that contribute to a consensus in foreign policy at the 
EU level. You mentioned that strengthening the European Parliament could 
lead to more consistency in foreign policy making. And I am wondering what 
is the basis of this argument, why you believe that. I would think that con­
flicts in the European Parliament run along national lines, not party lines, and 
the reason I think that is that colonial and historical legacies of foreign pol­
icy-making, as well as geographic proximity to certain countries, should be 
a stronger predictor of foreign policy preferences than party lines. So I am 
wondering, what contributes to consensus on foreign policy making? Is it 
preference intensity of certain countries, or is it country size, or is it simply 
the codecision procedure? Do you have any ideas about that?
• Professor Dieter Kugelrnann, PhD - Harz University of Applied 
Sciences
Well, actually the codecision procedure is not applicable, so we are talk­
ing about the unanimous decision in the Council and in this context limited 
influence, I completely agree with Dr Trzaskowski about the in this context 
limited influence of the European Parliament. My idea only was that you have 
aims in the EU Treaty concerning what we as Europeans want to do, in which 
direction we want to move, if it is about foreign security policy, and the Par­
liament is one interpreter of these aims. So if we talk about human rights, for 
example in Ukraine and Belarus, they are interpreting the Treaty provisions 
and in this context I am not sure if in the Parliament really colonial history is 
so important. I would presume - but you know it better - I would presume 
that it is actually more the will to strengthen the role of the Parliament itself 
in this area, because that is what the Parliament did in the past times too: that 
they of course made a certain policy, but they are also interested in strength­
ening their own role. So they are interested in common standpoints, and you 
will find majorities for general policy visions. So of course, you are right, that 
is not so close to party interests, but in the Parliament we always talk about 
the interests of parties, and also if they do something in foreign security pol­
icy they will have to decide according to what these interests are, how they in­
terpret the Treaty provisions in the light of the interest they are representing. 
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and European Law
It is my pleasure to be with you this morning and I would like to thank the 
organisers for inviting me. At the same time I have to convey the best regards 
to this conference from the president of the European Court of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg, Mr Jean-Paul Costa, who is as well one of the two honorary pa­
trons of this conference.
At the beginning maybe I should introduce myself very briefly, although 
I know I do have 20 minutes only, but I will keep the time, I promise that. My 
background is a little bit different from other speakers in this conference, be­
cause I am not a professor at the university. My background is judicial, I am 
originally a judge in my country, in Slovakia. I dealt with civil and administra­
tive law cases in the court of first instance and later in a court of appeal in Bra­
tislava, and then I spent ten years as a legal officer with the United Nations, 
where I worked with the Head Commissioner for Refugees. For the last three 
years I have been elected as a judge in the Human Rights Court in Strasbourg 
in respect of the Slovak Republic. So therefore my views will be from that point 
of view, from the point of view of another system, not the European Union sy­
stem, as is I think most of this conference, but from another perspective, which 
I think can be enriching. And also I think it is very good to bear in mind that 
there are at the moment more systems operating within Europe, not only the 
European Union but also the Council of Europe system. Moreover, there is the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and there is the UN sy­
stem. So it is good to have such information in mind that we can see the same 
thing from different perspectives, and that applies also to human rights.
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Introduction
The continuous process of new states entering into the existing European 
systems - Council of Europe or European Union, has had a certain impact on 
the profile of these systems. Many of these states entered into the system as 
a result of the dissolution of totalitarian regimes. Membership to the European 
Union proved to be a more difficult task, while membership to the Council of 
Europe proved to be relatively easy, since their acceptance by the Council of Eu­
rope can be considered a step towards their further integration into the Euro­
pean system.
In Europe there are up to three, at least, different legal sources of funda­
mental rights co-existing: national sources, international sources - such as 
the ECHR - and EU law sources, including the case-law of the European 
Court of Justice. We also have three different types of jurisdictions applying 
those different legal sources: the domestic courts of the member states, the 
two Courts of the European Union in Luxembourg and the European Court 
of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The result is that today virtually every act of 
every public institution in Europe can be reviewed as to its compliance with 
fundamental rights. While this represents a huge achievement of the Euro­
pean legal and ethical culture, it also raises the question of the coordination 
of those multiple legal sources. The co-existence of those different legal sy­
stems, each with its own set of fundamental rights, is an essential part of our 
legal tradition, reflecting an important aspect of European cultural history 
and diversity. The fact remains that the co-existence of all these overlapping 
legal sources raises at least two major challenges for the future: respect of ef­
ficiency of human rights protection and the need to preserve legal certainty.
Since there has not been adopted a document like “The Constitution 
for Europe“ or “The Constitution of the European Union“ yet, the European 
countries - members of the Council of Europe and/or members of the European 
Union - are still is in the process of finding the tools which would guarantee 
a unified harmonisation of different national legal systems and legislations into 
the one system - European.
The Convention and the Court
The European Convention on Human Rights was adopted in 1950 and 
works within the system of the Council of Europe, to which 46 European 
states are presently members. The European Convention on Human Rights, 
which the Court works with, has proved as a long-living instrument, which 
has never been modified, as far as its substantive provisions are concerned, 
through the 60 years of its existence.
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The Convention has its function of international control, which serves 
for the “Europe-wide internationalisation“ of the protection, on the basis of 
which whoever is under the jurisdiction of a state-party to the Convention 
may resort to the Court to complain for an alleged violation of protected hu­
man rights. The international control is considered as a final resort, with the 
added value of the internationally objective judge, when the national system 
is not ready or fails to meet the requirements of protection.
The Convention also represents the main element contributing to the 
formation of a European “common“ law. It is clear that the Court works 
on the basis of individual cases, and responds to concrete complaints co­
ming from individual applicants. It should, however, be understood that the 
Court does not hesitate to change its case-law, when and if it considers 
that its past pronouncements do not anymore reflect European standards, 
that Europe has taken different orientations than those proposed by its past 
case-law. Precisely this richness of the caselaw, and, at the same time, the 
respect of the precedent that the Court applies in most of the cases, give 
the opportunity to the states, whether they are or they are not parties to 
a concrete dispute, to know their exact obligations vis-à-vis the rights pro­
tected by the Convention.
The legal system of the Convention is not a closed one. It is in constant 
dialogue with other legal systems, including, of course, with other courts, 
both domestic, international or, more particularly, regional. This dialogue ba­
sically serves to detect the domestic legal parameters of a case before it, to 
have a close look at the legal system governing the facts of a case in order to 
be able to decide inter alia whether an applicant has exhausted domestic re­
medies, whether he has complied with the six-month rule, whether an inter­
ference by the state with an individual’s right was duly “established“ by do­
mestic law and, more generally, whether the legal treatment of an application 
by the bodies exercising power over him was consistent with the legal order 
of the state concerned. In any event, the state that has violated the Conven­
tion is obliged to redress the damage in the way that the Court indicates in its 
judgment; if its intention is to avoid similar violations for the future, the only 
solution for it is to change also the legal regime which generates violations, 
namely a law, a practice, etc. Judicial decision of the Court acts as a potential 
starter to provoke legislative or other changes of the domestic legal system.
The finding of a violation of the Convention against one state may have wi­
der repercussions going beyond alterations of the system of the state concer­
ned. The repercussions that the Court’s judgments have on the legal system of 
a state which has violated the Convention, but also on the legal system of third 
states, potentially transgressors of the Convention, are the driving force be­
hind the creation of a single European common law on matters of protection 
177
CITIZEN AND HUMAN RIGHTSAND LIBERTIES
of human rights. Other states may follow the opinion of the Courts expressed 
in its case law and change their own system or law. Behind such a behaviour of 
a state, other than the state directly involved in a violation, there may be its wil­
lingness to align itself with the European legality, but also its understanding 
that if a state does not align itself with a solution given by the Court with regard 
to the exact content and scope of a human right protected by the Convention, 
sooner or later it will also be condemned for similar violations.
The role of the Strasbourg Court is not limited only to settle disputes be­
tween an applicant and a state once and for all. By settling individual dispu­
tes, the Court creates caselaw which affects more generally the other parties 
to the Convention, and, in the long term, it contributes, through that indi­
rect function, to the consolidation of a uniform law of protection of human 
rights in Europe. Taking into account that the rights which are protected by 
the Convention cut across various branches of domestic or international law 
- civil law, criminal law, administrative law, constitutional law, etc. - the in­
fluence exerted by the Court’s caselaw goes well beyond the law of protection 
of human rights and substantially affects these other branches of law. And 
this is the contribution of the Convention and the Court in the creation of a 
common European legal space.
Impact of the Strasbourg Case Law on the National System
The Committee of Ministers invited the Court in its resolution to identify, 
in its judgments finding a violation of the Convention, what it considered to 
be an underlying systemic problem and the source of that problem, in particu­
lar when it was likely to give rise to numerous applications. The Court has ad­
opted a policy to take the initiative and propose itself to a state which has vio­
lated the Convention to take, apart from the individual measures redressing 
a specific violation, also more general measures to avoid similar violations in 
the future. The Court’s first so-called “pilot“ judgment was delivered in the case 
of Bromowski v. Poland.1 The case concerned the scheme for compensation in 
kind for the loss sustained by property-owners whose properties had had to be 
abandoned after the Second World War. They had required “a right to credit“ 
against the state. However, the latter had been unable to honour all those ob­
ligations due to a shortfall in the amount of land available. It is estimated that 
80 000 people are concerned. The Court was unanimous in concluding that, by 
failing to honour its obligation to the applicant, the respondent state had vio­
lated Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. It also found, for the first 
time in the history of its caselaw, a so-called “systemic“ violation, arising from 
the fact that the violation in question resulted from a large-scale problem ori­
1 Application No.: 31443/96, friendly settlement of 28 September 2005.
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ginating in a malfunctioning of Polish legislation and administrative practice 
which had affected a large numbers of people.
Owing to the constructive attitude of the Polish government, it was po­
ssible to conclude in this case a friendly settlement, according to which the 
Polish government not only settled the individual case, but also undertook 
“to implement as rapidly as possible all the necessary measures in respect of 
domestic law and practice as indicated by the Court“ and to “intensify their 
endeavours to make the new Bug River legislation effective and to improve 
the practical operation of the mechanism designed to provide the Bug River 
claimants with compensation“.
The Court forms its caselaw very carefully, in a way that reflects, most 
of the times commonly accepted mentalities and standards in Europe. The 
Court interprets the Convention on the basis of a wide acceptance of a rule 
by the totality of the European states. In these circumstances, its role is limi­
ted to finding an individual violation of that rule by a state which simply did 
not respect its own domestic obligations.
There are many judgments which by their nature are limited to the speci­
fic circumstances of a case and are not expandable to future situations. A very 
characteristic example of that situation is the judgment in the case of Refah 
Partisi against Turkey,1 where the Court found that the decision of Turkish aut­
horities to dissolve a Muslim-oriented party immediately before national elec­
tions did not violate Article 3 of the First Additional Protocol, because the pro­
gramme of that party and the political posture of some of its protagonists posed 
a serious threat to the democratic regime, and to the fundamental values pro­
tected by the Convention itself. The particular circumstances of a fragile de­
mocratic regime, and the peculiarity of the Muslim party, propagating sharia, 
etc., which was very close to taking over the reins of the state through democra­
tic elections influenced the Court in decision. It could be safely said that had 
the incident happened in any other part of Europe - or even in Turkey for any 
other party - the decision of the Court would have been different.
2 Applications No.: 41340/98; 41342/98; 41343/98; 41344/98.
3 Application No.: 25390/94, Judgement of 20 May 1999.
In the case of Rekvenyi v. Hungary,2 3  the Court recognized that new de­
mocracies face particular problems which must be taken into account, and 
which may in the end influence the judicial outcome: then the Court found 
that the prohibition of association of Hungarian policemen did not violate 
Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, because of the particular experience 
of Hungary, during the communist regime, linking the police with arbitrary 
power and authority, and serving the political goals of the old regime. “De­
politicisation“ then of the police was a justifiable measure taken by the new 
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regime, including, of course, a prohibition of freedom of speech and associa­
tion in certain circumstances.4
4 C. Rozakis, “The Impact of Foreign Constitutional Law and Case-Law on the Jusrisprudence of the Eu­
ropean Court of Human Rights“.
5 Application No.: 44774/98, Judgment of 10 November 2005.
Court Case-Law vis-a-vis Constitutional Courts
The Convention, being a subsidiary instrument, is really nothing without 
the domestic courts. Since the Convention ultimately aims at the realisation 
of human rights in each of the member states, it is of primordial importance 
that the national authorities and most of all the domestic courts contribute 
to the very best to this endeavour. The Court is not supranational and its 
judgments therefore have no immediate effect in municipal law, contrary to 
the judgments of the Court of Justice of Luxemburg.
In the case of Leyla §ahin v. Turkey5, a Turkish national and student at 
the faculty of medicine of Istanbul University complained that she had been 
prohibited by a circular of the vice-chancellor of the University from wea­
ring the Islamic headscarf at the university. She considered this prohibition 
to constitute a violation of her freedom of religion, an unjustified interfe­
rence with her right to education, and also discrimination, since students had 
to choose between education and religion, which discriminated between be­
lievers and non-believers. The Court considered that the impugned interfe­
rence primarily pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and free­
doms of others and of protecting public order.
As to whether the interference was necessary, our Court relied largely 
on the caselaw of the Turkish Constitutional Court. According to the Tur­
kish court, the prohibition of wearing the Islamic headscarf at university was 
based in particular on the principles of secularism and equality. Secularism, 
as the guarantor of democratic values, was the meeting point of liberty and 
equality. The principle of secularism prevented the state from manifesting 
a preference for a particular religion or belief. It thereby guided the state 
in its role as impartial arbiter, and necessarily entailed freedom of religion 
and conscience. It also served to protect the individual not only against ar­
bitrary interference by the state but from external pressure from extremist 
movements. The Turkish court added that freedom to manifest one’s religion 
could be restricted in order to defend those values and principles.
The Grand Chamber of the Court considered that notion of secularism to 
be consistent with the values the Convention. Upholding that principle co­
uld be considered necessary to protect the democratic system in Turkey. The 
Strasbourg Court, in relying to a large extent on the reasoning of domestic 
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courts, accepts the important role of such courts and thereby in a larger sense 
emphasises the subsidiarity of the Convention system. The Court states ex­
pressly that where questions concerning the relationship between state and 
religions are at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasona­
bly differ widely, the role of the national decision-making body must be given 
special importance. Accordingly, the Court accepts that the choice of the ex­
tent and form which regulations concerning the wearing and exhibition of re­
ligious symbols in educational institutions should take must inevitably be left 
up to a point to the state concerned. From the standpoint of the Court, the 
subsidiarity of the Convention system and the doctrine of the margin of ap­
preciation go hand in hand with a European supervision by the Court embra­
cing both the law and the decisions applying it.
The Court also noted the emphasis placed in the Turkish constitutional 
system on the protection of the rights of women. Gender equality - recogni­
sed by the Court as one of the key principles underlying the Convention and 
the goal to be achieved by the member states - had also been found by the 
Turkish Constitutional Court to be a principle implicit in the values underly­
ing the Constitution. Like the Turkish Constitutional Court, our Court consi­
dered that, when examining the question of the Islamic headscarf in the Tur­
kish context, there had to be borne in mind the impact which wearing such 
a symbol, which was presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty, 
may have on those who choose not to wear it. The issues at stake included 
the protection of the “rights and freedoms of others“ and the “maintenance of 
public order“ in a country in which the majority of the population, while pro­
fessing a strong attachment to the rights of women and a secular way of life, 
adhered to the Islamic faith. Imposing limitations on the freedom to wear the 
headscarf could, therefore, be regarded as meeting a pressing social need by 
seeking to achieve those two legitimate aims, especially since that religious 
symbol had taken on political significance in Turkey in recent years.
In such a context, where the values of pluralism, respect for the rights of 
others and, in particular, equality before the law of men and women were be­
ing taught and applied in practice, it was understandable that the relevant 
authorities should consider it contrary to such values to allow religious sym­
bols, including the Islamic headscarf, to be worn on university premises. The 
Court found therefore that the interference in the issue was justified on prin­
ciple and proportionate to the aims pursued, and could therefore be conside­
red to have been necessary in a democratic society, so that there was no vio­
lation of Article 9.
In line with the subsidiary nature of the Convention, any respondent state 
remained free to choose the means by which it would discharge its legal ob­
ligation to execute the Court’s judgment. Of course, such means had to be 
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compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court’s judgment. In the case 
of Assanidze v. Georgia,6 the Court took a further step towards strengthening 
the efficiency of the Strasbourg system. This is a case, therefore, that has to do 
with exceptions from the principle of subsidiarity and with endeavours to in­
dicate in extraordinary cases to the respondent state which measures were 
needed in order to reach full compliance with the Convention. The applicant, 
a well-known opposition politician, had been in prison on charges of fraud, 
but then continued to be detained by the authorities of the Adjarian autono­
mous republic. He was pardoned by the President of Georgia, Mr. Shevardna­
dze, whereupon the Adjarian authorities challenged the constitutional power 
of the head of state to pardon prisoners. In the end, Assanidze was acquitted 
by the Georgian Supreme Court of all charges against him, but remained ne­
vertheless in prison. The Georgian central authorities had taken all procedu­
ral measures possible under domestic law in order to obtain enforcement of 
the judgment acquitting the applicant, had also had recourse to various po­
litical means to settle the dispute, and had on numerous occasions repeated 
their request to the Adjarian authorities for the applicant’s release, but wit­
hout any success. The Court, however, emphasised that, under the Conven­
tion, it was solely the international responsibility of the state that was in issue, 
irrespective of the national authority to which the breach of the Convention 
could be imputed at domestic level. The Court concluded that the applicant’s 
continued imprisonment was within the “jurisdiction“ of Georgia and that 
the responsibility of the Georgian state alone was engaged under the Con­
vention. Consequently, having found that the applicant was being detained 
arbitrarily contrary to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the Court held, that the 
respondent state had to secure the applicant’s release at the earliest possible 
date. The very day after the judgment was delivered, the applicant was relea­
sed from prison in Adjaria, which is a striking demonstration both of the ef­
fectiveness of the human rights protection afforded by the Convention and of 
the very practical importance of the execution of the Court’s judgments.
6 Application No.: 71503/01, Judgment of 7 April 2004.
7 Application No.: 48787/99, Judgment of 8 July 2004.
The case oilla^cu, Ivantoc, Leçco and Petrov-Popa v. Moldova and Russia,7 
where the Court took a similar approach like in Assanidze. The case concer­
ned events that occurred in the “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria“, the 
region of Moldova to the East of the river Dniester known as Transdniestria. 
This region declared its independence in 1991 in connection with the disso­
lution of the former Soviet Union, which in turn led to a civil war and to the 
self-proclamation of a breakaway regime. This regime is not recognised by 
the international community. The case concerned the unlawful detention of 
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the four applicants, following their arrest in 1992 and their subsequent trial 
by the so-called “Supreme Court of the Moldavian Republic of Transdnie­
stria" and the ill-treatment, inhuman prison conditions and torture inflic­
ted on them during their detention, as well as the death penalty imposed on 
Mr Ila?cu and the mock executions to which he was subjected. The Court es­
tablished the responsibility of both respondent states and found a violation 
of Articles 3, 5 and 34 of the Convention. It ordered the immediate release of 
the applicants still in detention. Only two of the four applicants have been re­
leased to date. Mr Ila^cu was released in May 2001 and Mr Le§co at the expiry 
of the sentence imposed on him by the “Supreme Court of the Moldavian Re­
public of Transdniestria“ in June 2004. The other two applicants, Mr Ivantoc 
and Mr Petrov-Popa, are still in custody.8
8 L. Wildhaber, The National Conference of the Judicial Studies Institute, Dublin, November 18,2005.
’ Juges communautaires de droit commun; ordentliche Gemeinschaftsgerichte.
European Courts and the Domestic Courts
With the extension of the competences of the European Union, including 
in respect of fundamental rights, the traditional bilateral perspective has to 
give way to a more multilateral perspective, in which the coordination of the 
multiple sources of fundamental rights co-existing today in Europe represent 
one of the major issues.
The different legal sources mentioned above are not compartmentalised in 
the sense that each court would have to apply only the fundamental rights of its 
own legal system. Rather, in most cases different sources will have to be com­
bined, as the legal systems concerned do not only co-exist but overlap. This is 
especially true for the domestic courts of the member states which, in cases in­
volving EU law, may have to take into account up to three different sources si­
multaneously: their own national law, the European Convention on Human 
Rights and EU law. The national courts may also ask the Luxembourg court, 
with a prejudicial request, to pronounce with a prejudicial judgment, as issue of 
human rights. In this respect, domestic courts can be said to play a central role 
in the European protection of fundamental rights. In EU law they are often cal­
led “Community courts of ordinary jurisdiction.“9 In fact, one should add that 
they are to the same extent “Convention courts of ordinary jurisdiction“, as it 
is first for them to apply the Convention, since the Convention makes it an es­
sential requirement for any complaint to be declared admissible by the Strasbo­
urg Court that it has been duly raised before the domestic courts of the respon­
dent state. Despite the clear difference of subject-matter separating these two 
courts, there have been instances where the Luxembourg Court has entered into 
the field of protection of human rights, while the Strasbourg Court dealt with
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issues closely connected with matters pertaining to the European Community 
competence. The Luxembourg Court, whenever an issue of human rights arises, 
has, up to now, followed the caselaw of Strasbourg.
Insofar as the Strasbourg Court is concerned, the only question which has 
arisen to date is to what extent may this Court control acts or omissions of 
the Community violating human rights and the provisions of the Convention. 
From the well-known cases, e.g. Waite and Kennedy v. Germany10 or Matthews 
v. U.K.,11 and others, the following principles which, for the time being, govern 
the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to the European Union I Community, 
may be deduced:
10 Application No.: 26083/94, Judgment of 18 February 1999.
11 Application No.: 24833/94, Judgment of 18 February 1999.
12 C. Rozakis, “The Operation of the New Court in the Enlarged Europe".
- the Community itself cannot be considered as a person who may be re­
sponsible for violations of the Convention, and be a party before the Court, be­
cause it is not a party to the Convention. As a consequence, applications aga­
inst the Commission itself are inadmissible because of incompatible ratione 
personae;
- the fact that a state may be found responsible for acts of the EC does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that is also responsible for the alleged vio­
lation;
- member states may be also held responsible for acts or omissions which 
emanate from applications of community law within their domestic order. 
They cannot invoke their obligations to apply the law or practices of the Com­
munity, in order to evade responsibility;
- member states of the Community may be held liable for acts or omissions 
of the Community on the basis of their obligation to respect the Convention 
and not to void their responsibilities by relinquishing their own competence to 
international organisations. While a state may relinquish its competence and 
sovereignty to an international organisation, this does not mean that it does 
not remain responsible for possible violations of the Convention by the inter­
national organisation which affects rights of an individual under the jurisdic­
tion of the relinquishing state.12
As far as the cooperation between the two European Courts is concerned, 
it can be seen in the caselaw of the Court of Justice, parallel to the gradual ex­
pansion of the amount of litigation involving fundamental rights, an increa­
sing number of references to the Convention and to the Strasbourg case-law, 
demonstrating a clear commitment to ensure harmony between the Luxem­
bourg and Strasbourg jurisprudence.
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As a result, hardly any conflicts between the two European courts have oc­
curred in the past.
A striking example of this approach can be found in the preliminary ruling 
recently given by a Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice in the case of Ma­
ria Pupino (16 June 2005, C-105/03), which had to deal with an issue relating 
to domestic criminal procedure, one of the core areas of the European Con­
vention on Human Rights. Called upon to interpret the Framework Decision 
on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings, the Court of Justice sta­
ted inter alia that it was for the domestic courts to ensure that in interpreting 
national law in conformity with Community law, criminal proceedings rema­
ined fair within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention, as interpreted by 
the European Court of Human Rights.13
13 L. Wildhaber, National Conference of the Judicial Studies Institute, Dublin, November 18, 2005.
The harmony between the Convention and Community law is to a signifi­
cant extent also the result of an essential contribution being made by the do­
mestic courts, through their role in respect of the preliminary rulings by the 
ECJ. For at the end of the day it is for the domestic courts to apply the ECJ’s 
preliminary rulings to the facts of the case in the main proceedings. While 
there are indeed a good many preliminary rulings in which the ECJ draws it­
self the conclusion from the existing Strasbourg caselaw, in other rulings it 
confines itself to pointing to the relevant Strasbourg caselaw, leaving it to the 
referring domestic court to apply it to the circumstances of the specific case, 
thereby conferring on the domestic court some discretion as to what the im­
pact of the Convention on Community law issues should be.
A good illustration of these different approaches can be found by com­
paring the cases of Carpenter (11 July 2002, C-60/00) and Hacene Akrich 
(23 September 2003, C-109/01), which were both concerned with the expul­
sion of third-country spouses of EU citizens. In the Carpenter case the ECJ 
ruled, having regard to the Strasbourg jurisprudence, that a deportation of 
Mrs Carpenter would not be proportionate and would therefore infringe her 
husband’s right to respect for his family life within the meaning of Article 8 
of the Convention.
A similar problem, though involving different Community law provi­
sions, arose in the case of Hacene Akrich, in which the ECJ considered that 
even though Regulation no. 1612/68 did not apply to the facts of the case, 
the authorities of a member state, in assessing an application by the fo­
reign spouse of an EU citizen to reside in that member state, were under 
a Community law obligation “to have regard to the right to respect for family 
life laid down in Article 8 of the Convention“.
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Unlike in the Carpenter case, however, the ECJ did not itself assess the im­
pact of Article 8 on the facts of the case but confined itself to referring to the 
relevant Strasbourg caselaw.14
14 L. Wildhaber, The Coordination of the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe, Geneva, Septem­
ber 8, 2005.
An indication that domestic courts are doing fairly well in using the 
amount of discretion left to them in this respect by the ECJ can be seen in 
the fact that so far there have hardly been any serious applications brought 
to the Strasbourg Court challenging the result of the application by dome­
stic courts of ECJ preliminary rulings, even though such applications are ad­
missible ratione materiae, as has now been recently confirmed by the Stras­
bourg Court in the Bosphorus case. The case concerned the impounding by 
the Irish authorities of an aircraft which had been leased by the applicant 
Turkish company from a Yugoslavian airline. The Irish authorities had acted 
in pursuance of EC Council Regulation 990/93 which, in turn, had implemen­
ted the UN sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In 
a preliminary ruling delivered on 30 July 1996, the ECJ had found inter alia 
that the consequences of the impounding for the applicant company were 
not disproportionate and therefore not incompatible with the fundamental 
right to property. The Strasbourg Court made an important and much awai­
ted contribution to clarification of the relationship between the Convention 
and the Community Law. It found that the protection of fundamental rights 
by EC law, unless manifestly deficient, could be considered “equivalent“ to 
that of the Convention system. Consequently, there was a presumption that 
a state would not depart from the requirements of the Convention when it 
was merely implementing legal obligations stemming from its membership 
of the European Union.
A new legal situation may evolve in case of the future accession of the Union 
to the Convention. Such an eventuality may create dynamics which, in the end, 
and for those rights which coincide both in the Constitution and the Conven­
tion, may offer a unity of protection. This is absolutely clear for acts or omissions 
of the organs of the European Union, less clear for violations coming from na­
tional authorities in applying Union’s law. It may be anticipated that in the latter 
case the Luxembourg Court, through its prejudicial judgments, would follow the 
Strasbourg caselaw. One may also envisage that a closer cooperation may deve­
lop between the two Courts in order for them to streamline their caselaw.
Conclusion
In order to demonstrate the complexity of the human rights protection 
system in Europe and to sum up my presentation, let me conclude with the 
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case ofMrKoua Poirrez.1"’ Here was a physically disabled applicant, a na­
tional of Ivory Coast, who had been adopted as an adult by a French citi­
zen, although he did not thereby acquire French nationality. He applied for an 
adult disability allowance, but the French courts turned down his application 
on the ground of his Ivory Coast nationality. The French court hearing his 
appeal decided to ask the Court of Justice of the European Communities for 
a preliminary ruling on the compatibility between the relevant French law 
and Community law, on the basis that the applicant was a direct descendant 
of a citizen of the European Union. The Court of Justice found that Com­
munity law did not apply to the facts of the case: although the applicant’s 
adoptive father was indeed a national of a member state of the European 
Communities, he did not qualify as a migrant worker, since he had always 
lived and worked in France. On the strength of this Luxembourg judgment, 
all the French courts which successively dealt with the appeal rejected the 
applicant’s request for a disability allowance. He then applied to the Stras­
bourg Court which, in a judgment of 30 September 2003, i.e. more than 13 
years after he had originally applied, found that the applicant had been the 
victim of discrimination based on nationality. This was contrary to Article 
14 of the Convention taken together with Article 1 of Protocol no. 1, and 
our Court, ruling on an equitable basis, awarded him 20 000 euros for the 
damage he had suffered.15 6
15 Application No.: 40892/98, judgement of 30 September 2003.
16 L. Wildhaber, The Coordination of the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe, Geneva, Septem­
ber 8, 2005.
This case demonstrates the complementarity of the three legal systems 
involved, but also the complexity of their interplay: French law contained 
an element of discrimination which Community law was powerless to re­
medy, because it did not apply in the particular case; accordingly it was only 
in Strasbourg that the situation could finally be remedied.
The Koua Poirrez case furthermore highlights the problem of the length of 
proceedings in Europe. The applicant had to wait for more than 13 years be­
fore finally being vindicated in Strasbourg. While such a duration is also the 
result of the intervention of three different levels of jurisdiction, it is no op­
tion to abolish one of them, as each level has a key role to play in the Euro­
pean legal architecture. It is of course true that the Court of Justice had no 
other choice but to rule that Community law was not applicable to the facts 
of the case, but it would not have taken much for Community law to apply.
Another major challenge of the years to come will be the preservation of 
legal certainty and harmony between all those different legal sources of fun­
damental rights, through a coordinated and harmonised approach designed 
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to avoid confusion and relativism in this sensitive but most important area. 
While each legal system should be allowed to have its own fundamental 
rights and levels of protection, adapted to the specificities of the state or sy­
stem concerned, it is equally essential to have a coherent approach in respect 
of the rights which are common to most of the legal systems concerned, espe­
cially those laid down in the European Convention of Human Rights. Here 
we have to be aware of the fact that the same persons may claim the same 
rights under different legal systems. Remember Mr Koua Poirrez who invo­
ked basically the same right - the right not to be discriminated against - first 
under French law, then under Community law and finally under the Conven­
tion, each time with a different result.17
17 Ditto as under footnote 17.
Fortunately, a lot has already been achieved in this respect, not least thanks 
to an excellent cooperation between the domestic courts of the EU Mem­
ber states, the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human 
Rights.
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The Constitution of Liberty: The Normative and Dogmatic 
Connections of Principles of Liberty, Fundamental Freedoms 
and Human Rights within the Union
/. The legal network of liberty
There was a vision in Europe which developed into a horror: the vision and 
horror of a common constitution. Fortunately, our politicians found a pragma­
tic solution: The European Union will get another framework which shall work 
as a constitution without the title “Constitution“. Much ado about nothing? 
Instead of discussing a Shakespearean comedy or of squaring a circle, I will 
try to look behind the institutions and competences, following John Rawls’ 
remark that the political system must follow its basic liberties.1 Rawls repea­
ted Kant’s sentence that the civil constitution is based a priori on liberty,1 2  and 
so we are just amidst the European enlightenment. From this point of view 
I will look for the principles the Union is based on.
1 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York 1993, 8th lecture § 1.
2 I. Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis 
(1793), [in:] Werke in sechs Bänden, ed. by W. Weischedel, Vol. 6, Darmstadt 1966, p. 125 (145).
3 Cf. I. Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, 1784; Concerning the Ger­
man term “materieller Rechtsstaat“, cf. E.-W. Böckenförde, Entstehung und Wandel des Rechtsstaatsbegriffs, 
[in:] E.-W. Böckenförde, Recht, Staat, Freiheit, Frankfurt a. M. 1991, p. 143 sqq.; K. Stern, Das Staatsrecht 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Vol. 1, München 1977 § 20. Concerning “I’etat de droit“, cf. P. Pactet, In­
stitutions politique. Droit constitutionnel, 14th ed. Paris 1995, p. 127 sqq. Concerning the British term “rule 
of law“ cf. K. Loewenstein, Staatsrecht und Staatspraxis von Großbritannien, Bd. 1, Berlin-Heidelberg-New 
York 1967, S. 74 ff.
According to the Treaty on European Union, the leading principle is li­
berty. Long, long ago it stimulated the foundation of the European Com­
munities to lead the European states out of the narrowness of their national 
egocentrism. Nowadays, Article 6 paragraph 1 demands more. It demands li­
berty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
the rule of law (Rechtsstaat, I’etat de droit). Because democracy combines 
equality and liberty, and the rule of law - if we understand this term more in 
Kant’s and the continental sense of Rechtsstaat than in Dicey’s and the very 
special British sense3 - includes fundamental rights. The cross-section, the 
common meaning of this complex of values and aims is liberty, freedom, au­
tonomy. The Treaty on the European Union declares that these principles are 
a priori common to all Member States. So we may assume that liberty should 
be effective all over the Union as an objective principle in order to form its de-
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mocratic society4 and as a subjective right in order to establish the autonomy 
of the citizens of the Union.5
4 Cf. R. Grawert, Die demokratische Gesellschaft der Union, “Der Staat“ 46 (2007), p. 33—60.
5 Cf. P. Kubicki, Die subjektivrechtliche Komponente der Unionsbürgerschaft, “Europarecht“ (EuR) 2006, 
p. 489-511.
6 F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago-London 1960; German version: 2nd ed. Tübingen 1983.
7 The history of the terms “constitutio“, “Verfassung“, “Konstitution“ is explained by H. Mohnhaupt, D. Grimm, 
Article “Verfassung I, It', [in:] Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache 
in Deutschland, eds. O. Brunner, W. Conze, R. Koselleck, Vol. 6, Ist ed. Stuttgart 1990, p. 831 sqq., 863 sqq.
8 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in four books (1765), 9th ed. London 1783, 
reprint New York-London 1978, Vol. 1, p. 50 sq., 124 sqq.
91. Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis, 1793, 
II (“versus Hobbes“).
10 Publius (Hamilton), The Federalist Papers, No. 84.
11 K. Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Vol. III/l, München 1988, 2nd cap. (p. 175 
sqq): “Grundrechtskonstitutionalismus“.
12 “Land“, “Land Nordrhein-Westfalen“, “Länder“, “Grundgesetz“, “Bundesverfassungsgericht“, in this pa­
per, I use the constitutional German terms.
I will understand this system of principles, freedoms and individual rights 
as a “Constitution of Liberty“. “Constitution of Liberty“ was the title of E A. 
Hayek’s - winner of the Nobel Prize 1974 - famous book,6 and it is an ideal 
of European civilisation. Though the norms guaranteeing liberty within the 
Union derive from different sources and are effective on different levels, they 
form one system, because they are concepted as a meaningful structured 
whole, which parts could be joined together under a leading sense and sho­
uld work in a practical connection. This system can be named constitution, 
if we do not reserve that term only for the organisation of a state, but ex­
tend it with regard to its fundamental contents to the relations between the 
commonwealth and its people.7 This valuing understanding may be relied on 
Blackstone8 and Kant,9 and Hamilton10 as well as on the US-American con­
stitutional doctrine and especially on Article 16 of the French Declaration of 
Rights of 1789, which declares human rights as an unconditional essence of 
a substantial constitution. Designing the development and the efficacy of hu­
man and fundamental rights within its historical and normative context, you 
will pass the frontiers of a formal term of constitution of nation-states and its 
specific ideal of codification. So you will reach the connection of the national 
and international constitutionalism of fundamental rights.11
From the point of view of a citizen of the Union, the European constitu­
tion of liberty is rather complex, because it consists of a network and hierar­
chy of norms. The legal situation of the Federal Republic of Germany is even 
more difficult because the German Länder12 have constitutions of their own 
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with special codes of fundamental rights. If an inhabitant of a Land will look 
like me from the base of these regional constitutions up to the roof of the 
Union, he will recognise the following explanations of liberties and freedoms, 
listed from bottom to top:
within Germany
1. the fundamental rights and principles of the constitutions of the Län­
der, which rank above the law of the Land, but beneath that of the federation;
2. the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Euro­
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free­
doms (1950), which ranks beneath the Grundgesetz of the Federal Republic 
with the force of the federal law which transforms the international Conven­
tion into state law;
3. the European Charter of Social Rights (1961), transformed into federal 
law;
4. the fundamental rights of the Grundgesetz, which oblige all state fun­
ctions of the federation as well as those of the Länder (Article 1 paragraph 3 
GG);
5. the International Agreements on human rights (1966) as well as the 
Charter of the United Nations (1948) and the dogmatic traditions as sources 
of inspiration to interpret the national constitution;
within the Union
6. the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (1957, 1992, 1997, 2001);
7. the fundamental rights developed by the European Court of Justice as 
a result of the constitutional traditions common to the Member States;
8. in virtue of Article 6 paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the European Union 
the fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which the Union 
“shall respect“;
9. in virtue of Article 136 of the Treaty Establishing the European Com­
munity the “fundamental social rights such as those set out in the European 
Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in the 1989 Commu­
nity Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers“, which “having in 
mind“ the Community and the Member States will favour “the harmonisa­
tion of social systems“;
10. at least the Charter of the European Union on Fundamental Rights so­
lemnly proclaimed by the Council at Nice and taken as an instrument of in­
terpretation by the Court of Justice, though the Charter is not yet in force.
These different sources contain “hard“ and “soft“ law, obliging on the one 
side and influencing the politics and interpretations of laws on the other side. 
Liberalists hope that the combination of all those sources will amount to a con-
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sistently functional system. Optimistic liberalists may rejoice: an integrating 
constitution of liberties. Pessimistic liberalists may regret: a chaos of values 
and norms. But before we criticise that system, let me explain how it works, 
namely by incorporation of transmitted texts, by mutual influences of national 
and international law systems, and, of course, by harmonising interpretation. 
Finally, I will discuss the competition of fundamental rights - what we call in 
Germany Grundrechtskonkurrenzen - and the question of jurisdiction.
2. Constitutional incorporation of legal values and texts
At first let us consider the incorporation of legal ideas and texts into the 
constitutions of member states. Modern positivists are convinced that the le­
gal force of human rights is primarily based on positive decisions of a con­
stituent power. Nowadays, this conviction depends on the doctrine of de­
mocracy, that the demos is its legal source of its own and contains its law by 
itself. From this - very continental - point of view the legal force of human 
rights depends mainly on a positive constitution.
But in spite of the democratic theory of decision-making, another wide­
spread conviction exists in Europe, that, in a deeper sense, human rights be­
long to the very nature of men and therefore precede all public forces. This 
conviction depends on the cultural impression of Christian-occidental tra­
ditions of thinking and of monarchist-feudal political structures: Magna 
Carta on the one side, enlightenment on the other side. Because of these 
common traditions, the doctrine of human rights requires a supra-positive 
validity, which influences constitutional politics as well as the interpretation 
of constitutional charters. The German legal dogmatics and jurisdiction un­
derstands therefore an order of fundamental values as the basis of the posi­
tive legal order with the human dignity as focus.13
13 BVerfGE 35, 202 (225); 39,1 (43).
Some constitutions stress that cultural background by the explicit recogni­
tion of or attachment to dignity, liberty and other values or rights. An exam­
ple is Article 1 paragraph 2 of the Grundgesetz. The constitutions of Italy, Po­
land, Portugal, Spain and of some German Länder do the same. In this way 
philosophical and moral axioms become valid parts of the constitutions and 
leading aims of those member states. In a technical sense they are incorpora­
ted by positive recognition, acknowledgement or attachment.
Some constitutions of the German Länder incorporate not only unwritten 
traditional dogmas but even texts from other constitutions in order to com­
plete their constitutional programme. Instead of formulating codes of human 
rights themselves they refer to the code which the Grundgesetz has constitu­
ted. For example, Article 4 paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Land Nor- 
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drhein-Westfalen declares that the rights laid down in the Grundgesetz “in the 
form of 23 May 1949“ are constituent parts (Bestandteil} of the constitution 
of the Land and oblige as constitutional law of the Land everybody directly. 
To understand this formula you should know that the same rules on human 
rights are valid as constitutional law of the Federal Republic (Article 1 para­
graph 3 GG), so that they are binding twice, but on different hierarchical le­
vels, as multiple guaranties for the inhabitants of the Land Nordrhein-West­
falen. But does the incorporated text have the same meaning? I don’t think 
so, because it works in a different context. Though the constitutional courts 
of the Lander normally follow the jurisdiction of the Bundesverfassungsge­
richt, it is evident that for example the right to move and reside freely alter­
natively means the territory of the Land or that of the Federal Republic, and 
that the freedom of broadcasting depends on the different legal competences. 
The constitution of Nordrhein-Westfalen has another problem with the date 
23 May 1949: Does it mean that later amendments to the federal code of hu­
man rights shall not be incorporated into the law of the Land - so called pe­
trifaction — or does it mean that the reference to the Grundgesetz is dynamic 
so that the constitution of the Land could legitimately be changed by another 
constituent power than that of the Land?. Of course, several opinions exist 
and therefore chances for arguments.
The legal situation on the level of the Federal Republic as well as on the 
level of the Lander is even more complicated because the European Con­
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has 
been transformed into German law by a simple statute of the Federal Re­
public.14 While Austria incorporated the Convention into its constitution, it 
ranks in Germany beneath the federal constitution but above normal fede­
ral laws and above the constitutions of the Lander. The Bundesverfassungsge­
richt has decided that the text of the Convention as well as the jurisdiction of 
the European Court of Human Rights must be taken into consideration for 
the interpretation of the human rights laid down in the Grundgesetz. There­
fore the Convention and its European interpretations oblige the German le­
gislators with the force of the federal constitution and the jurisdiction of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. It took several years until this Court had adjusted 
its jurisdiction on human rights to this European dimension. Only after it had 
been convinced that the Convention guarantees a minimum standard of valid 
protection which principally fulfils the demands of the Grundgesetz did it ob­
lige itself to respect the contents and developments of the Convention.15
14 BVerfGE 74, 358 (370); 82,106 (120); 111, 307 (317).
15 BVerfGE 73, 339 (370); confirmation by BVerfGE 82, 106 (120); 83, 119 (128); 111, 307 (latest leading 
case).
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The European Charter of Social Rights from 1961 holds a similar position 
in German law.16 Even if it should directly entitle and oblige not only its Mem­
ber States, but also individuals, it does not have the force of constitutional law. 
But it can be important for the interpretation of constitutional human rights, 
especially for the understanding of Article 9 paragraph 3 GG,17 in which the 
rights of the social partners are guaranteed. Moreover, the International Agre­
ement on Civil and Political Rights from 196618 principally is considered as 
a source of interpretation of the German human rights.19
16 V. 18.10.1961 (BGBl. 1964II1262).
17 BVerfGE 88,103 (112); 58, 233 (253 sq.); 76, 1 (81).
18 V. 19. 12.1966 (BGBl. 1973 II1534).
19 BVerfGE 76,1 (81).
20 BVerfGE 37, 271 (280 sqq.); 52, 187 (202 sq.); 73, 339 (378).
21 Since the constitutional law from 21. 12. 1992 (BGBl. I 2086).
The ranking system of these different dogmas, norms and jurisdictions is 
rather complicated, and not only the normal person, but the normal jurist, too, 
could become confused. Nevertheless it is the federal code of human rights on 
the one side and on the other side the intensive jurisdiction of the Bundesver­
fassungsgericht which produce a certain harmonisation and, moreover, a uni­
fication within the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same time, they open 
the national system for the influences of international and supra-national Eu­
ropean law. That does not mean giving up the constitutional autonomy. But as 
soon and as far as national constitutions open their codes to those influences, 
they act in an integrative way.
3. Interdependences and interferences of European law
From this point of view, we may follow the legal ways of liberty into and 
within the Community and the Union and from there back to the Member 
States: ways of reciprocations. In the case of Germany it was the Bundesver­
fassungsgericht which paved those ways by its famous Solange (as-long-as-) 
judgments. By these judgements the Court insists on its constitutional sove­
reignty on questions of fundamental rights as long as the process of integration 
of the Community has not proceeded so far that the Community law inclu­
des a valid code of fundamental rights formulated and laid down by a parlia­
ment, a code which should be adequate to the code of fundamental rights of 
the Grundgesetz.20
Nowadays, its Article 23 paragraph 1 demands approximately the same.21 
The essence of the code of fundamental rights therefore defines an essential 
of the German constitution and of Germany’s national identity in the sense of 
Article 6 paragraph 3 of the Treaty on the European Union. The above men­
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tioned reservation of the Bundesverfassungsgericht was formulated in May 
1974.22
22 BVerfGE 37, 271.
23 BVerfGE 73, 339.
24 Cf. R. Grawert, Free Movement of Workers: Changing the European Society, “Managerial Law“ 47 (2005), 
p. 70-81.
25 Cf. R. Grawert, Die demokratische Gesellschaft der Union, “Der Staat“ 4 (2007), p. 33,46 sq.
26 Cf. Art. 2, 39 sqq., 4 sqq. ECT.
27 Cf. Title XI, especially Art. 136 ECT.
28 ECJ [in:] ECR 1969, 419 - 29/69 - (Stauder-Ulm); ECR 1970, 1125 - 11 / 70 - (Internationale Handels­
gesellschaft); ECR 1974, 591 - 4/73 - (Nold). But cf. the decisions of the Court refusing to consider such 
rights: ECR 1959, 17 - 1/58 - (Stork) and ECR 1960, 423 - 36, 37, 38, 40/59 - (Geitling). Cf. C. O. Lenz, 
Der europäische Grundrechtsstandard in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes, “Europäische 
Grundrechte-Zeitschrift“ (EuGRZ) 1993, p. 585 sqq., and the short survey [in:] P. Craig, Gráinne de Búrca, 
EU Law. Text, Cases, and Meteríais, 3,c ed., Oxford 2003, p. 317 sqq.
But in October 1986,23 just twenty years ago, the Court decided that 
meanwhile, the protection of human rights by the Community had reached 
an acceptable standard. This progress had been the answer and the success of 
the European Court of Justice.
Originally, the Rome Treaty Establishing the European Economic Com­
munity which we celebrated this year had been concentrated on the Com­
mon Market: The free movement of goods, persons, services and capital were 
concepted as “Community Policies“.
These policies were supposed to direct the common institutions and ob­
lige the Member States to entitle workers24 and other persons. The original 
Treaty favoured private persons, but did not entitle them directly in relation 
to the public power as classical human rights do. Therefore, subjective rights 
depend on legal concretions.
Nowadays the Treaty Establishing the European Community follows this 
concept. It is qualified by a special relationship between liberty and equality: 
Individual liberties result from organising equality.25 The Treaty stresses the 
elimination of discriminations and the realisation of equality.26
This programme for legal liberty by effective equality is adjusted to “the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition“ in order to Ar­
ticle 4 paragraph 2 of that Treaty. But it mistrusts the dogma of neo-libera- 
lism by obliging the Member States to intervene for a social policy.27 It does 
not rely on the energy of individual and social autonomy.
But since 1969 the European Court of Justice28 and since 1992 the Maa­
stricht Treaty have caused a paradigmatic turn. At first, the Court develo­
ped, beginning, of course, with the right to property and the freedom to pe­
ruse a trade or profession, step by step a broad panorama of fundamental
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rights, which meanwhile concerns nearly all aspects of social life. This de­
velopment is the human-rights answer to the expansion of the competen­
ces of the Community.29 Of course, the basic source of this jurisdiction was 
and must be the rules of the treaties, especially the rules on non-discrimi­
nation. Because these rules do not say very much about liberties, the Court 
has practised something like an authentic and dynamic interpretation. Poin­
ting it, you might say that the Court did - in the opinion of the Bundesverfas­
sungsgericht - what a European parliament should have done.30 With which 
legitimacy? Does the jurisdiction depend on something like the sovereignty 
of the Union, depending on the “peoples of Europe“, as the Court means?31 Or 
does it depend on a so-called “bottom-up“ structure of a practised European 
“community of justice“, scholars and courts, as an Advocate-General presu­
mes?32 Or are the decisions of the Court only facts accepted by the member 
states, their jurists and courts? Anyway, that jurisdiction establishing a com­
plex of fundamental rights and freedoms was a legal and political necessity, 
and so it became valid by acceptance. Since 1992, the interpretation may fol­
low Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, which declares that the Union 
is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and that it shall respect fundamental rights as 
guaranteed by the European Convention from 1950 and as they result from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general prin­
ciples of Community law. According to this declaration, the Court of Justice 
now uses a standing formula33 in order to define its “sources of inspiration“ - 
“inspiration“ is a good expression because the Court seldom expresses exa­
ctly which sources are meant.
29 The connection between these two developments was stressed by the “Bundesverfassungsgericht"; cf. 
BVerfGE 73, 339 (375); 58,1 (30 sq.); 37, 271 (279).
30 Cf. the text above to n. 19.
31 Cf. ECJ [in:] ECR 1963, 3 - 26/62 - (Van Gend & Loos).
32 Cf. M. Poiares Maduro, Der Kontrapunkt im Dienst eines europäischen Verfassungspluralismus, “Euro­
parecht“ 2007, p. 4 (12 sqq.).
33 The Charter of Fundamental Rights, proclaimed at Nice 2001, transmitted this formula into its Art. 53.
But is it possible to fix the relevant “constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States“, in view of twenty-seven states? Is that a question of le­
gal culture, history or comparison? If legal comparison should be relevant, 
we have to compare less traditions than valid constitutions, and I think that 
this is the way to respect the identities of the member states. Nevertheless, 
comparison is only a process and not a rule. Therefore it is not astonishing 
that the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun­
damental Freedoms has a prominent position amidst the Court’s “sources of 
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inspiration.“34 Meanwhile the Charter of Fundamental Rights works in the 
same way, though it is only proclaimed by the Council.35 Thus, the Conven­
tion works on multiple levels: twice within Germany, then within the Euro­
pean Council, and moreover within the European Community and Union.
34 Cf. e.g. ECJ [in:] ECR 1991,1-2925 (2951 n. 41) - C-260/89 (Elliniki Radiophona Tileorassi AE).
55 At Nice 7.12.2000, ABI. n. C 364/01 v. 18.12.2000.
4. Concurrences and conflicts of human rights rules and courts
This situation illustrates at least the main problem of the European “con­
stitution of liberty“: the problem of unity by concurrence and competition, 
more precisely: the concurrence or competition between different legal rules 
on human rights with similar contents and between different courts apply­
ing those rules on freedoms and liberties. Normally the rules and courts work 
within the frames of their special systems. Within these legal systems (from 
my personal point of view: the systems of the Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the European Council, the European Com­
munity and of the Union) the way of ranking the rules follows well-known 
principles, for example the principle of hierarchy or legitimacy or the princi­
ple of speciality or the principle of friendly interpretation.
But these normally helpful principles are not sufficient to solve the very 
special problems of legal concurrences and competitions in hieratic, but at 
the same time integrated systems, for example the Federal Republic of Ger­
many and the European Community and Union. Let me for example indi­
cate at first the German situation. There, the Republic and most of the Län­
der have autonomous constitutions with similar codes of fundamental rights. 
Their rules principally are applicable side by side. Therefore, contradictions 
are possible, if the rules differ in the extent of their guarantees of liberty or in 
their authorisations to limit the liberties. But even if they are worded quite 
similarly, they could be interpreted and applied in different ways by different 
administrations and courts which, perhaps, follow different “sources of in­
spiration“. In order to minimise such problems, the Grundgesetz dictates that 
a federal rule “overcomes“ (bricht) contradictory and even similar rules of the 
Länder (Article 31) so that they are not yet valid. But it makes an exception 
in respect to regional fundamental rights: Those rules of the Länder shall 
remain valid “also in so far“ (auch insoweit), as they guarantee liberties “in 
conformity with“ (in Übereinstimmung mit) the Grundgesetz (Article 142), so 
that there are double protections of liberties, doubled by their contents and 
by the competences of the constitutional courts.
For a long time, the Grundgesetz and the Bundesverfassungsgericht deve­
loped the protection of fundamental rights in a unifying way. Nowadays, the
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Constitutional Courts of the Länder36 act with a new self-consciousness stres­
sing the autonomous validity of the regional constitutions and of their own 
competences.37 8  And the Bundesverfassungsgericht promotes and respects this 
development in its latest jurisdiction, so that, for example, the Constitutional 
Courts of the Länder are able to apply the rules of the Länder on fundamental 
rights on rules of procedure of the Federation even if these fundamental rights 
resemble those of the Grundgesetz.33 Nevertheless, there remained some prob­
lems about the meaning of those ranking rules and about their extents.39 But 
that is not astonishing because the quarrels about interpretations are in fact 
political quarrels about autonomy, hierarchy and subsidiarity. I will not bore 
you with these quarrels and restrict myself to the thesis that rules of integrated 
states on fundamental rights must be respected as far as possible, that means: 
as far as their application does not disturb the functions of the federal law sy­
stem. Normally, it is not necessary for the functional compatibility of a law sy­
stem that constitutional rules of federated states lose their authoritative vali­
dity. Because we may handle possible contradictions as problems not primarily 
of validity, but of application. In order to avoid contradictions it will be enough 
to suspend the application of the contradicting rule in the very case of a contra­
diction and to let it be valid for other cases.
36 Some of them are named “Landesverfassungsgericht“ some “Verfassungsgerichtshof“.
37 Preeminent the so-called “Honnecker-Beschluss" (= decision) of the Verfassungsgerichtshof of Ber­
lin 12.01.1993, “Neue Juristische Wochenschrift“ (NJW) 1993, 515 sqq. About the new selfconsciousness 
and power of the constitutional courts of the Länder cf. Christian Tietje, Die Stärkung der Verfassungsge­
richtsbarkeit im föderalen System Deutschlands in der jüngeren Rechtsprechung des BVerfG, “Archiv des 
öffentlichen Rechts“ (AöR) 124 (1999), p. 282 sqq.
38 Verfassungsgerichtshof des Landes Sachsen, “Neue Juristische Wochenschrift“ (NJW) 1998, 1736 sqq.; 
BVerfGE 96, 345 (345, 351 sqq.).
39 Cf. R. Grawert, Wechselwirkungen zwischen Bundes- und Landesgrundrechten, [in:] Handbuch der Grun­
drechte in Deutschland und Europa, eds. D. Mertens, H.-J. Papier, Vol. 3, Heidelberg 2007-2008, § 80 n. 76 sqq.
40 Art. 5 ECT, Art. 2 and 6 par. 3 EUT.
I base my thesis on the respect to the constitutional autonomy of the pe­
ople who established a constitution. With regard to Germany, this respect is 
expressed in Article 28 paragraph 1 of the Grundgesetz. In its recent jurisdi­
ction, the Bundesverfassungsgericht stresses that rule which is an expression 
of subsidiarity, too. And therefore its sense fits for the European Commu­
nity and Union and their relationship to the Member States. The Treaties es­
tablishing those federations expressively stress the principle of subsidiarity.40 
But the consequence of “breaking“ and excluding a rule of a Member State is 
not so urgent, because Article 6 of the Treaty on Establishing the European 
Community stipulates “principles which are common to the Member States“ 
and also fundamental rights based on “the constitutional traditions common 
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to the Member States“. Nevertheless it is imaginable that the development 
of fundamental liberties comes to other results than constitutions of Mem­
ber States or of their official interpreters,41 maybe with regard to the extent 
of the guarantee, maybe to the protected subjects,42 its restrictions, for exam­
ple the restrictions “a constraining social necessity“ respectively “necessities 
of a democratic society,“43 restrictions which the Court of Justice, but not the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht took over from the Court of Human Rights; or we 
may reflect the consequences of the Bosman-Case which the Court of Justice 
decided obliged private associations by common fundamental rights, whilst 
national constitutions do not allow such restrictions of privates.44 Such dif­
ferences can become problematic, because the Community law not only ob­
liges the Community and the Union itself, but the Member States, too, if 
they execute the law of the Union.45 Article 51 paragraph 1 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights dictates that obligation expressively. Normative contra­
dictions may result judicial contradiction. They may remember the judicial 
reservation of the Bundesverfassungsgericht that it will reserve and keep its 
internal and Germany’s external sovereignty to prove the level of the Com­
munity liberties. In the cases “banana-market“46 and “European warrant for 
arrest“47 that Court seemed to become suspicious of the extending power of 
the Union. Only three months go, the President of the Bundesverfassungsge­
richt cautioned against “conflicts“ caused by the expanding jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice on the common fundamental rights.48
41 Cf. J. Kokott, Der Grundrechtsschutz im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht, “Archiv des öffentlichen 
Rechts“ (AöR) 121 (1996), p. 599 sqq.
42 The so-called “Deutschenrechte“, e.g. Art 12 par. 1 GG, which entitle only German nationals perhaps 
contradict the inhibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality (Art. 12 ETC); R. Störmer, Gemeins­
chaftsrechtliche Diskriminierungsverbote versus national Grundrechte?, “Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts“ 
123 (1998), p. 541 sqq., denies such possibilities.
43 Cf. ECJ, C-l 12/00, v. 12. 6. 2000, "Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift“ (EuGRZ) 2003, p. 42 (498 n. 79).
44 Cf. ECJ 1995, 1-4921 (Bosman), ‘Neue Juristische Wochenschrift“ (NJW) 1996, 505, and the critics of 
W. Kluth, Die Bindung privater Wirtschaftsteilnehmer an die Grundfreiheiten des EG-Vertrages - Eine Ana­
lyse am Beispiel des Bosman-Urteils des EuGH, "Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts“ 122 (1997), p. 557 sqq.
45 Cf. the survey of T. Jürgensen, I. Schlünder, EG-Grundrechte gegenüber Maßnahmen der Mitgliedstaa­
ten, “Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts“ (AöR) 121 (1996), p. 200 (208 sqq.).
46 BVerfGE 102,147 (161 sqq.).
47 BVerfGE 113, 273 (297 sq.).
48 Cf. the interview with Professor Dr. Hans-Jürgen Papier in “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung“ No. 169, 
24.07.2007, p. 5.
This attitude, which you can observe also in other Member States and the 
problems of normative and judicial concurrence are, of course, a conseque­
nce of the problem of sovereignty. I will repeat: a consequence of the prob­
lem, not of sovereignty itself. In its classical meaning sovereignty presuppo- 
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ses one sovereign. Therefore it has been and is rather difficult to identify its 
place in the frame of a federal republic which consists - like the Federal Re­
public of Germany - of states with peoples and constituent powers and de­
mocratic legislation of their own. Today the common opinion is that the peo­
ple of the Federation and its Grundgesetz dominate the national legal system 
of Germany, and the Bundesverfassungegericht participates in its internal so­
vereignty. The European Union cannot pretend one people of its own. But the 
Court pretends that the European Communities own a sovereign power de­
pending on the “union among peoples of Europe“ named by the preamble of 
the Treaty on the European Union, and that this common power legitimates 
the pre-eminence and superiority as well as the direct validity of the Euro­
pean rules, especially those of the primary European law49 of which the fun­
damental freedoms and liberties are parts. But if we do not want to flirt with 
the old-fashioned American thesis of parted sovereignty and respect the Tre­
aty, then the Union cannot compete with its founders and Member States in 
sovereignty. Consequently, the pre-eminence and the superiority and the di­
rect validity of the common fundamental freedoms and liberties cannot de­
pend but on the respect of the Member States. From this point of view, the 
courts of these States are at least able to solve conflicts between European 
and national laws. They may retain their power, like the Bundesverfassungsge­
richt normally does, or they may reject the European law. In the last case the 
Member State may decide whether it will be better for him to reform its con­
stitution or to leave the Union. At last, it is this check-up which decides the 
question on legal and cultural identity. But the most clever way - clever in the 
sense of Macchiavelli’s theory of surviving - will be to avoid the clash by mi­
nimising the zones of conflicts, by coordination and cooperation early.
49 Cf. ECJ [in:] ECR 1963, 3 - 26/62 (Van Gend & Loos).
50 Art. 32 ECHR.
One special zone is the interpretation and application of the European 
Convention for Protecting Human Rights. Because the rules of that Conven­
tion are sources of interpretation and jurisprudence on rather different le­
vels, several ways to contradictions are imaginable. Of course, the interpre­
tation of the conventional rules is mainly a task of the European Court of 
Human Rights.50 But its decisions neither oblige the European Court of Ju­
stice nor the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Neither the Union nor the Commu­
nity are members of the Convention. Therefore and in order not to disturb 
the European horizons, the different courts apply for a so called coopera­
tion. That means: When they find and formulate their interpretations of the 
decision-making rules, they respect the foregoing interpretations. The Bun­
desverfassungsgericht adds: only in respect to the national identities. The re­
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suit of those co-operations is a European “constitution of liberty“ developed 
by high courts. For a simple advocate or judge it will be very difficult to know 
and to follow the mysteries of their dogmas and interpretations, not to ima­
gine the European “everybody“. Nevertheless, that “constitution of liberty“ 
will produce a European harmonisation and unification. That is the same pro­
cess one may observe in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany: There 
the fundamental rights are very valid instruments of unification, ft is a politi­
cal question whether this process is useful or not, but there can’t be any doubt 
that it works rather efficiently.
5. Outlook
The more the supra-national competences of the Union will extend, the 
more its liberties will get a certain leading part for the European integration. 
If you look upon the different sources of guarantees, you will see that they 
work in a processual functional connection, although they are not parts of 
one codification. The instruments connecting the different levels and liber­
ties are reception, incorporation and friendly interpretation of values and ru­
les and the mutual respect of courts. Perhaps this working network will lead 
to a broader extension of liberties, perhaps with reference to the contents of 
liberty, but mainly with reference to crossing frontiers. But it could also lead 
to expanding limitations if they are discovered and applied as common “tra­
ditions“ or “principles“ of the majority of member states, and in this case it 
will become interesting to know what the constitutional courts of the mem­
ber states will answer.
Will the European Charter of Fundamental Rights change or put under 
stress this process when it becomes valid as primary Community law? As far 
it will introduce further fundamental rights, especially social rights, it will ex­
tend the domain of liberties and restrict the powers of the Union as well as of 
the member states. Of course, that is the hope of liberalism. Those who want 
the Union to be more liberal and integrated will welcome that event. But even 
beside the enlargement of the code of fundamental rights, the Charter will 
have a harmonising and unifying function and will not intensify the princi­
ple of subsidiarity. Those who want to keep their nation and its state as auto­
nomous and sovereign and as culturally unique as possible will regret the ad­
ditional liberties, equally common in and for all member states. In any case, 
the consolidation of the “constitution of liberty“ is a necessary part of the 
consolidation of the Union.
Why so? However the Union will be organised, maybe by a perfect, maybe 
by an imperfect constitution called “reform“, it will be developed in an un­
conditional connection of legitimacy with the modern European state. This 
state, more generally said: this special European form of public power, gets
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its legitimacy by fundamental rights. Let me remember again, like in the be­
ginning of my lecture, the French Declaration of Rights of 1789. Its Article 
2 proclaimed: “Le but de toute association politique est la conservation des 
droits naturels et imprescriptibles de l’homme. Ces droits sont la liberté, la 
propriété, la sûreté, et la résistance à l’oppression“ Since these ideas are in 
the heads of men, it is neither religion nor force nor nation which legitima­
tes public power, but the principle of equal freedom. Therefore the “Consti­
tution of Liberty“ is the base and the motor of the political association na­
med “Union“. Although it is a pity that the intended “reform“ of the Union 
shall be concentrated on its institutions while the fundamental rights shall 
remain non-essential accessories. But anyway, those rights will and must di­
rect the institutional and processual structures of the Union as well as of the 
Community. They are not only leitmotifs, but requirements of the princi­
ple of “Rechtsstaat“ (“rule of law“) and of the principle of democracy in the 
meaning of Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.
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I. Introduction
Democracy, the rule of law and the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms are the defining principles of the European 
Union. History, not least that of the Union itself, has shown that adherence 
to these principles constitutes a fundamental prerequisite for prosperity, jus­
tice, peace and stability for all.
There are a couple of systems applying in Europe for the protection of human 
rights. They operate at the world-wide, regional, and national level. This variety 
reflects historical developments which, at least in part, do not exist any more. 
For instance, the Council of Europe was established as an organisation associat­
ing only the states of (politically) Western Europe. After the fall of communism 
its membership reached 47 states. The number is close to that of the member­
ship of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); the 
main difference between these two organisations is the presence of the United 
States and Canada in the latter. Moreover, after the enlargement of the Euro­
pean Union, there is much greater homogeneity in Europe. Gradually the en­
largement has brought the composition of the Union into line with that of the 
Council of Europe. Obviously, it will still take some time and probably never 
become a complete process. For example, Russia’s accession to the European 
Union seems at the moment a very remote possibility. However, one could say 
that all the major European organisations substantially will have the same mem­
bers. The visible differences in membership would anyway hardly justify the ex­
istence of different European levels of protection of human rights.
The Council of Europe, the European Union, and the OSCE are all con­
cerned with ensuring that human rights are properly protected. With regard 
to the same organisations, certain types of rights are covered by different in­
struments, each with its respective treaty body supervising compliance with 
the relevant obligations. This is due partly to historical reasons. All these in­
struments add to those that have been established at the universal level for 
the same rights. The ensuing result gives a fairly complex picture.
It is important, however, to mention that some instruments overlap at 
least in part. To take just one example; the right to information is covered by 
Art. 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,1 Art. 10 of the Euro- 
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by GA Res. 217 A (III) (1948, in United Nations, 
A Compilation of International Instruments (1994), Vol. 1, Part. 1.
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pean Convention of Human Rights, Art. 19 of the UN Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,2 Art. 15 of the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul­
tural Rights3, Art. 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra­
cial Discrimination,4 the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference,5 and in numer­
ous other documents including Art. 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union.6 Each of these texts has some distinctive elements. 
Very often, when a new text is adopted, the rewording of a rule concerning 
a given right finds its origin in the drafters’ perception of the importance of 
some aspects that may have previously been less evident. Thus one could say 
that the number and variety of provisions concerning the same rights are also 
a product of historical developments.
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by GA Res. 2200 A (XXI) (1966), Interna­
tional Instruments, (1994), Vol. 1, Part. 2.
3 Ibidem.
4 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by GA Res. 
2106 A (XX) (1965), in International Instruments, Vol. 1, Part. 2.
5 Helsinki Final Act, adopted at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, August, 
1975, reprinted in (1975) 14ILM 1292.
6 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in Official Journal of the European Communi­
ties, 2000/C, 364/01.
Once an instrument is adopted and a machinery for monitoring its im­
plementation is put into action, there is an understandable reluctance on the 
part of those more directly concerned with its functioning - whether it is 
states, institutions or officials - to resist any change that one may wish to in­
troduce. This occurs irrespective of the fact that certain features of the sys­
tem may be due to a specific reason that no longer hold.
Since any suggestion of changes - even for the sole purpose of streamlin­
ing the existing systems for the protection of human rights - is likely to run 
into political difficulties, one could find some justification in limiting oneself 
to a description of what has been achieved so far. However, the interest in 
discussing the existing systems for the protection of human rights is not sim­
ply theoretical. In view of enhancing that protection and making a better use 
of resources, a reassessment appears of some use, even if only a few minor 
changes to the present systems will be regarded as politically suitable. More­
over, the production of texts for the protection of human rights is far from 
being concluded. An evaluation of the existing systems appears to be essen­
tial before any new initiative is taken in order to establish yet another instru­
ment. A further text should be adopted only if it serves an appreciable pur­
pose that prevails over the disadvantages that would be caused by making the 
systems for protecting human rights even more complicated.
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In the European Union, where the institutions of the Union may only ex­
ercise the powers which are attributed to them by the Member States, the 
implementation of fundamental rights essentially takes place at state level. 
Therefore it is clear that the international protection of human rights has 
its antecedents in domestic efforts to secure legal protection for individu­
als against the arbitrary excesses of state power. Such domestic attempts have 
a long and dignified history and are intimately connected with revolutionary 
activity directed towards the establishment of constitutional systems based on 
democratic legitimacy and the rule of law. Even today, the protection of hu­
man rights at both the national and international level is closely connected, 
if not symbiotic. All international instruments require states’ domestic con­
stitutional systems to provide adequate redress for those whose rights have 
been violated. It is only when those states’ own internal protective systems fail 
or where, in extreme cases, they are non-existent, that international mecha­
nisms for securing human rights come into play.
In a sense, therefore, international mechanisms operate to reinforce do­
mestic protection of human rights and to provide remedy when the domes­
tic system collapses or is found wanting. Europe has evolved what is probably 
the most sophisticated system of judicial protection of human rights, involv­
ing both the domestic constitutional orders of the states and the European 
Convention system. All European Union member states are already signa­
tories to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Liberties - agreed by the Council of Europe in 1950.
In brief, it is necessary to point out that the European Convention is a text 
from the Council of Europe, which is made up of 47 European states, includ­
ing Russia. The Charter is a text from the EU, which currently has 27 mem­
ber states. Also the scope of the protection provided by these two texts is dif­
ferent.
The Convention of the Council of Europe relates solely to civil and politi­
cal rights, while the Charter of the EU covers additional aspects, such as the 
right to good administration, and workers’ social rights, including the right 
to strike. The Charter also responds to the challenges of new technology by 
including articles, as already mentioned above, on bioethics and the protec­
tion of personal data.7 Moreover, the Charter covers those political rights of 
7 Nearly 15 years after the Council of Europe first called for a pan-European convention on issues on bioeth­
ics to harmonize disparate national regulations, in November 1996 the Council’s Committee of Ministers 
approved the Convention on Biomedicine and Human Rights for formal adoption. The draft convention re­
leased in July 1994 provoked strong public, professional, and governmental debate among European nations, 
particularly regarding provisions for biomedical research with subjects unable to give informed consent. Af­
ter the ratification the Bioethics Convention became the first such document to have binding force interna­
tionally. The Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regards to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data (1981) - which was the first legally binding international document with worldwide significance on 
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Union citizens that, by definition, cannot be included in the Convention of 
the Council of Europe (it is not a EU document).
//. EU approach to human rights in a historical perspective
- the paradox of the EU's Human Rights Policies
Providing that since the proclamation of the EU Charter a considerable 
step forward has taken place in the EU policy in the field of human rights, it 
is necessary to make a couple of remarks concerning the previous policy on 
this issue.
The European Union has from its conception up till now undergone a sig­
nificant transformation.8 In the last five decades it has developed from a sys­
tem of a predominantly economic co-operation between the member states 
into a new constitutional polity, simultaneously separated from and at the 
same time completely dependent on its constituent units (member states). 
Following this transformation, and while the integration deepened and wid­
ened, economic issues have become more and more pervaded by the funda­
mental issues, leading to the core questions of the European identity, fun­
damental values, standards of human rights protection on the national and 
Community level, to the most contentious issues of ever more extended com­
petences of the Community at the expense of the member states. Human 
rights are all too often assumed to be primarily matters arising in a coun­
try’s external relations rather than its internal affairs. The same way of think­
ing may or even should even be applied to the role of human rights within 
the external relations of the European Union. However, if we take a close look 
at this issue, it soon becomes apparent that the internal and external dimen­
sions of human rights policy can never be satisfactorily kept in separate com­
partments. They are, in fact, two sides of the same coin.
data protection - draws inspiration directly from the European Convention on Human Rights and Funda­
mental Freedoms. In particular art.8 of this Convention states that “Everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence". The EU directive 95/46/E on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data is based 
on the above-mentioned document.
8 For a great analytical presentation of the transformation of Europe and for reasons and consequences 
see J. H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100YALE L.J. 2403, 1991.
In the case of the Union, there are several additional reasons why a con­
cern with external policy also necessitates a careful consideration of the in­
ternal policy dimensions. First, the development and implementation of an 
effective external human rights policy can only be undertaken in the context 
of appropriate internal institutional arrangements. Secondly, in an era when 
universality and indivisibility are the touchstones of human rights, an exter­
nal policy which is not underpinned by a comparably comprehensive and au­
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thentic internal policy can have no hope of being taken seriously. Thirdly, at 
the beginning of the 21st century a credible human rights policy must assid­
uously avoid unilateralism and double standards, and that can only be done 
by ensuring reciprocity and consistency. Finally, the reality is that a Union 
which is not prepared to embrace a strong human rights policy for itself is 
highly unlikely to develop a fully-fledged external policy and apply it with en­
ergy and consistency. As long as human rights remain a suspect preoccupa­
tion within, their status without will remain tenuous.
The human rights policies of the EU for a long time was beset by a para­
dox.9 On the one hand, the Union was a faithful defender of human rights in 
both its internal and external affairs. On the other hand, it lacked a compre­
hensive or coherent policy at either level and fundamental doubts persisted 
whether the Institutions of the Union possessed adequate legal competence 
in relation to a wide range of human rights issues arising within the frame­
work of Community policies.
’ The Union’s policies have been analysed in considerable detail elsewhere. See generally, M. Dauses, The 
Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community Legal Order, (1985), 10 European LR 398; J. H. H. 
Weiler, N. Lockhart, Taking Rights Seriously, "The European Court and its Fundamental Rights Jurispru­
dence“ 1995, 32, CLM Rev. 51 and 579.
10 Art. 6 TEU.
11 Art. 7 TEU.
12 See J. H. H. Weiler, N. Lockhart, note 1 above.
On the positive side of the balance sheet, a strong commitment to human 
rights has been one of the principal characteristics of the European Union. 
The Amsterdam Treaty proclaimed that “the Union is founded on the prin­
ciples of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental free­
doms and the rule of law’’10 1  In other words, any member state violating hu­
man rights in a “serious and persistent” way can lose its rights under the 
Treaty11. The European Court of Justice has long required the Community 
to respect fundamental rights and the European Council has issued several 
major statements emphasising the importance of respect for human rights.12 
Similarly, the Community has taken notable initiatives in a wide range of 
fields from gender equality to racism and xenophobia.
Thus, in diverse ways the European Union has acknowledged that it has 
an important role to play in promoting respect for the human rights of its cit­
izens and of all other residents within the Union, and of ensuring that those 
rights are fully respected. This is so despite the fact that the Member States 
are, and will remain, the principal guardians of human rights within their 
own territories.
Equally, the Union is a powerful and uniquely representative actor on the 
international scene. It has the responsibility, reinforced by the capacity and 
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financial resources, to influence significantly the human rights policies of 
other states as well as those of international organisations. In recognition of 
this responsibility it had insisted, before the enlargement, that states seek­
ing admission to the Union had to satisfy strict human rights requirements.13 
Other governments wishing to enter into co-operation agreements with the 
Union, or to receive aid or benefit from trade preferences, must covenant to 
respect human rights. If that covenant is breached, serious consequences can 
ensue.14 It has adopted a number of declarations underlining the importance 
of human rights in its external relations and it has given substance to this ap­
proach by funding a wide range of development co-operation initiatives with 
major human rights components. It has sought to strengthen the capacity of 
civil society in many countries, before as well as after the enlargement. It has 
founded election monitoring and human rights monitoring, and has played 
an active role in support of human rights in a multilateral context.
13 Art. 49 TEU. In the European Communities’ founding documents moderate attention was paid to fun­
damental rights and freedoms. However, over time, the EU has increasingly articulated its desire to repre­
sent not only stability and prosperity, but also democratic values, culminating with the adoption of clearly 
political criteria for EU membership at the Copenhagen Council in 1993, including “respect for and pro­
tection of minorities“. The direct consequence of the Copenhagen declaration was that candidate states 
were requested to make evident that they ensure minority protection in order to accede to the EU. For 
more see M. Estebanez, The protection of National or Ethnic religious and Linguistic Minorities, [in:] The 
European Union and Human Rights, eds. N. Neuwahl, A. Rosas, The Hague 1995.
14 See e.g. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 8, The Relationship 
Between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Socialand Cultural Rights, C/C 12/1997/98 (1997).
Nevertheless, there is also the other side of the balance sheet. Here, de­
spite the frequency of statements emphasising the importance of human 
rights and the existence of a variety of significant individual policy initia­
tives, the European Union for a long time has lacked a fully-fledged human 
rights policy. This is true in relation both to its internal policies and, albeit to 
a lesser extent, its external policies. By the end of the 1990s the institutions 
of the Community, in relation to its internal human rights situation, had suc­
ceeded in cobbling together a makeshift policy which had been barely ade­
quate, but no means sufficient.
Therefore there has been a growing opinion that in the foreseeable future 
this approach might become unsustainable, increasingly ineffective and ulti­
mately self-defeating. Ironically, the Union has, by virtue of its emphasis upon 
human rights in its relations with other states, and its ringing endorsements 
of the universality and indivisibility of human rights, highlighted the incom­
patibility and indefensibility of combining an active external policy stance 
with what in some areas had come close to an abdication of internal respon­
sibility. For that reason, on the base on what has just been pointed out, the 
Union could only achieve the leadership role to which it aspires through the 
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example it sets to its partners and other states. Leading by example should 
become the Leitmotif of a new European Union human rights policy.
III. The Charter as an example of a new EU human rights policy
The way towards the new EU policy in the field of human rights became 
more clear and perceptible at the time when the work on the Charter began. 
The decision to frame a Charter of Fundamental Rights was taken at the Co­
logne European Council in June 1999, and in October, at the Tampere Euro­
pean Council, it was decided to establish a 62-member Convention (headed 
by the former German President Roman Herzog) to draft a Charter of Fun­
damental Rights of the European Union. Already in 1999, the Amsterdam 
Treaty established that the EU “should respect human rights and fundamen­
tal freedoms, upon which the Union is founded“. It allowed the Council of 
Ministers to suspend certain rights of a member state found to breach the 
Treaty, and it gave the European Court of Justice the power to ensure that EU 
institutions respect those rights.15
15 See more V. Bogdandy, The European Union as a Human Rights Organisation? Human Rights and the 
Core of the European Union, 37 CML Rev. (2000).
In December 2000 in Nice EU leaders, the European Commission and the 
European Parliament proclaimed the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. The summit did not make the Charter legally binding by in­
corporating it in the Nice Treaty, as there was too much opposition. Instead 
the Charter was declared a political declaration, but the question of its future 
role was already controversial. The Charter draws together for the first time 
all the personal, civil, political, economic and social rights into a single docu­
ment. The way the Charter was drafted was itself an achievement by involv­
ing all the EU institutions, national parliaments as well as a broad spectrum 
of society. The question of the legal status of the Charter had been the focus 
for the debate ever since the European Council in Cologne in June 1999 de­
cided to draw up such a document. Pressure for the Charter to be given full 
legal status was clear during the drawing up of it. The European Parliament 
came down firmly in favour of a binding legal document, integrated into the 
Treaties, as did the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions. Civil society representatives were virtually unanimous in their 
support as well. Accordingly, the Convention on the Future of Europe pro­
posed to incorporate the Charter of Fundamental Rights as part II of the 
draft Constitution Treaty, which was submitted to the Thessaloniki European 
Council on 20 June 2003. The text submitted by the Convention served as the 
basis for the work of the Intergovernmental Conference, which brought to­
gether the representatives of the current Member States as well as the states
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that joined the EU during the forthcoming two rounds of enlargement (27). 
Turkey also took part in all the meetings of the IGC.
The Charter was incorporated as part II to the Constitutional Treaty 
signed by Heads of the EU Member States in October 2004 in Rome. The 
inclusion of the Charter in the basic treaty would have had made it legally 
binding once the draft constitution had been approved. However, the Con­
stitutional Treaty failed to be ratified after referendum defeats in France and 
Netherlands in May 2005 and the EU was plunged into one of the greatest 
crises of its 50-year history. Nevertheless, despite the “no“ vote, which sent 
a shock wave through the establishment of the European Union and brought 
for some time uncertainty to the existence of the Charter, the document re­
mains an important part of the Reform Treaty agreed on by the EU leaders 
on 18 October 2007. The Lisbon Treaty deepens the co-operation in some ar­
eas, and extends it to new areas. But opinions differ on how much power this 
treaty transfers to the EU, and whether it transfers more or less than earlier 
treaties. In general this document sets forth a more pragmatic approach, and 
it is a rather technical improvement of the primary law of the EU because it 
simply amends its Founding Treaties. The amended treaty will clarify the lim­
its of European interference with individual rights by referring to the Char­
ter of Fundamental Rights as a legally binding instrument, which also makes 
more visible rights as guiding values for all the EU policies.
There has been a number of doubts concerning the relationship between 
the Convention and the Charter. As pointed out earlier, the Charter differs from 
the European Convention in that it covers some economic and social rights 
that are not contained in the Convention on Human Rights, such as the right to 
good administration, and workers’ social rights, including the right to strike. As 
well as this, it responds to the challenges of new technology by including arti­
cles on bioethics and the protection of personal data. And it covers the political 
rights of citizens of the EU, which the Convention does not, because it is not an 
EU document. During the elaboration of the Charter, it soon became evident 
that it meant, with respect to the rights and freedoms corresponding to those 
guaranteed in the Convention,16 the risk of a reduction in the level of protec­
tion already guaranteed by the Convention itself; to which risk might be added 
the risk of variant interpretations by Luxembourg and Strasbourg.17
16 See P. Lemmens, The Relation between the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European 
Convention on Human Rights - Substantive Aspects, “Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law" 2001, No. 1, p. 50-55.
17 A risk as the doctrine has shown, has become a reality on more than one occasion, specifically with re­
gard to the inviolability of the home with regard to undertakings, and the right to prevent self-incrimina­
tion in the field of Competition Law. See, among others, the opinion of R. Lawson, Confusion and Conflict? 
Diverging Interpretations of the European Convention on Human Rights in Strasbourg and Luxembourg 
in the Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe. Essays in Honour of H. R. Schermers, Vol. 3, 
Dordrecht-Boston-London 1994, p. 236 onwards.
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An additional matter of concern is the question what happens if rulings 
made by the European Court of Justice contradict judgements made by indi­
vidual national states and the European Court of Human Rights, which adju­
dicates on the European Convention on Human Rights. However, if a national 
government chose to ignore European Court ruling, there would be no way to 
resolve the conflict apart from political negotiations. On the other hand the Eu­
ropean Court of Justice adjudicates on purely EU matters. Therefore if the Char­
ter becomes a binding law,18 a mechanism would have to be worked out to allow 
a single jurisprudence - probably the European Court in Strasbourg - to inter­
pret the law. Mainly, because this change might open the way for the European 
Court of Justice to rewrite national laws in the social sphere: on strikes, collec­
tive bargaining, social security, working hours, and so on. At the moment, how­
ever, it is not possible to predict all the legal and political problems that might 
arise from this relationship in the future.
18 The Lisbon Treaty sealed in Portugal on October 19,2007 amends, rather than replaces, existing EU trea­
ties, including the failed constitution. This document, after being ratified by all 27 Member States, would 
make the Charter legally binding.
19 The Reform Treaty (and The Declaration included in an Annex), if it acquires legal force after the ratifica­
tion of all EU Member States done by the end of 2008, will only be binding on the Institutions of the Euro­
pean Union. The Union does not have competence beyond such. Therefore, the Charter does not limit the 
competence of Member States under the Treaties.
The full text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights was relegated to an an­
nex and replaced by a short cross-reference with the same legal value.19 It is 
supposed to make sure that EU regulations and directives do not contradict the 
European Convention ratified by all EU member states and to which the EU as 
a whole would accede under the treaty. Numerous questions and doubts have 
been raised lately with reference to the present legal position of the Char­
ter. Some commentators state that the European Court of Justice might take 
steps towards rewriting national laws in the social sphere: on strikes, collec­
tive bargaining, social security, working hours, and so on. However, it is nec­
essary to point out that notwithstanding the principle of primacy, the Eu­
ropean Court of Justice cannot scrap any national judgment or decision as, 
in turn, national authorities may not annul acts or legislation of the Euro­
pean institutions. The functioning of this “multilevel constitutional system" 
is rather based upon mutual trust and on the full respect of the law. The oth­
ers assume that the Charter applies to member states only when they are im­
plementing EU law, and most social and employment law is national law. Art. 
34 (social security and social assistance) of the Charter explicitly points out 
that these rights are guaranteed by the Charter only “in accordance with... na­
tional laws and practices“. And an explanation of the Charter’s right to strike 
declares that “The modalities and limits for the exercise of collective action, 
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including strike action, come under national laws and practices“. (Uris comes 
among the non-binding declarations accompanying the treaty.)
The UK, as one of the two countries with a common law legal system in 
the EU and largely uncodified Constitution, was strongly against making the 
Charter legally binding. Great Britain has negotiated for itself, as an extra 
guarantee, a legally binding protocol, which basically says that no court can 
rule that the “laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or ac­
tion“ of the UI< are inconsistent with the principles laid down in the Char­
ter.20 But again, whether this protocol will work in practice is a matter of in­
tense debate at present, and experts are divided on how effective this will be. 
Poland has joined Great Britain in asking for an opt-out of the Charter on the 
same issue and additionally made a unilateral declaration that seeks to pre­
vent the Charter being used to influence national legislation in the sphere of 
“public morality and family law.”21
20 It is true that Britain obtained a protocol, commonly called an “opt-out“, saying that the Charter cannot 
be used in British courts unless British law itself guarantees the same rights, But, in fact, the rights con­
tained in the Charter are almost all provided for in the UK’s national law. This is because the Charter con­
tains the rights derived from the European Convention on Human Rights of the Council of Europe (part 
of UK law through the Human Rights Act) and rights that derive from EU law (directly form the Treaties, 
such as equal pay for equal work, or through European legislation, such as limits on working time through 
the working time directive). The Charter must anyway be respected in all European legislation.
21 Declaration by Poland on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: “The Charter does 
not affect in any way the right of Member States to legislate in the sphere of public morality, family law, as 
well as the protection of human dignity and respect for human physical and moral integrity.“
It is necessary to view this document as a significant development in estab­
lishing the progressive EU human rights policy: the first formal EU instrument 
that upholds basic Western values such as the right to freedom of speech and 
thought, and equality before the law. It also recognises the right to strike, sub­
ject to national law, and fair and just working conditions, protects the right to 
collective bargaining and collective action, equal pay for men and women, the 
right to social security and freedom from discrimination. It bans reproductive 
cloning. Its main aim is to make these rights more visible.
The text of the Charter does not establish new rights, but assembles exist­
ing rights previously to be found in a variety of legislative instruments, such 
as national laws and international conventions from the Council of Europe, 
the UN, and the International Labour Organisation. Each of the Charter’s 54 
articles, which set out individuals’ rights or freedoms, is taken from a “pre­
cursor“ text. This can be another charter, a convention, a treaty or jurispru­
dence. Certain rights appear to be new, such as those relating to bioethics or 
the protection of personal data, in so far as they seek to respond to the chal­
lenges of new technologies in the areas of communication or biotechnology. 
In fact, as mentioned earlier a specific Council of Europe Convention on Bio­
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ethics already exists. Likewise, the protection of personal data is the subject 
of another specific Council of Europe Convention, as well as of Community 
directives. What the Charter does is to express these rights in a new way and 
raise them to the status of fundamental rights.
Having said the above, one might encounter a question about the necess­
ity of the Charter, since these rights already exist. The main reason is to make 
these rights visible, clear, and well-defined for European citizens. Whilst the 
rights deriving from the European Convention on Human Rights were al­
ready visible, those deriving from the judgments of the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities and the European Court of Human Rights were 
much less so. For example, the right to good administration found in the 
Charter synthesises a series of decisions of the Court of Justice of the Euro­
pean Communities in this field.
As well as making certain rights more explicit, the Charter is totally in­
novative in including fundamental economic and social rights alongside the 
more traditional civil and political rights and citizens’ rights resulting from 
the Community Treaties. This is something which has never been done be­
fore by any international European document in this field.
Since the time it was proclaimed in Nice, the Charter has increasingly 
made its existence felt. More and more EU citizens have been referring to its 
provisions in the letters, petitions and complaints they send to the European 
Parliament and Commission. EU lawyers, and specially the Advocates Gene­
ral at the European Court of Justice, regularly cite it in decisions - although 
they emphasise that it is not mandatory. In this way, the Charter has been al­
ready achieving its first objective of making fundamental rights visible.
The opponents object that there is no need for the Charter because such 
rights are already protected by the established conventions and national con­
stitutions in Europe. I would argue that even if the Charter merely represented 
a consolidation of existing law, it nonetheless enhances transparency and the 
legal certainty of the citizens of Europe, and is a contribution to global de­
mocracy as it provides a more consistent basis for EU’s external policy, and 
can thus be seen as a step towards a more democratic world order.
By making fundamental rights and freedoms clearer and more visible, the 
Charter helps to develop the concept of citizenship of the European Union 
and to create an area of freedom, security and justice (as stated in the pream­
ble). The Charter increases legal security as regards the protection of funda­
mental rights, where in the past such protection was guaranteed only by the 
case law of the Court of Justice and art. 6 of the Treaty on European Union.
Summing up, it is necessary to point out that the Charter of Fundamen­
tal Rights of the EU has to be seen in the wider context of the EU’s long-last­
ing commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms and its policy 
213
CITIZEN AND HUMAN RIGHTSAND LIBERTIES
in the areas of justice, freedom and security. The role and the position of the 
Charter cannot be underestimated in Europe at the beginning of the 21st 
century. It should be treated as a visible sign that the EU has taken a step for­
ward towards common policy in the field of protecting its individuals (not 
only citizens) in the same way regardless the borders, and taking into consi­
deration only humanity.
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Introduction
A fundamental freedom to receive cross border medical treatment is gran­
ted to citizens of the European Union by the internal market in services un­
der the European Community Treaty as interpreted by the European Court 
of Justice,2 3  most recently in the case of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care 
Trust? Controversially, the Court ruled in the Watts case that Member Sta­
tes may be required under European Community law to make adjustments to 
their social security systems.4 “An obligation exists under Community law to 
authorise a patient registered with a national health service to obtain, at that 
institution’s expense, hospital treatment in another Member State where the 
waiting time exceeds an acceptable period having regard to an objective med­
ical assessment of the condition and clinical requirements of the patient con­
cerned.”5
The Court found that Article 49 of the European Community Treaty ap­
plies where a patient receives medical services in a hospital environment for 
consideration in a Member State other than her State of residence, regardless 
of the way in which the national system with which that person is registered 
and from which reimbursement of the cost of those services is subsequen­
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tly sought operates6. Competence in the field of public health is retained by 
individual Member States, each of which has the responsibility for organising 
and delivering health services and medical care.7 There is thus the need to ba­
lance the objective of the free movement of patients in the European Union 
against overriding national objectives relating to management of the avai­
lable hospital capacity, control of health expenditure and financial balance of 
social security systems.8
6 There being no need in the present case to determine whether the provision of hospital treatment in 
the context of a national health service such as the NHS is itself a service within the meaning of Article 
49. Ibidem, para. 90.
7 Article 152(5) of the European Community Treaty.
8 Case C-372/04, Ibidem, para. 145 of the judgment.
9 See Council Conclusions on Common values and principles in EU Health Systems, 2733rd Employment, 
Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 1-2 June 2006, 3rd conclusion, 
http://www.consiIium.europa.eu/Newsroom.
10 Ibidem, 5th and 6th conclusions.
11 Emphasis added.
National Health Systems versus Freedom to Receive Cross-Border 
Health Care
The Member States of the European Union feel that it is necessary to cla­
rify the interaction between the European Community provisions on the free 
movement of services and the health services provided by national health sy­
stems;9 and strongly believe that developments in this area should result from 
political consensus, and not solely from case law. Representatives of the Mem­
ber States in the Council of the European Union have endorsed a Statement on 
common values and principles that underpin the health systems in the Mem­
ber States of the European Union;10 1  recalling the overarching values of univer­
sality, access to good quality care, equity and solidarity. Universality is defined as 
meaning that no-one is barred access to health care; whereas solidarity is closely 
linked to thefinancial arrangement of Member States’own national health systems 
and the need to ensure accessibility to all. The value of equity is stated to relate to 
equal access according to need, regardless of ethnicity, gender, age, social status 
or ability to pay. Emphasis is placed on the essential feature of all Member States’ 
health systems, namely, the aim to make each system financially sustainable in 
a way which will safeguard the above mentioned values in that Member State for 
the future. In addition, and beneath these overarching values, a set of shared ope­
rating principles include: good quality health care; patient safety; care based on 
evidence and ethics, embracing “the challenge of prioritising health care in such 
a way that balances the needs of individual patients with the financial resour­
ces available to treat the whole population;”" patient involvement, transparency
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and, where possible, choice between different health service providers; redress, 
a fair complaints procedure and clear information about liabilities and compen­
sation; and privacy and confidentiality. Any standardisation of health systems 
in the European Union would be deemed inappropriate. Member States would 
commit themselves to working together to share experiences and information 
about good practice in health care, through the Open Method of Coordination12 
in order to promote efficient and accessible high quality health care in Europe. 
The Member States would only countenance a legalframework on health servi­
ces which enshrines the values and principles endorsed by the Council.13
12 See the Communication from the Commission, “Modernising social protection for the development of 
high-quality, accessible and sustainable health care and long-term care: support for the national strategies 
using the ‘open method of coordination’“, COM (2004) 304, 20 April 2004.
Article 152 of the European Community Treaty provides, inter alia-.
1. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all 
Community policies and activities.
Community action, ... shall complement national policies,
2. The Community shall encourage cooperation between the Member States in the areas referred to in 
this Article and, if necessary, lend support to their action.
Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, coordinate among themselves their policies and 
programmes in the areas referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission may, in close contact with the Mem­
ber States, take any useful initiative to promote such coordination.
13 The Council invites the European Commission to ensure that the common values and principles are 
respected when drafting specific proposals concerning health services; and invites the institutions of the 
European Union to ensure that the common values and principles contained in the statement are respec­
ted in their work. Ibidem, 7th and 8th conclusions.
14 Commission Communication, “Consultation regarding Community action on health services” SEC (2006) 
1195/4,26 September 2006. Therein, the Commission explains that the Commission proposal for a Directive 
on Services in the Internal Market (COM (2004) 2,13 Jan. 2004) included proposals codifying the rulings of 
the European Court of Justice in applying free movement principles to health services but that this appro­
ach was not considered to be appropriate by the European Parliament and the Council, which institutions 
invited the Commission to develop a specific proposal in this area. See further, D. Ryland, Patient Mobility
The European Commission, in response, is developing, through a consul­
tation exercise, a Community framework for safe, high quality and efficient 
health services in the European Union. Questions being addressed include, 
inter alia: whether there are shared values and principles for health services 
on which citizens can rely throughout the European Union; what practical 
issues need to be clarified for citizens who wish to seek healthcare in other 
Member States, such as, for example, the availability of transparent informa­
tion on good quality health care, contractual liability and after care service. 
Greater choice in exercising individual entitlements in an enlarged European 
Union needs to be reconciled with the financial sustainability of Member Sta­
tes’ health systems and the flexibility of Member States to regulate their own 
systems without creating unjustified barriers to free movement. The Com­
mission, ultimately, will propose a draft Community Directive on health ser­
vices with an internal market legal basis during the course of 2007.14
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A High Quality of Health Care: Principles; Procedures; 
Competence and Reform?
To what extent can the European Community become involved in what is 
essentially the responsibility of Member States, namely public health?
Consider the following two opposing views.
On the one hand:
“By providing every EU citizen with the right to access the best national 
healthcare services available in the EU, in circumstances where his/her own 
national healthcare system has failed, the Court of Justice has given him/her 
the most valuable service available anywhere.”* 15
in the European Union: A Freedom to Choose', ibidem. See further, Health and Consumer Protection Direc­
torate-General, European Commission, “Summary report of the responses to the consultation regarding 
‘Community action on health services’“, (SEC (2006) 1195/4,26 Sept. 2006). The full list of contributors and 
their responses received may be consulted directly on the Commission’s website: http://www.ec.europa.eu/ 
health/phoverview/cooperation/mobility/results_open_consultation_en.htm. A health services Directive 
has been drafted and will be formally released by the Commission on 20 November, 2007. Source: “Finan­
cial Times“, 17 October, 2007, p. 7.
15 A. Kaczorowska, A Review of the Creation by the European Court ofJustice ofthe Right to Effective and Speedy 
Medical Treatment and its Outcomes, “European Law Journal“ 2006, Vol. 12, No. 3, p. 345 at p. 352.
16 Emphasis added. C. Newdick, Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing Individual 
Rights by Corroding Social Solidarity, “Common Market Law Review“ 2006, Vol. 43, p. 1645.
17 “It should be noted that the principle of solidarity is embraced in Title IV of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the Union, but that "the solidarity which underpins the recognition of fundamental social rights in 
the Community legal order does not reach into the protected sphere of national welfare provision". S. Giub­
boni, Free Movement of Persons and European Solidarity’, “European Law Journal“ 2007, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 360, 
at p. 374. “.. .the European Community has not so far crossed the threshold to a true social union of all Mem­
ber States which could be considered as just one community with mutual solidarity, where revenues and fi­
nancial charges are shared irrespective of national boundaries". K. Hailbronner, Union Citizenship and Ac­
cess to Social Benefits, “Common Market Law Review“ 2005, Vol. 42, p. 1245, at p. 1265. Citing Tomuschat, 
‘annotation of Sala’ in (2003) 37 CMLR, 449 at 454.
On the other hand:
“The European Court of Justice has embarked on a policy of strengthening 
the rights of EU citizens to obtain treatment in other Member States. ...is this 
individualistic view of health care rights mistaken and likely to damage the 
sense of social solidarity essential to any public, social welfare system?”16
The Principle of Solidarity17
There is a tension between the free movement of persons and the prin­
ciple of national solidarity. Giubboni continues: “So it is not by chance that 
the principle of national solidarity has been invoked by the Member States as 
a form of defence against the dynamics of economic integration - and parti­
cularly of the liberalistion of services - regarded as potentially destabilising 
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to the viability, in primis financial, of national social protection systems.”18 It 
is the nation state that is faced with difficult decisions and choices in the ma­
nagement of its own finite resources for health care. “Individual health care 
rights at the European level may not foster notions of solidarity. They will be­
nefit a vocal minority, but divert resources from poorly represented, less vi­
sible, less articulate groups typically composed of disabled, mentally ill and 
elderly patients.”19
18 S. Giubboni, op. cit., p. 366.
19 C. Newdick, op. cit., p. 1645.
20 Ibidem, p. 1651.
21 Case C-372/04, ibidem. It is settled caselaw that a system of prior authorisation cannot legitimise discretionary 
decisions taken by the national authorities which are liable to negate the effectiveness of provisions of Community 
law, in particular those relating to a fundamental freedom such as that at issue in the main proceedings (see Case 
C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms, para. 90, and Case C-385/99 Muller-Faure and van Riet, para. 84). Thus, in or­
der for a system of prior authorisation to be justified even though it derogates from a fundamental freedom of that 
kind, it must in any event be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance, in such 
a way as to circumscribe the exercise of the national authorities’ discretion, so that it is not used arbitrarily. Such 
a system must furthermore be based on a procedural system which is easily accessible and capable of ensuring that 
a request for authorisation will be dealt with objectively and impartially within a reasonable time and refusals to 
grant authorisation must also be capable of being challenged in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings [Smits and 
Peerbooms, para. 90, and Muller-Faure and van Riet, para. 85).’ paras. 115 and 116 of the judgment.
22 “The lack of a legal framework in that regard also makes it difficult to exercise judicial review of deci­
sions refusing to grant authorisation.” Ibidem, para. 118.
Procedures
Newdick goes on to say that health rights in systems based on social wel­
fare are relative rights. “Relative rights cannot guarantee access to substan­
tive benefits, so it is crucial to understand the procedure by which the court 
will scrutinise the decision-maker’s authority.”20
The ruling of the European Court of Justice in the Watts case is significant 
here in that it purported to circumscribe the potential for arbitrary discretio­
nary decisions of national health authorities concerning the grant or refusal 
of prior authorisation and the regulation of their waiting lists21. The Court no­
ted that the National Health Service regulations do “not set out the criteria for 
the grant or refusal of the prior authorisation necessary for the reimbursement 
of the cost of hospital treatment provided in another Member State, and the­
refore do not circumscribe the exercise of the national competent authorities’ 
discretionary power in that context.”22 Moreover the Court ruled, “...a refusal 
to grant prior authorisation cannot be based merely on the existence of waiting 
lists enabling the supply of hospital care to be planned and managed on the ba­
sis of predetermined general clinical priorities, without carrying out in the in­
dividual case in question an objective medical assessment of the patient’s medi­
cal condition, the history and probable cause of his illness, the degree of pain he 
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is in and/or the nature of his disability at the time when the request for autho­
risation was made or renewed.”23 Furthermore, the Commission consultation 
is examining such issues of procedure as, for example, more patient informa­
tion; and transparency of reasons for refusing authority to undertake cross bor­
der medical treatment, these being facilitative of judicial review. Suggestions 
by contributors for improvements include:24 clear information for patients on 
cross-border care; effective and transparent decision procedures; a patient- 
centred approach;25 evidence-based standards;26 and the right to appeal against 
refusals. There was a broad consensus that responsibility for clinical oversight 
should be with the country of treatment, with importance attached to coope­
ration with the relevant authorities in the patient’s home country, inclusive of 
managed cross-border care and international patient transport.
23 Ibidem, para. 119.
24 European Commission, “Summary report of the responses to the consultation regarding ‘Community 
action on health services’“, (SEC (2006) 1195/4, 26 Sept. 2006). Ibidem.
25 With regard to countries in which waiting lists are used to limit and manage health service supply, some 
contributors were concerned that “patients could bypass waiting lists" via cross-border healthcare. However, 
other contributors argued that patient mobility should be seen as a signal that patients are seeking alterna­
tives due to concerns over quality, cost or accessibility (in particular unions). From this perspective, patient 
mobility would signal that action should be taken by the responsible authorities to address patients’ concerns 
over their own health system, rather than suppressing patient mobility through administrative barriers.
26 One university considered that the definition of “undue delay” should be based on the best available scientific 
evidence rather than on cultural or national preferences, and therefore should be universal within the EU.
27 Article 5, para. 2 of the European Community Treaty provides: “In areas which do not fall within its exc­
lusive competence, the Community shall take action in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if 
and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States 
and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Com­
munity“. For further reference, see: G. de Burca, The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union, “Ute Modern Law 
Review“ 1996, Vol. 59, No. 3, p. 349, at pp. 366-368; A. G. Toth, The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maas­
tricht Treaty, “Common Market Law Review“ 1992, Vol. 29, p. 1079; N. Emilou, Subsidiarity: An Effective 
Barrier against the Enterprises of Ambition?, “European Law Review“ 1992, p. 383; G. de Burca, Reapprais­
ing Subsidiarity’s Significance After Amsterdam, “Jean Monnet Working Paper“ 1999, Vol. 7, http://www. 
jeanmonnetprogram.org; G. Davies, Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time, 
“Common Market Law Review“ 2006, p. 63.
The Principle of Subsidiarity27
Many contributors to the Commission consultation (in particular from 
national governments, unions and purchasers) emphasised that any Com­
munity action that affects the health systems should respect the subsidiarity 
principle, referring in particular to Article 152 of the European Community 
Treaty. In particular, many argued that the ‘steering capacity’ of national or 
regional healthcare regulators should be preserved.
Some contributors (especially umbrella organisations of dentists and 
some Member States) argued that the principle of subsidiarity does not pre­
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vent the application of European Union fundamental freedoms. In their view, 
increased freedom of choice and movement could be positive, and could help 
to increase access, quality and financial sustainability, rather than endan­
gering the balance of the healthcare system. Some contributions (in particu­
lar scientists and dentists) highlighted in this context the potential danger of 
a series of measures that could be used to limit patient, professional and pro­
vider mobility against the principles of the Treaty and the rulings of the Co­
urt of Justice. These include a reference to insufficient provision of informa­
tion to patients, extensive use of the prior authorisation requirements, or the 
general argument of “danger of instability” to health care systems.28
28 European Commission, “Summary report of the responses to the consultation regarding ‘Community 
action on health services’", (SEC (2006) 1195/4, 26 Sept. 2006). Ibidem. It is interesting to note here that 
the European Commission views subsidiarity “as a way of justifying the exercise of power by the Commu­
nity, rather than as a way of limiting or restricting it“, whereas “the Council generally views the principle as 
an expression of a limit on Community powers, implying a reduction in and repeal of Community legisla­
tion“. G. de Burca, The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union, "Ihe Modern Law Review" 1996, Vol. 
59, No. 3, p. 349, at pp. 366 and 367.
29 “...these two are not conceptually as distinct as they may first appear." P. Craig, G. de Burca, EULaw, 
Text, Cases and Materials, Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press, 2007, at p. 100.
30 The Intergovernmental Conference (established on 23 July 2007) was asked to draw up a Treaty (here­
inafter called ‘Reform Treaty’) amending the existing Treaties with a view to enhancing the efficiency and de­
mocratic legitimacy of the enlarged Union, as well as the coherence of its external action. The constitutional 
concept, which consisted in repealing all existing Treaties and replacing them by a single text called ‘Consti­
tution’ has been abandoned. The Draft Reform Treaty - Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclu­
sions of the Brussels European Council (21/22 June 2007) 11177/07,23 June 2007, General Observations Po­
int 1. http://www.eu2007.de/en/News/downIoad_docs/Juni/0621-ER/010conclusions.pdf Only available to 
date is the draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, which was submitted to the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) (Foreign Ministers) meeting 
on 15 October 2007, with a view to its final adoption at the IGC (Heads of State or Government) meeting in 
Lisbon on 18 October 2007, CIG 1/1/07 REV1. http://www.europa.eu The Union will be founded on the Tre­
aty on European Union (TEU) and on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (referred 
to as ‘the Treaties'), each Treaty having the same legal value. The Union will replace and succeed the European 
Community. Article 1, para. 3 of the Treaty on European Union.
31 In accordance with Article 5, competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with 
the Member States. Article 4 (1) TEU. The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of 
conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
Article 5 (1) TEU. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the compe­
tences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Com­
petences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States. Article 5 (2) TEU. 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union 
shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. Article 5 (3), first para., TEU. Under the 
principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to
It should not be overlooked that the principle of subsidiarity, intended to 
regulate the exercise of Community competence is inextricably linked to the 
existence of Community competence,29 soon to be Union competence.30 The 
reformed Treaties signed at Lisbon on 19 October 2007 have delineated more 
explicitly the competences conferred upon the European Union.31
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Competence and Reform
The majority view of contributors to the proposed Community action on 
health services Consultation was that a combination of both “supportive” 
tools (such as practical cooperation, or the “open method of coordination”) 
and legally binding measures would be the most efficient approach. There 
were clearly two main approaches preferred by different contributors. Some 
contributors preferred to include any changes within the Regulations on the 
coordination of social security systems,32 while other contributors preferred 
a new Directive on health services.
The internal market will remain a shared competence of the European 
Union with the Member States under the reformed Treaties;33 whereas the 
Union may only take complementary or supportive action,34 respecting the
achieve the objectives of the Treaties. Article 5 (4), first para., TEU. See further Declaration 28, Declaration 
in relation to the delimitation of competences, DS 870/07 Lisbon, 19 October 2007.
32 Regulations (EC) No. 1408/71 and 574/72, [1971] OJ L149/2 and [1972] OJ L74/1, as since amended by Reg­
ulation (EC) No. 883/2004, [2004] OJ L200/1. These are based on Article 42 of the European Community Treaty 
(under the chapter on the free movement of workers), and entitle persons for whom a medical treatment be­
comes necessary during a stay in the territory of another Member State, using the European Health Insurance 
Card. Reimbursement between the Member State and the providers is regulated by national rules. The Regula­
tions ensure assumption of costs for planned treatment in other Member States, subject to prior authorisation, 
and deal with the settlement of financial claims between receiving and sending Member States.
Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71:
(1) An employed or self-employed person who satisfies the conditions of the legislation of the competent 
State for entitlement to benefits ..., and:
(c) who is authorised by the competent institution to go to the territory of another Member State to re­
ceive there the treatment appropriate to his condition, shall be entitled:
(1) to benefits in kind provided on behalf of the competent institution by the institution of the place of stay... 
in accordance with the provisions of the legislation which it administers, as though he were insured with it;
(2) The authorisation required under paragraph 1 (c) may not be refused where the treatment in question is among 
the benefits provided by the legislation of the Member State on whose territory the person resides and where he 
cannot be given such treatment within the time normally necessary for obtaining the treatment in question in the 
Member State of residence taking account of his current state of health and the probable course of his disease. 
Form E 112 is the certificate necessary for the application of Article 22 (1) (c) (i) of Regulation 1408/71.
33 Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, replacing the European Community Treaty. 
Shared competence between the Union and the Member States applies in the area of the internal market. 
Article 4 (2) (a) TFEU. When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States 
in a specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. 
The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its compe­
tence. The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to 
cease exercising its competence. Article 2 (2) TFEU. The Union shall adopt measures with the aim of estab­
lishing or ensuring the functioning of the internal market, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Treaties. Article 22a (1) TFEU. See also, Protocol Number 8 on the Exercise of Shared Competence: With re­
ference to Article 2 (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on shared competence, when 
the Union has taken action in a certain area, the scope of this exercise of competence only covers those ele­
ments governed by the Union act in question and therefore does not cover the whole area. CIG 2/01/07 REV 
1, Brussels, 5 October 2007, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, 
IGC 2007, Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community - Protocols, http://www.europa.eu.
34 In certain areas and under the conditions laid down in the Treaties, the Union shall have competence to carry 




defined responsibilities of the Member States for health services.35 A new pro­
vision in the health Article 15236 empowers the Union in particular to enco­
urage cooperation between Member States to improve the complementarity 
of their health services in cross border areas. A further addition authorises 
the Commission in close contact with the Member States to take any useful 
initiative to promote coordination amongst Member States of their policies 
and programmes on health services in cross-border areas, and “in particu­
lar initiatives aiming at the establishment of guidelines and indicators, the or­
ganisation of exchange of best practice, and the preparation of the necessary 
elements for periodic monitoring and evaluation!’31 These fall short of em­
powering command and control legislation, legitimising supporting, supple­
mentary or coordinating action only. It remains the case that the responsibil­
ities of a Member State for its health services have been further strengthened 
under the reformed Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union so as 
to include the management of its health services and medical care and the 
allocation of the resources assigned to them in each Member State.38 This is 
a significant confirmation of the competence of a Member State as regards 
the allocation of resources assigned to health services and medical care and 
their consequential management in that Member State.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union39 provides: Everyone has 
the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from me­
dical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practi­
ces. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition 
and implementation of all Union policies and activities.40
their competence in these areas. Legally binding acts of the Union adopted on the basis of the provisions of the 
Treaties relating to these areas shall not entail harmonisation of Member States’ laws or regulations. Article 2 (5) 
TFEU. The Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of 
the Member States in the area of the protection and improvement of human health. Article 6 (a) TFEU.
35 Article 152 (7) TFEU.
36 Article 152, (2), subpara. 1 TFEU.
37 The European Parliament shall be kept fully informed. Article 152 (2), subpara. 2 TFEU. Emphasis added.
38 Union action shall respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of their health po­
licy and for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care. The responsibilities of the 
Member States shall include the management of health services and medical care and the allocation of the 
resources assigned to them. Article 152 (7) TFEU Emphasis added.
39 The Charter’s provisions will be solemnly proclaimed by the European Institutions one day before the 
Treaty of Lisbon is signed formally in December 2007. Source: Professor Hans-Gert Pottering, President 
of the European Parliament and honorary Patron of the international Conference entitled, ‘The European 
Constitution and National Constitutions! Ibidem, Krakow, 24 October 2007.
40 In Title IV Solidarity, Article 35.
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This two-pronged provision corroborates the conferred substantive com­
petence of Member States in the field of health care. At the same time it lends 
weight to the shared competence of the Union to integrate a high level of health 
care into its internal market activities.41 In exercising this shared competence, 
a framework directive which would leave as much scope for national decision 
as possible and which would respect well-established national arrangements 
and the organisation and working of Member State’s legal systems;42 incorpo­
rating procedural objectives only, would constitute a viable instrument, and 
one which would fall within the remit of the Member States’ endorsed sta­
tement in the Council.
41 See further the explanatory notes to Article 35 of the Charter. See D. Ryland, The Charter of Fundamen­
tal Rights of the European Union: Questions, Problems and Perspectives, “Państwo i Społeczeństwo" (State 
and Society) 2005, No. 1, p. 113; D. Ryland, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: 
Pandora’s Box or Panacea?, “Managerial Law" 2003, Vol. 45, No. 5/6, p. 145.
42 In accordance with the currently worded Protocol on the Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity 
and Proportionality attached to the European Community Treaty, Article 7.
43 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of 7 December 2000, as adapted [at..., on... 2007].
44 Article 6 (1), paras. 1 and 2, TEU.
45 Article 6 (1), para. 3, TEU.
46 This subarticle would have been inserted by the Constitutional Treaty. See P. Craig, G. De Burca, op. 
cit., at p. 416. It is not known whether it will be confirmed by the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference in 
the Charter of 2000 as adapted, which will be proclaimed in December 2007. See note 43, above.
47 (emphasis added). “One may wonder to what extent the Court of Justice of the European Communi­
ties will accept such limitation.” J Dutheil de la Rochere, The EU and the Individual: Fundamental Rights 
in the Draft Constitutional Treaty, “Common Market Law Review“ 2004, p. 345, at p. 352. See D. Ryland,
The Charter of Fundamental Rights is not incorporated in the Treaty of Lis­
bon; instead it receives a cross reference in an amended Article 6 of the Treaty 
on European Union, which provides that the Union recognises the rights, free­
doms and principles set out in the Charter,43 which accords to the Charter the 
same legal value as the Treaties, and which confirms that the Charter’s provi­
sions shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the 
Treaties.44 Moreover, “the rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be 
interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter 
governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explana­
tions referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions.”45
In order to assuage doubts and dilemmas in the controversial area of so­
cial ‘rights^ in particular those of the United Kingdom government which is 
opposed to their direct enforceability in the national courts, the inserted Arti­
cle 52(5)46 7  of the Charter provides: “The provisions of this Charter which con­
tain principles may be implemented by legislative and executive acts of Mem­
ber States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their 
respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpreta­
tion of such acts and in the ruling on their legality’.* 17 The interpretative provi­
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sions incorporated in the Constitution may have circumvented the direct en­
forceability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The scope still exists for 
the provisions of the Charter to be enforced indirectly by way of an interpre­
tative ruling from the European Court of Justice, on a reference from a natio­
nal court on a question of Union law.* 48
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Questions, Problems and Perspectives, ibidem, 
atp. 117.
48 Ibidem, at p. 122.
49 Protocol (No. 7) on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to Poland and to the United Kin­
gdom, CIG 2/01/07 REV 1, Brussels, 5 October 2007, Ibid. Article 1 (1) The Charter does not extend the ability of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, or any court or tribunal of Poland or the United Kingdom, to find that 
the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of Poland or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the 
fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms. Article 1 (2) In particular, and for the avoidance of 
doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom ex­
cept in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law. Article 2 To the ex­
tent that a provision of the Charter refers to national laws and practices, it shall only apply to Poland or the United 
Kingdom to the extent that the rights or principles that it contains are recognised in the law or practices of Poland 
or of the United Kingdom. Poland would appear to be doing somersaults here as a further Declaration would ap­
pear to contradict that which Poland purports to safeguard by way of being a Party to this Protocol. See Declara­
tion Number 53, Declaration by the Republic of Poland concerning the Protocol on the application of the Char­
ter of Fundamental Rights in relation to Poland and the United Kingdom. Therein Poland declares that, having 
regard to the tradition of social movement of ‘Solidarity’ and its significant contribution to the struggle for social 
and labour rights, it fully respects social and labour rights, as established by European Union law, and in particu­
lar those reaffirmed in Title IV of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. CIG 3/1/07 REV 1, 
Brussels, 5 October 2007, Ibid.
50 V. Miller, EU Reform: a new treaty or an old constitution?, “House of Commons Library Research Pa­
per“ 07/64, http://www.parliament.uk.
51 Ibidem, Citing EUObserver, 27 June 2007, http://www.euobserver.com.
52 The United Kingdom Parliament Select Committee on European Scrutiny Thirty Fifth Report on the Eu­
ropean Union Intergovernmental Conference, para. 73. “the words of the recital reaffirm that the Protocol 
is without prejudice to other obligations of the United Kingdom under the Treaty on European Union, the
It is submitted that the United Kingdom’s exclusion from the jurisdiction of 
the Courts concerning the Solidarity Title IV of the Charter is intended solely 
to protect the United Kingdom’s laws on industrial action.49 In any case, it has 
been submitted that “[t]he effect of this exemption is questionable, however, as 
it would appear to undermine fundamental principles about the obligation of 
Member States to adhere to the acquis communautaire (EC law, the Treaties and 
the caselaw of the European Court of Justice).”50 Moreover, “[i]t has been sug­
gested that the Charter could still have an indirect impact on UK law, particu­
larly in cases where the ECJ ruled on Charter-related issues in other EU Member 
States.”51 The United Kingdom House of Commons European Scrutiny Commit­
tee have reported their concerns about the security of the United Kingdom’s po­
sition under the Charter. In their view, it requires to be made clear that Protocol 
Number 7 to the reformed Treaties takes effect notwithstanding other provi­
sions of the Treaty or Union law generally.52 Fundamental principles of non-dis-
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crimination on grounds of nationality and proportionality spring to mind in this 
regard. The TEU explicitly provides that “fundamental rights, as guaranteed by 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen­
tal Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States shall constitute general principles of the Unions law.”53
The European Court of Justice has declared: “The Charter was solemnly pro­
claimed by the Parliament, the Council and the Commission in Nice on 7 De­
cember 2000.” Furthermore, the principal aim of the Charter, as is apparent from 
its preamble, is to reaffirm “rights as they result, in particular, from the consti­
tutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, 
the Treaty on European Union, the Community Treaties, the [ECHR], the Social 
Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council of Europe and the case 
law of the Court... and of the European Court of Human Rights.”54
The Charter, states one learned commentator, “is bound, in time, to be rec­
ognised as an authoritative re-statement of fundamental rights that derive their 
character as general principles of law from the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States or from international agreements to which the Member States 
are parties.”55
Conclusion
A balance of the principles as succinctly laid out in the Health Article of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, which does have the same le­
gal value as the Treaties, should, thus, be the benchmark for any Union action 
on health care. Issues of conferred competence are at stake and, respecting the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the patients right of access to 
a high quality of health care in an internal market in health services in the Eu-
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Union law generally... If it is intended that ECJ case 
law based on the Charter should have no effect at all within the UK, we should have expected some provi­
sion in the Protocol to make it clear that the Protocol takes effect notwithstanding other provisions in the 
Treaties or Union law generally. This would be the more necessary given the tendency for any derogation 
from the Treaties to be interpreted restrictively by the ECJ.“ A possibility would seem to exist „that follo­
wing a reference to the ECJ from some other Member State the Court might find that, in the light of the 
Charter,” a derogation from a provision of EU law, “has to be interpreted more restrictively than before (i.e. 
before the Charter had legal effect),” para. 58. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmse- 
lect/cmeuleg/1014/101403.
53 Article 6 (3) TEU.
54 Case C-540/03 European Parliament v Council, [2006] ECR1-5768, para. 38. See further Declaration 29, Dec­
laration concerning the Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Charter of Fundamental Rights, which has legally 
binding force, confirms the fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. The 
Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any 
new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined by the Treaties. CIG 3/1/07 REV 1.
55 Editorial Comments: What should replace the Constitutional Treaty?, “Common Market Law Review“, 
2007, Vol. 44, No. 3, p. 561, at p. 566.
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ropean Union should be facilitated legislatively by best practice procedures, in­
formation and transparency; it should further be qualified by the principles of 
solidarity and the sustainability of Member States’ national health systems.
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• Professor Jo Carby-Hall, PhD - The University of Hull
I was very interested in the talk of the learned judge from the European 
Court of Human Rights. I understand that you had some cases relating to 
economic migrants, you mentioned in a very minor way the situation of eco­
nomic migrants. We have had a very big problem in the last four years of 
economic migrants coming to Western Europe to work and the exploitation 
that we have experienced by employment agencies as well as unscrupulous 
employers. I would be interested to have your opinion - I want to be as brief 
as possible - on this situation, which is a European situation, it is happening 
in all T1 European Union member states, and also whether you have had any 
complaints in this respect in the Court.
• Jan èikuta - Judge of the European Court of Human Rights,
Council of Europe
Yes, but economic migration it is not the very agenda which we are fa­
cing in the Court, because what we are dealing with mostly with migration 
are cases concerning asylum applicants and questions relating to the ac­
cess to the territory, also detention because of preventing the entry or be­
cause of expulsion, and then family reunification cases relating to Article 
8 of the Convention, that kind of cases. But as regards economic migration, 
as far as I remember at the moment, I really do not remember which provi­
sion was invoked by them. It is difficult to answer at the moment, maybe la­
ter on during this conference I will come to certain case law in this regard, 
but what I remember at the moment are only political migrants. From the 
beginning they have always been political migrants, applying for a certain 
kind of protection, and that was my experience from my previous job where 
I worked for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, but it is 
a different cup of tea.
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• Professor Dieter Kugelmann, PhD - Harz University
of Applied Sciences
Mr Sikuta, my first question goes to you. How would you appreciate 
the influence of the EU Charter of Human Rights, if it will be valid, will it 
be applicable as law for the European Union, do you think it will influence 
the jurisprudence of the Court in Strasbourg, because the Union law is not 
untouchable, so will it change your jurisprudence? Do you think the Euro­
pean Court of Justice in Luxembourg will adapt its jurisprudence like it does 
already to your jurisprudence concerning the specific rights guaranteed in the 
Human Rights Charter?
And my second question goes to Professor Grawert, concerning the prin­
ciple of equal freedom. Liberty is one thing, equal freedom is a bit different. 
How do you think the social rights in the European Charter influence this 
concept of liberty? Liberty of course in the market freedoms is no question, 
but if you implement the Charter with a strong emphasis on the social aspect, 
on social rights, which we discussed in Germany some years ago, is there an 
influence on this general tendency of equal freedom?
• Professor Rolf Grawert, PhD - University of Bochum
It is the same with the social rights in the Union as the social rights in the 
states. Social rights means competencies of the state to explain what the so­
cial status of their citizens shall be. Therefore one thing is the competence of 
the state, and therefore Great Britain and Poland are afraid, I think, and the 
other thing is that social rights demand financial help from the state, and that 
is another problem of the budgets of the states. But I think, when we speak 
about migrant workers and so on, very many things in the social rights area 
do not cost very much, but still must be managed by the state laws. For in­
stance, and that would be a question to you, Diane, for instance insurance 
laws. If I go to Great Britain, perhaps to Scotland, and I do not have the mo­
ney I need. Therefore I think it is very necessary to stress that principle of 
subsidiarity, and Diane said something about this.
• jan Sikuta - judge of the European Court of Human Rights,
Council of Europe
Maybe back to the question raised by Professor Carby-Hall about migrant 
workers. They probably would invoke those social rights, which are not much 
covered by the European Convention of Human Rights. There are provisions 
relating to education and so on, but the Convention mostly covers citizen and 
political rights.
To your question, thank you very much for this interesting question. There 
has been discussion for a long time about the co-existence of the Strasbourg 
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Court and Luxembourg Court. Now as far as I know there was recent informa­
tion that there is a further development in this regard that EU probably is go­
ing to accede to the European Convention of Human Rights, Article 6 of that 
Treaty I think is where there has been adopted this kind of decision, so in this 
case the situation of course will maybe in the future clarify, because in case the 
Union as an entity accedes to the Convention, then it is a party to the Conven­
tion like any other 47 member states. This means that at the end the European 
Union will also have a judge there, who would be elected there in respect of the 
European Union, who would be an expert on EU law, which is of course in our 
realm very essential because all of us are judges who are experts on national 
laws of countries in respect of which we are elected there, plus maybe constitu­
tional law and other kinds of law, but national law for sure, and more and more 
in this very complex system of different legal systems which are now applicable 
within Europe. It is not only the T1 member states of the EU but it is much 
more complicated because we do have other 20 states which are not members 
of the European Union and our Court has to apply the rights in the same way 
to both categories of applicants. I would like to say much more, but there is not 
time now. Maybe we will have the opportunity to continue later.
• Diane Ryland - University of Lincoln
I would just like to address two questions, one to Judge Sikuta and one to 
Professor Grawert. Judge Sikuta, you have just touched upon the issue which 
I wish to raise, about the accession of the European Union to the Convention 
on Human Rights. And you have mentioned the minimum standards. And 
I wonder if there might be scope possibly for raising the standards, because 
the EU can actually adopt higher standards, they have to adopt the same mi­
nimum standard but may raise protection in certain areas. But my interest is 
in the constitutional significance of this. The Convention or your statute only 
allows states to accede, so there will have to be some prior amendment, be­
cause the EU is not a state. Has there been any move to change the statutes 
to accommodate this? And when will be done? Has it started? I have an inte­
rest in your side of affairs.
My second question to Professor Grawert. I noticed with interest a com­
ment you made towards the end of your paper, about the real liberalism, the 
positive force for human rights in the European Union, even though we have 
not been able to get a concordance on human rights. You mentioned that ru­
lings may come that the majority of member states aspire to certain social 
standards, and I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit more on that in re­
lation to the United Kingdom and Poland’s stance on social rights under the 
Charter, their opt-out.
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• Jan èikuta - Judge of the European Court of Eluman Rights,
Council of Europe
As I indicated earlier, of course I will stay with you all the day today, which 
means that in case you have further questions, as was proposed by the Chair­
man, I am available in the afternoon or later. Back to your question. Let me 
start with the second question. It is a question that I am not able to answer, 
because it regards the change in our statutes. Myself I am a judge, and here 
very much depends on the decision of member states. We have not dealt with 
that yet during our plenary of the judges.
And to the first question, of course it is a very interesting case, accession of 
the EU to the Convention. Several articles have been written on this coexistence. 
One of the opinions was that maybe in the narrow field of human rights which 
are mentioned in the Convention and protocols the Strasbourg Court will add 
something like a constitutional court in Luxembourg, something like a supreme 
court of that entity. In practice, will the standards increase? Of course everything 
is possible, and we had just a few days ago a discussion on the qualification direc­
tive of the European Union to our Strasbourg case law. In practice, the court is 
making decisions and judgements in the Chamber and in the Grand Chamber. In 
case there is an impact, important impact on the existing case law of the Court, 
very probably such case would be relinquished to the Grand Chamber because 
this is a case - in practice, I am speaking from a practical point of view, because 
I am not a professor, but I think it is quite relevant - so this would raise the im­
portant question of the interpretation of the Convention. So from this point of 
view we can expect that if there is an impact, then it goes to the Grand Chamber 
and the Grand Chamber takes a judgement which is something like a binding ju­
risprudence and case law which gives direction for further judgments.
• Professor Rolf Grawert, PhD - University of Bochum
I think the answer for Poland and Great Britain I can give you with He­
gel and the ghost. Hegel’s European “world spirit“ will do the thing. European 
world spirit has processual interpretation. I think even Great Britain and Po­
land must interpret their constitutions and their laws in the way of the Eu­
ropean Charter, because the European Charter after Lisbon is valid. Not as 
a literal part of a constitution, but it is valid. And the Court of Justice in Lu­
xembourg makes its decisions not by interpretation but by inspiration, inspi­
ration. Therefore I spoke of Hegel’s Weltgeist. By inspiration, and this inspi­
ration will touch Great Britain and Poland.
Also, I believe the other thing is the freedom of workers. The freedom of wor­
kers will bring them the social rights and they will demand from Great Britain 
and Poland to change their laws, as they will demand from the courts and the 
constitution makers to change the social rights to be common in all of Europe.
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And therefore I think it is a question of time till we will have a shared set of so­
cial rights in Europe. The first proof will be, we have very many Polish workers in 
Great Britain, and they will come back and they will go to France and after our 
famous three years also to Germany, and so on. And they will bring the social 
rights with them, and the courts must make their decisions in this way.
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Professor ZDZISŁAW MACH, PhD - Jagiellonian University
Social Dimension of the Constitutional Treaty: 
European Identity and Citizenship
It is my pleasure to share with you a few thoughts about the social aspect 
of the Constitutional Treaty, and more particularly about some implications 
that the Treaty may have on the European identity, including the role of Eu­
ropean citizenship.
It is a bit difficult to speak on this subject in detail at the moment, be­
cause the new Treaty has been signed but is still very new, and there has 
been no time to analyse it in detail. Nevertheless, there are a few problems 
and a few dilemmas related to the social implications of reforming the Euro­
pean Union and constructing a new treaty. I believe that in view of the Euro­
pean enlargement, and in view of possible further enlargement, and in view 
of the necessity to reconstruct and rethink the European institutions and 
European law, it seems important to take a different approach to identity.
The question whether a common European identity is a realistic project, 
whether we can have or whether we should have common European iden­
tity, is one of the most difficult and most controversial issues in the European 
Union, not only among the new member states but also among the 15 “old” 
member states. And it seems to me that it is very unlikely that a future com­
mon European identity will be based on common culture, on a core culture 
and cultural boundaries that we would all share. In this sense it is very un­
likely that a consensus could be reached on who is European and who is not 
European on the basis of a common culture. We neither have nor intend to 
have a common language. The working language of Europe may be English, 
but as far as identity is concerned, we protect our languages, we protect our 
heritage, we have different interpretations of history. We adhere to the idea 
that culture, policy and education should remain within the competence of 
nation states. And we also like, cherish and celebrate diversity.
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The situation of Europe is very different from the situation in which na­
tion states were 200 or 150 years ago, when national identities were built to 
replace local identities. Nation states had a tremendous power to execute this 
project, and the EU neither has this power nor there is any intention to con­
struct such a homogenous cultural entity as European culture. Also, if we 
look at the way we interpret European history, as we know very well there is 
much more story of some Europeans against other Europeans than a com­
mon European position against Others, and particularly Others who would 
be significant, equally important partners to all Europeans.
There is one exception of course: there is Islam. We can, if we like - most 
of us don't like - present European history as a story of conflict against Is­
lam. Today it would be neither practical nor safe to base European identity on 
this principle, not only for global reasons, but also because we have very sig­
nificant Muslim communities within Europe, our core citizens. Also, as for 
the place of Christianity in the preamble to the European Constitution when 
it was still discussed, the discussion revealed that the consensus on this, on 
core cultural elements, is not an easy thing to reach.
If we try to build core European culture, common European culture, then 
the question will remain to whom we can refuse European identity, where are 
the boundaries, who will be told “Sorry, you are not European, because you 
don’t share what we do share” So it seems to be much more realistic I think 
to expect that a common European identity will not be based on a core Euro­
pean culture, but will be based on European citizenship, common participa­
tion in European projects, and development of European institutions.
If we want to follow this way of thinking, then we need to look at Europe 
and the European identity not as something we have, but as a process of be­
coming, as a process of action, of joint, coordinated activity, aiming at some 
common goals and organised by the common institutional framework. If we 
look at identity not as a relatively stable model, but as a process of becoming, 
a process of constructing, creating the feeling of belonging to a common frame­
work, to a common civil society, then it looks much more realistic. I think the 
events which are currently going on in Europe allow us to be rather optimistic 
as far as the probability of the success of such a project is concerned.
I particularly want to emphasise the role of the category of European cit­
izenship, which apart from whatever else it might be, is designed in such 
a way that it encourages people to be active in local communities, wherever 
mobile European citizens happen to choose residence. And it remain to be 
seen to what extent this is going to be a reality of new trans-national democ­
racy, to what extent people will participate actively in democratic procedures 
on a local level and where parliamentary elections are concerned. Just a cou­
ple of days ago we saw that Polish immigrants in Britain and in Ireland are
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very active as far as national elections are concerned: we watched the queue to 
cast a vote in the national elections with amazement. It will be very interest­
ing to see whether they will be equally involved on the local level in the dem­
ocratic procedures.
And in may ways one can say that this new identity, understood as being ac­
tive in trans-national projects and in trans-national institutions, is already hap­
pening. Many people are actively involved in activities within the European 
framework, exceeding and crossing national boundaries, and yet at the same 
time they do not consciously construct their symbolic identity as a European 
identity. We are now in my Institute of European Studies involved in a large- 
scale project on trans-national démocratisation, and the very preliminary re­
sults show that a great and growing number of people, especially young people, 
when asked about their identity, still stick to traditional boundaries: they de­
scribe themselves through national or local identifications. Europe as a point of 
reference of the symbolic identities is still something very vague and very dis­
tant. At the same time however they are very active on the European level, and 
they take it for granted that mobility, common European projects, are some­
thing that is a real possibility for them, that there is a new framework of activity. 
Of course they massively take part in the new institutional possibilities, such as 
taking cases to the Court of Human Rights against their own state, and think 
this is their right, because they are Europeans. Of course if this develops, then 
after a while we may have a situation in which the European identity under­
stood as participation of citizens in institutions, in projects, in trans-national 
activity, in cross-border activities, will in fact construct and constitute the new 
type of identity as Europeans. People will be Europeans through what they do, 
even if symbolic labelling and symbolic identifications (i.e. that the people call 
themselves European) may come a bit later. The awareness of what it means to 
be active may be a bit delayed, because on the symbolic level we are still in the 
overwhelming domination of national rhetoric, of national symbolism. And if 
this happens, if I am right, then in a few years we will see a situation in which 
Europe will be taken for granted as a frame of reference for both democratic ac­
tivity and symbolic identifications. Then it will be completely out of the ques­
tion that this frame of reference should not be applicable, that it should change, 
and for instance people would be again forced to limit their activities back to 
the national boundaries.
Therefore a great deal depends on how consistently we will develop those 
institutions and projects on the European level that will facilitate this process. 
What is going to be the real meaning of European citizenship? Will any steps 
towards a European democracy, for instance European elections to the Eu­
ropean parliament, European political parties be taken? Is it realistic? At the 
moment it does not seem to be very realistic, but perhaps in the future it will 
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be. There is also the issue of how much power we give to the European Parlia­
ment, because it is a key institution in this process, the institution which rep­
resent European citizens and not the European states. So a more democratic 
mechanism, a greater role of the European Parliament, more common Euro­
pean projects and less veto power to member states: these are the conditions 
for the new European identity if we, as I suggest, see it not as a core European 
culture body, but as a process of becoming Europeans through being active 
within the European frame of reference.
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Professor HARALD KUNDOCH, PhD - Gelsenkirchen University 
of Applied Sciences
Free Movement of Capital and Payments (Article 56 and the 
Following Articles of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community - TEEC)
Free movement of capital and payments plays an important role in the Eu­
ropean single (internal) market. Free movement of capital means that eco­
nomic entities have access to a production factor, i.e. capital, which helps 
achieve optimal allocation. Free movement of payments is indispensable for 
the functioning of the other fundamental freedoms. Transnational payments 
are necessary for the conclusion of translational legal actions. Free move­
ment of capital and payments is complementary to free movement of goods, 
services and persons, just like mortgages are complementary to the claims 
they secure. Thus, free movement of capital and payments is the underlying 
condition of the Economic and Monetary Union.1
1 K.-D. Borchardt, Europarecht. Die rechtlichen Grundlagen der Europäischen Union, 3rd edition, Heidel­
berg 2006, Rdnr. 1029 ff; Haag, [in:] R. Bieber, A. Epiney, M. Haag, Die Europäische Union. Europarecht 
und Politik, 7th edition, Baden-Baden 2006, Rdnr, 28 ff.
2 K. Hailbronner, G. Jochum, Europarecht. Binnenmarkt und Grundfreiheiten, Stuttgart 2006, Rdnr 664 ff; 
M. Herdegen, Europarecht, 9th edition, München 2007, § 19.
Free movement of capital consists in transnational transfers of monetary 
capital and tangible goods, primarily with the purpose of investing. This free­
dom is one of the five fundamental freedoms and is guaranteed by Article 56 
of the TEEC and its following articles. Ensuring the possibility of transfer of 
capital and an integration of the banking and financial markets within the EU 
community system is a key element of the Economic and Monetary Union. 
Liberalisation of the flow of capital is, together with the other fundamental 
freedoms, a crucial component of the single (internal) market. At the same 
time, it constitutes an important aspect of the open market economy based 
on free competition.1 2
The legal basis for the enforcement of the freedom of movement of cap­
ital is the Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implemen­
tation of Article 67 of the Treaty. According to its Article 1 par. 1, member 
states are obliged to abolish restrictions on movements of capital taking 
place between persons resident in member states. Since January 1, 1994, 
Article 56 and the following articles of the TEEC have placed very severe 
restrictions on the possibilities for limiting the freedom of movement of 
capital. In other words, limitations implemented by member states are only
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allowed when their objective is to prevent infringements of national law 
and regulations. As a result of the application procedure, administrative or 
statistical data from the field of taxation law or banking supervision law is 
gathered. The European Court of Justice only in exceptional situations al­
lows limitations to the freedom of movement of capital and the obligation 
to obtain foreign exchange permits.3
3 A. Haratsch, Ch. Koenig, M. Pechstein, Europarecht, 5th edition, Tübingen 2006, Rdnr 625 ff; von Wil- 
mowsky [in:] Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, ed. D. Ehlers, 2nd edition, Berlin 2005, § 12.
4 EU- und EG-Vertrag, eds. O. Lenz, IC.-D. Borchardt, 3rd edition, Köln 2003, p. 703 ff; EuGH-Rechtspre­
chung Rechtssache 203/80 “Casati“ Amtliche Sammlung 1981, p. 2595.
5 U. Haltern, Europarecht-Dogmatik im Kontext, 2nd edition, Tübingen 2007, p. 657 ff.
Freedom of movement of capital has become the subject of a jurispru­
dential debate. The Treaty itself contains no legal definition of the notion 
of movement of capital. Therefore, this notion has been defined in the fol­
lowing general way by jurisprudence: “Overall, the notion of capital move­
ment signifies a transfer of value in the form of monetary capital connec­
ted with making a deposit or a transfer of tangible goods, from one member 
state to another. On the basis of Directive 88/361 (which however has not 
been binding since the Maastricht Treaty came into force), this includes di­
rect investments, investments in real estate, activities performed on secu­
rities which are traded on the capital market, monetary markets, futures 
contracts, as well as civil-law based secured transactions and flows of cap­
ital of personal nature.”4
Compared to other economic freedoms, the freedom of capital and pay­
ments has one distinguishing quality. In contrast to the other freedoms, this 
freedom is effective not only between the member states, but also in rela­
tion to third countries. It is however unclear whether this results in nati­
onals of third countries having the right to appear before national courts. 
Possibly this right might depend on such individuals having their perma­
nent residence on the territory of a member state. The protection applies 
to all individuals undertaking transnational capital transfers and relevant 
payments. Article 56 and the following articles of the TEEC are not appli­
cable only where to a given situation the provisions on freedom of services 
clearly apply.5
Article 56 of the TEEC extends beyond the classic ban on discrimination ex­
pressed by Article 12 of the TEEC in that it prohibits all restrictions on movement 
of capital. This prohibition covers all measures which hinder the flows of money, in 
and out of entities, both in terms of amount and of form. The scope of protection 
of freedom of capital and payments is therefore very wide. It results in a ban on any 
national regulations which directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, might hin­
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der the freedom of movement of capital and payments. Restrictions in this field are 
derived chiefly from tax law and certain provisions with regard to deposits (for ex­
ample, the obligation to deposit foreign securities in a bank).6
6 H. J. Küsters, Die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1st edition, Baden-Baden 1982, 
p. 359 ff.
7 J. Schwarze, Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht, 1st edition, Baden-Baden 2007, Rdnr 145-156.
8 F. Möslein, Kapitelverkehrsfreiheit und Gessellschaftshrecht, “Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht“ 2007, 
p. 208 ff.
9 EU- und EG- Vertrag, eds. O. Lenz, K.-D. Borchardt, 3rd edition, Köln 2003, p. 747 ff.
Article 57 of the TEEC stipulates however that certain measures with re­
gard to direct investment in third countries are admissible. These restrictions 
on movement of capital pertain only to third countries. Similar measures be­
tween member states would be inadmissible. These measures include restric­
tions involving direct investment (including investment in real estate), esta­
blishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to 
capital markets. This is a closed catalogue of such situations.7
Article 57 par. 1 of the TEEC applies to measures already in existence in 
this regard, created on the basis of national or Community law. As far as 
these measures are concerned, even after Article 56 and the following ar­
ticles enter into force, their continued existence is guaranteed. After their 
entry into force, only the European Community has the competence to es­
tablish such restrictive measures (Article 57 par. 2 of the TEEC). In terms 
of the intended liberalisation of movement of capital and payments, una­
nimity as the sole method of decision-making with regard to such measures 
might constitute a step back. For this reason, Article 59 of the TEEC gives 
the European Community the right to take safeguard measures, limited in 
time, where movements of capital to or from third countries may threaten 
to cause serious difficulties for the operation of economic and monetary 
union.8
Article 60 of the TEEC regulates the competence of the Council to take 
unilateral measures against a third country (an embargo) in the understand­
ing of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Council is urged to use 
this competence if there is no other way to prevent serious disruptions of the 
economic and monetary union. The right to introduce such measures rests 
with the member states until the Council itself acts to introduce appropriate 
measures (Article 60 par. 2 of the TEEC). This is a regulation which allows for 
an exception and which expresses the obligation to inform the Commission 
and other Member States of such measures.9
Article 58 par. 1 sec. b of the TEEC allows the EU Member States under 
certain conditions to limit the movement of capital and payments that is be-
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tween the Member States but also with third countries. Its subject matter 
concerns defined goods protected by law, which are specified in Article 58 
par. 1 of the TEEC. The steps undertaken by the Member States can be justi­
fied in the light of the Article 58. Within this fundamental freedom, as a re­
sult of necessary reasons the European Court of Justice decision in Cassis de 
Dijon case is justified (C-120/78). The privileges granted by acts of law to the 
EU Member States that have shares in capital companies need according to 
the view of the European Court of Justice justification by virtue of commonly 
acknowledged interests accounting for proportionality. This, in particular, re­
fers to the convenient representation in the company units as well as the in­
creasing ability to influence the company by means of the so+called ‘golden 
shares’.
“The freedom of movement of capital, as a key principle of the TEEC, 
may be limited by a national law only in the cases listed in Article 73d par. 
1 of the TEEC, or if required by the common interest. The national regula­
tion is only justifiable when it is adequate to guarantee the achievement of 
the designed objective and when its scope is no greater than necessary to 
achieve this objective. Consequently, the measures introduced by the mem­
ber states may be deemed, for the above-mentioned reason, to be justified. 
An example of a justifying reason can be the need to secure the supply of 
energy in an emergency.“10
10 Rechtssache C-503/99.
11 M. Herdegen, Europarecht, 9th edition, München 2007, § 19 Rdnr 5.
There are varying opinions in the jurisprudence as to what falls into the 
category of freedom of movement of capital and payments. The European 
Court of Justice has classified capital deposits made abroad as free move­
ment of capital, but the money due in mutual consideration as a form of the 
passive freedom of services. This ruling was based on the previous version 
of the TEEC, according to which the freedom of payments was only an un­
written appendix to a given fundamental freedom. Now the freedom of pay­
ments, regulated in Article 56 par. 2 of the TEEC, includes - apart from any 
transnational transfer of currency executed in exchange for a consideration - 
also transitional payments of damages and compensations, as well as claims 
for return of unjust enrichment.11
Where, then, is the dividing line between the freedom of movement of 
capital and the freedom of establishment and free movement of services? 
With regard to direct investments in establishment, depending on the in­
volvement there is a distinction between having a managerial influence on 
the undertaking and exercising the right of control (freedom of establish­
ment) and simply making a deposit (free movement of capital). As far as tax 
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regulations with regard to dividend payments are concerned, the European 
Court of Justice has adopted both perspectives. Similarly, in cases where real 
property is purchased in another member state, both the freedom of esta­
blishment and freedom of movement of capital apply. The jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Justice has not established a general division between 
these fundamental freedoms. Instead, the Court often allows a simultaneous 
application of provisions on free movement of capital, alongside provisions 
pertaining to other fundamental freedoms.12
12 J. Schwarze, Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht, Ist edition, Baden-Baden 2007, Rdnr 148.
13 J. Oechsler, Erlaubte Gestaltungen im Anwendungsbereich des Art. 561 EG, “Neue Zeitschrift für Ges­
ellschaftsrecht’’ 2007, p. 161 ff.
According to Article 56 par. 1 of the TEEC, all restrictions on the move­
ment of capital between member states and between member states and third 
countries are prohibited. Par. 2 of this article constitutes the same prohibition 
with regard to payments. In its efforts to maintain a common unified Euro­
pean capital market, the European Court of Justice has used a wide interpre­
tation of the notion of restrictions. This interpretation includes all direct and 
indirect measures which hinder transnational movements of capital and pay­
ments, including discriminatory measures. In principle, the ban applies to all 
types of inspections of the flow of currencies, all regulations in which capital 
transactions depend on obtaining a permit, as well as tax and penal law reg­
ulations that have a limiting effect.
Finally, the important issue of “golden shares”. As state enterprises were 
being privatised, governments wanted to maintain control over important 
decisions and the development of the enterprises even after they were no 
longer state-owned. This is why the member states reserved special rights, 
such as for example the right to withhold permission for certain acts, vot­
ing rights in the establishment of company’s managing bodies, and the 
veto right to a takeover by a foreign entity and to a transfer of the enter­
prise abroad.
♦ In Portugal, this is why for a large number of enterprises there was a cap 
at 10% of foreign shareholding, and a requirement to obtain a permit to 
sell capital amounting to more than its 10%.
♦ In France, the purchase of shares of the formerly state-owned enterprise 
ELF-Aquitaine required the permission of the French minister of eco­
nomy, who was entitled to veto the sale of the property of the enterprise.
The European Commission challenged these member states for breach 
of the provisions of the Treaty. In both cases, the European Court of Justice 
found that a breach had indeed occurred.13
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For Germany, the case against the federal government for the breach of 
the Treaty provisions on free movement of capital by adoption of the so- 
called “Volkswagen law” has been of particular importance. The “Volkswagen 
law” envisages, inter alia, that every shareholder, regardless of his/her share­
stake in Volkswagen Company, which was privatised in the meantime, can­
not claim a bigger share than 20%. This was supposed to guarantee the state 
of Lower Saxony, the main shareholder, a continued influence on the com­
pany. The European Court of Justice rules in this case on October 23, 2007. 
(Rechtssache C-112/05).14
14 W. Kilian, Verstößt das VW-Gesetz gegen die Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit?, 'Neue Juristische Wochenschrift" 
2007, p. 1508 ff. F. Sander, Volkswagen vor dem EuGH - der Schutzbereich der Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit am 
Scheideweg, “Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht” 2005, p. 106 ff; Ch. Teichmann, E. Heise, Das 
VW-Urteil des EuGH und seine Folgen, “Betriebsberater” 2007, p. IST? ff.
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Professor IAN BARNES, PhD - University of Lincoln
The Economic Aspects of the Constitution
The introduction of my paper should not really be limited to the economic 
aspects of the constitution, because that would seem to imply that I am mak­
ing substantive reference to the constitutional treaty. This has informed my 
discussion, but really I have tried to move things onwards and look at the Re­
form Treaty and take from it the keywords and expressions that are part of 
this particular document.
Before I move on to the presentation proper, I would like to go back to the 
founding fathers. The interesting thing about the old gentlemen (well, not all of 
them were gentlemen) is - many of us on this platform here remember a long 
long time back - and one of the first things that strike me about the European 
Union is that the politicians always used to describe it as being an economic 
entity, and the economists always used to describe it as being a political entity. 
I certainly believe it to be essentially a political entity, but I think it is interest­
ing as well that in many respects it is a very confused economic constitution. 
And I think the reason why we get ourselves into a real state about many of the 
issues which the lawyers here are wrestling is that the economic governance of 
the EU has always been based on a kind of second-best model, rather than if it 
were from a purely economic rationale. It is based upon the idea of a customs 
union and a common market, both of which are about excluding others and 
about promoting cohesion with those who actually belong to the club.
Essentially, what happens is that the EU has set up some basic frameworks 
for governance, but within that, each member state runs its own economy. 
And with that in mind, we have to remember that things have not moved as 
far as many people would expect they might have done. Certainly the current 
French government is talking now about creating national economic cham­
pions: they are not talking about European champions, they are talking about 
French champions. That is very typical of the conflict between the individual 
aims of countries and the collective ideal.
At the same time, we are dealing with a European Union which is very di­
verse. You look at the sort of league tables of who has got the money and who 
does not, as it were, and of course down there at the bottom there is Bulgaria 
and Romania, and I regret to say somewhere down at the bottom as well is 
Poland, while at the top end you have states like Denmark, Ireland, Luxem­
bourg, and indeed, surprisingly, the United Kingdom is up there near the top 
end as well. This diversity is remarkable.
It is interesting that our Chair should actually mention the fact that we 
have the same understanding of the social market economy. Naturally, there
CITIZEN AND HUMAN RIGHTSAND LIBERTIES
are many models of economic governance within the European Union. Ev­
ery state tends to run its economy in a different way, and really that is where 
the problems come in. Because what we have in essence is a series of econ­
omies linked together, but very different in terms of their character and na­
ture. Some are richer, some are poorer. In the case of France very much there 
is a statist, etatist tradition, Germany has the so-called social market econ­
omy, which has been described as a kind of relish model, in the United King­
dom there is the Anglo-Saxon model, there is the Scandinavian model, in­
deed what you have is a club which has got very many very distinct type of 
economy and society within it.
Overall, I suppose, this is in response to our Chair: are we considering the so­
cial aspect of this? I think it is clear that we are not the United States of America. 
So actually we do believe in a European social model, and this involves a developed 
interventionist state funded by relatively high levels of taxation, we believe in a ro­
bust welfare system, and in social protection, and of course we believe in equality, 
which in some societies is allowed to fall by the wayside. So in that sense we have 
got this diversity but also this belief in a social model for Europe. The only problem 
with this social model that we have got here is of course: can we actually afford it? 
And it is with the nature of globalisation becoming a real issue. Generally speaking 
then, I have tried to develop here some economic challenges that we face. Let me 
now move on to my presentation to give you outline of my ideas.
Introduction
Economic governance within the EU is essentially a shared competence 
and depends upon the interaction between the member states and their rela­
tionship to the EU as a whole. As time has gone on, the extent to which any 
member state can act autonomously had declined as the economies have be­
come increasingly interdependent. The role of the EU in this complex set of 
relationships is laid down in the Treaties in a very general way. The fact that 
the EU, as an organisation, came about because of a desire to pursue peace 
through economic means is important. As the EU has expanded and become 
significantly more complex, the market mechanism has bound the states to­
gether, in a way that has led to a feeling that economic governance is being 
wrested from the member states. The most specific example of this was the 
launch of the single currency in 1999 and the attempted completion of the 
single market in 1992. The expanded economic governance role of the EU has 
led to greater homogeneity of economic management, but member states are 
still able to make their own decisions. However, as Miriam L. Campanella 
and Sylvester Eijffinger (2003) point out deeper integration has not, yet, de­
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livered the necessary flexibility to cope with the seemingly relentless march 
of globalisation. They suggest that the EU economy is too rigid and poorly 
equipped to turn the differences between member economies into an asset 
when faced with global shocks and competition.
This paper critically examines the tensions between the constitutions of 
the 27 member states and that of the European Union. This discussion is in­
formed by an examination of the draft Reform Treaty, which was adopted 
by the Brussels European Council of June 2007 and, at the time of writing, 
awaits adoption or rejection by the EU member states. At the same time the 
paper notes the tensions between the different models of economic man­
agement of the member states.
All of the EU T1 economies are at very different stages of development 
and have different challenges to face. The response to these differences is 
often to rail against the constraints of the EU’s market-based economic phi­
losophy, as elaborated in the Treaties. Nevertheless, abandoning the inter­
nal market is not an option, as long as states wish to stay within the EU.
It is difficult to establish an appropriate relationship between the eco­
nomic constitutions of the member states and the European Union. The par­
adox of greater economic integration is that the economies of the EU are 
very different. The EU has become more diverse as membership has grown 
from six to twenty-seven states and because some states have displayed 
a greater sense of adaptability to the European mission. The pattern of con­
temporary economic development across the EU is different because states 
make different choices within the very broad framework of the EU’s policies.
One thing that makes the economies appear similar is the linking of the 
social with the economic. This occurs at the EU level and aspects of this go 
back to the social dimension of the European Coal and Steel Community. So­
cial and welfare provision exists in varying amounts within all the member 
states. In a very broad sense, this is often described as the European Social 
Model (ESM). An aspect of the ESM is the social market economy. This was 
a concept that was applied to a specific blend of economic management to be 
found in Germany and it was an alternative to models such as French indica­
tive planning and etatism.
Now the paradigm with respect to the social market economy has shifted 
and the concept is seen as being more inclusive. The term “social market 
economy” is likely to appear in the EU’s Reform Treaty and has been de­
scribed as part of the Lisbon Strategy.
The Performance of the EU Economies
In September 2007, it was clear that the EU’s economy was going through 
one of its upward phases with good growth performance and falling unem­
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ployment. However, as the table below illustrates, there were enormous differ­
ences between the very best performing economies and the laggards. The highest 
growth rates were generally to be found in the economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe, but with incomes highest in the developed economies. Even with supe­
rior growth rates, the process of catch-up will take at least 50 or 60 years.













Bulgaria 6.2 5.7 37 14.6 7.5
Romania 6.0 4.3 38 23.4 6.9
Poland 6.9 1.9 53 11.4 9.7
Latvia 11.3 7.7 56 31.7 5.6
Lithuania 7.7 4.6 58 21.6 4.7
Slovakia 9.4 2.4 63 7.9 10.6
Hungary 1.8 7.7 66 11.6 7.7
Estonia 7.3 5.2 67 18.7 8.0
Portugal 1.6 2.5 75 3.9 8.2
Malta 4.5 0.5 77 4.4 6.3
Czech
Republic 6.2 2.0 79 7.7 5.2
Slovenia 7.5 2.9 87 5.6 5.1
Greece 4.1 2.9 89 5.1 8.6
Cyprus 3.8 1.7 94 7.4 4.1
EU27 2.8 2.1 100 3.2 6.8
Spain 4.0 2.5 102 3.2 8.0
Italy 1.8 1.9 104 = 6.1
France 1.3 1.3 113 3.5 8.5
Germany 2.5 1.7 113 1.2 6.4
Finland 5.4 1.3 117 2.6 6.8
United 
Kingdom 3.0 1.9 118 4.2 5.3
Sweden 3.3 1.4 121 2.3 5.2
Belgium 2.9 1.7 123 2.7 6.6
Denmark 0.6 1.5 127 3.7 3.2




Netherlands 2.4 1.6 131 3.4
Ireland 7.2 2.6 144 5.4 4.7
Luxembourg 6.2 2.0 280 2.9 4.9
EA13 2.5 1.7 = 2.5 6.9
The challenge for the EU is to maintain a system that can overarch the 
very different member states economies and still enable the collective whole 
to respond adequately to the problems posed by globalisation and the rapid 
rate of technological change. Both these developments offer opportunities 
for the best performing and most flexible economies, but not all economies 
may be able to cope with the intensity of competition if they fail to reform. 
However, the extent to which there is an agreement about the direction of re­
form remains in doubt. The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and De­
velopment (OECD) set out the challenges facing the EU economy in their 
2007 report (OECD 2007). They were to:
♦ Further reform the internal market, including removing the remaining 
barriers to trade in goods and services.
♦ Ensure there is improved efficiency by promoting greater competition in 
the network industries such as telecommunications, ports and the en­
ergy sector.
♦ Remove barriers to labour mobility.
♦ Construct a cohesion policy that is more effective by ensuring that re­
gional policy promotes sustainable growth.
♦ Promote the EU’s role as a global trade power, by improving market ac­
cess and utilising the strength of the internal market, also abandoning 
policies that distort world trade.
All the above can be constructed as being about permitting the forces of the 
free market to do most of the work of reform. The OECD report points out that 
those countries that reformed early over such issues such as creating a flexible 
labour market have been the most successful. Much of this is the language that 
has emanated from the European Commission for many years, but has been 
resisted by individual member states. Member states can see reasons for rules 
that allow them access to other markets, but not the own.
The problem of divergent economies is illustrated by the desire of the 
French government under Nicolas Sarkozy. Whilst Sarkozy was regarded as 
a supporter of free markets prior to the 2007 Presidential elections, he soon 
dispelled that image in challenging the EU’s competition policy. His govern­
ment started to consider creating national champions. The suggested cre­
ation of a €70 billion power company in 2007 by the merger of Gaz de France 
with the private utility Suez was meant to offer a significant challenge to for­
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eign energy companies trying to penetrate the French market. This may allow 
the nuclear electric industry to be run by the private sector within France. 
Another example of a French champion that was being examined was the 
merger of Thales and Safran in the defence sector. Sarkozy also challenged 
the anti-inflation strategy of the European Central Bank by suggesting that 
boosting exports was more important than controlling inflation. The strate­
gic aims of the French government are of course at odds with EU competition 
policy. It is not that Sarkozy was proposing long-term nationalisation, it is 
more that he is seeking to directly influence industrial structure, rather than 
leave that to the market mechanism (Hollinger, Benoit 2007).
The European Social Model (ESM)
The European Social Model can be viewed as the broad range of social 
legislation that exists within the member states and the EU. It also represents 
a variety of shared values that exist across the EU. It is one of the broad link­
ing features of European economies and societies. ESM has many different 
variants depending upon the author. Anthony Giddens (2007: 2) presents 
a simple model that suggests the core ideas would be:
• a developed interventionist state funded by relatively high levels of tax­
ation;
• a robust welfare system that provides effective social protection, to some 
degree for all citizens, but especially those in need;
• a limitation, or containment, of economic and other forms of inequality.
Whilst the process of European integration has moved onward, there are 
many social models within the member states of the EU. Each state adopts 
a different approach, but as Anna Diamantopoulou, the EU Commissioner 
for Employment and Social Affairs (2003) pointed out at a fringe meeting of 
the Labour Party Conference, the EU states’ work and welfare policies are 
not the same as those of the USA. (So she was clear what it was not.) One 
possible description could well be that it is a political counterweight to EU 
fiscal rules that govern Economic and Monetary Union. In essence, she be­
lieved that the model was both a political term as well as a technical term. In 
this respect:
"... even if it escapes precise definition, the notion of‘model’ is sig­
nificant because it is ‘anticipatory’ or ‘aspirational’. In other words, 
like the expressions ‘European Union’ or ‘Common Foreign and Se­
curity Policy) the word ‘model’ hints at a progressive real conver­
gence of views among Member States on the broad objectives which 
they seek to achieve in employment and social policy.”
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The ESM has been under attack for some time by market-based econo­
mists, largely because of the disappointing economic growth. It appears to be 
barely affordable and is believed to act as a disincentive to change and enter­
prise. When the impressive growth rates of the post-Second World War pe­
riod came to a halt in the early 1970s, the funding of the ESM became more 
difficult because of the burden of high levels of unemployment and a dwin­
dling tax base. Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the EU in the 1980s, but 
these were countries that were only able to support limited welfare spend­
ing. Although the 1995 enlargement seemed to reinforce the ESM, the 2004 
and 2007 enlargements brought with them states who were trying to reform 
themselves to be less reliant on the state. Within the EU, the creation of Eco­
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU) put an institutional limit on budget defi­
cits. This meant that welfare measures had to be funded in a way which they 
had not been in the past. Finally, the reality of globalisation is that the EU 
cannot rely on its manufacturing base any longer. The pace of deindustriali­
sation has speeded up and many of the products that were traditionally made 
within the EU are now being made in South-East Asia.
The ESM would appear to be contradictory. Is it possible to have the bal­
anced budgets that EMU demands, respectable rates of economic growth, 
high levels of employment, good welfare provision and more equal societies? 
The Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden are cases where it would 
appear the ESM might work (although Sweden and Denmark are not part 
of EMU). However, the problems faced by the larger member states within 
EMU found controlling budget deficits very difficult in periods of slow eco­
nomic growth in the early years of the millennium.
The ESM is related to the concept of the social market economy in that 
those states that have a social market subscribe actively to the ESM.
The Concept of the Social Market Economy (SME)
In his important perspective on European economies in the mid-1960s, 
Andrew Shonfield noted the very different ways in which the capitalist model 
was developing in post-war Europe (Shonfield 1965). His examples ranged 
from the state as an entrepreneur in Italy to indicative planning in France and 
the market socialism of the Swedish state. Over fifty years later, despite the 
impact of the EU and the process of economic integration, the organisation 
of the European economies still differs significantly. Along with this they are 
still at very different stages of development.
The expression ‘social market economy’ is embedded in the language of the 
development of post-second World War Europe. The concept most commonly 
refers to the development of the German economy after the Second World 
War as a reaction to the state driven model of capitalism under the Nazi era 
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and the challenges of Marxist determinism. The economist most closely as­
sociated with this set of ideas was Walter Eucken of the Freiburg School, who 
suggested that the states role in the modern economy was to provide a polit­
ical framework for economic freedom. The Christian Democrat Ludwig Er­
hard, who was the Minister of Economics under Konrad Adenauer’s chancel­
lorship and who later became German Chancellor in his own right from 1963 
to 1966, led the development of the model and its early implementation. So- 
ziale Marktwirtschaft suggests that there is a choice of economic model that 
a state may adopt, which may involve both economic and social considerations. 
In this sense, it is not meant to be a socialist economy with all the implications 
of regulation and state control. As the model was originally operated in Ger­
many, very large businesses were broken up and the powers of Germany’s Fed­
eral Government over the economy, were weakened (Shonfield 1965: 240-241).
In 1999, Romano Prodi (then President of the Commission), echoed the 
language of the post-war origins of the social market economy. In his speech 
to mark the 10th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall he said:
“Their victory is the victory of freedom over oppression, of de­
mocracy over totalitarianism, of the social market economy over the 
Marxist-socialist command economy.” (Prodi 1999).
This places the social market firmly in the front-line of the Cold-War bat­
tle of economic systems, which communism was to lose.
The concept of a social market changed over time in Germany. There are 
now many large-scale enterprises, and the German economy has moved 
from being highly market-orientated to one with a significant degree of social 
protection. However, Germany has no privatisation agenda and mergers are 
closely monitored to ensure that market dominance does come about (Econ­
omist Intelligence Unit 2007). In recent years, attempts have been made to 
ensure state expenditure does not get out of control, so the state’s spending as 
a percentage of GDP declined from 48% in 1980 to less than 46% in 2006.
The German economy experienced major problems with the launch of 
EMU with a period of slow growth, in part due to becoming a member of 
EMU at a too high an exchange rate. The recovery of German competitive­
ness in the period 2004 to 2007 came at the price of domestic deflation and 
was brought about by the restructuring of large enterprises in Germany, not 
by the reforms of the Merkel government. That is the industrial restructur­
ing took place prior to the reforms having a significant impact. Change and 
modernisation is therefore possible without resort to the extremes of market 
forces (such as those that were imposed in the UI< under Margaret Thatcher) 
as long as industry engages in the task.
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Michel Albert further developed Shonfield’s view that there are differing 
models of economic governance that can be identified across Europe (Albert 
1993). The economic governance models to be found in a group of countries 
around the Rhine Valley adopted what he called the Rhenish model, based 
on the German style of social market economy. This was distinct from the 
Anglo-Saxon model (or the Neo-American capitalism). The Rhenish model 
was described as being institutional, collectivist, involved stakeholders, and 
having social partners who were involved in the decision-making process. In 
contrast, there was the Anglo-Saxon model, which was based upon the needs 
of the shareholders. For Albert, the stakeholders value consisted of reconcil­
ing the interests of clients, employees, shareholders and the social environ­
ment in general. In terms of company finance, banks were thought of as being 
a more stable means of finance, rather than subjecting companies to the va­
garies of the stock market (Albert 1997). The problem with this stability is 
that it may offer a threat to the change which is needed to meet the challenge 
of globalisation. As Albert (1997) was to observe:
“All the problems of the Rhenish model, both those of a cyclical 
and those of a structural nature, are directly or indirectly associated 
with the difficulty of reconciling the competitiveness and creativity of 
an enterprise with the costs of social security, costs that are becom­
ing increasingly high due both to demographic factors and to medical 
progress. Throughout continental Europe, the vitality of the economy 
and its ability to create jobs increasingly depend on the reduction of 
labour costs and on firms’ profitability.”
The way that the Rhenish model works at its very best is via high levels 
of capital investment per worker, leading to impressive levels of productiv­
ity, at least in comparison to many other European economies, especially the 
UK. Workers also tend to work far fewer hours than their counterparts in the 
UI< and the USA. This points to the superiority of the model, but the shorter 
hours worked are in the case of France, the result of constraints on individ­
ual choices, and elsewhere arise because of involuntary unemployment (Brit­
tan 1999). What does the term SME mean therefore? It is part of the debate 
about the Social and Economic constitution for the EU and it appears to be 
an attempt to reconcile economic dynamism and social cohesion within a set 
of legal rules and social conventions (Ebner 2006). Not surprisingly, the Eco­
nomic and Social Committee embraced the model. They believed that the 
EU had a role to play in defining the social dimension of globalisation be­
cause of the foundation of common values shared by its members whom they 
believed constituted the essence of a social market economy. They believed
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(perhaps optimistically) that the success of the Lisbon Strategy was the key 
for the success of an EU-policy contribution to the social dimension of glo­
balisation (Economic and Social Committee 2005a). The social market econ­
omy’s values included;
“...individual responsibility, respect for the rule of law, respect for 
the individual and property, transparency, integrity, human dignity, 
equality and freedom, fundamental trade union and workers rights, 
access to education, sound industrial relations and a high level of so­
cial protection.” (Economic and Social Committee 2005b).
The SME is a preferred option for a number of the EU states in that it is 
within the tradition of the European Social Model. Given a choice, there are 
many aspects of the SME that European voters prefer, even if they worry 
about the unemployment and lack of flexibility associated with it. A 2007 
FT/Harris poll of 65,000 people on systems of economic government dem­
onstrated that the populations of Europe deeply distrust the US model of 
market capitalism. When asked whether a free-market system was the best 
economic system, the Germans and Spanish, 48 per cent and 49 per cent re­
spectively, said that they thought it was, but respondents from Italy, France 
and the UK were considerably less enthusiastic. Only a minority of those 
polled felt that their economies should be modelled on that of the USA. They 
believed that their economic model should be reformed, not jettisoned. The 
German Finance Minister Peer Steinbriick suggested that the 2007 reforms 
taking place in Germany; “represent a successful renewal of our economic 
policy model of the social market economy.... We deliberately did not intro­
duce an Anglo-Saxon model.” (Atkins 2007). What this statement clearly im­
plies is that the from the German perspective the SME is the way forward, de­
spite doubts about its flexibility.
The Lisbon Strategy
The debate about the concept of the social market economy informed the 
Lisbon Strategy; the most radical attempt to reform the EU’s economy. The 
European Council held a special meeting on 23-24 March 2000 in Lisbon 
to agree a new strategic goal for the Union in order to strengthen employ­
ment, economic reform and social cohesion as part of a knowledge-based 
economy. The new strategic goal was to become within a decade (by 2010):
“...the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy 
in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion.” (European Council 2000)
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To achieve this strategy there needed to be preparation for
“...the transition to a knowledge-based economy and society by 
better policies for the information society and R&D, as well as by 
stepping up the process of structural reform for competitiveness and 
innovation and by completing the internal market; modernising the 
European social model, investing in people and combating social 
exclusion; sustaining the healthy economic outlook and favourable 
growth prospects by applying an appropriate macro-economic pol­
icy mix.” (European Council 2000).
The purpose of this strategy was to achieve full employment and strengthen 
regional coherence. Interestingly the strategy talked about an emerging new 
society which is more adapted to the personal choices of women and men 
and the implementation of sound macro-economic policy, hopefully achiev­
ing an average economic growth rate of around 3%. The strategy was devel­
oped and refined at subsequent meetings of the European Council and an en­
vironmental pillar was added at the Göteborg European Council meeting in 
June 2001. This stressed the need to ensure that economic growth was not to 
be at the expense of a deteriorating environment.
The Lisbon Agenda required that there be cooperation between the EU 
and the member states. The member states were responsible for implement­
ing reforms in line with the overall strategy. This was far more difficult to 
achieve than the Strategy document envisaged and the member states that 
failed to reform or invest in an appropriate way were to blame. They were, 
for example, slow to transpose or agree to the new legislation to achieve the 
strategy. A progress report published in 2004 by the Commission noted the 
success of the strategy to that time but commented that:
“Indeed, in certain domains there are significant problems which 
hold back the entire strategy and which hinder the return of strong 
growth. What is more, the most important delays have been identi­
fied in three strategic domains which are crucial for growth: knowl­
edge and networks, industrial and service sector competitiveness, 
and active ageing.” (Commission 2004).
The slowness to achieve the Lisbon Strategy was against a difficult back­
ground of generally slow growth within many EU states. Part of this slow 
growth was associated with the difficulties that the large member states had 
in adjusting to the launch of the EMU. However, the fact that the Lisbon 
Strategy had aspects of liberalisation, as in the Internal Market measures, 
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with exhortations for the member states to invest more heavily in research 
and development, displays a predictable confusion between the various sys­
tems and the EU’s economic governance priorities. The issues are therefore 
the concern of national governments and are likely remain beyond the scope 
of the EU in any formal treaty sense for the foreseeable future.
In 2005, the Strategy was relaunched because of a lack of progress and the 
need to take account of the fact of enlargement from 15 to 25 member states 
in 2004. It was recognized that Europe needed to become a more attractive 
place to invest and work, that knowledge and innovation needed to be at the 
heart of things and that policies must be put into place to allow businesses to 
create more and better jobs. It was felt that Europe’s actions need more focus, 
that support for change needed to be mobilised and that the Lisbon Strategy 
needed streamlining (Commission 2005).
The relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy was coincidental with an upturn on 
the European economy. This led to a more optimistic outlook and a recogni­
tion that the targets set by the Strategy could be achieved, although the 2010 
objectives look likely being missed, for example with respect to the target of 
3% research and development expenditure (Commission 2006:7). More im­
portantly, the strategy still does not really address the long-term problem of 
very high European labour costs in a globalised world.
From the Treaty of Rome to the Reform Treaty - in Search of the 
Economic Constitution
The Treaty of Rome is now fifty years old and has within it the basis of 
the economic constitution, which governs the relationship between what we 
now know as the European Union and the member states. As time has gone 
on the constitution has been refined by a series of cases heard before the Eu­
ropean Court of Justice such as Cassis de Dijon,1 which was the landmark 
judgement that confirmed that products must be treated the same as domes­
tic production no matter where they came from within the Community. The 
1986 Nouvelles Frontières judgement2 of the ECJ confirmed that competi­
tion rules applied to the air transport sector under Article 85 of the Treaty of 
Rome, which prohibits anti-competitive agreements and actions, and Article 
86, which concerned the abuse of a dominant market position. In addition, 
the Single European Act (signed in 1986 but coming into force in 1987) trans­
formed the basis of the economic constitution by laying down the imperative 
for the completion of the Internal Market.
1 “Cassis de Dijon" case 120/78 judgment of 20.02.1979 ECR 1979, page 649.
2 Nouvelles Frontières-, Joined Cases 209-213/84 [1986] ECR 1425.
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The above changes illustrate the way in which the economic constitution 
has been created. Firstly, they maintain the basis of national sovereignty over 
territory, but at the same time requiring that markets be kept open for those 
who wish to trade freely. For most of the fifty years since the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957, reform has tended to be incremental, with initiatives 
being recycled in order to meet the priorities of the moment. Even the launch 
of Economic and Monetary Union was something which took many years to 
reach fruition from the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union, TEU) 
signed in 1992 to its launch in 1999. Even now, there are only 13 members of 
the Eurozone.
The background to the Reform Treaty is the Constitutional Treaty, which, 
in retrospect, always looked fated to fail given the use of referenda to ratify 
it at a national level. In the case of both France and the Netherlands, domes­
tic political issues deflected much of the campaigns’ efforts towards domes­
tic concerns. The EU’s Reform Treaty could possible succeed, largely because 
it has a more modest nomenclature and may be ratified in a more benign po­
litical environment. However, at its heart is still the notion of the creation of 
a common market/internal market. Increasingly over the decades from the 
launch of the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty in 1957, there 
has been a struggle to agree on the substance of what this involves. The origi­
nal members of the EEC had very different ideas of what this involved largely 
because, despite their common allegiance to liberal democracy and market 
economics, they had different economic systems and were at different stages 
of economic development. However, as Freidrich observed:
“It is possible to deduce from the treaties the regulatory policy 
model of an open social market economy. This is a guiding princi­
ple for economic policy pursued at the national level. The basic regu­
latory policy principles are stable prices, healthy public finances and 
monetary frameworks, a sound balance of payments, and high levels 
of employment and social security” (Friedrich 2002: 2).
The failed Constitutional Treaty is the starting point for the most recent 
attempt to update the economic constitution. The term social market econ­
omy’ had often been used with respect to trying to define the nature of the 
EU’s economic constitution, but had not appeared in Treaty documents until 
the launch of the Constitutional Treaty. Duff (2005) makes the point that at 
the heart of the European Convention (the forum for debating the content of 
the Treaty), there was no agreement about what might be the most desirable 
model for managing the economic constitution. The working group on eco­
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nomic governance chaired by Klaus Hansch seemed divided on traditional 
lines. There was no great momentum to revise the Maastricht Criteria gov­
erning EMU, and the debate about the centralizing of fiscal policy revealed 
the difference between those who were essential centralist and the economic 
liberals such as the UI<. In essence therefore, the contrast between the Rhen­
ish model of social market economy and the Anglo-Saxon model.
In the Final report of Working Group VI on Economic Governance it was 
stated that:
“Some members of the group have emphasised the importance of 
including a reference to sustainable growth and competitivity. Others 
attach more importance to highlighting full employment, social and 
territorial cohesion and progress, and a better balance between com­
petition and public services in a social market economy.” (The Euro­
pean Convention 2002:2).
The Working Group on Economic Governance felt that economic and so­
cial objectives should be built into the Constitutional Treaty, which of course 
was a situation that had existed for some time. What they were not clear 
about was the mix between economic and social factors.
The Reform Treaty, currently going through the ratification process, is not 
the same as the failed Constitutional Treaty, in the sense that it does not at­
tempt to refound the existing treaties, it largely amends existing treaty provi­
sions. Most of its provisions with respect to the economy appear to be doing 
not much more than offer a tidying-up exercise with respect to this phase of 
the EU’s development. Examples of this tidying-up include the formal recog­
nition of the Fisheries Policy and the updating of the chapters of the Treaty 
dealing with EMU. However, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty revealed 
an underlying tension with respect to the adoption of the neo-liberal model 
of economic integration that relies excessively on market forces. The notion 
of what a “highly competitive social market economy” was present in the 
Union’s objectives, as laid out in the Constitutional Treaty, and was retained 
for the Reform Treaty.
Assuming that the Reform Treaty is ratified, the introduction of the 
phrase ‘social market economy” suggests that will be important in main­
taining the social achievements of the EU and the member states. Article 3 
calls for a “...Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stabil­
ity, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment 
and social progress,” and the phrase “free and undistorted competition” was 
dropped from the draft of the Reform Treaty at the Intergovernmental Con­
ference on 21 June 2007 (BBC 2007). Article 5 (3) of the Treaty suggests that 
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the Union may take initiatives to ensure coordination of Member States’ so­
cial policies. Significantly article 9 takes things further by declaring that:
“In defining and implementing its policies and actions, the Union 
shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of 
a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protec­
tion, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, 
training and protection of human health.”
There can be no doubt that the social references were particularly impor­
tant to the French, who had rejected the Constitution Treaty in 2005, partly 
because it was thought to be too market-orientated.
At the Brussels summit in June 2007, the French President Nicolas Sar­
kozy suggested that:
“Competition as an ideology, as a dogma, what has it done for Eu­
rope? It has only brought fewer and fewer people who vote in Euro­
pean elections and fewer and fewer people who believe in Europe.” 
(Gow 2007).
Article 3 of the Reform Treaty sets out the objectives with respect to eco­
nomic aspects of the relationship between the member states and the EU. 
Article 3 (1) suggests the importance of the well-being of EU’s peoples, arti­
cle 3(2) confirms the right to free movement of persons and article 3(3) calls 
for the establishment of an internal market. (This being an essential ongoing 
process which started with the signing of the European Coal and Steel Com­
munity Treaty (ECSC) in 1951 and the EEC in 1957). Significantly, Article 3 
(3) of the Reform Treaty then goes on to call for the:
“.. .sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic 
growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market econ­
omy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment.”
The form of words above is almost identical to that which is to be found in 
the Constitutional Treaty (The European Convention 2003a). An earlier draft 
of the Treaty in February 2003 talked about
“Europe with a free single market, and economic and monetary 
union, aiming at full employment and generating high levels of com­
petitiveness and living standards.” (The European Convention 2003b).
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However, there were amendments proposed to the 6 February draft (The 
European Convention 2003c) where the phrase ‘social market economy’ was 
proposed by a number of delegates. Then by May 2003, the phrase became 
embedded in the Constitutional Treaty (The European Convention 2003d).
The Reform Treaty then makes reference to the promotion of scientific 
and technological advance and economic, social and territorial cohesion, and 
solidarity amongst the Member States. Article 3(4) refers to economic and 
monetary union.
The Reform Treaty negotiations highlighted the role of the European Cen­
tral Bank. Should it become democratically accountable as an institution of 
the European Union? Why would this matter? In one sense it could be ar­
gued that this would simply be part of the démocratisation process, which 
is a substantial part of the EU’s agenda. However, it would represent a blur­
ring of the constitutional guidelines between the EU and the member states. 
In this respect we see that President Sarkozy was in favour of such a develop­
ment because it would make the ECB more sensitive to the need to promote 
economic growth rather than trying to contain inflationary pressures. The 
tough anti-inflation stance of the ECB, with its relatively high rates of inter­
est, had the effect of driving up the value of the Euro against the US dollar. As 
the Euro drifted into the politically sensitive range of €140 to 145 against the 
US$, so the complaints became more intense (Charlton 2007).
The expectations of member states politicians in the case of exchange rates 
can lead them to place their own national interest ahead of that of the over­
all European economy. The EU did not settle who was in charge of exchange 
rates within the Treaties, so this is contested ground. However, controlling 
exchange rates to gain a competitive market is very difficult to do within 
a very open economy. The Eurozone’s main trading partners as a whole are 
with the rest of the EU which is outside the Eurozone. Attempts to avoid the 
consequences of a rising Euro against the US$ simply disadvantage other EU 
members. In this respect, politicisation of the ECB and exchange rate pol­
icy simply runs contrary to established relationships. It is also difficult to see 
where such a policy might be pitched, when we remember that the trade 
weighted value of the Euro was no higher in 2007 than it had been for periods 
of time in the 1990s and in 2004 (Munchau 2007).
Conclusions
The shared competence over economic issues has caused problems for 
the European Union since its launch with the Treaty of Rome. The inter­
dependence between the economies and domestic economic governance 
has meant that progress over such central issues as the Internal Market 
260
PART 2
has been slower than might have been hoped for. The tensions in trying to 
maintain a balance between the economic and social aspects of governance 
are also not new. Whilst the economic objectives of the Reform Treaty ap­
pear to have moved forward little since the adoption of the Nice Treaty, the 
phrase social market economy’ within the Reform Treaty is new and re­
veals once again the problem of trying to ensure that economic aspects of 
the integration do not displace the important social progress that the EU 
has made.
The recovery of the European economy in the middle part of the first de­
cade of the new millennium has been an important stimulus to retain a strong 
link between the economic and the social aspects of governance. However, 
it is difficult to see how, given the diversity of the member states’ economies; 
there can be a true understanding of what the social market is and how it can 
be achieved in any kind of legal sense.
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Debating European Citizenship: Market Citizenship 
and Beyond
With adoption of the Treaty reforming the European Union, also known 
as the Lisbon Treaty, a debate is taking momentum whether the concept and 
substance of European citizenship - one of the least understood and most 
important dimensions of European integration - has been improved to the 
extent that we can clearly see iunctim between a new legal construct and su­
pranational, European civil identity. In order to be able to answer this question 
one should define precisely the scope of the very notion of European citizens­
hip as it has been subject of constant improvement within acquis communau- 
taire and confront this legal narrative with expectations manifested by the ci­
tizens themselves.
It has been frequently emphasised that European citizenship derives from 
a notion of market citizen: a national of a Member State entitled to exercise 
a body of rights and freedoms established by the Community law.1
1 See especially: R. Koslowski, EU Citizenship: Implications for Identity and Legitimacy, [in:] T. Banchoff, 
M. P. Smith, Legitimacy and the European Union, 1999; J. Shaw, The Interpretation of European Citizen­
ship, “Modern Law Review” 1998; J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe. “Do the New Clothes Have 
an Emperor?" and Other Essays on European Integration, 1999.
2 See: Commission of the European Communities, “A People’s Europe: Reports from ad hoc Committee, 
Bulletin of the European Communities”, Supplement 7/85.
But there has always been striving for a much deeper connotation atta­
ched to this legal construct. In the Preamble of the Rome Treaty of 1957 the 
Member States expressed their will to unify the “peoples of Europe”. For that 
reason four fundamental freedoms were installed, namely: free movement of 
persons, services, goods and capital.
The Economic and Monetary Union, in its current form, would be hardly 
imaginable without this catalogue of civic freedoms. On the other hand, one 
should mention a strive for ever closer Union of citizens as one may call 
a number initiatives undertaken by the European Commission as well as re­
presentatives of Member States.
It was in this context that in 1985 Carlo Ripa di Meana, member of the 
Adonnino Committee, coined the idea of introduction of local voting rights 
understood as a “decisive step toward involving the Community’s ordinary 
citizens in their common destiny.”2 In 1990, the Spanish Prime Minister Fe­
lipe Gonzalez advocated the idea of adoption of the new chapter on Euro­
pean citizenship that was to be incorporated into the body of the Treaty 
establishing the European Union. As it has been put convincingly by one of 
the researchers in the field: “In Felipe Gonzales’ terms, introduction of Euro­
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pean citizenship had a both symbolic and legal purpose. Symbolic, because 
European citizenship would have a chance to become an element of the Eu­
ropean consciousness on European integration, thereby fostering a sense of 
belonging to a certain community. This would provide greater political legi­
timacy to the actions of the European Community and thus respond to accu­
sations of a democratic deficit. As regards the legal purposes, European ci­
tizenship granted certain rights to be enjoyed by nationals of the Member 
States - European citizens”3
In its dual form, as proposed by Felipe Gonzales, European citizenship has 
been included into the body of the Treaty establishing the European Union.
The fundamental provision that depicts the essence of European citizen­
ship as expressed in the Maastricht Treaty is formulated in the Article 8, 
which stated that “Every person holding the nationality of the Member Sta­
tes shall be citizen of the Union.” The Amsterdam Treaty amended this provi­
sion by enforcing a principle of complementary status of European citizens­
hip since “The European citizenship shall complement and not replace the 
national citizenship” (art. 17).4
The 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference that elaborated an amended 
version of the Article 8 was inspired by the European Commission Report for 
the Reflection Group, in which one of the chapters was entitled “Heightening 
the Sense of Belonging to the Union and Enhancing its Legitimacy.“
The rationale of European citizenship in light of the Amsterdam Treaty 
was to “deepen European citizens’ sense of belonging to the European Union 
and make that sense more tangible by conferring on them the rights associa­
ted with it”.5
These rights constitute par excellence supranational, that is to say a truly 
European code of civic rights as:
- a right to move and reside freely within the territories of the Member 
States (Art. 18 of the EU Treaty)
- a right to take part in local elections as well as European Parliament elec­
tions guaranteed to every citizen residing in the Member State, other than its 
own, under the same conditions as enjoyed by the nationals of the Member 
State (Art. 19 of EU Treaty)
- a right to diplomatic and consular protection in the territory of a third 
country in which the Member State of which a citizen is not represented, to
See: A. Bodnar, Legitimacy of European Citizenship, [in:] The Emerging Constitutional Law of the Euro­
pean Union, eds. A. Bodnar, M. Kowalski, K. Raible, F. Schorkopf, Berlin-Heidelberg 2003, p. 290.
’ See: Article 17 (ex. 8) of the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Trea­
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be protected by diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State (Art. 
20 of the EU Treaty)
- a right to petition to the European Parliament and right to apply to the 
European Ombudsman (Art. 21 of the EU Treaty).6
6 Ibidem.
1 See: R. Koslowski, op. cit., p. 155.
8 See: F. Palermo, Integration of Constitutional Values in the European Union, [in:] European Constitu­
tional Values and Cultural Diversity, eds. F. Palermo, G. Taggenberg, Bolzano 2003, p. 108.
In light of these provisions it is becoming more evident that European 
citizenship has been constructed to complement member-state national ci­
tizenship by expanding a scope of rights in distinct spheres of public life. 
As Rey Koslowski rightly observed: “This extension of rights creates a diver­
gence between nationality and citizenship - categories that traditionally co­
incide in the context of nation states. This divergence corresponds with the 
co-existence of multiple political identities, national and European. Moreo­
ver, by extending democratic participation, EU citizenship represents a po­
tential source of legitimacy for the integration process as a whole; it is there­
fore more than empty symbolism.”7
However, European citizenship being based upon a code of rights alone 
cannot be acknowledged a sufficient platform for creation of European civil 
identity. There arises a problem of common value system that could be con­
sidered a sine qua non condition for genuine societal and legal recognition of 
a code of European civil rights.
A Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Toward a coherent 
constitutional space within the European Union
Constitutions could be considered the consequence of ideological, thus 
axiological underpinnings as well as political preconditions marking the fun­
damental rules of the social order within a given community. Some legal doc­
trines, especially in Italy, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Germany, identify 
a specific term to describe the constitutional rules aimed at making the ideo­
logical project underpinned by the constitution concrete. Take for instance 
the Italian forma di Stato, Spanish forma de Estado/forma del poder, German 
Staatsform or Austrian Baugesetze/Grundlagen verfassungsmässigen Ord­
nung, etc. Those principles depict divergence between public authority and 
civilian freedom, the correspondence between the goals of the legal system 
and the organisation of public powers that have to implement them. In other 
words, the legal/constitutional system is not only what it is, but also what it 
ought to be. It is the way of being (the Weltanschauung) of the State, thus af­
fecting the concrete exercise of public powers.8
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Taking into account the aforementioned remarks, one can formulate the 
following question: do the recently undertaken reforms of the EU constitu­
tional foundation provide a window of opportunity for collective identifica­
tion of EU citizens as active participants of a European civil society building 
process?
The Preamble. What does it mean to be a citizen of the European 
Union?
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe adopted by consensus 
by the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003 and submitted to 
the President of the European Council in Rome on 18 July 2003 is an outcome 
of extremely passionate axiologically-oriented constitutional debate concen­
trated on the ontological status of values and their identification. The charac­
ter of axiological debate on the essence of European citizenship the European 
Convention has been the forum of, revealed a clash between two distinct per­
spectives: absolute (or cognitional), and relativist (or non-cognitional). The 
debate within the European Convention became an arena of confrontation 
between the proponents of objective nature of moral values deriving from a 
transcendental source: God’s will, and the advocates of cultural determinism 
as framework for conscious and rational human choice within the sphere of 
axiological identity construction. These two perspectives, prevalent within 
European societies, constituted a bone of contention in the process of draf­
ting of the Constitutional Treaty. It was the overwhelming spirit of inclusive 
axiological pluralism and not so much competing value choice perspective 
that prevailed in the European Convention, which opened up room for con­
sensus over the axiological foundations of the Constitutional Treaty. Howe­
ver, one should not overlook a complex process of reaching this consensus 
through matching overlapping sets of values such as for instance:
(a) Christian-democratic (religion, nation, tradition, law),
(b) Liberal-democratic (ownership, liberty, law tolerance),
(c) Social-democratic (labour, equality, tolerance).
A great deal of attention paid by the public opinion to the Convention’s 
debate - seen especially in the accession countries, like in Poland for instance 
- was focused on the problem of reference to Christian values (Invocatio Dei) 
as one of the key sources of European identity. This problem has already been 
addressed in the Polish constitutional discourse in 1997 over the new Con­
stitution of the Republic of Poland. The Preamble of the current Polish Con­
stitution became a subject of a fierce ideological dispute between proponents 
of cognitional and non-cognitional perspectives on the axiological source of 
commonly binding regulations.
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The compromise that was reached in the constitution-making process 
took a form of inclusive axiological pluralism, or an ecumenical Invocatio Dei 
as one may put it. The axiological consensus in this case was built upon the 
recognition that:
“We, the Polish Nation - all citizens of the Republic,
Both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and 
beauty,
As well as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal va­
lues as arising from other source [...]. Hereby establish this Constitution of 
the Republic of Poland as the basic law for the State, based on respect for 
freedom and justice, co-operation between the public powers, social dialo­
gue as well as on the principle of subsidarity in the strengthening the powers 
of citizens and their communities.”9
9 The Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland as adopted by the National Assembly on 2 
April 1997, Warsaw, The Sejm Chancellery 1997.
10 Defining such procedures and competencies within the EU institutional architecture was seen as cru­
cial since the EU citizens want to know what they can expect from various EU bodies. This is especially the 
case of strengthening of the European Commission’s legitimacy. The key question in this context was how 
to elect the president of the Commission and the Commission itself - whether by the citizens themselves 
directly, or by the European Parliament? From the perspective of a legitimacy as well as checks and balan­
ces imperative, it was postulated to choose the president of the Commission on the motion of the Coun­
cil, i.e. national governments, whereas the Commission should be chosen by the European Parliament or 
in direct elections.
Among other arguments expressed in the Polish public discourse concer­
ning the mission of the European Convention and primary goals EU should 
fulfil, it was most often pointed to the following:
- strengthening of self-identification of EU citizens with the common in­
stitutions and values they represent;
- strengthening of both formal and informal legitimacy of the EU;
- reinforcement of public and external security understood as interdepen­
ding spheres of the Union’s competence;
- reinforcement of EU sectoral policies related to advancement of social 
welfare;
- reinforcement of EU international role in economics and politics;
To meet these expectations and goals the EU was expected to:
- clarify in which matters the unanimity of the member states will be nec­
essary, and in which the decisions of a majority will be binding;10
- adopt the European Constitution in the form of the Basic Treaty the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights should be the foundation of;
- adopt a cross-pillar approach to reform of EU institutional architec­
ture aiming at making the second and the third pillar legally binding, which 
should increase their effectiveness;
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- expand a majoritarian voting and cooperation with the European Par­
liament;11
- simplify the Master Treaties in order to make them easily understand­
able for citizens;
- encompass the European Parliament and national parliaments with more 
power to influence decision-making within the EU;
- deepen a subsidarity policy;
- be the Union of “closer cooperation” but not “Europe of different speeds”.
11 The expansion of majoritarian voting was seen as crucial with regard to the false but popular opinion 
that the EU enlargement would undermine its effectiveness. It was argued here that the broader the mem­
bership, the lesser the relative weight of any one member, and thus the lesser the ability to block the deci­
sions of the members. According to this logic, the expansion of majoritarian voting along with the number 
of EU members may very well increase decision-making power within the Union.
The axiological compromise that was reached by the European Conven­
tion with regard to the essence and substance of a Draft Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe was not so much a result of political bargaining as 
in the aforementioned case or in most cases of national constitution-making, 
but a deliberate recognition that a credible axiological foundation of supra­
national, European civil identity can only be obtained by adoption of inclu­
sive perspective on inspiration of European identity construction. It is preci­
sely this mode of reasoning that made the European Convention - inspired 
by Thucydide to legitimately claim that “Our Constitution... is called a de­
mocracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the greatest 
number”. Thus, the constitutional credo of the EU sounded logical when re­
ferring to the following construction...
“Conscious that Europe is a continent that has brought forth civilisation; 
that its inhabitants, arriving in successive waves from earliest times, have gra­
dually developed the values underlying humanism: equality of persons, free­
dom, respect for reason,
Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance 
of Europe, the values of which, still present in its heritage, have embedded wit­
hin the life of society the central role of the human person and his or her in­
violable and inalienable rights, and respect for law [...] (Preamble of the Draft 
Treaty).
Reflecting the will of the citizens and States of Europe to build a com­
mon future, this Constitution establishes the European Union, on which the 
Member States confer competencies to attain objectives they have in com­
mon [...] (Art. 1).
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.
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These values are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination (Art. 2).
When trying to find an explanation for the constitutional compromise 
that resulted in adoption of a Draft Treaty it seems plausible to point to a cer­
tain awareness prevalent among the members of the European Conventions 
that axiological debate over the core values underlying the very nature of Eu­
ropean citizenship cannot be settled by political compromise. The code of 
the European citizenship found its expression in the provisions of the Part 
II of the Draft Treaty. The enumerative catalogue of values attached to Eu­
ropean citizenship was put in the following structure: Dignity (Title I), Free­
doms (Title II), Equality (Title III), Solidarity (Title IV), Citizens’ rights (Title 
V), and Justice (Title VI). Adoption of such a wide catalogue of both ethical 
and praxeological provisions could only be possible by the way of recognition 
of centrality of human individual as a subject of normative constitution-ma­
king. Article II-1 of the Title I leaves no doubt that: “Human dignity is invio­
lable. It must be respected and protected.”
It was precisely this awareness that had already been present in the pro­
cess of drafting the Charter for Fundamental Rights, which - later on - were 
adopted into the body of the Draft Treaty. In the Title VII of the Draft Tre­
aty entitled “Interpretation and application of the Charter” the status of the 
Charter had been settled so that the scope and interpretation of rights and 
principles had been known to the institutions, bodies and agencies of the 
Union. The crucial provisions in this context had been laid down in Article 
11-52, points 2-4, namely:
“Rights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in other 
Parts of the Constitution shall be exercised under the conditions and within 
the limits defined by these relevant Parts (p. 2). Insofar as this Charter con­
tains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and 
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Con­
vention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive 
protection, (p. 3). Insofar as this Charter recognises fundamental traditions 
common to the Member States, those rights shall be interpreted in harmony 
with those traditions” (p. 4).
One can expect certain ideological disputes to continue even after the for­
mal completion of the ratification process of the Reforming Treaty. Thus, the 
European Convention adopted a relativist, non-cognitional approach to con­
stitution-making, which was hoped to provide a wider window of opportu­
nity for axiological consensus.
Interestingly enough, one observed a divergence in the public perception 
of constitutional debate in the new and old EU countries. In current mem­
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ber countries a great deal of attention was paid to political, social and economic 
values attached to civil rights and freedoms, whereas in the new member coun­
tries, in Poland particularly, the focus was mainly on ethical values. This, in it­
self, constitutes the biggest challenge for the citizens of new Europe: how to 
merge the two distant perspectives on the same code of rights and freedoms 
into a single sphere of European civil society? However, it would be wrong to 
suggest that constitution-drafting is influenced solely by values that are ethi­
cal in nature. Other values that are praxeological, political, and economic in 
nature play important roles in constitution-making. The praxeological consi­
derations are designed to ensure that public authority is structured so that it 
functions effectively.12
12 See: 7, p. 65.
Praxeology of European citizenship
The most visible manifestation of the praxeological dimension of Euro­
pean citizenship as defined in the Draft Treat could be found in the catalogue 
of political rights, which had been put in the form of provisions of the Title 
V. The centrality of political rights attached to European citizenship could be 
explained in terms of a constant efforts undertaken by the European Union 
institutions to limit so-called “legitimacy/democratic deficit”. The previous 
code of rights as settled by the Maastricht Treaty with subsequent changes 
had been enriched by the establishment of a right to good administration, 
which guarantees every person ...’’the right to have his or her affairs handled 
impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the Institutions, bodies 
and agencies of the Union” (Article 11-41). The overall code of political rights 
includes: right to vote and stand as a candidate at elections to the European 
Parliament (Art. 11-39), right to vote and stand as candidate at municipal elec­
tions (Art. 11-40), right to good administration (Article 11-41), right of access 
to documents (Article 11-42), right to refer to the European Ombudsman (Ar­
ticle 11-43), right to petition (Article 11-44), right to move and reside freely wit­
hin the territory of a Member State (Article 11-45) and right to diplomatic and 
consular protection (Article 11-46).
As has been already pointed out, the evolution of European citizenship 
that can be observed from the adoption of Maastricht's code of rights until 
the elaboration of a Draft Treaty by the European Convention should be seen 
in light of a permanent striving of the Union to increase its popular legiti­
macy. If legitimacy is defined not exclusively in terms of a lawfulness of pro­
cedure that leads to establishment of democratic political representation, but 
also in terms of societal recognition, then the deepening and widening of the 
European citizenship certainly enhances the legitimacy of the European inte-
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gration process. Let us now consider the legitimacy-building potential of Eu­
ropean citizenship through the analysis of impact that European citizenship 
has on emergence of European demos or European civil society.
European demos, identity and legitimacy
As I have argued already the restructuring of scope and interpretation of 
the European citizenship code in the Constitutional Treaty and more speci­
fically in the Charter for Fundamental Rights may lead to consolidation of 
the European demos or European civil society as one may put it. The result 
of the European Convention diligent work opened up a chance for emer­
gence of European civil identification, in which there co-exist overlapping 
political communities and where there appear many channels of interest 
advocacy within the domain of public governance. It is plausible to expect 
a slow but firm dismantling of the long-lasting symbiosis between the nation­
state and civil identity/loyalty. As Joseph Weiler put it convincingly, the nor­
mative or in that sense constitutive aspect of European citizenship dissolves 
interdependence between citizenship and nationality within the supranatio­
nal constitutional sphere, which in turn leads to establishment of the Union 
composed by citizens, who by definition do not share the same nationality’’13 From 
this perspective, “The substance of membership (and thus of the demos) is in 
a commitment to shared values of the Union as expressed in its constituent 
documents, a commitment, inter alia, to the duties and rights of a civic so­
ciety covering discrete areas of public life, a commitment to membership in 
a polity which privileges exactly opposites of nationalism - those human fea­
tures which transcend the differences of organic ethno-culturalism.”14
13 J. H. H. Weiler, The Reformation of European Constitutionalism, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 
1997, No. 35, p. 119.
14 Ibidem.
15 J. Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe, “Praxis Inter­
national” 1992, No. 12.
Consequently, European citizenship denotes what Jürgen Habermas defines 
as “post-national constitutional patriotism”15 as well as a precise allocation of ci­
tizens’ rights and obligations within the distinctive domains of Member States 
jurisdictions and the body of the Union’s law. Popular identification with the va­
lues embodied in the EU’s constituent documents - in the Charter for Funda­
mental Rights in particular - provides a normative source of legitimacy whe­
reas the complementary source is to be found in day-to-day implementation 
of European citizens’ rights code within the jurisdictional spaces created.
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By way of conclusion, it can be stated that just as the very notion of citi­
zenship was constitutive for the state itself in the Aristotelian times, national 
citizenship was deeply interwoven with the idea of democratic nation-state, 
the emergence of European citizenship symbolises a new understanding of 
democracy in today’s Europe.
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• Professor Manfred Weiss, PhD - Frankfurt University
If I may refer for a moment to today’s judgement, which we get from the 
European Court of Justice on the Volkswagen case: the question which really 
has to be discussed I think seriously referring to all of those freedoms is the 
question of the extent to which protectionist policies are still necessary, and 
how far can the freedoms really be implemented. This is still a tension which 
is very delicate, very problematic, in particular if we integrate in this picture 
the social dimension, the question what about, for example in the case of in­
vestments, takeovers and so on, what about the workers’ side in this picture.
• Professor Harald Kundoch, PhD - Gelsenkirchen University of
Applied Sciences
The Fortress VW, we talked this morning about this word “Fortress” will 
be turned today probably, and I will explain it to you now. The “Fortress” 
means it is a case European Commission against Germany. This is not very 
spectacular in itself, because we have more cases against other big countries 
like the United Kingdom (British Airport Authorities), the Netherlands with 
telecommunication, and also we were talking this morning about Hungary, 
which is a prospective case, not at the moment actually at the court, but it 
will come to this case. Let me first explain the Volkswagen case. Why is it 
a case? In 2002 we had a case against the French company Elf Aquitaine. All 
of the companies I mention are state-held companies, and now going to be 
privatised. So this is the situation. And the essential word for this is “golden 
shares”. In the case against France referring to Elf Aquitaine, this expression 
has been used for the first time. What does it mean? Golden shares means 
that the state has still the possibility to block decisions. Why? We have free 
movement of capital, and equally, as you told us, equal treatment, Chairman, 
every shareholder should be treated equally. But there are some shareholders 
who have double votes, more votes than only the shares they obtained. This 
is quite surprising. The idea is that the state in its mind believes in its special 
responsibility for certain branches, for instance energy, telecommunications,
275
CITIZEN AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
cars (Daimler Benz, the same thing, and now Volkswagen), and in Hungary 
also energy.
Referring back to my speech, it is only the question of Articles 56-60 that 
we have an internal market, but the responsibilities go further, they concern 
also the relations between the companies in the European market with in­
vestors from outside. And who are those investors? What do you think about 
investors from outside? You have heard about Gazprom, the Russian energy 
company, or Chinese companies which with a lot of money who take busi­
nesses over behind the curtains: they keep buying shares and at a certain mo­
ment they have the majority. This is why we have the cases I mentioned, Elf 
Aquitaine, British Airport Authority, and now Volkswagen. We have a special 
Advocate General handling it. All I can tell you is what the lawyers in Ger­
many always say before the court: “at the high sea we are all in Gods hands”. 
This holds true also today. Normally the Court will follow the proposal of the 
Attorney General, who today is M. Damoso Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer.
• Professor Manfred Weiss, PhD - Frankfurt University
I think again we have here the conflict between a sort of protectionism, 
which was defended unanimously by quite a few member states, and the free­
doms which are embedded in the Treaty.
If you remember the referenda in the Netherlands and in France, I was in 
France at that time, and I can tell you that the constitution did not play a role 
whatsoever in the referendum, it was absolutely irrelevant. What was rele­
vant for most people was the question: what does Europe mean socially for us? 
Workers were afraid - it was the time of the first draft of the service directive 
- that the impact might be that they all lose jobs and so on, that people would 
come from other countries and so on.
• Professor Harald Kundoch, PhD - Gelsenkirchen University
of Applied Sciences
Yes, but the question is, do we not have to dig deeper to find what we think 
could be the soul of the project? I will dig deeper, and I refer to Ludwig Er­
hard, I am very proud that my English colleague, Ian Barnes, quoted Ludwig 
Erhard. One of Erhard’s very simple sentences was: Social is when we have 
full employment. When we have full employment, this is social. In my opin­
ion, this is right. But I will come back to social in another way.
When we talk about identity, soul, then we need, and this had not been the 
case, to talk about the European Parliament. The European Parliament - in the 
first beginning of the EU it was named Assemblee Parlementaire, not a parlia­
ment, that’s a difference. And it should be the representation of all European 
citizens. The fact is however that (I was dealing with this topic in 1973, and 
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I worked on the first direct election) we have no common law to elect this par­
liament.
I will focus on two subjects: the soul and the identity. I have got this morn­
ing in your institute this folder. And this is named EuroCulture, and this is 
a very good folder. Culture is one of the symbols. Dennis de Rougemont, a citi­
zen living in Geneva started with this, but also a Polish professor, Jerzy Holtzer, 
who wrote a very important book about the relation between Poland and Eu­
rope. And I could fill another speech with remarks of Jerzy Holtzer. And there 
is a second possibility to achieve identity, after culture, common Euro culture: 
it is sport. I will tell you about a personal experience with the Commission. 
I was responsible in 1989 for the Universiada in Germany, in Duisburg. Every 
two years students from all over the world come to a different place, to Sheffield 
for instance, we were talking about that. And so I asked the Commission in 
a written paper why we had at the Olympic games no common sports team? 
We do not have a common sports team, we have national teams. Universi­
ada is something you have here in the University College, Gaudeamus Igitur. 
This is the answer for the Universiada and what every sportsperson gets when 
they obtain the first place: we hear this anthem. But what has happened now in 
the Reform Treaty? No symbols. Nothing common, European. So this is a step 
back to the nationalised situation. And I apologise, but there are some signs in 
Poland in the previous government which had been also putting more efforts 
into the more nationalised situation. We have this situation, we must keep an 
eye on it, and perhaps this might be a lecture for next time but I think if you un­
derstand what I said, this is in my opinion, the key notes for identity: culture, 
sports and common spirit, and also in this matter I wish you all the best.
• Professor Rolf Grawert, PhD - University of Bochum
The expression “European identity” derives from the Treaty in connection 
with defence and foreign affairs of the European Community, not with the in­
terior of the Union. Therefore the expression “European Community is a vi­
sion”, as you declared. And therefore I may ask, we have as a whole of the 
Union the rights of the citizens, the migration, the living in the EU, education 
(or should it be education?), or - it would be my thesis - the euro? Because we 
had our German soul in the Deutschmark, and therefore perhaps, and we dis­
cussed it very often with French friends, perhaps the euro can become a se­
cret soul, from the euro to the industries and to education and so on. That was 
like the beginning of the community and the Union and perhaps the identity 
will work something like this.
And the last question to the citizenship, and perhaps the next speaker in 
the afternoon can answer this question too, the expression “nationality” de­
rives from the 19th century. And since this time nationality means that a per­
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son is owned by the state totally. They must die for the state, they must give 
everything for the state, but they can expect also what is necessary to live in 
the state: security (now we speak more of security than of defence and liabili­
ties). And therefore my question: what are the bases of this European citizen­
ship, what so to say “intelligent design” is behind this citizenship compared 
to nationality?
• Professor Reiner Arnold, PhD - Regensburg University
Just a short question, although I do not know if the answer could be so 
short. What are the characteristics of an identity, both national and supra­
national identity? In the Reform Treaty and in the Constitution you will find 
a guarantee of national identity, already expressed by Article 6 paragraph 2 
of the EU Treaty, which is now taken over by the Reform Treaty. It is defined 
somewhat, for example the fundamental constitutional structures are part of 
this identity. Could we transfer these ideas, that is to say that common values 
which are of constitutional character which shall be common to the mem­
ber states as well as to the Union, on the basis of Article 6 par. 2 of the Union 
Treaty, are these common values maybe such basic constitutional structures 
which can give in part identity for the EU? Identity by values, so to say. You 
spoke of symbols. The Dutch did not like symbols. Yet possibly the symbols 
are not as important as values?
• Professor Dieter Kugelmann, PhD - Harz University
of Applied Sciences
First question. Citizenship is linked to participation in elections, and to 
Article 17 and 18, the free movement, but what the European Court made 
out of it is a fairly social citizenship, because most of the judgements given by 
the Court concern access to social assistance, which Professor Grawert men­
tioned. So is the definition of citizenship in a European context necessarily 
a social one?
And the other question to Professor Barnes, concerning the economic side 
of it. While you are right, there are a lot of contradictions in the text now, there 
used to be a lot of contradictions in the old text too. So if we read Article 2 now, 
it is more or less the same - still plenty of contradictions. And we live with that, 
and maybe it is a good thing to live with only one world, “social” In Germany 
we only have one word, “social” and the fundamental law and we made out of 
thee two our social system. But that is a decision of politics, not decision of law, 
that is what politicians can afford, or they think they can afford, and perhaps 
that is also the way. So my question: who will decide on this, is it wise to leave it 
to the European Court, to say “The Court will decide what social market econ­
omy means”? The Court will probably be reluctant and we will rely on the com-
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mon market. Or is it just an anchor, a key issue to evolve, a dynamic concept of 
social market which may change with the years?
• Pamela Barnes - University of Lincoln
One of the themes that I noticed coming through the discussion of iden­
tity very strongly has been an emphasis on education. I think what is impor­
tant for us to remember is that in the Laeken declaration the whole reason 
why the Treaties should be reformed, and the reason for our search for a con­
stitution, is that we should make things simpler, more open and transparent, 
and in particular the European Union should become more relevant to the 
young. And we have been talking about education, we are in an education es­
tablishment, yesterday we had speeches which were looking at questions like 
the democratic deficit, I remember one particular phrase, “a common men­
tality of European jurists”, through education, through the way in which we 
open the debate and the discussion about European law. My question is just 
a very quick one: One of the things that I have not noticed during the discus­
sion of our first speaker when he was talking about education and transla­
tional programmes and projects was reference to the Bologna process. I won­
dered to what extent he felt that it would feature in the development of more 
openness for the young?
• Professor Manfred Weiss, PhD - Frankfurt University
We have heard from Professor Kugelmann that citizenship actually is 
linked to the social concept and to the educational concept. I am just com­
ing from a conference on migration in South Africa, and there were mainly 
non-Europeans. And the big worry of these people is what is the impact of 
what we do in Europe. When we are strengthening the concept of citizenship 
in this dimension, what does this mean for non-citizens who might consider 
perhaps one day also going to Europe? May I add this question to you. Please 
start, and then we go around the table.
• Grzegorz Pozarlik, PhD - jagicllonian University
I will try to be very brief. If I understood your questions properly, the 
question concerns the relationship between national and European citizen­
ship. I believe, and this is also a contribution to other questions that are per­
haps related to that, we are now debating the future of democracy in Europe. 
Democracy is being challenged by the very need to redefine its boundaries, 
also social boundaries. That is to say, democracy, as has been rightly pointed 
out in terms of the organic connection between nation and state, democracy 
is now transcending the boundaries of the nation state, and loyalties are be­
ing dispersed. I would say that European citizenship provides a modest but 
nonetheless real chance, an opportunity for adaptation of many aspirations 
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and desires. Many Europeans seem to not find this in the reactions of na­
tion states, Poland included especially. We are now constructing a post-na­
tional state understanding of democracy. Democracy is no longer organically 
bound to the nation state. I would say that we need European citizenship, es­
pecially we need to give the chance to millions of Europeans to get involved 
in decision-making, in creating a European public sphere, for this very pur­
pose: to finally find an appropriate and full alternative, a wide spectrum of 
possibilities to allocated our dispersed loyalties. So I would say, yes, Europe 
is offering a space for multiple identities, local, national, pan-European and 
even global. So once again, the real question is what is the future for democ­
racy, and in Europe this political system is offering a chance to overcome this 
organic, 19th century born concept.
The European Court of Justice and its understanding of citizenship is in­
deed mainly of a social character. Yes, yes. But I would not say that every as­
pect of our life is social. It is also political, economic, cultural. In a way you 
are right saying that the euro is becoming now a common denominator for 
millions of Europeans to call themselves “Yes, we are Europeans” Yes. Ro­
mano Prodi was outspoken in arguing that the euro is now becoming a real 
material denominator of European identity. However, let me refer once again 
to Schuman and Monnet. An ever-closer union of citizens of Europe reduced 
only to common currency is a bit too modest a project. The euro is impor­
tant as a starting point for building a European public sphere, European pub­
lic authority, European public identity. Let me conclude by saying that Euro­
pean citizenship is offering at least a modest window of opportunity to finally 
overcome the boundaries of nation state as the genuine depositary of democ­
racy.
• Professor Zdzisław Mach, PhD - jagiellonian University
Of course it is not possible to give a full discussion in this very short time, 
but let me say a few things. The way I see identity is as a process of construc­
tion of the collective image of who we are. And this can only be done contex­
tually in relation to partners, Others, who give meaning to the relation, who 
give meaning to our own image. It very much matters in relation to whom we 
are building our collective identity. This is what makes it difficult, of course, 
in the European context, to build a collective identity, because the question 
remains who are these Others. Are they the Islamic people, the Chinese, the 
Americans, the Russians?
In the old days it was simple, because whatever other reasons to inte­
grate Europe or the EU or the Communities, the Iron Curtain was a bound­
ary which served as a context-making boundary. There was another Europe, 
in relation to which the European Communities could build their own iden­
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tity as market-oriented, respecting human rights, freedom, democracy and 
so on because there were others. And now we have to find the context or re­
define the context.
As far as national identity is concerned, we know better, because this is­
sue has been studied for generations, and in Europe there are at least two 
different models of national identity, one is based on ethnic identity, com­
mon culture, common heritage, common origin, and the other one is based 
on citizenship, and this other model which I think is much more relevant to 
the project of European identity. It is kind of distinguish conceptually be­
tween nationality and citizenship, like in France, where the French national 
is a French citizen and vice versa. In Poland for example everybody under­
stands the distinction, because we know very well because of our history that 
one can be a Polish national without being a Polish citizen. Of course an eth­
nic model of identity is not suitable for European identity, we cannot do it, 
and even if we could, we should not, I think, because it would be excluding 
others, and if we want to develop further, if we want to build new relations 
with neighbours, and if we want to open up to newcomers, to new members 
perhaps, then we cannot exclude from the start. In fact, the least problematic 
border of Europe is the northern one because there is nobody on the other 
side to whom we say “No, you do not belong any more”.
As I am looking for a soul of Europe, of course I know it is provocative and 
it is not easy, but I think the soul is in mobility, dialogue and negotiation. If 
we define ourselves collectively as a community, then the community is char­
acterised by the ability and intention to negotiate, to undertake dialogue, to 
encourage mobility, not only in the physical sense, but also broadening ho­
rizons, inviting others to dialogue. This makes us much more inclusive than 
exclusive, but also allows us to negotiate values, to negotiate a framework of 
reference. This is essential, because on the one hand nobody is excluded from 
the start because of what one is. The door is open, but it is not so open as to 
say that anybody is European, because you must be able and willing to nego­
tiate and to contribute and to be active. Therefore, I would even be inclined 
to deny European identity to people who have been in Europe for ages as long 
as they think they have the absolute truth and they are not able or not willing 
to open up and not negotiate. And of course I am not going to name names, 
but it would be possible if one wanted to.
Referring to the question about Bologna process, I think this is one of the 
projects that is contributing to European identity, because it is mobility, nego­
tiation, dialogue, it is also looking at oneself from the outside through the eyes 
of the others. It is comparing, but also building something common. It is not 
to replace one’s local or national or different still identity by something else, it 
is negotiating and taking in brackets and seeing one’s own identity, one’s own 
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heritage for instance in the context. And I know it was deliberately done this 
way, but it is also in fact working this way. Millions of students of course take 
part, and this of course is an economic project, but there are many other proj­
ects involved. So yes, this is what I am talking about.
• Professor Ian Barnes, PhD - University of Lincoln
About identity - a really interesting question, actually. Probably like our 
previous speaker, I always knew what the EU was all about, up to that night in 
1989: it had been always about the fact that we were different from what was 
on the other side of the Iron Curtain. And this is really what you were allud­
ing to. I guess it was that kind of certainty where everybody knew: it was about 
East versus West, really quite clear. There wasn’t any big intellectual debate 
about this of the kind that we look at today; we actually knew.
I would like to say two brief things which relate to the economic maters. The 
first thing is steps. Steps. If you look at the sort of economic map of Europe, you 
can see steps. Top of the steps, rich countries. And then you go down the steps 
until you get to the poor lot. Basically I think Europe is being defined by steps 
to a certain extent. We would very happily welcome the Swiss, because they are 
rich, and by the way they are quite good at exploiting others, but we of course 
would not welcome the poor people who live further east. And to a certain ex­
tent you can see it as a kind of overall sense in which the EU defines itself. It is 
not a very comfortable thing to say, and of course there is also political steps 
and so on, but the economic aspect really does matter. And if you look at it as 
a whole, it really strikes you: are they good enough, are they rich enough to join 
us. It is a disturbing fact, we define ourselves very much in economic terms as 
well as in political terms. The only problem is of course that it is not very polite 
to actually say that, and that is a very interesting point in itself. So this is just to 
take things somewhat further.
The second point is about the euro and identity. We have all been about the 
euro in recent times, and one thing you have got to remember is that all the 
stuff that the Treaty says about requiring the new member states to join the 
euro may not come to a very great deal, and just a quick health warning here: 
yes, there is a requirement for new member states to join, but many of them 
will choose not to qualify. Just simply take the Swedish model. The Swedes are 
obliged to join. Yet the fact of course is that as time goes on, less and less peo­
ple feel the enthusiasm.
So it may not be that the euro will become a symbol, because we may not be 
certain that people actually choose to qualify, because although it is a Treaty 
commitment, there is no time set on it, and that again in itself is a very in­
teresting matter. People always ask us “When will the British join the euro as 
a symbol of our European commitment?” It is quite simple, ladies and gen­
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tiemen, we will not. The reason why we will not of course is because if we 
are doing badly, they will not have us, and if we are doing well, we would not 
want to join anyway. Moving on to the issue of what the notion of the so­
cial market economy means in practical terms, and who will interpret it. 
It is quite clear that if you look at the idea of the social market economy, 
back to the years when Ludwig Erhardt was really a genius, he was abso­
lutely extraordinary, he was the finance minister and later the chancellor of 
Germany. His version of the social market economy was very different to this 
that exists in Germany now. And I think what happens with these phrases is that 
they are useful, in that they set a tone, they set a series of ideas, they remind us 
of what the European Union has got to be, it has got to balance a purely eco­
nomic gain and a social responsibility towards the fellow members. On the other 
hand, our ideas will change; at the moment the notion of the social market econ­
omy seems really good because the European economies are doing quite well 
at the moment. What we tend to find is that once the economies go through 
a downturn, as it was 4-5 years ago, you would get a real sense of doubts, and 
then of course this scurrying back to national objectives and then the European 
mission tends to come into fashion again. You can see it to a certain extent even 
now, particularly the French at the moment are going down that line, looking for 
national solutions to things. We already heard about German solutions to things 
as well, and what always strikes me is that it is useful to keep these phrases be­
cause it reminds us that there must be a degree of solidarity within the Treaties 
and within the membership. So, my bet is that social market economy will be 
reinterpreted several times, as it has been already in Germany; it used to mean 
something very substantially different than it does now.
• Professor Manfred Weiss, PhD - Frankfurt University
I will neither take an effort to draw conclusion from what we did this morn­
ing, nor will I comment the different interventions. I only can say, it was 
a real, to come back to your sports picture, it was a real marathon we had this 
morning, with speeches starting from human rights, going through liberties, 
through identities, citizenship, freedom of capital... It really was something 
which, if you look at the different topics, might rather lead to a sort of confu­
sion than to a sort of consistency. But I think everything has shown to be linked 
together and we are talking about what to do after this Reform Treaty with this 
European project. Can we be optimistic, do we have to be sceptical, and so on. 
Now we have a lunch break until 15:30, sharp. When you will be here again, 
you will be relieved; I will not be the chair person, so the democratic deficit will 
be overcome! But please try to be here in time, because we have again quite 
a few speeches and want to have some discussion. Please join me in thanking all 
our speakers of this morning and the participants of the discussion.
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ZBIGNIEW CZUBINISKI, PhD - jagiellonian University
European Citizenship - How Far Can We Depart from 
Member States Nationality?
Usually I prefer to express myself in Polish of course, because that is my 
mother tongue. However, because I have to formulate a couple of provoca­
tive questions to all my British and German colleagues, as well as colleagues 
from other new member states, and because I am a part of the common pro­
ject, which was started two years ago, and there are people from the UK, Ger­
many, Austria and the Czech Republic involved, I will rather express myself 
in English. I would like to present to you only five points, which lead me to 
only five conclusions.
Point number one: during the long process of preparation for EU mem­
bership we were asked to fully harmonise our domestic laws with community 
law, and in addition we were asked also to prepare a draft of the new Polish 
constitution. It was understandable that the contemporary constitution, the 
so-called “small constitution” was not enough, because it actually only amen­
ded a few provisions from the 1952 constitution, which was the constitution 
of the Polish People’s Republic. It simply could not work.
The new constitution was prepared in 1997, it was adopted in April, and at 
that time obviously a majority of my colleagues at home and aboard thought it 
was a wonderful constitution, and actually we had solved all the problems and 
the new law is fully harmonised. It turned out not to be so. Let me point out 
to you a couple of things only. From the beginning, certain aspects were mi­
xed, including terminology, which is extremely import for continental Europe. 
When to use the term “national” and when to use the term “citizen”? In our 
1997 constitution unfortunately those two terms are used interchangeably to 
cover the same meaning. And I will not try to present to you all fourteen rather 
serious mistakes, but I would like to refer to Article 55, which reads: No Polish 
national can be extradited. Later when we were asked to prepare this article
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for the institution of European arrest warrant, it caused us a lot of problems, 
but fortunately, it was solved.
Why did I start with the state level? Simply to find the answer: can we really 
depart, speaking about European citizenship, from state citizenship? I shall 
now take a leap straight to my conclusion, because what I am going to tell you 
is: not really, we cannot depart from it. It is a very gradual process which we 
have to take step by step. We begin with constitutional state level. Later we 
have to go to international public law, international private law, and finally we 
are entering the EU law, which was actually what happened when European 
citizenship was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. What do we have to refer 
to? And what is our source of information, institution and, let us call it using 
Professor Usher from Edinburgh’s terminology, the orientation point?
First of all, how can we classify each individual? Each member state of the 
union provides us with certain terms. But the naming is different. We have to 
define what is a citizen of the state. But on the other hands, in some constitu­
tions we have a kind of equivalent for citizen, which is a national. Another prob­
lem: a resident, legal resident and illegal resident. When we go a step above, 
on a higher level, it is difficult because definitions of a resident are completely 
different in different constitutions of member states. Migrant and immigrant 
- the same story. I tried to compare constitutions from six member states, and 
also I could not find on the constitutional level a common ground. Alien and 
foreigner - the same story. And quite frequently we have suddenly different 
terms such as a person, physical person, and individual, and definitely the last 
category which is not desired by any state, i.e. the stateless person.
Can we find solutions? Yes, we can. We can, in international public law. 
Because as a matter of fact, international public law mentions that the tra­
ditional subject of international public law, that is to say the state, actually 
provides and is supposed to give the full definition for citizens, and further­
more, international law says that it is up to the state to define how we are go­
ing to treat its individuals. Moreover, it was written in the 1933 Montevi­
deo convention that it is also up to the state to determine the scope of right 
and duties for its citizens. There were some controversies, because the best 
method just to classify all individuals went to the states and immediately the 
international community found that in some cases it is not enough, because 
we have the situation that one individual person might be connected with 
two or even more states. So there were some rules to define, because it was 
up to the states to decide and it was the state’s responsibility to take care of 
each individual. So now we have the rules. For instance, the Notebon case, by 
International Court of Justice, when we had a definition of the so-called effec­
tive citizenship, the real legal political and economic bind with the state and 
also not taking citizenship simply by convenience. Furthermore, we have at­
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tempted successfully, and we have several conventions, what to do with pe­
ople who are not lucky, homeless, stateless? So we invented a special kind of 
passport for them, plus also the development of humanitarian law, the Ge­
neva convention, where we find provisions referring not only to citizens but 
also to people without citizenship.
Let me now come gradually to another level, which would be the level of 
international organisation, the level which slowly will lead to the European 
Communities and later on to the European Union. What would be the tur­
ning point? I think that the best example which might be served here is the 
Count Bernardotte case, an advisory opinion expressed by the International 
Court of Justice in 1948, in the case for reparation for injuries suffered in the 
service of the United Nations. Let me just refresh your memory of what hap­
pened: a citizen of Sweden came to Palestine and was supposed to help solve 
certain cases of deaths and problems connected with how to divide Palestine, 
etc. And he was killed. When the family referred to the Swedish government, 
the government declared that it had not sent him there as a civil servant of the 
Swedish government; he was in Palestine as a high-ranking officer of the Uni­
ted Nations. Since this advisory opinion the United Nations finally was trea­
ted as an international entity, it had rights that we call ius tractatus, and also 
the special protection for all individuals working for the United Nations.
This is why it was relatively easy when the Treaty of Rome was introduced 
and later on finally when we had the “international political earthquake” when 
the Treaty of Maastricht introduced European citizenship - because it was in 
fact just to meet wishes of all the European Union countries. Why? Because 
of the different forms of the European identity. And in Europe, actually, and 
that is my question to all of you, I think that we can agree and hopefully it is 
not very controversial, that forms of European personal identity exist on dif­
ferent levels. First, the level of the city, the level of the region, later on defini­
tely identification with the nation state, later on, identification - and it is gro­
wing, particularly what I am observing right now among my students, among 
Poles, among all those new members of the EU - identification with the Eu­
ropean Union. But also, there is another aspect of identity, identification with 
the larger Europe, the whole Europe as a continent. What was the answer for 
all those wishes, all those demands? It was the introduction of European ci­
tizenship.
At the beginning there was no political will to give such a long list of rights. 
And also, because there was such a great demand for such a positive aspect 
of this identity, it was proposed just to cut links between what we have in all 
constitutions, links between rights and duties. So just give only a certain limi­
ted amount of rights. It would be wonderful, and people really would support 
the Union. That is exactly what happened. At first in Article 8, and later on 
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in Articles 17-22, we have a long list of all those wonderful rights. Wonder­
ful rights which are, as a matter of fact, strictly connected with domestic citi­
zenship, with state citizenship, and with state responsibility. Let me mention 
only one. The right to move. Is it not connected with citizenship in a state? 
Later - diplomatic and consular protection. Regulations concerning the right 
to be elected in municipalities where we reside? In any case, it was enthusia-
However, states and also practitioners (and I have to speak partly as a practi­
tioner) were also afraid. Why? Apart from written law, convention law, treaty 
law, we have in the system of the EU also a very important role played by the 
European Court of Justice. The Court in about 20 cases expressed its position. 
Particularly one judgement, concerning the so-called Micheletti case, was re­
ally dramatic. In brief, what was the case about? It was an Argentinean who 
moved to Italy, he was not so successful economically but he gained Italian ci­
tizenship relatively quickly. Later he moved to Spain and in Spain he was tre­
ated as an illegal alien. Spain wanted to expel him. He proved that he had Ita­
lian citizenship and according to European law Spain has absolutely no right to 
expel him. However, the Spanish authorities claimed that he had obtained Ita­
lian citizenship in a manner which was not fully legal. Who has the authority 
to determine legality of citizenship, and how each individual may obtain citi­
zenship in another member state? The Court said clearly that it is only up to 
a member state to determine how, when and in what time an individual obtains 
citizenship. Other states, and also according to European law, they have sim­
ply to accept that. In some countries there were a lot of worries, because they 
noticed that they had to grant privileges, but had no influence on what other 
countries, and also those newcomers to the EU, did with their state citizens­
hip. That was problem number one. Problem number two which I am going to 
point out briefly was that with political rights, there was also another couple of 
judgements, making European citizenship a gateway for social benefits. Other 
member states have to accept legally and provide a legal status to European ci­
tizen. They are not only obliged to provide full political rights, but also social 
rights as well. That was a real problem.
In spite of all the difficulties, which were quite significant, there were some 
achievements. The greatest achievement is simply what we call in one phrase 
Schengen acquis. In spite of some minor difficulties it is a great achievement. 
Visa policy strictly connected with state security. Common asylum policy, 
which causes problems, but nevertheless is something good. What I think is 
an achievement of the Polish delegation is that we can speak about identity 
and we can speak about common points for European identity in the policy 
of the new neighbourhood, towards countries in the vicinity. And that was 
done: common policy towards residents from third countries.
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Time for conclusions. Conclusion number one. I believe that writing down 
the idea, the concept of European citizenship is still in statu nascendi. And it 
should rather follow, I would rather say follow a few steps behind, what is go­
ing on with the mainstream of the EU law. Number two: this concept of rights 
and duties which is always in each state constitution for the citizen should be 
also transferred to the EU. It should not only privileges, rights, without du­
ties. Another point which I would like to make quite clear: responsibility. We 
cannot develop more rights for European citizens without giving responsi­
bility to the EU. Otherwise we will be at a loss. Another point: jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Justice. It plays a very important role, but can put 
member states in a very difficult situation, and in a couple of cases created 
more controversy than it solved. And the last comment is that at the current 
stage of European integration, the concept of European citizenship is still de­
eply rooted in the state tradition and it requires institutional experience and 
also legal solutions both from domestic law and from international law.
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Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the European 
Constitutional Debate
Introduction
One of the fields of European integration most affected by the constitutio­
nal reform has been the area of freedom, security and justice. The commitment 
to abolish the pillar structure of the European Union was widespread, while the 
question how to translate the actual provisions on justice and home affairs into 
a new constitutional/reforming treaty gave rise to a lively discussion. The re­
sults of constitutional debate, from the European Convention to the IGC 2007, 
have confirmed the strong political will to reinforce the fundamental rights of 
EU citizens, introduce new forms of parliamentary scrutiny and strengthen the 
legal and institutional framework for the EU area of freedom, security and ju­
stice. Despite the importance of these changes, this paper puts forward the 
argument that the constitutional reform could bring about relatively limited 
practical changes to EU policies in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
Moreover, some provisions of the Reform Treaty may have a negative impact 
on the capacity and efficiency of cooperation in the area of freedom, security 
and justice and may further encourage the Member States to transfer most ad­
vanced forms of common actions outside the European Union.
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice - a brief description
The Maastricht Treaty on the European Union erected a three-pillar edifice 
of European integration whose third pillar comprised various forms of coope­
ration in justice and home affairs. Many of them had existed much before 1992 
and their inclusion into the new organisation was a kind of cosmetic surgery. 
That face-lift of cooperation in justice and home affairs had obvious conseque­
nces for the nature of the third pillar and the overall balance of EU policies. The 
third pillar was a strictly intergovernmental area where the EU Member States 
kept their sovereign right to decide upon their home affairs and judicial coope­
ration, as well as regulate migration flows and safeguard their national borders. 
EC institutions had not much say in those matters and any progress of coope­
ration depended on consensus among the Member States.
In 1995 seven of the EU Member States abolished their internal borders 
and allowed for free movement of their citizens and legal third-country na­
tionals across their territories. The emergence of the so-called Schengen area 
was a great leap forward since persons staying within this area could tra­
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vel freely without border controls, yet at the same moment new advanced 
forms of visa, asylum, police and judicial cooperation were put into motion. 
The most impressive element of the Schengen structure was a huge compu­
ter network called the Schengen Information System, gathering lots of per­
sonal and material data and checking them against delivered items (alerts’). 
Obviously enough, the Schengen version of cooperation in justice and home 
affairs made a considerable difference in comparison with limited and mea­
ger results in the EU third pillar.
Such an incompatibility and in a sense perplexity of justice and home coo­
peration provided the inspiration to enact the Amsterdam reform. Although 
the Amsterdam treaty reforming the European Union was intended to im­
prove the functioning of numerous policy fields, its provisions concerning ju­
stice and home affairs were controversial. First of all, a relatively simple and 
transparent structure of third-pillar cooperation was replaced by a multi-le­
vel asymmetrical and entangled cross-pillar construction in an “area of free­
dom, security and justice.” Provisions relating to free movement of persons 
were transferred to the Community pillar, although full communitarisation 
of immigration, visa, asylum and other policies related to free movement of 
persons was placed under 5-year quarantine. The third pillar was reduced to 
police and criminal justice cooperation. The strength of Community institu­
tions was much bigger, although in the third pillar still limited due to the un­
animity principle in the Council, “national security clauses” and special ar­
rangements in decision-making and jurisdiction of the ECJ. The Schengen 
acquis was inserted into the framework of the European Union, although its 
provisions were granted special autonomy. Since the communitarisation of 
free movement of persons was opposed by the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Denmark, the Amsterdam treaty established special derogations, the so-called 
opt-outs, for the three Member States, allowing them to opt in with respect to 
secondary law in immigration, asylum, visa, border control and civil justice 
policies. Adding a special Schengen association agreement of Norway, Ice­
land and - more recently - Switzerland, as well as Council decisions concer­
ning Irish and British participation in some parts of the Schengen acquis, one 
could feel lost in this complex and entangled legal and institutional constru­
ction of the EU area of freedom, security and justice.
Step forward, step back...
Evidently, the need for simplification and legal-institutional rearrangement of 
that area has been well visible in the developments of EU reform since the Laeken 
European Council. A special Working Group X had been formed in the Euro-
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pean Convention1 and worked out a set of important proposals,2 of which many 
were struck out by the Member States during the 2004IGC. Overall consent on 
abolishing the pillar structure of the Union went together with the Member Sta­
tes’ reservations concerning specific cooperation fields in the third pillar matters. 
Regardless of particular stipulations voiced by some of the Member States, the 
Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe (the ‘Constitutional Treaty’) for­
mally abolished the three pillars and replaced them with a single legal and insti­
tutional framework. Hitherto ‘horizontal’ forms of cooperation and - quite often 
- policy shifts were given up as well. The treaty gave the principle of primacy of 
EU law constitutional sanction, and strengthened the role of the European Par­
liament, admitting at the same time national parliaments to some forms of scru­
tiny over certain aspects of EU internal security policy. A ‘solidarity principle’ 
was introduced in order to better share by the Member States costs and respon­
sibility for managing migration, controlling borders and preventing terrorism. 
The incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,3 confirming the right 
to freedom and personal security, to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States, to asylum, to protection of personal data, and containing 
principles of proportionality and ne bis in idem in criminal justice, was another 
novelty.4 Yet formal abolition of the pillar structure was partially undermined by 
special provisions concerning first of all internal security matters, especially po­
lice cooperation and criminal justice.5
1 See Final Report, doc. CONV 426/02.
2 British opt-out and Polish unilateral declaration would significantly limit the scope for the Charter.
3 The list of the most relevant innovations includes:
- Legal integration of the area of freedom, security and justice (formal scrapping of the third pillar);
- Increased parliamentary control on the supranational (European Parliament) and national levels (national 
parliaments);
- Strengthening of the European Court of Justice;
- Binding character of the Charter of Fundamental Rights for EU institutions, bodies and agencies as well 
as for the Member States;
- Evaluation by the Council of the implementation of the Union policies in AFSJ by Member States' au­
thorities with the view of full application of the principle of mutual recognition;
- Principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility regarding free movement of persons;
- Optional establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office.
4 See J. Monar, Justice and Home Affairs in the EU Constitutional Treaty. What Added Value for the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice’?, “European Constitutional Law Review” 2005, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 226.
5 The ‘Reform Treaty” was signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007 as the Treaty of Lisbon amending the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community.
Despite the importance of these changes, this paper puts forward the ar­
gument that the constitutional reform could bring about relatively limited 
and practical changes to EU policies in the area of freedom, security and ju­
stice due to the following factors:
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1) Minor changes to legal measures and decision-making procedure,
2) Continuity in legal effects of old’ third-pillar acts,
3) Upholding of the general ‘national security’ clause,
4) Emergency brakes in policing and criminal justice,
5) Institutional orchestration,
6) ‘Protocolarisation’ and opt-outs.
Ad 1) The present Community legal instruments will replace the wide range 
of measures applied in the area of freedom, security and justice. Regulations 
and directives should predominate in the legislative output of EU institutions. 
It would not make difference in policies relating to free movement of persons, 
subject to the first-pillar ‘hard’ instruments since 1999. Likewise, it should not 
bring about significant change in the now third-pillar legislative toolbox. For 
a couple of years the most frequently adopted, feasible and relatively efficient in­
strument has been a framework decision. There is a widespread belief that they 
are just a mirror of directives: binding as to the result to be achieved upon each 
member state to which it is addressed yet leaving to the national authorities the 
choice of form and methods. Convention, the strongest legislative measure in 
the third pillar, is practically dead. The last convention adopted by the Council 
was the 2000 Convention on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. In a si­
milar vein new ‘decisions’ would have the same binding force as ‘old’ decisions 
adopted by the Council to issues of a more narrow, specific nature.
The Reform Treaty upholds the Community method, renaming it ‘ordi­
nary legislative procedure’. This procedure is valid in Chapter IV of the Tre­
aty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in the area of freedom, 
security and justice, however with some exceptions of certain areas where 
measures are taken in accordance with a special legislative procedure, i.e. 
following unanimous decision by the Council after consulting the European 
Parliament. That ‘special legislative procedure’ to:
- measures concerning passports, identity cards, residence permits or any 
other such document;
- minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences and 
sanctions in the area concerned;
- regulations on establishing a European Public Prosecutor's Office from 
Eurojust;
- decision to extend the powers of the European Public Prosecutor's Of­
fice to include serious crime having a cross-border dimension;
- measures concerning operational cooperation between police, customs 
and other specialised law enforcement services;
- conditions and limitations under which the police, customs and other 
specialised law enforcement services of the Member States may operate in 
the territory of another Member State.
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As far as measures concerning family law with cross-border implications 
are concerned, the Reform Treaty allows for a ‘passerelle’ consisting in apply­
ing ordinary procedure to certain aspects of family law following unanimous 
decision by the Council after consulting the European Parliament. Interest­
ingly enough, national parliaments shall exercise control over any extension 
of ordinary procedure to family law.
Although legal migration, currently governed by unanimous voting in the 
Council, would be put under ordinary procedure, the Member States would 
nonetheless keep the right to determine volumes of admission of third-coun­
try nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek 
work, whether employed or self-employed.
Ad 2) A new protocol on transitional provisions, adapted from the Con­
stitutional Treaty, provides that the legal effects of the acts of the institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies adopted on the basis of Title VI of the Treaty on 
European Union prior to the entry into force of the Reform Treaty shall be pre­
served until those acts are repealed, annulled or amended in accordance with 
the Treaty. As Steve Peers rightly concludes: “This clause would mean, for in­
stance, that third pillar measures adopted before the entry into force of the Re­
form Treaty (or at least, Decisions and Framework Decisions) have no direct 
effect.”6 The recent case C-119/05 Lucchini Siderurgica7 confirms that.
6 S. Peers, EU Reform Treaty analysis 1: JHA provisions, August 2007, downloaded from: http://www.sta- 
tewatch.org on 25.07.2007.
7 Case C-119/05 Ministero dell’Industria, del Commercio e dell’Artigianato v. Lucchini SpA, formerly Luc­
chini Siderurgica SpA, Official Journal of the EU C 211, 8 September 2007, p. 3.
Ad 3) Starting from the Schengen Convention of 1990 and the Maastricht 
treaty, cooperation in justice and home affairs was subject to ‘national secu­
rity clauses’ entitling the Member States to adopt measures to safeguard in­
ternal security and public order and to reinstitute national border checks at 
internal borders.
The Reform Treaty preserves those clauses. According to Article 4 TEU, the 
European Union shall respect “essential State functions, including ensuring the 
territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding 
national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility 
of each Member State”. New Article 66 TFEU confirms that the provisions on 
the area of freedom, security and justice “shall not affect the exercise of the re­
sponsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance 
of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security”
Likewise, the politics of internal security may be exempted from the ju­
risdiction of the ECJ. According to Article 240b TEU, in exercising powers 
regarding the provisions on police and criminal justice the Court of Justice 
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“shall have no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of opera­
tions carried out by the police or other law-enforcement services of a Mem­
ber State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member 
States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguard­
ing of internal security.” The draft Treaty upheld thereby restrictions imposed 
on the ECJ from the outset of justice and home affairs cooperation in the 
EU. Moreover, under pressure from some Member States, the Reform Treaty 
introduced transitional period of five years after the entry into force of the 
Treaty before the European Court of Justice can extend its jurisdiction over 
measures of EU judicial cooperation in criminal matters introduced prior to 
the ratification of the Treaty. Hence the powers of the ECJ under the present 
Title VI of the TEU shall remain the same, including where they have been 
accepted under Article 35 (2) TEU.8
8 Any Member State may accept by a declaration the jurisdiction of the ECJ to give preliminary rulings on 
the validity and interpretation of framework decisions and decision, on the interpretation of conventions 
and on the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing them.
’ See S. Garcia-Jourdan, Le traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe: quels apports pour la coopé­
ration judiciaire et policière en matière pénale?, R.A.E. - L.E.A. 2003-2004, No. 3, p. 380.
Ad 4) Since the Reform Treaty decides to enshrine police cooperation and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the single legal framework and or­
dinary legislative procedure, the Member States secured “emergency brakes” 
in especially sensitive areas of that cooperation.9 This is a classical sover­
eignty safeguard introduced into EU law under pressure from some Mem­
ber States afraid of too deep penetration of EU norms and rules into their na­
tional criminal justice and police systems.
This mechanism, in relation to the approximation of criminal laws and 
regulations of the Member States, is as follows: Where a Member State re­
presented in the Council considers that a draft directive would affect fun­
damental aspects of its criminal justice system, it may request that the draft 
directive be referred to the European Council. In that case, the ordinary le­
gislative procedure shall be suspended. After discussion, and in case of a con­
sensus, the European Council shall, within four months of this suspension, 
refer the draft back to the Council, which shall terminate the suspension of 
the ordinary legislative procedure. Within the same timeframe, in case of 
disagreement, and if at least nine of the Member States wish to establish en­
hanced cooperation on the basis of the draft directive concerned, they shall 
notify the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission accordin­
gly. In such a case, the authorisation to proceed with enhanced cooperation 
shall be deemed to be granted and the provisions on enhanced cooperation 
shall apply.
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The ‘emergency brake’ may be used with regard to minimum rules of judi­
cial cooperation concerning:
• mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States;
• the rights of individuals in criminal procedure;
• the rights of victims of crime;
• any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council has 
identified in advance;
• definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly 
serious crime with a cross-border dimension such as: terrorism, traffi­
cking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, 
illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corrup­
tion, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organi­
sed crime.
Another variant of ‘emergency brake’ refers to the situation of the lack of 
consensus in the Council necessary to adopt a proposed measure. It provi­
des for the possibility of a group of Member States applying a ‘flexibility’ pro­
cedure. In the absence of unanimity in the Council, a group of at least nine 
Member States may request that the draft regulation be referred to the Euro­
pean Council. In that case, the procedure in the Council shall be suspended. 
Next the above-described procedure applies. This kind of‘flexible emergency 
brake’ is applicable to a regulation concerning the establishment of a Euro­
pean Public Prosecutor's Office and to measures concerning operational coo­
peration between the police, customs and other specialised law enforcement 
services of the Member States.
Ad 5) Coordination within the Council of the post-Maastricht third pil­
lar cooperation between the Member States in the organisational framework 
made up of working groups and committees had been the task of the Coo­
rdinating Committee (so-called K.4 Committee) whose competencies were 
defined in Article I<.4 TEU. Post-Amsterdam AFSJ was covered by the wide 
range of working groups, high-level groups, expert groups, committees and 
networks. The strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum 
(SCIFA) was responsible for the ‘communitarised’ cooperation while the Co­
ordinating Committee (CATS) continued to be in charge of police and judi­
cial cooperation in criminal matters.
The Reform Treaty upholds a coordinating body though limits the area of its 
activities to internal security matters. Without prejudice to Coreper’s preroga­
tives, a standing committee shall be set up in order to ensure that operational 
cooperation is promoted and strengthened within the Union as well as to faci­
litate coordination of the action of Member States' competent authorities. Re­
presentatives of the Union bodies, offices and agencies concerned (like Europol 
or Eurojust) may be involved in the proceedings of this committee.
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What draws our attention in the Reform Treaty is the enhanced position 
of the European Council as institution of the EU. Heretofore, the European 
Council has been entitled to provide the Union with the necessary impetus 
for its development and define the general political guidelines. The Reform 
Treaty highlights the strategic role of the European Council.
According to the proposed provisions, the European Council would keep 
providing necessary impetus and define general political guidelines (article 
9b TEU) but moreover “The European Council shall define the strategic gu­
idelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, 
security and justice” (article 62 of a new TFEU). That “legislative and opera­
tional planning” may confirm the strategic role of the European Council, not 
only in the context of long-term strategic programs of strengthening and de­
veloping cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice, but also in 
regular quarterly practice of its meetings.
The European Council acting unanimously seems to be the additional go­
vernmental institution guarding the guardians of the Treaties and watching 
over sovereignty of the Member States.
In the context of sovereign rights of the Member States, we have to stress 
that the member states retain a right of initiative in police and criminal justice 
co-operation alongside the Commission, which enjoys a monopoly of initia­
tive under the community method. To be sure, the right of initiative would no 
longer be exercised on an individual basis, in order to avoid free riding and 
unreasonable legislative proposals surging next in the Council, it would be 
a collective initiative of a quarter of the Member States.
Ad 6) The Amsterdam treaty had introduced to the then established area of 
freedom, security and justice special regulations stemming from reservations of 
some Member States about communitarisation’ of policies regarding free move­
ment of persons as well as the decision to insert the Schengen acquis into the EU 
legal framework.
Numerous protocols attached to the main text of the Treaty brought about 
further differentiation of AFSJ and special treatment of certain Member States 
whose derogations from some parts of the TEC were approved and given nor­
mative sanction.
The draft Reform Treaty makes no changes to the practice of ‘protocolari- 
satiori except for minor technical amendments. The JHA-related protocols (on 
the Schengen acquis, on British and Irish opt-out from Title IV TEC and Danish 
opt-out from most of Title IV TEC, on asylum for EU citizens, on British and 
Irish border controls, on the external competence over border controls) are still 
annexed to the Treaty.
The most important new derogation concerns the UI< and Ireland as well as 
Denmark which got a new opt-out from any individual proposal regarding poli-
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cing and criminal law. Therefore, adding the present opt-outs of the three Mem­
ber States, they managed to extend derogations to the entire AFSJ.10
10 Denmark’s opting out does not include some provisions on visa policy (common visa list, single visa format).
11 S. Carrera, F. Geyer, The Reform Treaty & Justice and Home Affairs. Implications for the common area of 
freedom, security & justice, “CEPS Policy Brief” No. 141, August 2007, p. 2.
12 M. den Boer, Crime and Constitution: a Brief Chronology of Choices and Circumventions, “Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law" 2004, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 143.
13 W. Wagner, Guarding the guards. The European Convention and the communitisation of police co-oper­
ation, “Journal of European Public Policy” 2006, Vol. 13, No. 8, p. 1230-1246.
Final remarks
The Reform Treaty in a sense is a step back, since it acknowledges nume­
rous sovereign competencies that the Member States retain in their internal 
security policies and gives them wider room for manoeuvre in the field of in­
ternal security outside the legal and institutional framework of the EU. CEPS 
experts Carrera and Geyer pose a slightly rhetoric question: “did we scrap the 
pillars only to construct a ‘mosaic’ (a ‘patchwork’) in the Areas of Freedoms, 
Securities and Justices?’11 Monica den Boer, referring still to the Constitutio­
nal Treaty, considered it the ‘proof of the lack of vision about the long-term 
objectives.”12
Indeed, the complex and entangled EU area of freedom, security and ju­
stice as erected in Amsterdam would after the present reform of the Treaties 
still be as complicated as before, with new provisions having in some cases 
a retrogressive effect. For instance, widened parliamentary scrutiny may disco­
urage Member States from sensitive undertakings in the field of internal secu­
rity, border management and migration. Introduction of a specific ‘emergency 
brake’ in some areas of judicial cooperation in criminal matters makes any 
progress in this area hostage of Member States.
Another evidence of the lack of progress in the third pillar area, or even 
false meaning of advancement in this field, is the arrangement of prerogatives 
and power of Europol and Eurojust. The role of both major EU bodies invol­
ved in internal security cooperation was kept limited to being an information 
clearinghouse and a coordinator of national activities in a support capacity. 
The question of assignment of operational powers to Europol indicates insur­
mountable barriers to a qualitative advancement in EU internal security coope­
ration. A commitment to endow Europol with operational powers was already 
present in the Amsterdam treaty. The Reform Treaty does nothing else than re­
peat this promise. Instead, national parliaments were tasked with the political 
monitoring of activities of Europol. Although some experts see this proposal as 
an example of exception clauses advocated by the proponents of intergo- 
vernmentalism,13 we would rather consider it another brake restraining in 
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the name of national sovereign interests further practical collaboration un­
folding on transnational level.
The logic of the reform in the area of freedom, security and justice is quite 
perverse. It seems that it could reinforce the tendency to develop novel forms 
of justice and home affairs cooperation outside the EU. The Reform Treaty ex­
plicitly acknowledges the opportunity to launch and develop certain forms of 
cooperation outside the Union. “It shall be open to Member States to organise 
between themselves and under their responsibility such forms of cooperation 
and coordination as they deem appropriate between the competent depart­
ments of their administrations responsible for safeguarding national security” 
(article 66a draft TFU). Variable geometry of internal security cooperation 
between the EU Member States is thereby sanctioned. The gap between inter- 
governmentalism and communitarism cannot be closed overnight.
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Fundamental Social Rights in the German Constitution 
and in Community Law - Equivalent Rights?
Constitutions tend to be more than symbols; in the case of fundamen­
tal rights, they also have to provide means for the balancing of conflicting in­
terests. In recent years it has become clear that, as a consequence of its role 
in protecting the fundamental freedoms, it will be up to the European Court 
of Justice to outline and define certain social rights - even in the absence of 
a binding constitution and community charter of human rights. The following 
paper will try to show what this may mean for the interrelationship between 
national constitutions and Community social rights.
/. Fundamental social rights in German law
The German Social Model has many specific features, such as the famous 
Mitbestimmung and codetermination by Works Councils. One of the most 
characteristic features of this model may be the coexistence of codetermina­
tion at the shop floor level and autonomous collective bargaining at the in­
dustry level. The constitution protects the latter. The German Constitution 
protects miscellaneous fundamental social rights and sets out the basic pil­
lars for collective bargaining, but does not provide a complete picture of the 
German social model.
The basic pillars are found in Arts. 12 and 9 (3) of the Constitution. Art. 9 (3) 
provides the constitutional basis for the freedom of association, and which 
has been interpreted as including the right not to join an association; this ar­
ticle also protects the autonomy of collective bargaining.1 Art. 12 protects 
the freedom of professional and wage-earning activities, thus guaranteeing 
a certain core of entrepreneurial freedom. Based on these rather barren pro­
visions, the Federal Constitutional Tribunal as well as the Federal Labour 
Court, in the course of extensive case law, have been trying - and overall 
succeeding - to strike a balance, reconciling these rights and establishing 
a more complete picture of collective autonomy.2
1 Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) 24 May 1977, BVerfGE 44: 322; BVerfG, 27 April 1999, BVerfGE 
100: 271.
2 See, for example, the overview Dieterich gives in Erfurter Kommentar, 7th ed. 2007, Art. 9 GG.
The following is a summary of the basic features of this system of rights pro­
tection. The German constitution most notably protects the autonomy of the 
social partners in collective bargaining and industrial action. Collective bargai­
ning between the social partners is characterised by a high degree of autonomy, 
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free of interference by the state, with the legislator’s competences being restric­
ted to regulating the procedural framework.3 One recent and important exam­
ple: The decision of the Federal Labour Court of 24 April 20074 adopted and 
specified an interesting aspect of this collective autonomy. This case concerned 
a strike against a company which had declared an intention to relocate part of 
its production. The trade union that called for the strike had demanded nego­
tiations on its claim for a comprehensive social compensation plan. The com­
pany considered the compensation claim as prohibitive, and viewed the strike 
as being directed against the relocation itself (a trade union leaflet calling for 
the strike and arguing against the relocation contributed to this standpoint). 
Nevertheless, the Federal Labour Court confirmed that it was not the task of 
a court to assess the level of claims made in collective bargaining; the strike was 
legal to the extent the objective of the claim was compensation.
3 Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) 24 May 1977, BVerfGE 44: 322; BVerfG, 27 April 1999, BVerfGE 
100:271; BVerfG, 3 April 2001, BVerfGE 103: 293.
4 Federal Labour Court (BAG) 24 April 2007, 1 AZR 252/06, Der Betrieb (DB) 2007:1924.
5 BAG 28 March 2006, 1 ABR 58/04, Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis (AP) No 4 § 2 TVG Tariffähigkeit.
6 BAG 21 April 1971, Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis (AP) No 43, Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf BAG 5 March 1985, 
Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis (AP) No. 85, Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf; BAG 12 January 1988, Arbeitsrechtliche 
Praxis (AP) No. 90, Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf; BVerfG 26 June 1991, BVerfGE 84, 212; Zachert 2001a: 401.
7 Zachert 2000; Zachert 2001 overviews; see also Schiek 2005; Bercusson (ed.) 2006; Däubler 1999.
On the flip side of collective autonomy are, first of all, the strict requirements 
imposed on trade unions that want to participate in collective bargaining. As 
a legal requirement for collective bargaining, employee associations must de­
monstrate a certain amount of social power and capacity to exercise pressure.5 
Second, the Federal Labour Court, backed by the Constitutional Court, firmly 
links industrial action to collective bargaining. Any industrial action that is 
not aimed at supporting a collective bargaining claim is considered illegal. As 
a consequence, strikes that are not supported by a trade union as well as strikes 
protesting dismissals and political strikes are considered illegal.6
2. Fundamental social rights in community law
Community law has increasingly acknowledged fundamental social rights. 
The spectrum and content of these rights accounts for three main pillars: so­
lidarity and collective rights, individual rights, and a referral to international 
conventions signed and ratified by all the member states - with international 
conventions most importantly guaranteeing free association, collective bar­
gaining and collective industrial action.7
The right of collective bargaining and industrial action is enshrined in Art. 
28 of the Community Social Charter, while Art. 27 guarantees workers’ rights 
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to information and consultation within the undertaking. In comparison with 
the German Constitution, the rights enshrined in the Community Social 
Charter are far more specific and extend beyond collective bargaining, inclu­
ding the right of individual employees to information and consultation.8 Art. 
29 to 31 of the Community Social Charter also sets out a further set of indi­
vidual rights, such as the right of access to a free placement service (Art. 29), 
the right to protection against unjustified dismissal (Art. 30) and the right to 
working conditions which do not compromise the health, safety and dignity 
of workers (Art. 31).
8 Zachert 2001:1045.
9 The Charter is not legally binding.
10 Zachert 2000.
11 Case C 438/05 (Viking, AG Maduro’s opinion was delivered on 23 May 2007); Case C 341/05 (Laval/ 
Vaxholm; AG Mendozzi’s opinion was delivered on 23 May 2007; before these cases, see also ECJ 21 Sep­
tember 1999 (C-60/96, Albany), E 1-5751; more on Albany, Brentjens und Drijvende Bokken: Blanke 2000: 
28; Bruun/Hellsten 2001: 63.
The Community Social Charter of 1989 is not the only instrument that 
provides a paralegal9 basis for the European social model. According to Art. 
136 (1) of the EC Treaty, “the Community and the Member States [had] in 
mind fundamental social rights such as those set out in the European Social 
Charter [...] and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social 
Rights of Workers”. Art. 6 (2) of the EU Treaty refers to the European Conven­
tion on Human Rights as well as the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States.10
Although there are a variety of legal grounds to be considered, the legal 
quality of these rights is not yet clear, since none of these legal instruments 
are binding under Community law. This is becoming increasingly problema­
tic. There are a growing number of cases before the European Court of Justice 
that address the question of the exact nature of the relationship between fun­
damental freedoms and social rights. While fundamental freedoms (such as 
the freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide services throughout 
the Community) are essential and judiciable rights upon which the common 
market is founded, social rights are not given the same legal protection. Ca­
ses of conflict between fundamental freedoms and social rights are, thus, al­
ways hard cases.
The next cases relating to this issue, which will be decided by the ECJ, are 
the Viking and Vaxholm cases.11 In both of these cases, industrial action was 
taken in accordance with Finnish or Swedish domestic law. However, since 
these claims concerned a company planning a transnational relocation of an 
undertaking or workers, the action affected the company’s freedom of estab­
lishment or freedom to provide services.
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Rightly, the Advocates General in the Wh'wgand the Vaxholm cases upheld 
social rights in the face of a possible conflict with the fundamental freedoms 
of the common market. I agree with them insofar as they state that “the right 
to associate and the right to collective action are essential instruments for 
workers to express their voice and to make governments and employers live 
up to their part of the social contract.”12 We cannot build a legitimate legal Eu­
ropean order without social rights capable of compensating for certain conse­
quences of the application of the fundamental freedoms.
12 AG Maduro, 23 May 2007, Case C 438/05 (Viking), § 60.
3. Possible conflicts?
One strong argument for the fundamental legal relevance of collective rights 
in community law is Art. 6 of the EU Treaty. According to paragraph 2 of this 
provision, “the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms [...] and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, as general principles of Community law.” The assumption 
underlying this provision is basically a correct one: social rights and, primarily, 
collective social rights arise from the constitutional traditions of the Member 
States; and, in a way, these traditions are common to the Member States.
However, it is a mistake to deduce that the Member States will define the 
scope and content of these social rights in similar ways. This was one of the 
main reasons why collective industrial relations were excluded from the com­
petence of the European Community under Art. 137 (5) of the EC Treaty. Al­
though those rights may be equivalent in substance, diverging interpretations 
are possible. This is also true of the various legal instruments at the European 
level: They represent similar and functionally equivalent Member States’ tra­
ditions on one side and diverge in text and content on the other side. Advo­
cate General Mengozzi had to put great effort into interpreting each of these 
instruments as forming a coherent basis for European social rights. In the 
light of the supremacy of Community law over national law, conflicts and di­
verging interpretations of equivalent rights in national law and Community 
law are particularly problematic.
a) Reconciling fundamental freedoms with the exercise of fundamental 
social rights
Differing interpretations of equivalent provisions in Community law and 
in national law occur particularly in the area of industrial action. The Viking 
and Laval cases, which are still pending before the ECJ, are good examples 
of the interpretative questions at issue in this area. At the heart of these ca­
ses lies the need to strike a fair balance between the fundamental social right 
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to take collective action and the freedom to establish and provide services. 
The application of the fundamental freedom of movement guaranteed in the 
Treaty must be reconciled with the exercise of fundamental social rights.13 In 
such cases, the question arises as to which criteria and tests should be applied 
for an industrial action that conflicts with a fundamental freedom. The tests 
employed by the European Court of Justice are bound to shape the scope and 
limits of transnational industrial action in Europe.14
13 AG Mengozzi, 23 May 2007, Case C 341/05 (Laval/Vaxholm), § 85.
14 See Körner 2007.
15 My italics.
16 AG Maduro, 23 May 2007, Case C 438/05 (Viking).
17 My italics.
18 AG Mengozzi, 23 May 2007, Case C 341/05 (Laval/Vaxholm).
19 My italics.
20 See above footnote 4.
The Advocates General in the Viking and Laval cases have presented two 
different approaches that could be applied in such conflicts. Advocate Gene­
ral Maduro in the Viking case holds that Art. 43 EC Treaty precludes a coor­
dinated policy of collective action taken by a trade union or an association of 
trade unions if this has the effect of partitioning the labour market15 or impe­
ding the hiring of workers from certain Member States to protect the jobs of 
workers in other Member States.16 7
Advocate General Mengozzi, in the Laval case frames this issue by asking 
whether the collective action is motivated by public interest objectives.11 In ad­
dition, he wants to apply a test of proportionality and demands from the na­
tional courts in this context:18 When examining the proportionality of the col­
lective action, the national court
should [...] verify whether the [conditions the trade union had de­
manded] involved a real advantage19 significantly contributing to the 
social protection of posted workers and did not duplicate any iden­
tical or essentially comparable protection available to those workers 
under the legislation and/or the collective agreement applicable to 
the service provider in the Member State in which it is established.
These tests put the level of a trade union’s demands under legal scrutiny, 
and in doing so clearly diverge from the German Federal Labour court’s deci­
sion on a strike for a compensation plans to be established by collective bar­
gaining.20 In the German context, autonomy of collective bargaining means 
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that courts must respect those demands put forward by a trade union in the 
context of collective bargaining. The Federal Labour Court explicitly ackno­
wledges that demands in the context of collective bargaining have to serve 
different goals, among them political mobilisation of members. The courts 
may not question an organisation’s political aims.
The difference between the opinions of the Advocates General and Ger­
man law, in this context, is an important one. However, such diverging inter­
pretations of equivalent rights to industrial action are not easy to identify - 
and even harder to reconcile.
b) The scope of a negative right of association
My second example concerns the “negative right of association.” The Ger­
man Constitutional Court has had various opportunities to affirm this right 
on the one hand, and to establish limits on the other.21 One feature of the 
German interpretation of the right to associate includes the right not to join 
an association. Here, a distinction has been made between membership in an 
organisation and subjection under a collective agreement. One of the most 
important effects of membership in an employers’ association in Germany 
is the members’ participation, through the association, in collective bargai­
ning and their undertaking to be bound by any collective agreement conclu­
ded by the association (Art. 4 (1) Tarifvertragsgesetz - Collective Bargaining 
Act). However, while membership in a social partner organisation typically 
entails subjection under collective agreements, this is not true for the con­
verse position.
21 BVerfG, 11.07.2006, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2007, 51.
The ECJ, on the other hand, has also recently ruled in the Werhof case that 
freedom of association, as part of the Community legal order, entails a right 
not to join an association or union. This case concerned Article 3 (2) of Di­
rective 98/50 amending Directive 77/187 on transfers of undertakings. The 
ECJ was asked to determine the meaning of a contractual clause that refer­
red to a collective agreement after the transfer and in a situation where the 
transferee was not a member of the employers’ association that had conclu­
ded the agreement. The ECJ rejected the claimant’s argument that the clause 
must necessarily be ‘dynamic’ and referred to collective agreements conclu­
ded after the date of transfer of the undertaking. The terms and conditions in 
the collective agreement were only binding until the date of its termination or 
expiry, or the entry into force or application of another collective agreement. 
An important argument in this case was the negative right of association: “If 
the ‘dynamic’ interpretation [...] of the contractual reference clause [...] were 
applied, that would mean that future collective agreements apply to a trans­
feree who is not party to a collective agreement and that his fundamental 
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right not to join an association could be affected.”22 In contrast to the German 
Constitutional Court, the ECJ did not make a distinction in the case between 
membership in an organisation and subjection under a collective agreement.
22 ECJ 9 March 2006 - C-499/04 (Werhof), E 1-2006, 2397; Stafford 2006.
23 ECJ 9 March 2006 - C-499/04 (Werhof), E1-2006, 2397 (Art 11 is one of the fundamental rights which, 
in accordance with the Court’s settled case law, are protected in the Community legal order, as is stated 
in Article 6(2) EU).
24 European Court of Human Rights, Sigurjonsson v Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A, No. 264; 
Gustafsson v Sweden, judgement of 25 April 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1996-11: 637.
25 European Court of Human Rights, Sigurjonsson v Iceland, judgement of 30 June 1993, Series A, No. 264, § 35.
4.The process of designing fundamental rights of the Community
a) Legal sources and inspirations
The Werhof decision is interesting for still another reason. In its decision, 
the ECJ not only refers to Art.ll of the European Convention for the Protec­
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to support its decision;23 it 
also invokes decisions by the European Court of Human Rights, which estab­
lished the right not to join an association.24 There are good reasons for this, as 
the Convention is, first of all, a binding legal instrument, and second, the only 
instrument explicitly mentioned in Art. 6 (2) of the EU Treaty.
However, upon closer examination, the European Court of Human Rights 
itself in the Sigurjonsson v Iceland decision recognised a negative right of as­
sociation by referring to a range of instruments of international law (e.g. Art. 
20 (2) of the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
as well as Art. 11 (2) of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social 
Rights of Workers of 1989, which provides that every employer and every 
worker shall have the freedom to join or not to join professional organisa­
tions or trade unions). Accordingly, the court found that Art. 11 of the Euro­
pean Convention must also be viewed as including a negative right of asso­
ciation.25 We see the ECJ referring to the ECHR for an interpretation of the 
Community Charter, and the latter referring back to the Commnunity Char­
ter: We could call this a circular argument, or we could also view it as coo­
peration. In any case, the reciprocal references contribute to the creation of 
a core of rights, which, at times, appear to be quite independent from the spe­
cific legal sources, with the European Court of Justice juggling to find an ade­
quate balance between these sources in the Community legal order. This is 
inimitably expressed by the Advocate General Mengozzi in his opinion of the 
Laval case, when he states:
Even though, in terms of international instruments, [Art 6 (2) EU 
Treaty] mentions only the European Convention for the Protection 
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of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [...], its wording is in­
spired by the case law of the Court of Justice to the effect that that 
Treaty has ‘special significance,’ in order to enable the Court to iden­
tify the general principles of Community law. The Court is entitled, in 
so doing, to draw inspiration26 from instruments for the protection of 
human rights other than the ECHR.27
26 My italics.
27 AG Mengozzi, 23 May.2007, Case C 341/05 (Laval/Vaxholm), § 64.
28 For example: ECJ 9 March 2006 - C-499/04 (Werhof), E 1-2006: 2397, § 32.
29 See also Buckel 2007.
One important instrument providing inspiration in this regard has always 
been the Community Charter of Fundamental Rights, which the European 
Court of Justice regularly (and rightly) takes into account when interpreting 
community law.28 Advocate General Mengozzi has declared:
Admittedly, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is not a legally bin­
ding instrument. However, the Court has already emphasised that its 
principal aim, as is apparent from its preamble, is to “reaffirm rights as 
they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and inter­
national obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty on Eu­
ropean Union, the Community Treaties, the [ECHR], the Social Char­
ters adopted by the Community and by the Council of Europe, and 
the case law of the Court [...] and of the European Court of Human 
Rights.”
Drawing upon this range of instruments also affords the court some flexi­
bility when interpreting each of these provisions.29
b) Inspiration from the Member States?
However, what role do national legal systems, the “common constitutio­
nal traditions” and national fundamental social rights play in this game? How 
far do they inspire and should they inspire the interpretation of community 
rights?
In this vein, I will only briefly outline the German perspective. European 
and community law increasingly inspires German law. However, as far as so­
cial rights are concerned, the German Federal Labour Court almost exclusi­
vely refers to the European Social Charter of 1961. The German Federal Labour 
Court has taken the European Social Charter into account when delivering de­
cisions on the right to industrial action. When filling lacunae of the law and es­
tablishing the limits of industrial action, the German labour courts are bound 
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to have regard for the European Social Charter.30 For example, in light of Art. 6, 
No. 4 of the European Social Charter, the German law on the right to strike 
has been questioned, thereby restricting the right of trade unions to strike by 
only permitting such action in the narrow context of collective bargaining.31 
This year saw the first decision in an industrial action case, in which the co­
urt explicitly modified its former position on solidarity strikes and secondary 
industrial action, using the European Social Charter as a basis for its ruling. 
According to the German Federal Labour Court, it would not be in accor­
dance with Art. 6 No. 4 of the European Social Charter to restrict the right 
to strike to the only company and branch where the collective bargaining has 
occurred.32
30 BAG 12 September 1984, 1 AZR 342/83, BAGE 46: 322; BAG 10 December 2002,1 AZR 96/02, BAGE 
104:155.
31 Council of Europe’s ministerial committee, 3 February 1998, published in Arbeit und Recht (AuR) 1998:156.




36 AG Mengozzi, 23 May 2007, Case C 341/05 (Laval/Vaxholm), § 77.
In view of the supremacy of Community law and the binding character of 
the European Social Charter, influencing between domestic legal orders and 
the community order tends to be one-sided. However, important arguments 
back the view that Community social rights law should only be developed by 
taking into account the social rights granted in the Member States’ legal or­
ders. One argument supporting this position is that national legal systems 
are far more specific and experienced with possible conflicts between social 
rights and entrepreneurial freedoms.33
Second, according to Art. 137 (5) of the EC Treaty, the Community still 
does not have full competence to support the activities of the Member States 
in the fields of pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to 
impose lockouts. The striking disparity between the activities of the Euro­
pean Court of Justice and the development of a European social order calls 
for a new approach to the question of competence and acknowledgment of 
Community social rights34, but also calls for a restoration of the comparative 
method.35 That is why I would not subscribe to the following statement in Ad­
vocate General Mengozzi’s opinion in the Laval case.36 Regarding the consti­
tutional traditions of the Member States, he is
not of the view that they must be examined exhaustively, in view 
of the fact that [...] the Charter of Fundamental Rights, although not 
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binding, is principally intended to reaffirm the rights resulting from 
those traditions.
But the Charter is still in need of interpretation and concrétisation, and 
this task cannot be accomplished without regard for the legal systems of the 
Member States, at least in the area of social rights.
A third reason for the necessity of taking close account of the domestic le­
gal orders in the area of social rights is that the ECJ has repeatedly affirmed 
that community law is to be interpreted according to its own logic, indepen­
dently of equivalent provisions in national constitutions. In the Fogasa de­
cisions, in particular, the ECJ reaffirmed the binding nature of the ECJ’s in­
terpretation of the general principles of equality and non-discrimination in 
Community law. Member States are bound by these interpretations “even 
when the national rules at issue are, according to the constitutional case law 
of the Member State concerned, consistent with an equivalent fundamental 
right recognised by the national legal system.”37
37 ECJ 12 December 2002, C-442/00 (Rodríguez Caballero); ECJ 16 December 2004, C-520/03 (Olaso 
Valero); ECJ 7 September 2006, C-81/05 (Cordero Alonso); Kocher 2007.
38 Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) 11 July 2006,1 BvL 4/00, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 
2007: 51. The Court builds on the decisions confirming the constitutionality of the community law’s su­
premacy (BVerfG 22) October 1986, BVerfGE 73: 339 (“Solange IF'); BVerfG 12 October 1993, BVerfGE 
89:155 (“Maastricht”).
39 Preis/Ulber 2007; Kocher 2007. See also Classen 2007: 60 f.
40 See doc. CONV 258/02.
Recently, the German Constitutional Court implicitly affirmed the same 
principle of coexistence side by side without direct interferences.38 When 
a German court considers a particular rule as contrary to a fundamen­
tal right, which is established as a Community fundamental right as well as 
a German constitutional right, national courts now have the discretion to de­
cide if they will refer the case to the European Court of Justice for a prelim­
inary ruling - or if they prefer to refer to the Federal Constitutional Court. 
Thus, diverging interpretations of equivalent rights are explicitly acknowl­
edged. The German courts, in the case of equivalent rights, are competent 
to choose between the European Court of Justice and the Federal Constitu­
tional Court.39
Therefore, there are many reasons to reinstate the comparative method in 
the interpretation of fundamental social rights - and help avoid the common 
constitutional traditions falling apart from the developing European consti­
tution.40
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DISCUSSION
• Professor Jo Carby-Hall, PhD - The University of Hull
I would just like to comment on Dr Eva Kocher’s intervention, and Pro­
fessor Arnold, you have also touched upon the subject. You were talking, Dr 
Kocher, about the Laval case, and the Viking case, which are very import ca­
ses to be judged by the European Court of Justice. It is interesting to see that 
in the industrial action stage, there are a lot of things that have come out of 
this case which are very important, especially to the UK where we do not 
have a written constitution. We are one of the few countries that do not have 
a written constitution. We have a constitution, but it is not written down. There 
are other documents and that is about it. When it comes to industrial action, 
most of your constitutions give a right to strike, or a right to take industrial 
action short of a strike. We do not have this right, we have a freedom, whate­
ver that means, and there are four areas which come out of the Laval case: first 
thing is political strikes, they are prohibited under our freedom to strike. Se­
condly, we have very strict procedures, perhaps stricter than in the rest of the 
EU member states, as to how we can go on strike, and if we do not follow these 
procedures, we have an illegal strike which makes the union liable in tort, in de­
lict. So that is the second perspective. The third perspective is that we are not 
allowed to take secondary industrial action; I cannot sit down and explain it be­
cause that would be a lecture. Secondary industrial action is not allowed. Indu­
strial action must be between the employer and the trade union in dispute, to 
put it very briefly. And lastly, to support an action in a foreign country is also 
illegal. We have no constitution on that, we do have laws on that. And what 
I am worried about: because we are very strict on industrial action laws, what 
I am worried about is that it looks as though the European law will have an ef­
fect eventually, not at this stage, on British law, and we may have to change our 
laws. I would like to ask Dr Kocher what is the situation in Germany: do you 
think that these two cases will have an effect on German law?
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• Professor Dieter Kugelmann, PhD - Harz University
of Applied Sciences
My question goes to Dr Gruszczak, concerning his sceptical view of the 
progress we are making in the area of freedom, security and justice. I shall try 
to attack a little bit your scepticism. In my opinion it is not as bad as you think 
it is. Already in the Treaty of Amsterdam I think there was no cross-pillar 
construction, I think it was a one-pillar construction, meaning that the emi­
gration and asylum policy is completely shifted to the first pillar: applicabi­
lity of the community method, applicability of legislation, Commission, Par­
liament and so on. So that is what we have and that is what works. And now 
about changes. You talked about the public order clause. In my opinion it will 
probably not be applied, just like in the past, it was never applied as far as 
I know, so it will not really be a problem for the progress of a closer policy 
in this area. And I also would say it is not probable that states like in Schengen 
will hop over to a construction of treaty law. The Reform Treaty is of course not 
a revolution, but we have never seen revolutions during the European integra­
tion. Still, in this area there is progress, because originally the whole system 
stems from the pillar construction, from the inter-governmental side, and 
now I think what is happening is evolution towards the community method, 
even if we have this brake system, but this emergency brake system is a system 
within the organisation of the institutions, within the institutional frame, be­
cause it is the Council finally who has to take the decision. So in the end, what 
I am really trying to ask is whether your scepticism is legitimate?
• Professor Rolf Grawert, PhD - University of Bochum
I have a special question to Mr Czubinski. The European citizenship: is 
it functional citizenship like in private international law, or better to be ful­
filled in a political sense as a basis of something equal to the state commu­
nity? Second, also to you, how does the citizenship of the union influence 
the scope and elements of nationality and national citizenship? For instance, 
can - I will not say here Poland - but can Germany nationalise all people of 
Greenland, or of China, we have a very good connection with the Chinese, 
I think there is two billion of them or something: is it possible? Or could the 
courts of the other member states say “no“? Therefore, is there not in citi­
zenship of the Union a new element of community? What if the Court has 
to decide who the Union may protect against third states? A new decision in 
a new Notebon case will be necessary, or a regulation or something like that, 
or an opinion, to have an effective Union citizenship, or to prevent states 
from doing whatever they want?
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• Zbigniew Czubiriski, PhD - Jagiellonian University
Professor Grawert, thank you very much for two very important que­
stions. Actually before I try to answer the first one, I would like to tell you 
something. I participated in the Hague Conference on International Private 
Law, representing the Polish Ministry of Justice. Later I wrote a report and I 
was strongly criticised, because the question was: what is the position of the 
EU? And it was a convention concerning some items connected with civil 
law procedure. And I said there were three positions: the position presented 
by the person who represented the Commission, the position represented by 
the person who came from the European Parliament, and we have also had 
a member of the European Parliament whose opinion was completely diffe­
rent from the two previous ones. So far in international private law we are 
looking for special linkage between two legal systems, right? So it could be 
residence, domicile, or citizenship. And we are in this process of gradual uni­
fication of European international private law, it is not yet ready, so still we 
are operating just like in the classic international private law.
The second question, should we have something like the Notebon case 
in the EU system? I think I share entirely your point of view: there is a need 
for it. Because so many years ago when I was studying consular law, I never 
thought that we would have something like marriage of convenience in Poland, 
but we have now, and it is on the increase. Plus we have some people coming 
here establishing businesses, and asking for a quick pass to Polish citizenship. 
And when a year ago I expressed my opinion in a small article published in the 
Polish Journal of International Public Law, that as a matter of fact we will not 
have a problem with German minorities in Poland from the legal point of view, 
due to the fact of European citizenship, so all those other aspects connected 
with minority status from another member of the EU are solved.
But I have a question, and I ask you for a short comment: both of us, both 
our nations, we have a problem, because you have Germans living abroad in 
third countries and you have a very specific regulation in your law concerning 
citizenship. And we have this problem, we are now working on a new law on 
citizenship, and we have quite many Poles living abroad, and I am thinking of 
the countries created on the territory of the former USSR. So far, let me tell 
you in brief, the problem is partially solved. We introduced a new law about 
“karta Polaka”, identity card of a Pole, by which means we are giving rights to 
nationals, citizens of a third country, and to some extent, I am sorry to say be­
cause we have the goodwill, we are acting partly against regulations of Euro­
pean law stemming form the primary source, European law. How to solve it? 
I do not know, so I am asking you: how did you solve this in the German le­
gal system?
313
CITIZEN AND HUMAN RIGHTSAND LIBERTIES
• Artur Gruszczak, PhD - Jagiellonian University
I am just wondering what this constitutional reform, the treaty reform is 
for. And I guess it is for making the EU more efficient, more citizen-frien­
dly, more transparent and more governable in the sense of making decisions 
and enforcing them. And I would not totally agree with you: let me keep my 
sceptical position on this. Because first of all, I have been talking about the 
area of freedom, security and justice, which is a whole range of different po­
licies, form of cooperation and even some external linkages, external forms 
of coordination, going to such issues as global migrations, like trans-national 
crimes, activities of cross-border criminal gangs or organisations, and let us 
say the global war on terror, however we take this concept and this politi­
cal process. So the community method of the ordinary legislative procedure 
which is defined in this Treaty is not the same as the community method in 
the present EC treaty. Moreover, the present community method is only a sum 
of policies on migration, asylum, visa or judicial cooperation in civil matters. 
It did not manage to grasp the whole range of issues which were defined in the 
treaty, there are some exceptions, like internal legal migration, like some aspe­
cts of asylum policies, and some question of civil law like family law.
Moreover, there are some issues which cannot be just closed within the 
community method, they are still horizontal or cross-pillar, like for example 
the problem of securitisation of migration policies or securitisation of mi­
grants, or just the question of preventing and fighting terrorism, which invol­
ves a lot of different measures, like detention of telecommunications, which 
now were put on the Directive, which is the community measure, some se­
cond pillar undertakings, in different forms like military surveillance of elec­
tronic space, trying to eavesdrop on some data transmitted among potential 
or real terrorists, and there are different third pillar measures, like police coo­
peration, like judicial cooperation.
My other point was that we have witnessed a strong tendency to shift 
some areas of cooperation outside the EU, to launch some initiatives outside 
the legal and institutional framework of the Union. Why is that? Well, be­
cause this cooperation in internal security matters for example, attempts at 
constructing internal security governance in the EU has been heretofore in­
effective, or not as effective as was expected, because of certain deadlocks in 
this legal procedures, especially at the level of working groups, expert com­
mittees, so it seems like those “epistemic communities” in the case of security 
polices were too much in conflict, couldn’t work out a common approach, 




That is of course a question of the very concept of security, security is not 
a one-dimensional concept, this is a kind of a Moebius’ strip, inside and out­
side, a holistic concept, so dividing it into foreign security or security po­
licy identity in the second pillar and in the third pillar is a little bit artificial, 
and that goes into the practical moves, it really involves just operations or 
some undertakings of special bodies or secured agencies, which every mem­
ber state just has in its institutional framework.
The last remark: how to measure progress in this area of freedom, secu­
rity and justice? In the number of acts approved by the Council or in the co­
decision procedure? In the number of hits set to the Schengen Information 
System, number of Europol employees, which are now about half a thousand 
people working for what? Sorry for asking these questions, but what does Eu­
ropol do in this matter, comparing to Helmut Kohl’s famous “European FBI”? 
Europol would have to be the European criminal police, but it is nothing like 
that. This is the so-called “data police”, or just a clearinghouse.
• Eva Kocher, PhD - University of Hamburg
Well, there is only one question I have to answer, but in fact it is not easy 
to answer, it is about the effects of the Viking and Vaxholm cases on Ger­
man law. It has already had some effects, the discussion about these cases of 
conflict of fundamental freedoms and social rights has already had the ef­
fect of kind of renaissance of the European Social Charter, the Council of 
Europe’s European Social Charter of 1961. It is interesting that these events 
have shown that you cannot have a legitimate legal order with fundamental 
freedoms if you do not establish complementary social rights. So it has be­
come clear that even without a constitution, without the Reform Treaty, with 
only the community charter at hand, the European Court of Justice will have 
to develop some kind of functional constitutional rights. So that these cases 
will have to develop some kind of rules on conflicts of these rights.
In the German context the renaissance of the European Social Charter has 
led to some effects already, I would say. It is very indirect effects. You said in 
the UK the freedom to strike is quite limited in certain aspects. I could say it 
is also limited in the German context with the constitutional right to strike. 
Possibly the fact of a written constitution existing may not be the decisive fac­
tor, I am not sure about that. We have this prohibition of political strikes, no 
strikes without a trade union, very strict limits on secondary action or soli­
darity strikes, and the strict limits on solidarity strikes, already broken down 
now in a decision of July this year, where the federal labour court used the Eu­
ropean Social Charter explicitly as an important argument to modify the ju­
risdiction. So this is one indirect effect I think, but an important one.
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The second possible effect is the decision on the Vaxholm and Viking ca­
ses. If you look a little bit closer at the Viking case, you will see that it is a pa­
rallel one to the one that the federal labour court decided in April this year. 
The decision of April this year, the German decision, was on a case of relo­
cation of business within Germany. The Viking is on trans-national reloca­
tion of business. And the German decision of April 2007 has just established 
some quite clear rules on the criteria that you use if you have to assess a strike 
against this kind of relocation, emphasising the autonomy of collective bar­
gaining. The Viking decision will be a decision establishing some rules; there 
may be a different rule for strike against national relocations and strikes aga­
inst trans-national relocations, and it will create problems, so there will have 
to be some kind of communication.
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Parliamentary Supremacy: a British Perspective
/. Introduction
Limitations of space do not allow for a full discussion, analysis and evalua­
tion of a very important doctrine, namely, “Parliamentary Supremacy” which 
is fundamental to the British constitution. Taking into account these limi­
tations, it has been decided to treat in a brief manner the former European 
Union Constitutional Treaty, now replaced by the Reform Treaty of October 
2007. The discussion on that topic should provide the European legal frame­
work of the principle of “primacy” of European law over British law in speci­
fied fields only.
There will then follow a brief discussion on the meaning of the doctrine of 
Parliamentary Supremacy, British style.
Following some background notions and an explanation of “monism” and 
“dualism”, the step-by-step development of the primacy of European law over 
British law (and other Member States’) laws, will be analysed through the Eu­
ropean Court of Justice’s judicial pronouncements in its jurisprudence.
So as to show the legal basis of the primacy of European law over British 
law in specified fields, an analysis will take place of a key British Act of Par­
liament.
This will be followed by an evaluation of the relationship between Euro­
pean Union law and British law on supremacy. The key question will be asked 
and answered on whether or not the primacy of European Union law impinges 
upon the supremacy of the British Parliament. The consequences of the Brit­
ish European Communities Act, 1972, will then be briefly treated.
Some concluding thoughts will follow.
Before plunging into this programme, it is important to define what is 
meant by the title of this work, namely “Parliamentary Supremacy” and con­
trast it with the word “sovereignty” Authors and judges often use the expres­
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sion “Parliamentary sovereignty”1 rather than “Parliamentary supremacy”. Al­
though the two expressions appear to be synonymous, it is submitted that they 
are not! The word “sovereignty” is more relevant to territorial disputes or is­
sues, such as the issue between Spain and the United Kingdom over the sov­
ereignty of Gibraltar, or the dispute between Argentina and the United King­
dom over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands or, as termed by Argentina, 
the Malvinas. T.R.S. Allan, on of the power and resilience of positivism talks of 
the “...separation of legal from political principle”. He states that “...The polit­
ical notion of the ultimate sovereignty of the electorate must be distinguished 
from the legal doctrine of legislative supremacy; the courts owe their allegiance 
to the latter and recognise no “trust” between Parliament and the people.”2
1 E.g. Professor, Sir Neal MacCormick, [in:] Questioning Post Sovereignty, ELR 2004, p. 852 talks of “sover­
eignty"; T.R.S. Allan, The Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty, “Public Law” 1985, p. 614; The Hon. Sir John 
Laws, Law and Democracy, “Public Law” 1995, p. 74; H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, where he talks of 
“sovereignty of Parliament” or “Parliament is sovereign” 1961, p. 145-146; R.E.V. Heuston, Essays in Consti­
tutional Laws (2nd ed., 1964),who talks of “Sovereignty" as a legal concept; Marshall, Constitutional Theory 
(1971) who talks of “sovereign Parliament” and “the Sovereign... is the British Parliament” particularly at pp. 
42-43; H.W.R. Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, “Cambridge Law Review" 1955, p. 172; Lord Pearce in 
Bribery Commissioner v Ranasinghe [1965] A.C. 172 (JCPC) talked of the legislature being “sovereign”. Sim­
ilarly, The Lord President Cooper in MacCormick v Lord Advocate [1953] S.C. 396 in the Scottish Court of 
Session, Inner House talked of “unlimited sovereignty of Parliament”; V.C. Megarry in Manuel v Attorney 
General [1983] Ch. 72 (Ch.D) talks of Parliament’s “sovereign power”. H.W.R. Wade, Sovereignty - Revolu­
tion or Evolution?, 112 L.Q.R. 1996, p. 568. T.R.S. Allan, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Law, Politics, and Revo­
lution, 113 L.Q.R. 1997, p. 443.
2 In Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty, “Public Law” 1985, p. 614. See also Dicey, quoted by T.R.S. Allan 
who expressed the same sentiment. He said “The judges know nothing about the will of the people except 
in so far as that will is expressed by an Act of Parliament” Although this differentiation has been made be­
tween political “sovereignty” and legal “supremacy”, Allan appears not to have understood the distinction he 
clearly makes! On numerous occasions, the learned author uses these two words as being synonymous by 
talking of “Parliamentary sovereignty”!
3 (2004) O.J. C 310 Art. 1-6.
For the avoidance of any doubt, the preferred expression, namely “suprem­
acy” will be used in this work. Where a quotation is used which contains the 
word “sovereignty” then this word will be used for purposes of authenticity.
2. The former Constitutional Treaty and the Reform Treaty
on supremacy
The Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe, which is now in the 
waste paper basket of history, provided that the “Constitution and law ad­
opted by the Union’s institutions in exercising competences conferred on it 
shall have primacy over the law of the member states.”3
It will be noticed that Article 1-6 of the Constitutional Treaty expressed 
clearly the principle of supremacy of European Union law, but that “suprem­
acy” was, and is, limited to the European Union not operating ultra vires its 
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sphere of competence.The word “competences” in Article 1-6, was, and is, 
therefore of crucial importance. The German Constitutional Court in Brun­
ner v European Union Treaty* 1 posited that “...because of the principle of lim­
ited powers... no power to extend its powers is conferred on the European 
Union, and the claiming of further functions and powers by the European 
Union ...is dependent on supplementation and amendment of the Treaty and 
is therefore subject to the affirmative decision of the national parliaments.”4 5
4 (1994) 1 CMLR57.
5 Para. 33 of the judgment.
6 See Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law, 5th Edition (2006). Sweet and Maxwell at pp. 379-380 
where examples of critical comments are given, some of which are that “the principle of supremacy without 
also alluding to the principle of direct effect, the Constitution offers only an incomplete and... potentially 
misleading description of the relationship between Union law and... national legal systems” See also ibi­
dem, at chapter 5. See too A. Bonnie, The Constitutionality of Transfers of Sovereignty. The French Approach, 
(1998) 4 EPL 517; P. Craig, UK Sovereignty after Factortame, (1991) 11 YEI 221; M. Kumm, Who is the Arbi­
ter of Constitutionality in Europe?, (1999) 36 CMLR351; S. Peers, Taking Supremacy Seriously, (1998) 23 EL 
Review 146; G. Marshall, Parliamentary Sovereignty - The New Horizons, (1997) PL 1; C. Schmid, All bark 
and no bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court’s “Banana Decision", (2001) 7 ELJ 95.
7 See Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States - Brussels, 5th October, 
2007, CG 3.01.2007, REV, Draft Declaration 27 (Declaration concerning primacy). The Conference also de­
cided to attach as an Annex to the Final Act the Opinion of the Council Legal Service on the primacy of 
EC law (as set out in 11197/07 (JUR 260) of 22nd June, 2007, that “It results from the case law of the Court 
of Justice that primacy of EC law is a cornerstone principle of Community law. According to the Court this 
principle is inherent to the specific nature of the European Community. At the time of the first judgment 
of this established case law Costa/EbJEL, 15th July 1964, (Case 6/641) there was no mention of primacy in
This was the first time that a Treaty provided expressly for the primacy of Eu­
ropean Union laws over national laws. A protocol attached to the Constitutional 
Treaty made it clear that Article 1-6 is intended to consolidate the existing case 
law as has been developed over the years by the European Court of Justice.
However that provision of the Constitutional Treaty had been the subject 
of criticism6 and proved problematic in other areas, in spite of eighteen Mem­
ber States ratifying it. One of many of these problematic issues was whether 
Article 1-6 was, in fact, a consolidation of existing case law and not a licence 
given to the European Court of Justice to treat all matters relative to the Con­
stitution. If that were the case, there would clearly be an extension of the Eu­
ropean Court of Justice’s jurisdiction.
At the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) under the German presi­
dency (June 2007) it had been decided not to reproduce in the Treaty of the 
European Union the article on the supremacy or primacy of European Union 
law over national laws. Rather the IGC agreed on the following Declaration, 
namely "The Conference recalls that, in accordance with well settled case law 
of the EU Court of Justice; the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on 
the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member States under 
the conditions laid down by the said case law.”7
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Thus this “primacy” features, not as an Article in the Reform Treaty itself, 
but as a Declaration to that Treaty. It is worth noting three matters with re­
gard to the former Constitutional Treaty (and now the Declaration to the Re­
form Treaty). First, that the Constitutional Treaty (and now the Declaration 
to the Reform Treaty) was the first Treaty to mention expressly the primacy 
of Community laws over Member States’ national laws. Second, the former 
Constitutional Treaty and the Declaration to the Reform Treaty do no more 
than consolidate the existing case law of the European Court of Justice on 
this issue. Third, that “...after two years of uncertainty over the Unions treaty 
reform process, the time has come to resolve the issue and for the Union to 
move on. The period of reflection has provided the opportunity... for wide 
public debate and helped prepare the ground for a solution.”8
3. The meaning of the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy in the 
United Kingdom
The legislative supremacy of the British Parliament (or Parliamentary su­
premacy) expresses the central legal concept of the doctrine in British con­
stitutional law.To put it in another way, under British constitutional arrange­
ments Parliament is legislatively supreme.
Much has been written on this subject. This work is not intended to repeat 
the various views expressed by learned authors and judges. For a deeper anal­
ysis of this doctrine, the reader is referred to the relevant texts.9
The doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy is one of the most important 
and controversial aspects of the British constitution. In this part it is pro­
posed to treat the traditional doctrine and the attitude shown by the British 
courts by making use of precedents from the cases heard by British courts. 
Whether or not the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy is affected by Euro­
pean law is a separate issue. The European jurisprudence on the subject will 
be evaluated in the next part of this work. It is well known that the United 
Kingdom does not have a written constitution. This being the case, once the 
original rule is traced back to an Act made by Parliament, the court has the
the treaty. It is still the case today. The fact that the principle of primacy will not be included in the future 
treaty shall not in any case change the existence of the principle and the existing case law of the Court of 
Justice”. The draft Declaration was submitted to the IGO (Foreign Ministers) on 15lh October, 2007 and was 
finally adopted at the IGO (Heads of State or Government) which met under the Portuguese presidency in 
Lisbon on 18th/ 19th October, 2007.
8 See Council of the European Union, Brussels 23 June, 2007, 11177/07 CONCL. 2 (Presidency Conclu­
sions), para. 8, p. 2.
’ For the legislative supremacy of Parliament doctrine seen as a “rule of recognition” see H.L.A. Hart, The con­
cept of Law, (1961) at pp. 89 to 107. In its political context, see the Right Honourable Lord Woolf of Barnes, 
Droit Public - English Style, “Public Law” 1995, p. 57; The Honourable Sir John Laws, Law and Democracy, 
“Public Law” 1995, p. 74; and T.R.S. Allan, The Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty, “Public Law” 1985, p. 614. 
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duty to interpret it since it is the law of the land and only Parliament has the 
power to make laws. Such laws cannot be questioned by the courts. Parlia­
ment achieved its supremacy through a process of gradual development. The 
Tudor and Stuart monarchs ruled by Royal Prerogative but gradually, as a re­
sult of Parliamentary struggles, it was recognised that the consent and advice 
of the House of Commons and the House of Lords was required.
The Bill of Rights of 168910 provided “...that the pretended power of sus­
pending of lawes or the execution of lawes by Royal Authority without Con­
sent of Parliament was illegal”. Thus from that date onwards, only Parliament 
- which consists of Commons, Lords and the Monarch - is able to make laws. 
What needed to be clarified was whether or not there were any restrictions or 
any limitations on Parliament’s power.
101 Wil & Mary Sess 2, ch. 2, p. 1.
11 Particularly in Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution published in 1885. Professor 
Dicey’s ideas proved to be influential over a period of two generations, but De Smith, in his book entitled 
Constitutional and Administrative Law published in 1998, considered that Dicey’s views “no longer war­
rant detailed analysis” At the time when De Smith expressed his opinion, Dicey’s views may have been out 
of fashion, but there is little doubt that Dicey’s pronouncements on the supremacy of the British Parlia­
ment are now favoured by senior members of the British justiciary.
Suggestions were made in the seventeenth century that any Acts of Parlia­
ment which were repugnant and unreasonable could be declared invalid by 
the courts. The reason why those suggestions were made was because of the 
influence, which existed at the time, of the philosophy of natural law. Such 
natural law being the standard by which human law was judged against the 
standards set by God-given law, namely the ultimate ideal. This philosophy 
did not survive and was replaced by the standard of positivism which enables 
the courts to accept the fact that if the proper parliamentary procedure was 
gone through, then Parliament was the supreme body to make laws.
4. The Diceyan meaning of Parliamentary supremacy
What does “Parliamentary supremacy” mean under the British constitu­
tion? The classical meaning of the doctrine will be found in the works of 
Dicey,11 an Oxford University professor in the nineteenth century. The doc­
trine of Parliamentary supremacy under British law means (a) that Parlia­
ment alone can make laws; (b) that such laws can be made on any topic; (c) 
that all British courts are compelled to obey any laws made by Parliament; (d) 
that a current Parliament may expressly repeal any law made by a previous 
Parliament; (e) that a later Act which is inconsistent with a previous one im­
pliedly repeals that latter; (f) that, with regard to any constitutional legisla­
tion, the above may not apply; and (g) that no other body has authority to rule 
on the validity of Parliament’s enactments.
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It is proposed to analyse briefly some of the “components” which make up 
the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy enumerated above.
First, it has been said that Parliament is the supreme law-making body. 
The historical struggle to achieve this supremacy is paramount in this con­
text. By the fourteenth century Parliament emerged as the supreme law-mak­
ing body. In the seventeenth century James I wanted to rule by the use of the 
royal prerogative. The conflict between the King and Parliament for suprem­
acy was fought in the courts. In the Case of Proclamations in 161112 Chief 
Justice Coke stated that “...the King cannot create any offence which was not 
an offence before, for then he may alter the law... by his proclamation...”
1212 Co. Rep. 74; 77E.R. 1352. Chief Justice Coke consulted two Chief Justices, Chief Baron, and Baron Al- 
tham “upon conference between the Lords of the Privy Council and them”.
13 The prerogative power of the Stuart Kings to “suspend” laws meant that these laws could be made inop­
erative for an indefinite period of time.
14 The prerogative power to “dispense” meant that persons who offended against the laws were given a dis­
pensation from paying the penalties imposed by an Act of Parliament.
15 1689 1 Will. & Mary Sess. 2, ch. 2.
16 Ibidem, para. (1).
17 Ibidem, para. (2). James II made great use of his prerogative of suspending laws of a penal nature relat­
ing to religion in his Declaration of Indulgence in 1687 and 1688 which led to the Revolution of 1688. By 
the time of Edward I, direct taxation was firmly in the domain of Parliament. The consent of Parliament 
was thus required for the levying of direct taxation. The Stuarts however used the Royal Prerogative to 
levy taxes under their prerogative of foreign affairs. They regulated trade by imposing duties on imported 
goods. The Case of Impositions (Bate’s Case) 1606 2 St. Tr. 3 is a notorious constitutional example of such 
practices. The Royal Prerogative to defend the realm at times of emergencies was also used as a a reason to 
raise money to build military ships. See The case of Shipmoney (R v Hampden) (1637) St. Tr. 82S.
18 In “Studies in Constitutional Law” 1987, p. 80.
19 See D. Judge, The Parliamentary State, (1993) and consider Ungoed-Thomas J's judgment in Cheney v 
Conn [1968] 1 All ER 779. “What the Statute itself enacts cannot be unlawful, because what the statute 
says and provides is itself the law, and the highest form of law which is known in this country. It is the law
In 1689 the claims by the Stuart Kings to rule by royal prerogative and 
thus suspend13 and dispense14 with laws were resolved by the Bill of Rights,15 
which stated, inter alia, “That the pretended power of suspending of lawes or 
the execution of lawes by Royal Authority without consent of Parliament is 
illegal.”16 The Bill of Rights also stated “That the pretended power of dispens­
ing with lawes or the Execution of lawes by regal authority as it has been as­
sumed and exercised of late is illegal.”17
The power of the monarchy after 1689 was subject to parliamentary con­
sent. C.R. Munro18 said that “Parliament was to be its own master and free 
from interference... Parliaments were to be held frequently, and the election 
of their members was to be free. The Crown’s power to levy taxes was made 
subject to parliamentary consent... and powers of suspending and dispens­
ing of laws... were declared illegal". Thus in 1689 the doctrine of parliamen­
tary supremacy was firmly established!19
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Second, it was said above that Parliament can make laws on any topic. Its 
legislative power is thus unlimited. Of course, Parliament acts reasonably and 
responsibly when legislating and does not intend to legislate in derogation of 
international law.
With regard to this latter issue, namely conflict between international 
and national laws, there are some pronouncements made by the courts. In 
Mortensen v Peters10 the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland concluded that 
Scots law relating to fishing limits prevailed over international law. Lord Kill- 
achy said “A legislature may quite conceivably, by oversight or even design ex­
ceed what an international tribunal ...might hold to be its international rights. 
Still, there is always a presumption against its intending to do so”. In this case it 
was only a “presumption”. The express words of the Scottish Legislature were 
conclusive!21
Thirdly, a parliamentary enactment cannot be challenged by the courts 
and thus make it invalid.22 This has been firmly established since the Glorious 
Revolution in 1688 which made Parliament supreme. Cockburn said23 “there 
is no judicial body in the country by which the validity of an Act of Parlia­
ment could be questioned. An act of the legislature is superior in authority to 
any court of law... no court can pronounce a judgment as to the validity of an 
Act of Parliament.”24
Fourth, it was stated that a current Act of Parliament may expressly repeal 
any law made by a previous Parliament and a later Act which is inconsistent 
with a previous one impliedly repeals that latter. Maugham25 said clearly “The 
legislature cannot, according to our Constitution, bind itself as to the form
which prevails over any other form of law, and it is not the court to say that parliamentary enactments, the 
highest law in the country is illegal”
20 (1906) 14 SLT 227 (High Court of Justiciary).
21 The court was unanimous in dismissing the appeal. See too, Burmah Oil Co. v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 
75 (HL) where the War damages Act, 1965 was passed by Parliament retrospectively to deny compensa­
tion being sought for damage lawfully caused, namely the destruction of Burmah Oil installations upon or­
ders of the commanding officer of the British forces to prevent the advancing Japanese forces from captur­
ing these.
22 In countries with a written constitution, the constitutional court or the ordinary courts are able to deter­
mine whether the legislative enactments are constitutional. See e.g. Marbury v Madison (1803) 1 Cranch. 
137 in the Supreme Court of the United States.
23 In Ex parte Canon Selwyn (1872) 36 JP 54.
21 See also Sir Robert Megarry VC’s judgment in Manuel v Attorney-General [1983] Ch. 77, where he said that 
the duty of the court is “to obey and apply every Act of Parliament, and... the court cannot hold any such Act as 
ultra vires” Statutory instruments and other subordinate legislation can however be held to be ultra vires. Con­
trary to the view that the courts cannot question the validity of an Act of Parliament, see Chief Justice Coke’s 
judgment in Dr. Bonham's Case (1610)8 Co. Rep. 114. He said that “the common law will control Acts of Parlia­
ment and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void (atp. 118). This dictum was before 1688 and is therefore 
considered to be obsolete. See Lord Reid’s dictum in Pickin v British Railways Board [1974] AC 765.
25 In Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 590 (CA). 
325
EUROPEAN UNION AND STATE POLITICAL SYSTEMS
of subsequent legislation, and it is impossible for Parliament to enact that in 
a subsequent statute dealing with the same subject-matter there can be no 
implied repeal. If a subsequent Act of Parliament chooses to make it plain 
that the earlier statute is being to some extent repealed, effect must be given 
to that intention just because it is the will of the Legislature.”26
26 See H.L.A. Hart, “The Concept of Law” 1961, pp. 145 and 146 on whether or not Parliament can limit 
the power of its successors. See too G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory (1971) at pp. 42 and 43 and R.E.V. 
Heuston, Essays in Constitutional Law (1964, 2nd ed., pp. 6 to 8), where some interesting modern views are 
expressed on the subject. See too W.R. Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, 1955, CLJ172.
27 The reader is referred to a modest selection of cases relevant to parliamentary supremacy. See Attorney- 
General for New South Wales v Trethowan et al. [1952] AC 526 (JCPC) and MacCormick v Lord Advocate 
[1953] SC 396 Inner House of the Court of Session. See too Lord Denning’s dictum in Blackburn v Attorney- 
General [1971] 1 WLR137 at p. 140. Lord Reid’s dictum in Madzimbamuto v Larner-Burke [1969] AC 645; 
Lord Sankey’s dictum in British Coal Corporation v The King [1935] AC 500 at p. 520; and Megarry VC”s 
judgment in Manuel v Attorney-General [1983] Ch. 77 (ChD) and Slade LJ in the Court of Appeal.
Of significant importance from a constitutional law point of view, much 
case law has come about with regard to Commonwealth issues. Lack of space 
does not allow a discussion of parliamentary supremacy in this sphere.27
5."Pilgrim's Progress" in the development of the primacy
of European Union law
Background
The European Community Treaty is “silent” on the issue of which law should 
take priority in case of conflict. Is it national law or Community law? The ex­
planation for this “silence” can only be twofold in nature. First, that it was con­
sidered unnecessary to make this matter explicit at the time of signature of this 
Treaty, and/or, second, that it was a diplomatic omission!
Thus no guidance whatsoever or hint was given by the Treaty on that issue. 
The matter had to be decided by the courts in the Member States assisted by 
the European Court of Justice and its jurisdiction under Article 234 of the Eu­
ropean Community Treaty. The European Court of Justice proved to be most 
influential in developing the law and in establishing the principle of primacy 
of European Community law over national laws.
A matter of priorities - Monism versus Dualism?
The question of priorities between directly effective international law and 
domestic law is normally seen as a matter of national law to be determined in 
accordance with the constitutional rules of the State concerned. Incorpora­
tion of international law will depend on whether a State is monist or dualist 
in its approach to international law. If monist, international law will be trans­
lated automatically into national law from the moment of ratification with­
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out the need for further measures of incorporation. If dualist, international 
law will not be binding under domestic law until incorporated by a domestic 
Act of Parliament.
In the case of the United Kingdom, which operates a dualist system, in­
corporation by statute needs to take place. In the case of those countries 
which operate a monist system, as for example France, adoption takes place 
automatically. In either of these two systems the “adoption” which takes place 
does not solve the question of priorities.
As far as European Union law is concerned, “peu importe” whether the 
system is monist or dualist, for these do not solve the necessary uniformity 
problem in the application of the European Union Member States’ laws and 
the primacy of European Union law over Member States’ national laws. It is 
because of this problem, namely that of uniformity, that the European Court 
of Justice has developed its own constitutional rules on the supremacy or pri­
macy of European Union laws over the laws of the Member states in certain 
fields only.
The contribution and pronouncements of the European Court of/ustice 
in the step-by-step development of the primacy of European Union law
In Van Gend en Loos in 196228 the European Court of Justice held, inter 
alia, that “...the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law 
for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit 
within limited fields.”
28 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administrativ den Belastingen (26/62) [1963] ECR 1; [1963] CMLR 
105 (ECJ).
29 Costa v Ente Nationale per I’Energia Ellettrica (ENEL) (6/64) [1964] ECR 1141; [1964] CMLR 425 (ECJ).
By talking of a “new legal order” the European Court of Justice wanted to 
point out, it is submitted, three matters. First, that the European Commu­
nity (as it then was), was not merely an international law organisation. Sec­
ond, that the European Community enjoyed a more independent status, and 
in the third instance, that, arguably, the European laws had a greater impact 
on the laws of its Member States than did international law.
In Costa v ENEL in 1964,29 the notion of primacy of European law over 
national law was robustly affirmed by the European Court of Justice, which 
found that “The integration into the laws of each Member State, of provi­
sions which derive from the Community and more generally the terms and 
the spirit of the Treaty, make it impossible for the states, as a corollary, to ac­
cord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system 
accepted by them... Such a measure cannot therefore be inconsistent with 
that legal system.
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The executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to an­
other in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardising the at­
tainment of the objectives of the Treaty ...The obligations undertaken under 
the Treaty establishing the Community would not be unconditional... if they 
could be called in question by subsequent legislative acts. It follows ...that the 
law stemming from the Treaty... could not... be overridden by domestic legal 
provisions... without being deprived of its character as Community law and 
without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question. 
The transfer by the states from their domestic legal system to the Commu­
nity legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries 
with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a sub­
sequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community can­
not prevail”.
The European Court of Justice went even further in the case of Interna­
tionale Handelsgesellschaft in 1970,30 which found that “...the law stemming 
from the Treaty ...cannot because of its very nature be overridden by rules of 
national law, however framed... Therefore the validity of a Community mea­
sure or its effect within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations that 
it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution 
of that State or the principles of a national constitutional structure”.
30 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermitte (1/70) 
[1970] ECR 1125; [1972] CMLR 255 (ECJ).
31 Simmenthal SpA v Amministrazione delle Finanze delo Stato (70/77) [1978JECR 1453; [1978] 3 CMLR 670.
32 R v Secretary of State for Transport Ex parte Factortame Ltd (c-221/89) [1991] ECR 1 - 1305; [1992] QB 
680; [1992] 3 WLR 228.
Similarly in Simmenthal in 197731 the European Court of Justice consid­
ered that “a national court which is called upon to... apply provisions of Com­
munity law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary 
refusing... to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, even if 
adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the court to request or await 
the prior setting aside of such provision by legislative or other constitutional 
means”
In the Factortame case in 198932 the European Court of Justice applying 
the same principles as those expressed in Simmenthal posited “...the full ef­
fectiveness of Community law would be ...impaired if a rule of national law 
could prevent a court seised of a dispute governed by Community law from 
granting interim relief in order to ensure the full effectiveness of the judg­
ment to be given on the existence of the rights claimed under Community 
law. It follows that a court which in those circumstances would grant interim 




To epitomise the situation as developed by the European Court of Justice, 
it may be said that the primacy of Community law over national law is now 
firmly established. Thus, if there is a conflict between national law and Com­
munity law, this latter has to prevail and any national law which is incompat­
ible with Community law, even if it be of constitutional significance (for coun­
tries with a written constitution), would be inapplicable.
The reason for such primacy of Community law is that without that pri­
macy, Community laws would be ineffective, as there would be no uniformity 
in the application of Community laws in the Member States of the European 
Union.
This research shows that the domestic courts of the Member States have 
generally accepted the notion of primacy of Community law as from their en­
try into force, provided the domestic courts regard it as directly effective.
6. The legal basis of the primacy of Community law over British law
Unlike other European Union States, the United Kingdom does not have 
a written constitution! Furthermore it will be recalled that the United King­
dom operates a dualist system. As such, for the British courts to give effect to 
the principle of primacy of Community law, an enactment by the British Par­
liament becomes necessary.
The European Communities Act, 1972 contains two important sections 
(and their sub-sections) within its provisions which treat the notion of pri­
macy or supremacy of Community law. These are sections 2 and 3. Apart 
from some discreet topics which have the effect of excluding Community 
laws33 section 2 (1) of the 1972 Act provides for the direct effect of Commu­
nity law in the United Kingdom. The section states “All such rights, powers, 
liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or arising 
by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to 
time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties 
are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United 
Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed 
and followed accordingly; and the expression “enforceable Community right” 
and similar expressions shall be read as referring to one to which this subsec­
tion applies”34. Section 2 (2) talks of the implementation of Community ob­
33 Namely the freedom to impose increases in taxation, the introduction of retrospective the creation of 
new offences under the criminal law. See Schedule 2 to the Act of 1972 legislation and the creation of new 
offences under the criminal law. See Schedule 2 to the Act of 1972.
34 “Section 2(1) makes the concept of direct effect a part of the UK legal system. It deems law which under the 
EC Treaties is to be given immediate legal effect to be directly enforceable in the UI<. Accordingly UI< courts,
329
EUROPEAN UNION AND STATE POLITICAL SYSTEMS
ligations by means of secondary legislation. Although the Act does not spe­
cifically35 state that Community law is supreme over British laws, sub-section 
(4) of section 2 provides that “...any enactment passed or to be passed... shall 
be construed and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this sec­
tion.” These “foregoing provisions” being duties and obligations imposed by 
Community law36.
The 1972 Act furthermore provides support for the primacy of European 
Union rights under section 3 (1) which states, “For the purposes of all legal pro­
ceedings any question as to the meaning or effect of any of the Treaties, or as to 
the validity, meaning or effect of any Community instrument, shall be treated 
as a question of law (and, if not referred to the European Court, be for determi­
nation as such in accordance with the principles laid down by and any relevant 
decision of the European Court or any court attached thereto)”37.
7. The Relationship between European Union law and British law 
on supremacy
It is proposed to treat two matters in this part of the essay. The first matter 
proposes to answer the question of whether or not the primacy of European 
Union law impinges upon the supremacy of the British Parliament. The second 
matter will treat the consequences of the European Communities Act of 1972. 
Does the primacy of European Union law impinge upon the supremacy 
of the British Parliament?
The brief answer to the above question is both “Yes” and “No”! A short 
comment is necessary for a fuller understanding of these two contradictory 
answers. There exist dicta in some British courts’ judgments to indicate that 
the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy in the United Kingdom remains 
unscathed in spite of the doctrine of the primacy of European Union law.
Did not Lord Denning in Macarthy’s case say that the British Parliament 
could, at any time, repudiate the European Communities Act, 1972? He stated
which on the orthodox domestic approach to international law may not direcdy enforce a provision of an in­
ternational treaty or a measure passed there under, are directed by section 2 (1) to enforce any directly effec­
tive EC measures. There is no need for a fresh act of incorporation to enable UK courts to enforce each EC 
Treaty provision, regulation, or directive which according to EC law has direct effect." P. Craig, G. De Burca, 
EU Law, Text Cases and Materials, Oxford University Press 2007, p. 366.
35 Express or specific mention of the primacy of Community law is not necessary for the United Kingdom 
but is bound by the findings of the European Court of Justice case law (as discussed briefly above).
36 See the Protocol attached to the Treaty which affirms this.
37 With regard to state liability in damages, the British courts (namely the Court of Appeal and the High 
Court) have acknowledged the European Court’s decisions. See Brasserie du Pecheur (46 and 48/93 [1998] 
1 CMLR 1353 (ECJ); [1998] 3 CMLR 192 (CA) and Francovich v Italy (C-6 and 9 /90) [1991] ECR 1-5357; 
[1992JIRLR 84; and [1993] 2 CMLR 66.
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that “...If the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an 
Act with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision in it or in­
tentionally of acting inconsistently with it and says so in express terms then 
I should have thought it would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute 
of our Parliament.”38
38 In Macarthys Ltd v Smith [1979] ICR 785 (CA) at p. 789. See also Garland v British Rail Engineering Ltd. 
[1983] 2 AC 751 where Lord Diplock agreed with Lord Denning’s opinion as expressed in the Macarthys case.
39 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 at 593.
40 See the dicta of the European Court of Justice in part 4 of this work entitled“Pilgrim’s Progress” treating 
the development of the primacy of European Union law.
The "Yes" factor
Thus it is argued that the primacy of European law does impinge upon the 
supremacy of the British Parliament. The case law, as seen above, makes this 
abundantly clear. The European Court of Justice in Costa v ENEL39 posited 
“By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created 
its own legal system which, on entry into force of the Treaty, became an in­
tegral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts 
are bound to apply. By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having 
its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity 
of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real pow­
ers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from 
the States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign 
rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which 
binds both their nationals and themselves.”
The "No" factor
On the other hand, the British Parliament may deliberately and intention­
ally repeal the European Communities Act, 1972, or may pass deliberate leg­
islation inconsistent with European laws. In such circumstances the suprem­
acy of the British Parliament remains intact.
Looking realistically at the situation it is very unlikely that the United 
Kingdom will leave the European Union. For political and practical reasons 
that country is too entrenched in Europe to do so!
It may therefore be said that the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy ex­
ists as a theoretical possibility, despite the fact that the European Court of 
Justice in its judgments views the European Community Treaty as constitut­
ing an independent legal order having primacy over national law in its appli­
cation in domestic courts and institutions.40 An interesting opinion has been 
expressed by Lord Justice Laws in the Court of Appeal. In the learned judge’s 
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opinion, changes which have been made to British law have been voluntary 
and have not been imposed directly by European Union law. The fact that 
the British courts have changed their approach to the interpretation of Brit­
ish statutes to take into account the European Union enactments in specific 
fields does not offend against the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy.
What are the consequences of the European Communities Act, 1972?
Although there was uncertainty in the British courts over a period of some 
seven years (i.e. from 1972 to 1979) after the United Kingdom joined the Euro­
pean Community, inMacarthys Ltd v Smith111 in 1979 a majority Court of Appeal 
was prepared to accept the European Court of Justice’s decision in the Costa?2 
and Simmenthal41 *34  cases. Cumming-Bruce and Lawton LJJ in their judgments 
based on their interpretation of section 2 (4) of the European Communities Act, 
1972, gave European law priority over British law simpliciter. The Master of the 
Rolls, Lord Denning, was more moderate and exacting by using the construction 
approach and construing the Equal Pay Act, 1970, in accordance with the prin­
ciple of equal pay for equal work under Article 119 (now Art. 141) of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community. Lord Dennings view was that “...we are 
entitled to look to the Treaty as an aid to its construction...” It is interesting to 
note however that although “moderate and exacting” in that he construed the 
case in its context, namely the Equal Pay Act, he was prepared to go further in 
stating in his judgment “...but not only as an aid but as an overriding force. If 
on close investigation it should appear that our legislator is deficient or is in­
consistent with Community law by some oversight of our draftsmen then it 
is our bounden duty to give priority to Community law. Such is the result of 
s. 2 (2) and (4) of the European Communities Act 1972”.
41 (1979) ICR 785 (CA).
« Costa v ENEL(C-6/64) (1964) ECR 585; (1964) CMLR425.
43 Amministrazionedelle Finenze dello Stato SpA (C-l06/77) (1978) ECR 529; 3 CMLR 263.
44 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd. (1991) 1 AC 603 (HL) as stated by J. Steiner, 
L. Woods, C. Twigg-Flesner, EU Law, Oxford University Press 2006, pp. 78 and 79.
The Factortame case11 in 1990, heard in the House of Lords, is considered 
to be the most important case treating this issue. Lord Bridge was of the opin­
ion that the combined effect of section 2 (1) and (4) of the 1972 Act was "... 
as if a section was incorporated in... the Merchant Shipping Act, 1988, which 
in terms enacted that the provisions with respect to registration of British 
fishing vessels were to be without prejudice to the directly enforceable Com­
munity rights of nationals of any Member State of the EEC”. Thus if the Brit­
ish law infringed the directly effective Community rights of the claimants, 
European law would be applied over the inconsistent provisions enacted by 
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domestic legislation. In applying the subsequent decision of the European 
Court of Justice, the House of Lords45 were unanimous in granting relief.
45 Ibidem, p. 645.
It is interesting to note that in the Factortame case the “construction” ap­
proach applied by Lord Denning (in Macarthys (see above)) was not invoked. 
Community law thus prevailed. Lord Bridge pointed out that although the 
Treaty did not provide specifically for the principle of primacy of Commu­
nity law over domestic law, that principle was “...well established... in the ju­
risprudence of the Court long before the United Kingdom joined the Com­
munity. Whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it 
enacted the European Communities Act was entirely voluntary”.
Thus far it may be concluded that the primacy of Community law over 
British domestic law is now well established in the case of directly effective 
Community law. That “primacy” takes the form, either by “construing” the 
domestic law in the light of European law (the Lord Denning approach), or 
by the direct application of European law over domestic law, thus giving pri­
ority to European law (the Lord Bridge approach); this latter being based on 
the implied interpretation of the intention of the British Parliament resulting 
from section 2 (1) and (4) of the 1972 European Communities Act.
8. Concluding thoughts
From the brief discussion and analysis which took place in this work, four 
conclusions may be drawn.
First, as has been shown, there is no doubt that in practice European Union 
law has primacy over British law in specified fields.
Second, there is an undoubted supremacy of the British Parliament in the­
ory since the European Communities Act, 1972 may be expressly repealed at 
any time Parliament wishes to.
Third, the Declaration attached to the Reform Treaty of October 2007 
which states, inter alia that the case law of the European Court of Justice, etc. 
have primacy over Member States’ laws, is valueless since the present Trea­
ties are silent on the issue of the primacy of European Union laws.
Finally, this being so, it is submitted that the Declaration should have been 
omitted altogether from the Reform Treaty leaving the principle of primacy 
of European Union laws to be developed, as has hitherto been the situation, 
through the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice.
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Reform of the House of Lords1
1 The author wishes to thank the Ferens Research Trust of the University of Hull for awarding him a Fel­
lowship which enabled him to pursue his research on the constitutional changes currently taking place in 
the United Kingdom. This article on the reform of the House of Lords is based on the research carried out 
during his Fellowship.
2 The notion of durability and adaptability of the House of Lords is thoroughly discussed by N. Baldwin 
in his works, e.g. The House of Lords: a Study in Evolutionary Adaptability, Hull Papers in Politics; House 
of Lords, Wroxton College 1990.
3 As a result of the English Revolution (1640-1660), King Charles I was executed, a republic (the Common­
wealth of England) was declared and Oliver Cromwell became Lord Protector of England. Consequently, 
the House of Lords lost its power and the Act of Parliament of 19 March 1649 abolished the Lords on the 
premise that it was considered ‘useless and dangerous to the people of England’. It was not until 1660 when 
the restoration of the monarchy took place and the House of Lords assembled again.
Introduction
The origins of the House of Lords can be traced to the Councils sum­
moned by the English kings, some eight centuries ago. But, it was during 
the reign of Edward III (1327-1377) that the British Parliament became dis­
tinctly bicameral. The upper chamber was then composed of aristocrats and 
high-ranking members of the clergy, and not much has changed in this re­
spect until more recently. The House of Lords evolved, underwent numerous 
changes and reforms but proved to be durable and adaptable2 to the chang­
ing political reality throughout the centuries. The status of the Lords has, 
nevertheless, altered dramatically.
At first, it was considered to be the more powerful of the two chambers. 
With its dominance diminished, the House of Lords was abolished for eleven 
years in the middle of the seventeenth century.3 After it was restored in 1660, 
it subsequently regained its position of the more powerful chamber of Parlia­
ment and continued to be considered as such until the nineteenth century.
Over the course of this century, however, the House of Commons’ supe­
riority became evident, while the Lords, as a result of industrialisation, grew 
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more and more out of touch with the changing structure of society.4 The pri­
macy of the House of Commons was secured with the increase of its authority 
under the Great Reform Act 1832. Additional reforms between 1867 and 1885 
as well as later Acts of 1911 and 1949 strengthened it.5
4 N. Baldwin, The House of Lords: a Study in Evolutionary Adaptability, Hull Papers in Politics, p. 4-5.
5 The development of the British Parliament is discussed by Polish authors: A. Zięba, Parlament Wielkiej 
Brytanii, Warszawa 2004, or A. Pułło, Izba Lordów Zjednoczonego Królestwa Wielkiej Brytanii i Irlandii 
Północnej, [in:] Izby Drugie Parlamentu, ed. E. Zwierzchowski, Białystok 1996.
6 A. Pułło, op. cit., p. 307.
7 One of the most prominent representatives of the Labour Party, who inter alia played the function of 
the Leader of the House of Commons from 2001 to 2003.
8 R. Cook, The Point of Departure: Diaries from the Front Bench, Simon and Schuster 2004, pp. 280-281.
9 An Elected Second Chamber: Further reform of the House of Lords, HMSO, Cm 7438, July 2008.
The House of Commons has retained its undisputed primacy in the leg­
islative process until today. This has been widely acknowledged to the extent 
that when in colloquial speech the term ‘parliament’ is used it is tantamount 
to referring to the lower house.6
On the other hand, the role and powers of the Lords have been slowly 
changing with the intention of making it a legitimate and assertive revising 
rather than rival second chamber. But, until now - after nearly a century 
since it was stated in the Preamble to the Parliament Act 1911 that the reduc­
tion of powers of the Lords was essential, because it lacked the popular and 
elected principle - the necessary modernisation has not taken place. Hopes 
for conclusive changes flourished with the Labour Party’s attempt to imple­
ment reforms proclaimed in their 1997 Manifesto. They appeared promising, 
but after the initial changes in 1999, unfortunately, little has been achieved.
The late Robin Cook,7 who was engaged in the reform of the House of 
Lords, emphasised the fact that the second chamber lacks relevance, legiti­
macy and representativeness. He urged that a modern House of Lords was 
needed in order to strengthen parliamentary democracy. Cook was quite dis­
appointed with the government’s inefficiency in implementing the reform 
and predicted still in 2003 that: “Sadly, it will not be a Blair government that 
carries out that modernisation.”8 It has been recently proposed in the White 
Paper of 20089 that the plan of the reform should be presented in party man­
ifestos before the next general election in order to see which option is cho­
sen by voters.
This approach will again surely delay the whole process, and the respon­
sibility will be passed on to the next government. There are big chances that 
this time it will no longer be a Labour government.
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Reforms in the twentieth century
The upper house was subjected to a number of attempts to radically mod­
ernise it from 1909, but the particular governments did not quite manage to im­
plement the proposed reforms. The first incentive for action stemmed from the 
fact that, in 1909, the Lords attempted to veto Lloyd George’s People’s Budget 
when the Liberal government had a large majority in the House of Commons. 
The Bill was sent to the House of Lords with an overwhelming Conserva­
tive Party majority. Both houses had nearly equal powers and this situation 
caused a constitutional crisis. The House of Lords could reject Bills and used 
its power in the case of this very Bill that proposed new taxes, which could 
have been considered somehow discriminatory against landed wealth.10 Such 
a situation led to two general elections in 1910. Consequently, as a result of 
the deadlock, the House of Commons sought to diminish the powers of the 
other Chamber. This was achieved by the Parliament Act 1911, which regu­
lated relations between both houses, for the first time. It was also stated that 
a thorough reform should ensue at some unspecified time in the future, which 
inter alia would have to comprise the removal of hereditary peers.11 The Act 
secured the absolute primacy of the House of Commons in relation to finan­
cial matters12 and limited the Lords’ veto on other issues by granting them de­
laying power of three sessions, eventually changed to two sessions under the 
provisions of the Parliament Act 1949 (the second chamber still retained the 
right to veto Bills extending the life of a Parliament for periods longer than five 
years). These two acts are now known as “the Parliament Acts.”13
10 E. A. Smith, The House of Lords in British Politics and Society 1815-1911, New York 1992, p. 174.
11 M. Russel, Reforming the House of Lords, New York 2000, p. 13.
12 J. Straw, The Governance of Britain: An Elected Second Chamber: Further reform of the House of Lords, 
Ministry of Justice 2008, p. 1.
13 See: I. Richard, D. Welfare, Unfinished Business Reforming the House of Lords, Vintage 1999, pp. 28-31.
14 Ibidem, pp. 33-35.
Other modifications gradually introduced to the House of Lords included 
the Salisbury Convention accepted in 1945, which became an important part 
of the informal running of the House. It relates to the legislation implement­
ing the government’s manifesto commitment which the upper house does 
not reject, nor does it introduce ‘wreaking amendments’ to the Bills that are 
in accordance with the government’s programme outlined during the elec­
tion.14 In 1958, the Life Peerages Act enabled men and women to become Life 
Peers. It was also one of the few significant reforms in that period. The sec­
ond chamber, however, has remained partly hereditary and partly appointed, 




tion could be considered as democratically legitimate. Some politicians, like 
Robin Cook or Tony Benn, maintain that democracy demands election.15
15 R. Cook, op. cit.; T. Benn, Democracy means an elected second chamber, SCGN 1999, December, No. 149.
16 I. Richard, D. Welfare, op. cit., pp. 45-46.
17 http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1983/1983-labour-manifesto.shtml, 29 August 2008.
18 J. Mitchell, A. Davies, Reforming the Lords, IPPR 1993, pp. 25-27.
In 1968, the Labour government of Harold Wilson took action aimed at 
radically reforming the House of Lords. The proposals were based on the out­
come of a cross-party debate, during which it was decided that the most sa­
lient changes planned to be introduced involved removing hereditary peers, 
granting life peers the right to vote, decreasing the number of bishops and 
law lords, setting the number of peers with voting powers at 230, and arrang­
ing the chamber in such a way that the government party would be the larg­
est party, but would have no majority. There was also a proposal to change the 
functions of the Lords, which could as well be developed and extended with 
time. As a result, the government introduced the Parliament (No. 2) Bill in 
1968. In spite of the overwhelming support for the reform in the upper house, 
the Bill failed in the House of Commons following strong opposition in the 
backbenches on both sides.16
During the twentieth century, three different options regarding the future 
of the Lords were considered by the reforming bodies. First to leave it unal­
tered, second to abolish it, or third to reform it. Each of these alternatives had 
fervent supporters and die-hard opponents. Both major parties at some stage 
were for dissolving the Lords. The Conservatives, when in opposition, advo­
cated this idea in the late 1970s, and the Labour Party introduced this pledge 
in their 1983 Manifesto in which they proposed to abolish the House of Lords 
without replacement:
We shall: (...) Take action to abolish the undemocratic House of 
Lords as quickly as possible and, as an interim measure, introduce 
a Bill in the first session of parliament to remove its legislative powers - 
with the exception of those which relate to the life of a parliament.17
Eventually, the Labour Party changed its policy and, in 1992, proposed the 
idea of replacing the Lords with an elected second chamber as a part of several 
constitutional reforms.18 At present, the only option considered is the third one, 
namely the reform of the House of Lords. There appears to be a wide consensus 
across the major parties on this choice. It is generally acknowledged that a sec­
ond chamber is required, because it plays an important role in complement­
ing the House of Commons, though it needs democratic legitimacy, in spite
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of the fact that in the present situation it gets praise for the excellent work 
which it is doing.19 It is a foregone conclusion that in a democratic country 
of the size of the United Kingdom, a second chamber is needed.20 It plays an 
important role in checking the executive and alleviates the legislative load of 
the lower house.
In recent years, especially, after the accession to the European Union, leg­
islation has increased in quantity but decreased in quality.21 Thus, an asser­
tive and legitimate House of Lords is a priority in order to secure the delivery 
of a valuable legislature that meets contemporary standards.
Criticism of the House of Lords
Many commentators supplied various reasons justifying the need to 
change the structure and functions of the House of Lords. One of the most 
common concerns is that the upper house, consisting of hereditary and ap­
pointed peers, has no legitimate right to question the elected representatives 
from the House of Commons.
Incidentally, the awkward situation in the British Parliament is acknowl­
edged internationally, and may cause some embarrassment to the officials 
representing the oldest democracy in the world, who participate in various 
events.
Robin Cook, in a self-deprecating passage in his diaries points, out the fact 
that Lesotho was the only one other country in the world in which “hereditary 
chieftains still retain the right to pass laws for the rest of the nation.”22
He duly recalls one episode that took place during a Europe - Africa Sum­
mit, when in his capacity as a Foreign Secretary he spoke in support of dé­
mocratisation.
In response, the president of an autocratic African state made a point by 
stating that he could not be taken responsible for not being able to introduce 
a full democracy during the fifty years after his country gained independence, 
when the British Parliament was not able to get rid of the hereditary princi-
” Ibidem.
20 See: M. Russell, op. cit.
21 After the United Kingdom had joined the European Community in 1973, Europeanisation of the British 
policy took place. As a result of the increase of legislative burden, even the parliamentary European Com­
mittees created to help make European policy are overworked and unable to deal effectively with their 
tasks. This obviously leads to a situation in which legislation is criticised for being of low quality and poorly 
implemented. For more on this aspect of Europeanisation see: P. Norton, The United Kingdom: Political 
Conflict, Parliamentary Scrutiny, [in:] National Parliaments and the European Union, ed. P. Norton, Lon­
don 1996; A. Forster, A. Blair, The Making of Britain's European Foreign Policy, Longman 2002; J. Mitchell, 
A. Davies, op. cit.
22 R. Cook, op. cit., p. 33. However, it might be worth adding that it is now observed that because of politi­
cal pressures legislative powers of the king and chieftains are steadily decreasing in Lesotho. 
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pie for five hundred years.23 Political imbalance is another important flaw of the 
House of Lords, which was invariably accused of being the Conservative Party’s 
own committee.24
23 Ibidem, p. 33.
24 J. Mitchell, A. Davies, op. cit., p. 29.
25 N. Baldwin, op. cit., p. 12.
26 R. Cook, op. cit., p. 33.
27 I. Richard, D. Welfare, op. cit., p. 51.
28 J. Mitchell, A. Davies, op. cit., p. 30.
The Lords had been dominated by this party during the twentieth century, 
until the removal of the majority of hereditary peers and Mr Blairs nominations 
granting life peerages.
This enabled them to pass at their convenience legislature of their party and 
exercise their powers over other parties’ Bills by rejection or postponement.25 
Robin Cook pointed this phenomenon out and commented that although the 
Labour Party had two landslide victories (1997, 2001), the House of Lords was 
still dominated by the Conservatives.
He also did not leave unnoticed the fact that the second chamber tended to 
defeat the Labour government more often than the last Conservative govern­
ment during the eighteen years when they were in office.26 Richard and Welfare 
emphasize that the Blair government was defeated in its first session nearly three 
times more than the Thatcher/Major governments on average.27
The table presented below analyses the government defeats in the House of 
Lords during the period 1970-2001. The record scores were over 100 per year 
and took place in the years 1974/1975,1975/1976, which, of course, was during 
the time of the Labour government.
In spite of this unhealthy tendency, it is worth mentioning that the Lords 
have gained respect, when they displayed a lot of courage and decency dur­
ing the Thatcher era, for opposing the antidemocratic moves of the “Iron La­
dy’s” administration.
The House of Lords should be given credit for observing its right to crit­
icise the government even at the time, when the House of Commons was 
dominated by the Conservatives.28
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Table 1: Government defeats in the House of Lords 1970-71 to 2000-200129
Session Number Session Number
1970/71 4 1985/86 22
1971/72 5 1986/87 3
1972/73 13 1987/88 17
1973/74 4 1988/89 12
1974 13 1989/90 20
1974/75 103 1990/91 17
1975/76 126 1991/92 6
1976/77 25 1992/93 19
1977/78 78 1993/94 16
1978/79 11 1994/95 8
1979/80 15 1995/96 10
1980/81 18 1996/97 10
1981/82 7 1997/98 39
1982/83 5 1998/99 31
1983/84 20 1999/00 36
1984/85 17 2000/01 2
According to some commentators the House of Lords could not become 
a legitimate legislative chamber, because of its undemocratic and anachronis­
tic composition.29 30  It is, indeed, the largest upper house in the world; before the 
first stage of the reform it had over 1200 potential members (size of the house 
is not fixed - in practice it could grow even bigger). Second chambers world­
wide are much smaller. On average, they have no more than 60 per cent of 
the number of the lower house. For example, Poland (460 members - lower 
house / 100 members - upper house), the USA (435/100), Australia (148/76) 
or France (577/321).31 The number of its members fluctuates constantly, and 
every month the House of Lords Information Office issues an analysis of its 
composition. Lord Sudeley recalls that, originally, it used to be a very small 
chamber. For example, during the reign of Elizabeth I, it consisted of hardly 
more than sixty peers.32 With time, as new Lords were nominated, it kept on in­
creasing its size substantially. Thus, Richard and Welfare are right to comment 
that the British Parliament has been weakened because one of its chambers lost 
the rationale for hereditary peers and it is unable to perform its duties appro­
29 http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2001/rp01-077.pdf, 21 August 2008.
30 J. Mitchell, A. Davies, op. cit., p. 7; A. Pullo, op. cit., p. 324.
31 M. Russell, op. cit., pp. 25-28.
32 Lord Sudeley, Why Tamper with the House of Lords, “Monday Papers” 1979, No. 9, December, p. 2.
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priately. They stress the fact that the second chamber, paradoxically, functions 
only because the greater part of its members do not show up, and it wisely does 
not attempt to make use of its powers, which have their source in its illegiti­
mate composition.33 In the 1940s, only one eighth of the members of the House 
of Lords regularly attended meetings.34 Some commentators have argued that 
since the average daily attendance was 368, there seemed to be no reason for 
keeping the upper house bigger.35 As for the use of its powers, it its worth men­
tioning as an example that during the legislative process the Lords are able to 
delay Bills proposed by the House of Commons. As a result, the lower house 
may be forced to start the whole procedure all over again during the next ses­
sion because of the discontinuation principle.36
33 I. Richard, D. Welfare, op. cit., p. 49.
34 G. Pondel, Z problematyki reformy parlamentu Zjednoczonego Królestwa, “Państwo i Społeczeństwo”
2006, Vol. 4, p. 145.
36 A decision regarding the size of the reformed second chamber has not been reached, yet. Presently 
(summer 2008), the House of Lords has over 700 peers, which still makes it the largest upper house in the 
world. The government suggests that it should have between 400 and 450 members. The Wakeham Com­
mission, for example, proposed 550. There have also been other suggestions regarding the size but, basi­
cally, the reformers unanimously agree that the House of Lords should be smaller. Another aspect is the 
ratio of an elected and appointed element in case of a hybrid house that the labour government favours. 
One of the options voted for in the House of Commons in March 2007 and proposed by the present gover­
nment in White Paper 2008 as suitable is 80% of elected and 20% of appointed members.
36 According to the principle of discontinuation, the Bills that the Parliament had worked on during one 
session are not considered by the Parliament in the next session.
37 A. Pułło, op. cit., p. 314.
38 I. Richard, D. Welfare, op. cit., p. 48.
39 See: D. Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the UK, New York 2003, pp. 188-202.
However, this power of the House of Lords has been exercised very spar­
ingly, as it was feared that, when provoked by such actions, the House of Com­
mons could put forward arguments for speedy reform of the second chamber 
or even propose the idea of abolishing it.37
The Composition of the House of Lords
Similarly to what was discussed above, Richard and Welfare observe that 
there are three major reasons underpinning the necessity to reform the sec­
ond chamber. First, there is no justification for the hereditary principle in the 
Parliament. Second, the house lacks political balance. And, finally, it does not 
have legitimacy to perform its duties properly.38 All of these three reasons de­
mand changes in the composition of the House of Lords, which is an essential 
part of reform and will be critical for the future of the chamber39.
The reformers are aiming at enabling it to perform a variety of functions 
with efficiency and ample legitimacy as a balanced second chamber. Many dif­
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ferent views on the composition have been presented as this issue has been 
widely discussed in the media and during two rounds of consultations (1101 
submissions during the first round, several hundred in the second round). 
A number of choices have been presented. The most often discussed options 
included appointed, mixed (hybrid) or elected House of Lords. The following 
are just a few major examples on how members of the House of Lords could 
be selected.
Advocates of appointment state that this is a way of securing the appro­
priate number of individuals with specialist knowledge and experience from 
a wide range of walks of life. In their view, this is necessary in order to supply 
expertise in the legislative process. Lord Norton of Louth, an academic and 
Conservative politician, former head of the Department of Politics and Inter­
national Studies at the University of Hull, who according to the House Maga­
zine is the “greatest living expert on parliament” in the United Kingdom, admits 
that it would be difficult to sustain the present house and gives reasons why 
a fully appointed second chamber is the best choice. In his opinion, it is 
a democratic option, indeed, because it relies on the concept of core account­
ability.40 Under the existing system, the argument goes thus, when one cham­
ber is elected the other should not be elected because it would introduce 
divided accountability that would not be good for public policy. In such a sit­
uation, it would be unclear who shall be held responsible for the outcomes of 
the legislative process.
40 Lord Norton of Louth argues that the concept of accountability is a characteristic feature of parliamen­
tary democracy. It is used in relation with the power of electors to vote against the MPs who do not act 
in the interest of the electors. He introduces the notions of core accountability and divided accountabil­
ity. The former is used in order to describe a situation in the British Parliament, where the body responsi­
ble for public policy, which is the government elected through the House of Commons, is accountable to 
electors. If the second chamber was also elected it could lead to a situation when the legislative outcome 
becomes a compromise between the two houses. This would create divided accountability, because in the 
case of disagreements between the two chambers and the lack of the outcome of public policy it would not 
be possible to decide which body is responsible for this situation.
Moreover, if the second chamber was elected, it would indubitably de­
mand more powers than the appointed chamber would get. Consequently, it 
could become powerful enough to constrain the work of the lower house. An 
elected second chamber would not be easy to justify in a unitary state, and 
above all it would not add any value to the process, because, unlike in a fed­
eral state, it would be a repetition of the first chamber as far as the composi­
tion is concerned. Thus, there would be no added value to the process. When 
the house is appointed there is a qualitative distinction and extensive exper­
tise available, which means that the legislators can look at issues from per­
spectives different from elected politicians in the Commons. In a nutshell, 
following this train of thought, the appointed second chamber adds value 
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without threatening the supremacy of the lower house.41 Surprisingly, the 
former Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair, also favoured such an approach in 
recent years, although previously on various occasions he expressed a differ­
ent preference. Robin Cook stated that it was not long ago when the leader 
of the Labour Party supported a wholly elected second chamber: “Tony Blair 
said in 1995, ‘We want a properly directly elected second chamber’, or, in 
1996, ‘We have always favoured a wholly elected House of Lords.”42 In spite 
of these declarations, Tony Blair changed his views with time. He had later 
emphasised on various occasions that, being strongly against a hybrid upper 
house, he believed that only a fully appointed chamber would guarantee that 
the House of Lords became a revising, not a rival, chamber. During the vot­
ing process that took place in March 2007, the House of Lords backed the 
same idea and voted for a fully appointed option rejecting all other alterna­
tives. On the contrary, the House of Commons was in favour of a wholly, or 
80% elected 20% appointed second chamber. The then Prime Minister, even­
tually, modified his views and said that he would support the choice that was 
reached by consensus. The idea of creating a fully appointed chamber will 
surely face great opposition from the public, because it would be seen as “Re­
placing the House of Lords with a House of Cronies (...)” to use the wording 
of Robin Cook.43 Lord Norton, however, believes that cronyism can be over­
come once a statutory independent appointments commission is set up. Its 
responsibility would be selecting appropriate individuals for the House of 
Lords on the basis of certain criteria of which the main one would be out­
standing quality, since there would be high quality threshold for the candi­
dates. There should also have to be an across-party agreement that no party 
should have a majority in the House of Lords, and this chamber would consist 
of a large independent element. The responsibilities of such an appointment 
commission, which would have to rely on the transparency and legitimacy of 
its actions, would thus entail prevention of cronyism and maintenance of the 
high quality of the house.
41 The views of Lord Norton of Louth ware expressed during an interview that the author of this article 
conducted on 27 August 2008.
42 R. Cook, op. cit., p. 52.
43 Ibidem, p. 82.
But the introduction of a fully elected second chamber, just as it is done in 
many countries all over the world was also seriously considered. Proponents 
of this idea bring forward the argument that in their view democracy does re­
quire an elected second chamber.
The opponents argue that this option might threaten the supremacy of the 
Commons, as were stated above.
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The next choice taken into account was the abolition of the second house 
and the introduction of a unicameral system, based on the premise that there 
are many legislatures that function without a second chamber (Sweden, Den­
mark, New Zealand, the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, the Northern 
Ireland Assembly). This solution, however, does not seem to be a feasible op­
tion nowadays. MPs did not support the abolition during parliamentary votes 
on 4th February 2003 and the majority of them voted in favour of a bicameral 
system in March 2007.
A serious alternative recommended by the Wakeham Commission was 
a hybrid upper house. And this turned out to be a very popular proposal. 
It relies on the combination of an elected and appointed element. The ra­
tionale behind it was the belief that appointed peers would provide expertise 
and their elected counterparts democratic legitimacy. Such a structure of the 
chamber would also secure the primacy of the wholly elected Commons. Still 
unresolved, however, is the issue of the proportions of elected and appointed 
elements. The Wakeham Commission’s recommendation was a 50/50 split, 
but it did not gain political support, although the model of a mixed house 
is the alternative favoured by the Labour government. Many commentators 
had argued that it would be a bad choice by lack of synergy that, in their view, 
would make it worse than a fully elected or appointed house. In the same 
vein, Lord Norton believes that the hybrid house would be the worst op­
tion, because inter alia it requires two types of members. Consequently, one 
type could be seen to be more legitimate than the other. It is difficult to pre­
dict what such a house would actually deliver. There are also practical prob­
lems connected with this option. Would appointed and elected members be 
treated in the same way? Would they be paid differently? By asking this kind 
of questions, Lord Norton also stresses the fact that the greatest problem is 
the status of members and whether they would all be equal.
Reforms under the Labour Government since 1997
Many officials have explicitly voiced their views regarding the necessity 
of abolishing the House of Lords, but it, nevertheless, survived until our 
times and is likely to last as long as the British Parliament. At the turn of the 
twenty-first century, the debate regarding its role and usefulness is still going 
on. When the Labour Party took power after the landslide victory over the 
Conservatives, one of the major objectives in the Blair project to modernise 
Britain was the reform of the House of Lords, which along with devolution44 
44 In the years 1997-1999, as a result of referenda approving the transfer of powers from central govern­
ment to regional and local bodies, devolution was implemented in the United Kingdom, which resulted in 
the creation of the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland Assembly.
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aimed at changing the shape of British politics in the new century.45 The re­
form of the upper house remained unfinished business for 88 years, as none 
of the governments until the Labour Party came into office in 1997 was able 
to introduce radical changes. Every previous reforming administration either 
failed or left the job incomplete.46
45 Public Policy under Blair, ed. R. Atkinson, S. P. Savage, Palgrave 1998, p. 13.
46 I. Richard, D. Welfare, op. cit., pp. 3, 11.
47 Labour Manifesto, New Labour because Britain Deserves Better, 1997, p. 32.
The Labour government kicked off quite courageously, and seems to be 
very busy with the reform. Unfortunately, not much progress has been made 
since the first stage was implemented.
First stage of reform
The Labour Party in its 1997 Manifesto articulated the necessity to reform 
the upper house and outlined its proposal for changes meant to be conducted 
in two stages. By way of modernisation they planned to address the above- 
mentioned defects of the House of Lords, namely, the need to change the com­
position and size of the second chamber including the decrease in the number 
of peers with a view to gaining democratic legitimacy and creating political bal­
ance. The following excerpt states the aims explicitly in this respect.
The House of Lords must be reformed. As an initial, self-contained 
reform, not dependent on further reform in the future, the right of 
hereditary peers to sit and vote in the House of Lords will be ended 
by statute. This will be the first stage in a process of reform to make 
the House of Lords more democratic and representative. The legisla­
tive powers of the House of Lords will remain unaltered.47
In the same document, it was mentioned that the second stage of reform 
would be dependent on the decisions made by a committee of both Houses 
of Parliament.
By looking at the outline of the composition of the Lords presented below 
in Tables 2 and 3, which show the situation before the first stage of reform, 
one notes the overwhelming dominance of the Conservative Party and hered­
itary peers as well as the fact that the house membership was out of propor­
tion in comparison with the modern second chambers around the world.
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Table 2: Composition of the House of Lords by party strength as at 13 Octo­
ber 1999 - before the implementation of the first stage of reform48
Party Life Peers
Hereditary Peers Lords 
Spiritual TotalOf First Creation
By 
Succession
Conservative 172 2 297 - 471
Labour 160 1 18 - 179
Liberal Dem. 49 0 23 - 72
Cross Bench 128 5 220 - 353
Other 32 0 80 26 138
TOTAL 541 8 638 26 1,213
NB The figures in the above table are based on those peers who were eligible to attend the House of Lords 
(i.e. Peers without Writs of Summons (65) or on leave of absence (52) are excluded.)
Table 3: Composition of the House of Lords by peerage type as at 13 October 
1999 - before the implementation of the first stage of reform49
Archbishops and bishops 26
Peers by succession (of whom 17 women) 751
Hereditary peers of first creation 8
Life peers under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 27
Life peers under the Life Peerages Act 1958 (of whom 101 women) 518
TOTAL 1,330
Of whom:
Peers without Writs of Summons (of whom 3 minors) 65
Peers on leave of absence from the House 52
10 persons who had inherited peerages have disclaimed them for life (3 of these 
now sit in the House by virtue of other titles)
Consequently, the House of Lords Act 1999 removed anachronistic domi­
nance of hereditary peers. All of them were to be removed, originally, but through­
out the process, it was agreed to leave ninety-two, including Royal Office holders




- the Earl Marshal and the Lord Great Chamberlain. Tables 4 and 5 present the 
composition of the interim house, after the changes introduced in 1999.















Conservative 173 41 9 1 224
Labour 191 2 2 195
Liberal
Democrats 56 3 2 61
Cross bench 131 29 2 1 163
Archbishops 
and Bishops 26 26
Other 6 6
TOTAL 557 75 15 2 26 675
Table 5: Interim house by peerage type - 2 May 200151
Archbishops and bishops 26
Life Peers under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 28
Life Peers under the Life Peerages Act 1958 (106 women) 533
Peers under House of Lords Act 1999 (4 women) 92
TOTAL 679
Subsequently, the Royal Commission was appointed. Its overriding objective 
was to examine various aspects concerning the House of Lords and make recom­
mendations regarding its role, functions and composition in order to prepare the 
ground for the second stage of reform. It became known as the Wakeham Com­
mission, and taking the name after its chairman Baron Wakeham.50 12
50 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ldl99798/ldbrief/Idanal.htm, 25 August 2008.
51 Ibidem, 28 August 2008.
52 J. Straw, op. cit., p. 2.
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When the general elections of 2001 were approaching, it became evident 
that the Labour Party would address the issue of the second stage of reform of 
the upper house in their manifesto in which they presented their support for 
the Wakeham Commission that prepared 132 recommendations.
We are committed to completing House of Lords Reform, includ­
ing removal of the remaining hereditary peers, to make it more rep­
resentative and democratic, while maintaining the House of Com­
mons’ traditional primacy. We have given our support to the report 
and conclusions of the Wakeham Commission, and will seek to im­
plement them in the most effective way possible. Labour supports the 
modernisation of the House of Lords’ procedures to improve its effec­
tiveness. We will put the independent Appointments Commission on 
a statutory footing.53
53 Labour Party, Ambitions for Britain: Labour’s Manifesto 2001, p. 35.
54 2001 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto ’Time for Common Sense’ http://www.conservative- 
party.net/manifestos/2001/2001-conservative-manifesto.shtml, 19 January 2009; 2001 Liberal Democrat 
General Election Manifesto ‘Freedom, Justice, Honesty’ http://www.libdemmanifesto.eom/2001/2001-li- 
beral-manifesto.shtml#constitution, 19 January 2009.
55 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/Id200102/ldhansrd/vo010620/text/10620-01.htm, 29 August 
2008.
56 White Paper, 2001, The House of Lords: Completing the Reform, London, HMSO, Cm 5291.
57 The seven options for the composition of the reformed House of Lords were: (1) fully appointed, (2) fully 
elected, (3) 80 per cent appointed/20 per cent elected, (4) 80 per cent elected/20 per cent appointed, (5) 60 
per cent appointed/40 per cent elected, (6) 60 per cent elected/40 per cent appointed, and (7) 50 per cent 
appointed/50 per cent elected.
Thus, the Labour Party declared that it would complete the process. There 
seemed to be a good political moment for the changes, since the Conservative 
and Liberal Democrat parties also wished for House of Lords reform in their 
manifestos.54 During her speech on 20 June 2001,55 the Queen stated that the 
second stage of reform would ensue following consultations. According to the 
White Paper, it would involve the removal of ninety-two hereditary peers, es­
tablishing an appointments commission and diminishing the number of peers 
to 600, including 120 representing regions. But these proposals did not get the 
support of Parliament. The government responded to the recommendations 
of the Wakeham Commission and published a White Paper on the Lords in 
November 2001.56 This was followed in 2003 by a debate and free votes on the 
composition of the House of Lords. A Joint Committee appointed by the Lord 
Chancellor and the Leader of the House of Commons set out seven options 
for the composition of a reformed House.57 Neither the debate nor the voting 
were conclusive. None of the proposed options was chosen.
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The first steps, that involved the removal of most of the hereditary peers, 
were promising. This move helped the Blair government finish the domi­
nance of the Conservative Party in the House of Lords and the unprecedented 
number of nominations for Life Peers that Blair made secured the Labour 
Party majority in the House of Lords (see Tables 6 and 7). Unfortunately, these 
changes led to the present “comfortable” situation that seems to have dimin­
ished the government’s eagerness to implement further reform of the second 
chamber.













Conservative 153 39 9 0 0 201
Labour 209 2 2 0 0 213
Liberal 
Democrat 69 3 2 0 0 74
Crossbench 170 29 2 2 0 203
Bishops 0 0 0 0 26 26
Other 13 2 0 0 0 15
TOTAL 614 75 15 2 26 732
NB Excludes 9 peers who are on leave of absence.
Table 7: Breakdown of Lords by type of peerage - 6 October 200859
Men Women Total
Archbishops and bishops 26 0 26
Life Peers under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 
1876 22 1 23
Life Peers under the Life Peerages Act 1958 456 144 600
Peers under House of Lords Act 1999 90 2 92
TOTAL 594 147 741
58 http://www.parliament.uk/, 9 August 2008.
59 Ibidem.
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The twentieth century was dominated by Conservative governments. This 
situation might explain why the Lords survived without major changes, since 
this house had invariably the Conservative majority. Similarly, now, the La­
bour administration, in its third consecutive term, has not been able to wind 
up the planned modernisation, although it started reforms, but got on until it 
achieved majority in the second chamber. They appear, currently, to be satis­
fied with the situation and do not seem very worried about the second cham­
ber’s lack of power because this helps avoid friction in the legislative proc­
ess. Some critics observing the moves of the Labour government predicted 
that there would be no second stage of reforms.60 One of the factors respon­
sible for the little progress seems to be the fact that there is not enough polit­
ical support for the introduction of the necessary radical changes61 in spite of 
political declarations.
60 I. Richard, D. Welfare, op. cit., p. 7, or see: R. Cook, The Point of Departure: Diaries from the Front 
Bench, Simon and Schuster 2004.
61 G. Pondel, op. cit., p. 148.
62 Britain forward not back - Labour Party Manifesto 2005.
63 Are you thinking what we’re thinking? It's time for action - Conservative Party Manifesto 2005.
64 The real alternative - Liberal Democrat Party Manifesto 2005.
65 The House of Lords: Reform, HMSO, Cm 7027, February 2007.
Present state of the House of Lords reform - summer 2008
All the major parties (Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat) expressed 
in their 2005 manifestos a commitment towards the further reform of the 
House of Lords. Below are extracts from their respective texts.
In our next term we will complete the reform of the House of Lords so that 
it is a modern and effective revising Chamber.62
The House of Commons needs to be made more capable of standing up to 
the executive. We will strengthen select committees and make time for proper 
scrutiny of all legislation. As part of our drive for efficiency across Whitehall 
and Westminster, we will cut the number of MPs by 20 per cent. We will seek 
cross-party consensus for a substantially elected House of Lords.63
Reform of the House of Lords has been botched by Labour, leaving it une­
lected and even more in the patronage of the Prime Minister. We will replace it 
with a predominantly elected second chamber.64
The above passages express the necessity to conclude the process of re­
forming the House of Lords. This unanimous attitude led to establishing 
a cross-party commission that discussed the issue of reform and published 
a governmental White Paper “The House of Lords: Reform” in 2007.65
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After the failure of the free-vote in 2003,66 regarding the composition of 
the reformed second chamber, the voting was repeated. This time the House 
of Commons voted in favour of a fully elected (337 to 224) or 80% elected 
/ 20% appointed (305 to 267) chamber, while the House of Lords voted for 
a fully appointed second chamber (361 to 121).67
66 Both Houses voted on seven options regarding the composition of the second chamber on 4 February 
2003. The House of Lords backed a fully appointed chamber, whereas the voting in the House of Commons 
did not show support for any of the options.
67 J. Straw, op. cit., p. 2.
68 An Elected Second Chamber: Further reform of the House of Lords, HMSO, Cm 7438, July 2008.
69 J. Straw, op. cit., p. 3.
70 An Elected Second Chamber...
Recently, a new White Paper released on 14 July 200868 presents the results 
of the cross-party group work on House of Lords reform. A consensus was 
reached on a variety of issues. Justice Secretary Jack Straw states that the paper 
is not a final blueprint for reform, but it rather aims at stirring discussions on 
the proposals and options that are included in it. The Labour Government be­
lieves that the eventual proposals would have to be presented to the electorate 
for the decision on whichever views should be supported. Thus, the best way 
to achieve this goal would be including the party ideas regarding the form and 
role of the second chamber in their general election manifestos.69
The White Paper 200870 contains information on where agreement had 
been reached as well as the points that cause differences of opinion. It presents 
the results of the cross-party group’s work. There is a wide consensus regard­
ing the role of the second chamber as well as the relationship between both 
houses of Parliament. The upper house will complement the House of Com­
mons. The government will be able to pass its manifesto Bills through Parlia­
ment and the primacy of the House of Commons will be secured. There will 
be a mechanism in order to maintain the difference between the composition 
of each house. This approach shall ascertain the primacy of the Commons 
and enable the second chamber to exercise its powers. The four major princi­
ples that shall help achieve this objective are as follows:
members of the second chamber should be elected on a diffe­
rent representative basis from members of the House of Commons;
- members of the second chamber should be able to bring inde­
pendence of judgement to their work;
- members should serve a long term of office; and
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- the second chamber should take account of the prevailing poli­
tical view amongst the electorate, but also provide opportunities for 
independent and minority views to be represented.”71
71 Ibidem.
72 At present the full, official name of the second chamber is: “The Right Honourable the Lords Spiritual 
and Temporal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Parliament assembled.”
73 http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/uk_politics/6341599.stm, 13 August 2008 (the last two refer to Jack Straw
The White Paper stresses the fact that the primacy of the House of Com­
mons could not be threatened, while the second chamber should become more 
assertive, which would stem from the fact that it would acquire the electoral 
mandate. The system of choosing peers is still to be debated since the govern­
ment would like to gather opinions on the size of the reformed chamber as well 
as which of the following options are most suitable: first past the post, alterna­
tive vote, single transferable vote or an open or semi-open system. The elected 
members would serve for a term of 12-15 years without possibility of renewing 
it. One third of them would be elected during each election.
The government believes that in order to preserve a significant independ­
ent element in the House of Lords there should be some members who are ap­
pointed. It agrees with the result of the voting in March 2007 at the House of 
Commons that chose a 20% appointed element. In an elected second cham­
ber there would be no church representatives. In order to become eligible for 
the House of Lords, the candidates would have to fulfil criteria in line with 
those of the House of Commons and the membership would not be associ­
ated with the status of a peerage. Another result of modernisation would be 
the fact that the members would receive salaries. It is advised that the transi­
tion is gradual and the second chamber stays in a transitional phase until its 
composition becomes totally changed in the course of three electoral cycles.
The impending reform will result in eliminating peerages, and thus it 
shall become unlikely that the upper chamber retains the name of “House 
of Lords”72 In the White Paper 2008 it is called “reformed second chamber” 
to keep it neutral. Consequently, the government is asking for suggestions 
regarding the name of the new house. One of the options might be Senate, 
which had found a wide consensus among members of the cross-party group. 
It may sound too republican, but seems to be one of the most popular op­
tions, too. The issue still remains unsettled, however. Incidentally, the BBC 
conducted a survey on its website in which it asked for proposals for the new 
name for the Lords. The current name proved to be the most common re­
sponse, but other suggestions included: Senate, Upper House, House of Peers, 




The Parliament Act 1911 stated that the House of Lords lacked a popular 
and elected principle. A century later the same can be said and still no final 
reform has been implemented. It is a large, undemocratic, one of its kind sec­
ond chamber in a country that prides itself on being the oldest democracy in 
the world. Nicholas Baldwin has stressed on various occasions the fact that 
the House of Lords was a prime exponent of the British constitutional tradi­
tion in respect of its capacity for gradual adaptability to changing environ­
ment.74 He argues that this was possible because the upper house was not 
created according to a detailed plan of action. In his own words:
(...) the House of Lords was not established to meet the require­
ment of any particular theory of politics; it was not created by any na­
tional convention; it does not owe its existence to some paper scheme 
drawn up by politicians, academics or constitutional lawyers. Rather 
it is a product of history. It has not been made; it has grown.75
This romantic idea might have still been valid in the nineties. In recent 
years, the very process of reform that has been underway indicates inevita­
ble, although delayed, revolutionary modernisation. A wide range of learned, 
experienced or simple individuals from different walks of life (the very peo­
ple that Baldwin refers to in the passage above) have had their say throughout 
all this time by contributing to various commissions, consultations, submis­
sions of recommendations, surveys, etc., in the debate on the reformed sec­
ond chamber. It becomes clear that the adjustment to the contemporary re­
ality requires a bespoke scheme agreed by “the powers that be” outside the 
House of Lords.76 It is not a viable option that the second chamber be allowed 
to take its time indefinitely. The splendid tradition of evolutionary adapta­
bility will very likely come to an end when the newly created upper house 
changes its name as well as the rationale underpinning its composition and 
functions to make it suitable for the modern democratic era.
Obviously, reform will not be concluded during the present term of the 
government. There seems to be a large degree of agreement about fundamen­
tals, yet the reformers cannot find a clear way forward. The above-mentioned 
examples show that even though the reform of the upper house has been dis-
- Commons Leader responsible for Lords reform).
74 See: N. Baldwin, House of Lords, Wroxton College 1990; N. Baldwin, op. cit.
75 N. Baldwin, op. cit., p. 13.
76 See: R. Cook, op. cit., p. 279. 
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cussed from many angles and all the aspects of changes have been targeted, 
various governments invariably lacked the determination to conclude mod­
ernisation regardless of the unequivocal declarations in favour of reform. Af­
ter some years of promissing changes that started in 1997, we are now wit­
nessing a period of stalemate. It takes place after the Labour governement 
introduced the initial changes that helped it achieve its political objective. 
Once this was acomplished, the government did not seem to be really push­
ing the modernisation forward. The developmnents demonstrate that the La­
bour Party is quite happy with ending the Conservative dominance and does 
not seem to be interested in changing it any further - to put it bluntly.
As far as the future of the House of Lords is concerned, abolishing it is just 
not considered any more, and there is a wide cross-party consensus about it. 
The reform will have to be completed, because if the House is to stay it has 
to be modernised.77 There may still be doubts about how much of it will be 
elected or appointed, or even if it shall be fully appointed or fully elected, for 
that matter.
77 J. Mitchell, A. Davies, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
Nevertheless, the radical change of this undemocratic institution is un­
derway and is performed in a most democratic manner involving cross-party 
debates as well as widespread public consultations. Once it is finished, it will 
not be easy to defend Baldwin’s principle of adaptability of the second cham­
ber any more, because a new order will be introduced according to a plan 
made virtually from scratch. This revolutionary approach, however, might be 
one of the major reasons why reform has been delayed for so long, as people 
tend to be reluctant to act against tradition.
Composition has become the most contantious issue. Naturally, only once 
this is settled all other interrelated elements will follow suit, e.g. relations be­
tween the two houses, functions, supremacy, etc. It is envisaged that no mat­
ter what composition is chosen there will always be pros and cons. After a cen­
tury of debates, the time is ripe to make changes. But it seems that all that can 
be done is to evaluate the possibilities and decide which option is least contro­
versial.
First there has to be a political will and courage on the side of the reform­
ers. Each of the three solutions (a fully elected, hybrid or appointed second 
chamber) have supporters who are able to propose convincing arguments. 
Interestingly enough, the House of Commons opts for a fully elected or 80% 
elected second chamber, even though this may be seen by many as a way to 
threaten their primacy and creating a rival rather than revising upper house. 
On the contrary, the House of Lords is for the appointed second chamber. 
This might be understood as a conscious move to prevent reform, because if 
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both houses voted unanimously there would be little excuse for not imple­
menting it duly.
If election is considered democratic although, in a democracy not all in­
stitutions have to be elected (e.g. judges, juries) the elected House of Lords 
may have a greater public support than one composed of appointed peers. 
The latter is problematic because it is not going to be easy to pursuade society 
that appointment may not necessarily mean creating a “House of Cronies” but 
shall be a better way of maintaining high standards without threatening the 
supremacy of the lower house. Thus, the option with the fully elected house is 
more likely to be introduced in the foreseeable future, because the politicians 
will probably not go for the appointed house, as it is bound to cause contro­
versies. It will certainly not be easy to pursuade the public that cronyism can 
be prevented. Unfortunately, people tend to see the appointment as a way of 
securing the majority of a party in power rather than the creation of a com­
petent body.
It just might happen that a compromise is reached in the form of a hybrid 
house. The present government is supporting a mixed (80% elected 20% ap­
pointed) second chamber. Specialists are against it. Lord Norton stressed the 
fact that it is the worst option and criticises the White Paper 2008 that in­
troduced it for its low quality. But it just might be politically the easiest way 
forward. The voters may accept more willingly this idea on the premise that 
the elected element gives the house democratic legitimacy and the appointed 
peers would provide expertise. If a hybrid chamber is introduced then it will 
probably evolve in the British traditional way towards a fully appointed or 
elected house as with time the faults or advantages of any of these propos­
als could become discernable. It is a foregone conclusion that whatever the 
choice is made the second chamber will have to be more flexible than now in 
order to adapt to the demands of the modern times. The Labour government, 
opportunistically, does not seem to be interested in taking a responsibility for 
further reform and it is willing to wait until the next election to see which par­
ty’s programme for modernisation voters choose. The impending reform will 
just have to wait a little longer.
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On the Reform of the House of Lords as well as Domestic 
and European Politics
Interview with LORD NORTON OF LOUTH/
• Jerzy Marcinkowski* *
* Philip Norton, Lord Norton of Louth (born 5 March 1951), is an English author and academic. The House 
Magazine has called him our greatest living expert on parliament’. He is Professor of Government in the De­
partment of Politics and International Studies at the University of Hull in England. Philip Norton gradua­
ted from the University of Sheffield with a Bachelor of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy, and from the Uni­
versity of Pennsylvania with a Master of Arts. He is the author or editor of 27 books. In 1998, he was made 
a life peer with the title Baron Norton of Louth. He subsequently chaired a commission for Leader of the 
Opposition William Hague to design ideas for the strengthening of the institution of Parliament. He has also 
served as the Chairman of the House of Lords Constitution Committee. In 2007 the Daily Telegraph named 
him the 59th most influential person on the right in British politics.
•• Jerzy Marcinkowski wishes to express his thanks to the Ferens Research Trust of the University of Hull 
for the award of a Fellowship which gave him the opportunity to interview Professor Lord Norton of Louth 
on 27 August 2008.
During the free-vote on the composition of the second chamber in 2007, 
the House of Lords backed a fully appointed house. Some commentators state 
that such an option is not democratic and if implemented the House of Lords 
would be criticised for becoming the ‘House of Cronies’. What might be the 
justification for this attitude in the second chamber?
• Lord Norton of Louth
There are a number of justifications for it. First, in fact, it is a democratic 
option. People say election of the second chamber is a democratic option. 
I would say not necessarily. There are different definitions of democracy, but 
at the heart of the concept of the representative democracy is the concept of 
accountability. You elect people to act on your behalf, if they do not act in the 
way that you wish them to, you can then remove them. Thus, accountability 
is at the heart of it.
Now, you may argue that favours election. It does not, if you wish to re­
tain accountability for public policy. Under our existing system, we have what 
I term core accountability. There is just one body elected to government. There 
is the party in government that is responsible for public policy in the United 
Kingdom. And that one body is therefore accountable to electors. In other 
words, it can be turned out of office at the next election. There is no divided 
accountability. The government cannot say “it is not us who is responsible, it 
is another body”. In our present system we have the election of government 
through the House of Commons and that maintains that core accountabil­
ity. Now, our argument would be if we elect the second chamber then by vir­
tue of election that chamber would be able to say ‘we demand more powers 
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than the existing appointed chamber’ It would not necessarily claim to be co­
equal with the first - although there would be an argument that it is entitled 
to - but it would most certainly claim that it needed more power than the ex­
isting second chamber. Thus you have a second elected body claiming greater 
powers than the existing second chamber to limit what the first chamber is 
doing. Once you have that, you have the potential to end up with outcomes 
that are different to those put forward by the party in government. The out­
come might be a deal between the two chambers. Therefore there is divided 
accountability: who do the electors then hold responsible for the outcomes of 
public policy or, especially, for no outcomes of public policy if there is conflict 
and no agreement? Which body do they hold responsible? With the present 
system you get the benefit, which is quite unusual, of core accountability, be­
cause you have one body in government that is elected through elections to 
the House of Commons, and yet you get the benefits of a second chamber be­
ing able to complement the first without challenging that core accountabil­
ity. Those benefits derive from the existing system, which we think would be 
lost if the second chamber was to be elected. Having two elected chambers 
divides accountability and it delivers nothing in terms of adding value to the 
political process. You just elect a second body of politicians, which is difficult 
to justify in a unitary state. You can justify it in a federal state, because peo­
ple elect the members of the second chamber to speak for a particular state, 
a subunit of the nation. Now, in a unitary state you do not have that. Electors 
would be voting for members of the second chamber on exactly the same ba­
sis as voting for the first chamber. It would add nothing. The present arrange­
ment means that you have a second chamber that is qualitatively distinctive. 
It has the extensive expertise, the members can look at issues from a perspec­
tive different to elected politicians. It adds value to the process without chal­
lenging the fundamental supremacy of the first chamber.
On your second question about the ‘House of Cronies’, you can avoid that 
in the way that a number of people suggested. There is a movement on the 
Lords side that favours reform, but not election. We want some reform of the 
House of Lords but it not to be elected. One of the reforms is to create a stat­
utory independent appointments commission. It would not comprise mem­
bers appointed by the Prime Minister. Most members of the current non-stat- 
utory commission are independent members or come through nomination 
by other parties, but the process is not necessarily seen to be independent of 
the Prime Minister. If you have a statutory independent appointments com­
mission with responsibility for putting forward names on the basis of cer­
tain criteria, of which the main one would be outstanding quality - that they 
would have to have particular merit - there would be a high quality thresh­
old to put names forward. A commission that was independent and would
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be seen to be independent, applying a high quality threshold to nominations 
coming from the parties and being proactive in identifying and putting for­
ward the names of the independent members. There would be a general agree­
ment that no one party should have a majority in the House of Lords. And there 
should be a large independent element. The appointments commission, statu­
tory based, agreed as being independent would avoid accusations of cronyism 
and maintain the quality of the House, and doing it through a process that is 
seen to be transparent and legitimate.
• Jerzy Marcinkowski
Would not in your view a partially elected, partially appointed chamber 
be a better option?
• Lord Norton of Louth
No, it would be a worse option. Some peers take a view and some MPs take 
a view that you either have a wholly elected or a wholly appointed house and 
that a hybrid house would be the worst of both worlds, because you would have 
two types of members. What would be likely to happen is what happened to­
wards the end of the unreformed house just before 1999 when you had hered­
itary peers and life peers. Neither was elected, but life peers were seen to be 
more legitimate, because they were put there on individual merit and not be­
cause their forefathers were there. When the government suffered a defeat in 
the House of Lords the media analysed it. Who made the difference? Was it 
the hereditary peers? Because they were seen as somehow less legitimate than 
life peers, if they made the difference then somehow this diminished the vote. 
Now, if you have a partly elected house and the government is defeated then 
what would people’s comments be? How did the non-elected members vote? 
Did they make a difference? This somehow would delegitimise the vote, if they 
did make the difference to the outcome.
It is not clear what value a hybrid house would bring and it would be rather 
similar, as I have argued before, to putting the two chambers together as one, 
because you have those that are elected and those who are appointed. It is not 
clear what a hybrid would actually deliver. There would then also be some prac­
tical problems. Would the elected members be full-time politicians - in which 
case they would probably want paying a salary. Appointed members at the 
moment only get expenses; there is no salary. Many members have outside 
jobs. Are they all going to be treated the same? Are elected members going to 
be paid differently? Would they require bigger offices? There are then practi­
cal problems. But, the main difficulty I see is that of status and moving away 
from the present situation where all members are treated as equal in the house. 
I think the proposal for a hybrid house is fundamentally challenging without 




Nicholas Baldwin, the author of a number of publications on British gov­
ernment and politics, once wrote that: "... the House of Lords was not estab­
lished to meet the requirement of any particular theory of politics; it was not 
created by any national convention, and it does not owe its existence to some 
paper scheme drawn up by politicians, academics or constitutional lawyers. 
Rather it is a product of history. It has not been made; it has grown.” Is the im­
pending reform not going to change this tradition? Will such a statement still be 
valid when the second chamber’s name, composition, roles change radically?
• Lord Norton of Louth
It will be difficult to sustain the present house. Conditions will definitely 
change. There is a fundamental problem, which Dr Baldwin touched upon. 
At present, the House of Lords, he is quite right, has evolved and adapted. To 
some extent the House of Lords has almost reinvented itself to be a chamber 
that is complementary to the elected first chamber. It does not challenge the 
supremacy of the elected first chamber - it accepts the supremacy that de­
rives from election. It fulfils tasks that are complementary - that add value to 
the process - and it draws on the particular strengths of the second chamber: 
the experience and expertise that is characteristic of its membership. Now, 
the Lords was not designed in that way. But because of two statutory changes 
- the 1958 Life Peerage Act and 1999 House of Lords Act - that fundamen­
tally transformed the nature of the institution, the house has adapted to meet 
the conditions it faced. It has proved itself to be extremely adaptable. Now, 
if the second chamber were to be elected, you would have problems not just 
that it would not develop in an evolutionary manner but also that it would 
then have to be decided what exactly the functions are of the chamber and 
how will electing it enable it to fulfil these functions. How would their func­
tions be qualitatively distinctive from an elected first chamber? Reformers ar­
gue that you just keep the existing functions while electing the membership. 
However, once you have elections this changes the terms of trade between 
the two chambers. Why should elected members - who could say ‘we are 
elected so can be as legitimate as the first chamber’ - fulfil what can be seen 
as subordinate functions, and certainly less politically high profile functions 
than those of the first chamber? Elected members in the first chamber do 
work that is politically significant and thus enhances their profile. It would be 
difficult to have elected members of the second chamber doing none of this 
but carrying on doing what the present second chamber does, which is fairly 
detailed scrutinising work. You do not get any great publicity usually from 
doing that detailed work, which is why it is left at the moment to the sec­
ond chamber. The elected members would probably be seeking to do things
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not greatly dissimilar to the elected first chamber. There would be a problem 
in maintaining the functions. You would have to identify the functions of the 
elected chamber and I am not sure how qualitatively distinctive they would be. 
And certainly they would undermine what has been the nature of the house so 
far, which has been its adaptability, its ability to change in the light of changing 
conditions and retain - in fact, enhance - its relevance to the political process.
• Jerzy Marcinkowski
Robin Cook once said that: “The constitutional reality is that Britain has 
a unicameral parliamentary system concealed by an elaborately colourful, 
but pathetically irrelevant second chamber” when he referred to the undis­
puted primacy of the Commons due to the fact that the Lords have no legiti­
macy and thus no real power (p. 280). Do you agree with the view that there 
is de facto a unicameral parliamentary system in the United Kingdom?
• Lord Norton of Louth
No. Robin Cook was completely wrong and wrong on both counts. First of 
all, the second chamber is legitimate. Legitimacy does not derive solely from 
election. Legitimacy derives from popular acceptance that people are quali­
fied to do their job. We do not elect judges, we do not elect civil servants and 
we need not elect the members of the second chamber, who are there to do 
a particularly distinctive job based on their background, experience, expertise. 
Members of the second chamber are legitimate for the purpose of undertak­
ing the particular jobs that are ascribed to the second chamber. And there is 
evidence that it is popularly accepted. We have survey data that to some ex­
tent justifies that.
Second point, Robin Cook was completely wrong in terms of what the sec­
ond house does. It does have powers. What it cannot do is override the House 
of Commons if the House of Commons insists on getting a measure through. 
What the House of Lords does is not to challenge a measure in terms of ends 
but instead focuses on means. So the Lords will accept the vote of the House of 
Commons on the principle of a bill and instead will look at the detail - can it be 
improved? And that is what it focuses upon, more so than the Commons. The 
Lords procedures ensure that the house can look at the every part of the bill 
that requires scrutiny in a way that the Commons generally does not. And in 
doing that, the Lords makes more of a difference to the details of government 
bills than the House of Commons. As far as estimates are concerned, one was 
that the House of Lords, in the detail of legislation, makes twice as much dif­
ference as the House of Commons. So it has a significant impact on legislation. 
Each year, each parliamentary session, something like 3000 to 4000 amend­
ments to government Bills will be secured in the House of Lords. Without the 
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work of the House of Lords, the statute book in the United Kingdom would be 
in a far worse state than it is. Without the House of Lords we would have a mass 
of, in many respects, undigested legislation getting on to the statute book. It is 
legitimate to do the task it does, the task it does, it does rather well. It could be 
even better but what it does, it does well. And this makes the difference.
• Jerzy Marcinkowski
Some say that the second chamber is not interested in reform at all. What 
mechanisms can the House of Lords use to delay reform?
• Lord Norton of Louth
As I said, the Lords has some interest in reform, but not in election. We 
argue against election. That is why we voted for the all-appointed option 
and against all the others, as we did in 2003. Many members expressed their 
views based on a formulation I developed in the debate in which I declared 
that I would vote for the all-appointed option and vote against all the others. 
Other peers followed suit, including the then Lord Chancellor. Thus, we are 
against election by a fairly clear margin. But, we do favour reform. I drafted 
the House of Lords Bill that Lord Steel introduced this past session designed 
to achieve some changes, including a statutory independent appointments 
commission, getting rid of the by-election option for the hereditary peers, 
allowing for peers who wish to retire to apply to do so to. There are various 
changes that we would like to see and are pushing for. So we favour change, 
we are not against change per se.
How do we resist demands for election? Mainly by force of argument and 
by showing that the arguments put forward by the government are not very 
good. So, all the documents they have produced by the government, the vari­
ous white papers on the reform of the House of Lords, have generally been in­
tellectually extremely poor. And the latest one is remarkably even worse than 
the one that preceded it, which is saying something. We have developed our 
case by arguing on grounds of principle and certainly on grounds of practice 
with arguments that resonate with electors, for example that an elected sec­
ond chamber is likely to be extremely costly and will not add any value to the 
political process.
All it will add is another body of elected politicians, which people are gen­
erally not in favour of, and it would undermine the functions that the Lords 
presently fulfils and for which there is some popular support. We know from 
survey data that electors rather like the Lords for being an independent body 
and one that engages in the detailed scrutiny of legislation. Electors accord 
higher priority to carrying out these functions than they do to having an 
elected element in the house: that came only fifth in the list of priorities in 
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a recent poll. And the higher priorities can be achieved by retaining the House 
as presently constituted.
There is a political argument as well that there is very little benefit to gov­
ernment for actually going ahead and having elected an second chamber. It 
would be a lengthy process, it would get in the way of other reforms and it is 
not clear how government itself would benefit from the process. And since 
both main political parties in the House of Commons are split down the mid­
dle, it is not the best basis on which to bring forward the legislation.
• Jerzy Marcinkowski
The House of Lords Act 1999 removed all but 92 hereditary peers from 
the second chamber. In the subsequent years Blair nominated an unprece­
dented number of Labour peers. According to the data I gathered (27 August 
2008) now there are 211 Labour peers, 207 Crossbenchers, 205 Conserva­
tives, 77 Liberal Democrats. Can we say that the dominance of the Tories in 
the House of Lords has ended?
• Lord Norton of Louth
The House of Lords Act 1999 got rid of over 600 hereditary peers. Before 
1999, you had a House that was characterised by two features. One was that 
it was mainly hereditary membership - about 2/3 members were there by 
virtue of inheriting their title - and second it was a very Conservative body 
as it has been since the early 19th century. It has been predominantly a Con­
servative institution. All that changed in 1999. The 1958 Life Peerage Act 
made it possible for people to be nominated for their lifetime (and not have 
their titles pass to their heirs). By 1999, you already had about a third of the 
membership as life peers. So when you got rid of hereditary peers it trans­
formed it into a chamber predominantly of life peers. That changed the na­
ture, fundamentally. By getting rid of most hereditary peers it got rid of that 
large Conservative element. It produced a House in which no one party has 
an absolute majority. And, as the figures you indicated show, the Labour 
Party is now the largest single group in the House, but only just, and there 
are no objections to that because it is the party in government, so it is quite 
right for it to be the single largest party. As you mentioned, at the moment 
the Crossbenchers are the second largest group as a result of recent crea­
tions. They were just third but they are currently second. The Conservatives 
are almost the same. When the Conservative Party is back in government, 
there will be a few more Conservative creations to make it the largest sin­
gle party in the house. That will change the situation, but not greatly. We 
are in a situation where no one party has an absolute majority and there­
fore when the government wants to get its way it has to persuade other par­
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ties in the House to support it. They will look to the Liberal Democrats and/ 
or Crossbenchers for support. The Liberal Democrats have more effect be­
cause they vote in greater numbers in relation to their total. Crossbench­
ers are not so good at voting because they do not have the same sort of po­
litical steer on issues. But the government has to persuade those who are in 
the House to go along with it, otherwise it may lose if anything is pressed to 
a vote. That is the situation in which the Labour government finds itself. But 
a future Conservative government will find itself in an identical situation, fac­
ing an opposition of almost the same size. So, whichever party is in govern­
ment, it will face the same situation. And there is a general agreement among 
the parties that that should be the case that there should be no one party with 
an absolute majority in the House of Lords. That broad situation is basically 
accepted across the political spectrum.
• Jerzy Marcinkowski
The term ‘eurosceptic’ was coined in the United Kingdom to describe those 
representatives of the Conservative and Labour parties who were opposed to 
the European Economic Community. Nowadays, it refers to those who do not 
support the European integration. But eurosceptics differ on both their vi­
sion of Europe and on the manner in which it is perceived to fail. What are the 
characteristic features of euroscepticism in the Conservative Party and how 
can this phenomenon be described?
• Lord Norton of Louth
I would distinguish different attitudes going beyond simply European 
scepticism and supporting European integration, which would take into ac­
count the points you made about changes over time. I think you can identify 
four approaches within the party, the same I think would be in the Labour 
Party. First of all, we have what I would term anti-Europeans, you then have 
Eurosceptics, then you have Euro-agnostics and then you have Europhiles.
Anti-Europeans were those who were opposed to British membership of 
the European Community. The objection in large measure, I think, was con­
stitutional. They did not want to be a part of some supranational body. They 
wished to retain British independence. Britain, in their view, should be al­
lowed to go its own way. They wanted Britain to be like Norway rather than 
an integral part of a supranational decision-making body. So there has always 
been a group opposed to membership in the first place: people like Enoch 
Powell and John Biffen, who opposed British membership and therefore ar­
gued against the European Communities Bill when it was going through Par­
liament in 1972.
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Anti-Europeans are distinctive from Eurosceptics because they are in fa­
vour of membership. Their position is not on constitutional grounds, al­
though it comes into it, but essentially economic in that that they favour 
membership as a means of achieving a single market. It is, if you like, a free 
market orientation, one of getting rid of barriers and opening up the market. 
However, Eurosceptics, especially following Mrs Thatcher’s Brugge speech in 
1988, argue that it is the case of so far and no further’: ‘yes’ to the Commu­
nity as a means of achieving a free market and ‘no’ to it if it is going beyond 
that to create some great political edifice where, in a sense, you have a Euro­
pean government rather than simply the erosion of trade barriers. Euroscep­
tics are those who do not want to go beyond the intentions of the Single Eu­
ropean Act. That is the distinction.
The Euro-agnostics within the party, probably the largest single part in the 
party, are not strongly for or against European integration. They would prob­
ably tend to be sceptical, but would largely go along with the leadership - or 
allied to that what they see is in British interests, which should be the lead­
ership’s position. They support what is in British interests in relation to the 
European Union. That might mean negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, like 
John Major did, but being wary of going any further, and looking to the lead­
ership for advice on the issue and being willing to be persuaded. They do not 
necessarily lean toward Eurosceptics, nor toward Europhiles, but remain will­
ing to be persuaded to do what they think is in the best interests of the coun­
try. They comprise the largest part, and arguably the most important, in the 
party: it is how this body of opinion swings that determines how far the party 
can go.
And then you have Europhiles who have a principled belief in European 
integration. They want to take it further, not so much on economic grounds 
but in political terms of coming together. Many critics would say they are in 
favour of the United States of Europe. They used to be far more prominent in 
the Conservative Party, especially when Edward Heath was party leader, but 
nowadays they are very much in the minority position.
We have thus seen some change within the party. But then we have seen 
significant changes in both parties. For both main parties, European integra­
tion is not a fault-line of British politics, and both are divided on it.
• Jerzy Marcinkowski
What are the most contentious issues in the debate on the European Un­
ion within the Conservative Party?
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• Lord Norton of Louth
How far integration is taken. I do not think there is any problem with is­
sues like enlargement. The party has favoured that because both sides can 
agree that is a good thing looking from slightly different perspectives. But 
that has not ever been a big issue. Things like Eastern expansion including 
Turkey in general parties have been sympathetic towards. That has not been 
the issue, it is how far the integration has been taken.
Two elements to that. One political and one economic. The political is the 
structures within the EU, how much further powers do you give them to cre­
ate the equivalent of a foreign minister, president, things like that. How much 
do you then bind that within some sort of a constitutional arrangements, 
constitutional treaty. There is a resistance to taking that further. That is the 
political one. The economic one is economic union. Particularly, their resist­
ance to joining the Euro zone. If we go down that route, anyway, a referen­
dum is promised. The government has got itself in a fix, because it probably 
would not win, therefore it is probably not going to end up going down that 
route. But in any event there is resistance to greater economic union. That 
badly split the Conservative party, including during the general election in 
1992, when it became an issue whether one should say to the European Un­
ion: ‘Well, not now’ as opposed to those who wanted us to say: ‘Never’. And 
that has caused quite a rift within the party.
• Jerzy Marcinkowski
Some have noticed that the Tories ceased to argue publicly over the Euro­
pean Union. Is this a sign that the eurosceptical faction in the Conservative 
Party came to terms with the inevitable changes or do not want to lose votes 
among the pro-European electorate?
• Lord Norton of Louth
The party was divided on Europe, badly divided, and electors do not re­
ward divided parties. The party needed to reduce the significance of Europe 
or European integration as an issue for political purposes. Therefore, the 
leaders have played down pledges somewhat and rather emulated the Labour 
party to some extent by saying that they would not do that without a referen­
dum. That is the way of putting it to one side. Both sides will say we can wait 
and then we argue our case in those circumstances. So it has been a deliber­
ate approach by the party leadership to downplay the issue because it is not 
politically rewarding. Even though the party stand may coincide with popular 
opinion. Nonetheless, it is still politically damaging, because the party is di­
vided and the electors do not reward a divided party. And at times the party 
also looked a little extreme in its stance. Even if electors agree with the stance 
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they do not like a party that looks extreme. The perception of being extreme 
derives from a combination of things, but it is politically unwise for European 
integration to be such a high profile and divisive issue. And the party badly 
split on the issue in 1997 and did not really want to go back to that situation.
• Jerzy Marcinkowski
David Cameron once used the term British “broken society”. How can this 
be understood?
• Lord Norton of Louth
Well, I suspect the term depends on who you are asking as to its mean­
ing. There is a problem with British society. I am not so sure the society as 
a whole is broken but there are elements of society which are problematic. It 
is a definitional and a relative problem. Is it much more broken than it was? 
Because some of the social problems we can see now you could see in ear­
lier years, just in a slightly different form. Every generation perceives there is 
a problem with young people. We have always had the perception of that 
problem. There is a problem that takes different forms. But, I think, what he 
is focusing upon is to some extent a lack of social cohesion through the dis­
integration of groups. It has always been a Conservative axiom that you build 
up society from what we call little battalions. It is families, social groups, lo­
cal organisations. They are the means through which people are integrated 
into society and learn social skills. There has been a tremendous emphasis 
on bodies like that. And there is a perception that they are diminishing sig­
nificantly. You need to re-establish them. Move it away from the state which 
tends to tell people how to behave and adopts a one side fits all’ framework 
for social development. Instead leave it to the locality. Get people involved 
through local groups and at the same time through that it is a way of inte­
grating and it is a way of developing social responsibility, tackling the danger­
ous disintegration of the family and too many isolated young people without 
a sense of social responsibility.
It is really integrating a lot of young people into society when they ap­
pear to be isolated from it. We have always had these people. It is a matter 
of scale, becoming more pronounced, you see it in certain figures - number 
of broken homes, teenage pregnancies, things like that. It is how you address 
those problems through restoring local pride and repairing the local bodies 
through which people can be integrated into society.
I think that is a possible solution. And addressing one of the modern prob­
lems like the Internet, which on the one hand is a great communication tool, 
on the other hand is massively antisocial. People spend their time in front of 
the screen, they have no social interaction, do not develop social skills. They 
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are isolated. It also creates problems in the political system that is not geared 
to that at all. Arguably we get this divorce between individuals, young people 
and the political process which is not geared to how they now operate. That 
is how I would see what David Cameron is getting at. There is that broken el­
ement which does not mean it is a whole society. But there is a problem and 
the perception that this is a growing problem. That always has been an issue 
to which the Conservatives have been very sensitive to the need to maintain 
cohesive society. And they have always been worried at the signs of discord 
or problems.
• Jerzy Marcinkowski
To the vast majority of voters, the EU is not an important issue for the 
country. As far as the Conservative Party is concerned, what are the issues of 
highest importance for the United Kingdom?
• Lord Norton of Louth
You are quite right. People may have strong views on European Union, 
but do not give it priority. That has always been a problem. Because there has 
been a danger of the party looking at opinion polls. But if you ask them what 
is their priority EU is not at the top of the list, certainly not at the moment.
A range of issues resonate with the electors. These include public services, 
because there has always been an attachment to things like the NHS and now 
there seems to be a problem with more and more public money invested in 
the NHS but delivering less. Thus, the NHS, but public services generally is 
an issue. Not necessarily giving these priority, but they are certainly seen as 
more important than European integration. Then there is the fear of crime.
According to official figures, the crime rate is decreasing, but politically 
what is important is not the figures, but the perception. And people are al­
ways worried about crime. So, fear of crime is important. People want to feel 
safe in their neighbourhoods. Perception that there are people around that 
make problems.
I think with many education is an issue. How do you improve the quality 
of the education system: primary and secondary education? Those are par­
ticular issues.
At the moment, clearly becoming the big issue is the state of the economy. 
Once you have an economic downturn, people wonder: how am I going to be 
able to afford goods, survive, and pay the mortgage? Is my job under threat? 
There are longer term issues like retirement. Is it going to be more difficult to 
retire? Problems with pensions and things like that.
The economy, particularly at the moment, is rushing up to the top of the 
agenda and is certainly causing the government unpopularity. If the economy
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continues badly the Labour government stands little chance of winning the 
next election. The economy is very much coming to the foreground.
• Jerzy Marcinkowski
The Conservative Party that played a major role in British politics during 
the 20th century suffered a landslide defeat in 1997. Is it legitimate to say that 
the issue of Europe led to this situation?
• Lord Norton of Louth
No! I shall tell you what did, this is something that I have actually written 
in terms what made the Conservative successful and what resulted in disas­
trous defeat.
Why was the Conservative party so successful in the 20th century? There 
are essentially four variables specific to the party and a fifth that is external 
to it. The main variable has been that the party has been able to convey that 
it is a party of governance. In other words, it has been able to handle well the 
affairs of the nation, particularly its financial affairs. It was able to convey - 
which does not mean it was good at it — but it was effective in conveying that 
it was good in running the country, it was a party of governance. Now, this 
first and foremost is the most important variable. As long as the party han­
dled the economy well, it was supported and for most of the century it was in 
government. But there are still three other variables.
One is a united party, another is strong leadership and the fourth is public 
service. The party seemed to be working for the public good rather than for 
self-interest. Over the 20th century, the Conservative Party was generally seen 
as the best party for handling the affairs of the nation. It was a fairly united 
party. There were exceptions, like at the beginning of the century over free 
trade and tariff reform, but generally it has been a fairly united party. Elec­
tors prefer a united party to a divided one. Strong leadership has always been 
a characteristic feature of the Conservative Party, with the party looking to 
the leader to determine policy and deliver electoral success. And public serv­
ice on the part of the leader and other parliamentarians was another feature 
of the party: they were there to serve the nation and not to further their own 
interests.
Then there is the fifth, external, variable, and that is that the Party has 
been very fortunate in its opponents. They generally split at times that were 
opportune for the Conservative Party. Those splits (in the Liberal Party in the 
late 19th century and early in the 20th century, and later in the Labour Party) 
were extremely beneficial. Now, when those variables have come together the 




Now, at the end of the 20th century, what happens? There is the ignomini­
ous withdrawal from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992, with a collapse 
of confidence in the government, with the Conservative Party no longer 
seen as being the competent party in handling affairs of the nation. After 
withdrawal from the ERM, public support for the party collapsed. For the 
first time, when people were asked which party would be better in handling 
the nation’s economy, Labour started coming up out top. This had not hap­
pened before. So that was the fundamental thing. At the same time, you got 
a disunited party divided over Europe and not only over Europe, but espe­
cially badly divided over Europe. Related to that, it proved difficult to provide 
strong leadership at a time when the party was split down the middle. Sleaze 
also became an issue, with the public perception that MPs were more con­
cerned with making money for themselves than they were with pursuing the 
public good. The split over Europe, problems with leadership and sleaze were 
not the cause of the party’s unpopularity. What they did, though, was to rein­
force it. Fundamentally, it was the perception that the party was not the party 
of governance that was at the root of the party’s problems. There was the view 
on the part of electors that the party could not be trusted in the handling of 
the economy. Therefore, they were not voting for it.
When you look at what happened, Labour then became the ‘in’ party, be­
cause it was seen as the party of governance. It replaced the Conservatives as 
the party of governance. It seemed to be handing the economy well, it could 
be trusted. It came into power fairly united, with a strong leader in Tony Blair. 
And what was helping was that the Conservative Party was in disarray. The 
conditions were completely reversed.
It has taken ten years for the Conservative Party to come to terms with 
this situation. It is always difficult to show you are a party of governance when 
you are in opposition, but under David Cameron the party has started to 
achieve that turnaround. It was not achieved under the three predecessors. 
William Hague, lain Duncan Smith, Michael Howard were not able to reverse 
the party’s fortunes. David Cameron recognised what needs to be done as 
a long term solution and is starting to reverse the fortunes of the party, aided 
by the very fact that Labour is now jeopardising its claim to be a party of gov­
ernance. The economy is doing badly. Labour is no longer seen as being the 
party able to deliver economic success. The Conservatives now are overtak­
ing it as the party is seen to be more competent. The party is now coming 
back to being its old self, the party of governance, a status that was lost in 
1992. That is the situation. It is not Europe that is responsible for the party’s 
earlier defeat. It is the collapse in trust in government in handling the affairs 
of the nation. It did not cause the party to lose. It may have contributed to the 
scale of the defeat, but not to the fact of defeat.
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• Jerzy Marcinkowski
Is it justified to say that 35 years after the United Kingdom joined the EU 
its traditional constitutional system has been revolutionised? Acts of Parlia­
ment are now checked if they do not breach European law.
• Lord Norton of Louth
Indeed. It has changed fundamentally, because it is at odds with the funda­
mentals of the British constitution. At the heart of the constitution is the doc­
trine of Parliamentary sovereignty. It means that the outputs of Parliament are 
binding, they can be set aside by nobody other than Parliament itself. That is 
intrinsic to our constitutional arrangements and it was confirmed by the Glo­
rious Revolution of 1688-1689. It is a well-established intrinsic feature.
You are quite right to imply that the membership in the European Com­
munity fundamentally challenges that. Under the terms of membership, Eu­
ropean law takes priority over United Kingdom law. In the event of conflict, 
that conflict is resolved by the courts and they give priority to European law. 
The implication therefore, clearly, which was not properly realised when we 
joined the European Community, was that the courts would be able to strike 
down provisions of British law that conflicted with European law. That, even­
tually, happened in the 1990s, e.g. the EOC case in 1994, when a provision of 
the British law was struck down as being contrary to the European law. It was 
a natural consequence of membership, but it took quite a lot of people by sur­
prise when it actually happened.
Yes, it does not sit well with the doctrine of the Parliamentary sovereignty. 
The doctrine itself remains extant because the reason the courts can do what 
they do is because Parliament gave them the power to do so by passing 1972 
European Communities Act which gave effect in domestic law to our mem­
bership. Parliament could formally repeal the 1972 Act, the consequence of 
which would be our withdrawal from the Community. What the courts are 
doing in striking down acts of Parliament is exercising the power given to 
them by the Parliament. In that sense, the doctrine remains in place. Parlia­
ment could take away the power it has given to the courts.
However, as long as the Act of 1972 stays - in other words, so long as 
the UI< is a member of the European Union - the courts have this power to 
strike down the British law. The effect of membership, I have argued, provided 
a new judicial dimension to the British constitution. It was our membership in 
the European Community that gave the courts a role they have never had before. 
It does not sit particularly well with our constitutional arrangements, so there 
is that inherent conflict as part of our constitutional arrangements.
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Dissonant Federalism, Consonant Nationalism? 
The Impact of the European Union on the Devolving 
Constitution of the United Kingdom
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the way in which EU member­
ship has had a strong impact on the development of British devolution over 
the last ten years. Limits of time and space only permit consideration of 
how Scotland and Wales have used their powers with respect to EU policy- 
making.1 The author’s main contention is that the British model of devolu­
tion may develop into a dissonant federalism while simultaneously creating 
a consonant constitutional nationalism in both Scotland and Wales within 
the overarching context of European integration.1 2
1 On Northern Ireland, see e.g., B. Hadfield, Northern Ireland - Political Process: Peace Process?, “Euro­
pean Public Law” 1998, No. 4, p. 451.
2 Such discussion naturally falls within the confines of the perennial issue of multi-level governance in the Un­
ion: See, e.g., The Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards a Third Level?, ed. C. Jeffrey, London 
1997; The Transformation of Governance in the EU, eds. B. Kohler-Koch, R. Eising, London 1999; Gover­
nance in the EU, eds. G. Marks et al., London 1996; N. Nugent, W. Paterson, The Political System of the Eu­
ropean Union, [in:] Governing Europe, eds. J. Hayward, A. Menon, Oxford 2003, p. 92-113.
3 A. Ross, M. Salvador Crespo, The effect ofdevolution on the implementation of European Community law in Spain 
and the United Kingdom, “European Law Review” 2003, No. 28, p. 210; A. Sbragia, Italy Pays for Europe: Po­
litical Leadership, Political Choice, and Institutional Adaptation, [in:] Transforming Europe: Europeaniza­
tion and Domestic Change, eds. M. Cowles, J. Caporaso, T. Risse, Ithaca 2001, p. 79—96.
4 Kottman refers to the UK as a devolving unitary State: J. Kottman, Europe and the regions: sub-national 
entity representation at Community level, “European Law Review” 2001, No. 26, p. 159-160.
5 J. Hopkins, Devolution from a Comparative Perspective, “European Public Law” 1998, No. 4, p. 323.
Spain and Italy already present a type of federalism which is “uneven,” 
“asymmetrical” or “disjunctive” with different autonomies enjoying different 
sets of rights.3 A similar effect has been caused through devolution within the 
United Kingdom since the coming to power of the New Labour government 
in 1997 and the creation of devolved executives and legislatures following 
simple majority referenda in Wales and Scotland in September 1997. These 
devolved authorities exist above the local level but only enjoy a certain degree 
of constitutional protection and autonomy.4
Devolution in the United Kingdom clearly follows a decentralising trend 
that is apparent in many other EU Member States,5 partially based on the idea 
that EU regional policy is best put into effect if strong sub-national govern-
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ment is actively involved in the decision-making process.6 Nevertheless, the 
British model is based on peculiar historical and politico-cultural approaches 
whereby, since devolution, the Westminster Parliament has retained its abil­
ity to legislate on all matters for the whole country pursuant to the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, a uniquely British solution. The creation of Brit­
ain’s state-centric system of multi-level governance has generated and will 
continue to generate a specific set of institutional factors.7 With the continu­
ing presence of the centre (located in Whitehall) in all aspects of devolved or 
transferred EU policy, the development of regional input and responsibili­
ties by the devolved institutions8 must therefore be seen in sharp contrast to 
those regional governments in other EU States which hold exclusive compe­
tence for the generation and/or implementation of EU policy in certain fields 
(e.g., Austria, Germany, Spain, Italy and Belgium).9
6 A. Cyngan, Scotland’s Parliament and European affairs: some lessons from Germany, “European Law 
Review” 1999, No. 24, p. 483, at 483.
7 C. Carter, Making Multi-Level Governance work?, “Manchester Papers in Politics: Devolution and Eu­
ropean Policy Series” 2003, No. 5, p. 6.
8 See generally C. Jeffery, Sub-National Mobilization and European Integration, “Journal of Common 
Market Studies” 2000, No. 38, p. 1.
’ See, e.g., T. Borzel, States and Regions in the European Union. Institutional Adaptation in Germany and 
Spain, Cambridge 2002.
10 Act of Union 1536, c. 3, 28 Hen. VIII, as further defined and revised by the Act of Union 1543, c. 26, 34 
& 35 Hen. VIII.
11 Wales had been annexed to the English Crown by the Statute of Rhuddlan (Wales) 1284,12 Edw. I.
Historical nature of dissonance in the British constitutional system
The asymmetrical relations of Scotland and Wales in the United 
Kingdom are based on history, means of incorporation and developed 
bureaucratic interrelations
Wales was the first peripheral nation to enter into union with England in 
153610 (having been effectively taken over by military conquest and royal an­
nexation in the thirteenth century11) and followed about 50 years after the 
coming to the English throne of the Welsh House of Tudor. In the absence of 
any strong central institutions including a single effective ruler or parliament, 
Welsh unity - dogged by its mountainous geography - had been based rather 
on ancient cultural and legal affinities. It was fully integrated into England’s 
administrative structures (including the county system, courts and law), al­
though in the 20th century a legal provision was made to recognise the distinc- 
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tive Welsh traditions as regards religion12 and language.13 A revival of Welsh 
national cultural consciousness (along with those in Scotland and Ireland) 
gathered speed in the late 19th century followed by a successful political na­
tionalist revival in the form of Plaid Cymru (the “Party of Wales”) founded 
in 1925, with its first Westminster MPs elected in 1966. One of the Party’s 
present aims is to promote the constitutional advancement of Wales with 
a view to attaining full national status for Wales within the European Union. 
Since the 2007 Welsh elections, Plaid Cymru has been in coalition govern­
ment with the Welsh Labour Party.
12 Disestablishment of the Anglican Church of Wales: Welsh Church Act 1914, c. 91, 4 & 5 Geo. V.
13 Welsh Language Act 1967, c.66; and the Welsh Language Act 1993, c. 38.
14 Act of Union 1707: Union with Scotland Act 1706, c. 11, 6 Ann.
15 P. Hogwood, Devolution in the UK: A Step Towards Fédéralisation?, “Manchester Papers in Politics: Dev­
olution and European Policy Series” 2003, No. 4, p. 7.
In comparison, Scotland entered into union with England in 170714 as an 
independent (and ostensibly equal) kingdom within the new Great Britain, 
having itself provided a common monarch for both kingdoms over the pre­
vious 100 years from the Scottish House of Stuart. Under the terms of the 
Union, Scotland retained its own state church (the Presbyterian or Calvin­
ist Church of Scotland), together with its own laws and legal system, education 
(including its universities) and local government structures. As with Wales and 
Ireland, a reassertion of national cultural identity in the 19th century preceded 
a political renaissance in the 20th with the founding of the Scots National League 
in 1920 in favour of Scottish independence: this movement was superseded 
in 1928 by the formation of the National Party of Scotland, which became 
the Scottish National Party (“SNP”) in 1934. At first the SNP sought only 
the establishment of a devolved Scottish assembly, but in 1942 they changed 
this to support all-out independence. The SNP now forms the Scottish Gov­
ernment following upon the 2007 Scottish elections and promotes indepen­
dence within the European Union.
The relationship between the central administration of the British State, 
located in Whitehall (London), and its territorial departments - the Scot­
tish Office and the Welsh Office - reflected this different pattern of incorpo­
ration. Although both Offices - as departments of the British government - 
enjoyed their own Secretaries of State (cabinet ministers), the Scottish Office 
had been founded earlier, enjoyed wider discretion in action and was better 
resourced than its Welsh counterpart. This differentiation clearly indicated 
the central government’s greater readiness to acknowledge Scottish national 
distinctiveness than Welsh national distinctiveness,15 a matter which still 
persists to this day.
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UK-EU policy universe: Pre-devolution Scottish and Welsh input
Before the introduction of Labour’s devolution plans, the hallmark of the 
British approach to EU policy-making was a highly centralised system, fo­
cused on and substantially contained within central (national) government 
centred in London (and particularly Whitehall), comprising a limited number 
of highly specialised participants that were members of an experienced inner 
core of actors: this inner core dominated European policy-making within the 
United Kingdom.16 The exclusivity of this club in the formation of the UK’s 
position to EU policies is best described by Bulmer and Burch.17
16 S. Bulmer, M. Burch, British Devolution and European Policy-Making: A Step-Change towards Multi­
Level Governance?, “Manchester Papers in Politics: EPRU Series” 2002, No. 2, p. 12.
17 Ibidem, pp. 8-9.
18 Ibidem, pp. 9-11.
19 S. Bulmer, M. Burch, Organisingfor Europe - Whitehall, the British State and the European Union, “Pub­
lic Administration” 1998, No. 76, p. 601; S. Bulmer, M. Burch, The Europeanisation of British Central Gov­
ernment, [in:] Transforming British Government, ed. R. Rhodes, Vol. 1: Changing Institutions, Basingstoke 
2000, pp. 46-62.
The coordination of policy as well as a measure of oversight was 
achieved through a small central secretariat in the Cabinet Office (the 
European Secretariat). Its three or four top personnel plus legal ad­
visers along with key players in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) 
and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the UK’s Perma­
nent Representative to the European Communities formed the hub of 
the government’s European policy making network. These personnel, 
both ministerial and official, plus one or two others from the Treasury 
and the two Departments most consistently and substantially involved 
in European matters, dealing with agriculture and trade and indus­
try, formed the inner core of the network. Formally speaking coordi­
nation was achieved through a tiered system of cabinet committees 
at both ministerial and official levels. This coordinating net stretched 
out into Brussels through the UK Permanent Representation to the 
EU (UKRep), and engaged as the need arose, depending on the nature of 
the issue, personnel in other domestic Departments. At first, other than 
those Departments already mentioned, very few others were involved.
In typical Whitehall fashion, this limited policy-making universe started 
to expand and evolve over time.18 Thus the Scottish and Welsh Offices were 




Although EU policies had a great impact on key areas within their numer­
ous policy functions, the Scottish and Welsh Offices (two of the “territorial 
Departments of State”) were too small, too far from the centre in Whitehall 
- sometimes even neglected by it.20 While ministers and officials in the ter­
ritorial Departments were part of the UK/EU information net, they had no 
Departmental lead on European issues of any significance since that lay with 
the relevant UI< Departments - they were nonetheless part of the collective 
decision-making process within Whitehall.21 Despite the disadvantages faced 
by the territorial Departments, they gradually adopted a more pro-active ap­
proach to EU policy formation - with the Scottish Office in particular seek­
ing to expand its participation in Cabinet Office co-ordination mechanisms 
and in the Brussels arena:
20 S. Bulmer, M. Burch, British Devolution and European Policy-Making: A Step-Change Towards Multi­
level Governance?, “Politique Européenne” 2002, No. 6, pp. 114-124.
21 Ibidem, p. 11.
22 R. Gomez et al., European Union Policy Making in the UK: A Brief History, “Manchester Papers in Poli­
tics: Devolution and European Policy Series” 2003, No. 5, p. 14.
23 C. Carter, The Formulation of UK-EU Policy Post-Devolution: A Transformative Model of Governance?, 
“Manchester Papers in Politics: Devolution and European Policy Making Series” 2002, No. 3, p. 2.
24 Generally, M. Keating, Nations Against the State: the New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia 
and Scotland, 2n<1 ed., Basingstoke 2001.
European Union policies, notably the Structural Funds, encour­
aged direct links with the Commission and opened up new opportu­
nities for the territorial ministries [to] assert their interests beyond 
their traditional, narrow concerns with EU agriculture and fisheries 
policies. While the territorials remained at the periphery of UI< pol­
icy making, the 1990s saw increasing recognition on their part of the 
benefits of dealing independently with Brussels.22
As a result, the political appeal of a direct relationship with the EU was to 
prove significant as the devolution process got underway in the late 1990s.
British model of devolution
Despite the trends of decentralisation of policy-making and implementa­
tion evident in other EU Member States, UI< devolution was predominantly 
driven by domestic factors.23 The political division of the United Kingdom 
in the 1980s and 1990s had seen successive Conservative governments un­
able to command the support of voters in Scotland and Wales, the major­
ity of which voted for the Labour Party (together with the Liberal Democrats 
and nationalist parties).24 The feeling of being effectively disenfranchised in­
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creased demands for devolved government in the United Kingdom. By ad­
dressing this issue on coming to power in 1997, the Labour Government at­
tempted to adapt the British State to the changing political landscape and so 
try to reinforce the Union against the separatist threats posed by the Scottish 
and Welsh nationalists.25
25 C. Carter, The Formulation ofUK-EU Policy Post-Devolution: A Transformative Model of Governance?, 
“Manchester Papers in Politics: Devolution and European Policy Making Series” 2002, No. 3, p. 2.
26 George Robertson, June 1996, cited in M. Keating, What’s wrong with asymmetrical government?, [in:] 
Remaking the Union. Devolution and British Politics in the 1990s, eds. H. Elcock, M. Keating, London- 
Portland 1998, p. 195-206.
27 S. Bulmer, M. Burch, British Devolution and European Policy-Making: A Step-Change towards Multi­
Level Governance?, 'Manchester Papers in Politics: EPRU Series” 2002, No. 2, p. 15.
28 A. Evans, UK devolution and EU law, “European Law Review” 2003, No. 23, p. 475. See Scotland Act, 
s. 28 (7).
29 P. Hogwood et al., Devolution and EU Policy Making: The Territorial Challenge, “Public Policy and Ad­
ministration” 2000, No. 15, p. 81; M. Keating, What’s wrong with asymmetrical government?, [in:] Remak-
In so acting, the Labour Party did not consider the introduction of devo­
lution as a step towards fédéralisation of the British Constitution and forms 
of governance. Although mindful of accommodating claims by the three na­
tions for more effective self-governance, the Party clearly intended to pre­
serve the Union (and with it the principle of parliamentary sovereignty):
The UI< Parliament will of course remain sovereign, but the es­
sence of devolution is that for the better government of our country, 
certain powers are passed on to an elected Scottish Parliament. That 
is what devolution means - that all Westminster MPs decide that 
they should exercise some of their powers relating to Scottish affairs 
by devolving them to a parliament set up by them for that purpose. 
And it follows from that that the devolution legislation will explicitly 
recognise the fact of parliamentary sovereignty.26
Nevertheless, as Bulmer and Burch observed: “In effect, devolution marks 
an end of the UI< unitary, centralised state.”27 As a result, the design of devolved 
power and policy-formation in the UK is unique in the European Union.
The British model of devolution was so designed as to secure asymmetri­
cal decentralisation of power in the UK while respecting the principle of par­
liamentary sovereignty.28
Under the devolution legislation of the late 1990s, each nation has a dis­
tinctive constitutional arrangement, with the range and nature of powers de­
volved to the receiving territorial authorities being consistent with the ex­




This asymmetric, disjunctive or dissonant nature of devolution further re­
flects both historical relations as well as the perceived different demands for 
power in Scotland and Wales (together with Northern Ireland).
Scotland on the one hand gained the broader and more substantial mea­
sure of devolution with a wider range of policy fields transferred - basically 
in line with the areas previously administered by the Scottish Office - and full 
power to develop primary legislation in these fields. Moreover, Scotland fol­
lows the Westminster model whereby parliamentary and executive functions 
are distinct. Under the 1998 Scotland Act,30 the Scottish Parliament is able to 
make binding laws without seeking permission from Westminster but only in 
the areas devolved by Westminster. The Scotland Act contains a list of pow­
ers reserved for the UI< Parliament, including foreign affairs, and the Scottish 
Parliament may not pass any enactment contrary to the 1972 European Com­
munities Act: everything not on the list of reserved powers is devolved to the 
Scottish Parliament. It also remains possible to transfer matters to and from 
the reserved list if both Parliaments agree. One important power is the Scot­
tish Parliament s possibility of varying the level of UI< income tax in Scotland, 
by an increase or reduction of 3%.
Wales on the other hand saw a narrower range of functions inherited by 
its National Assembly31 from the Welsh Office and only had power to make 
secondary legislation within the parameters set by the Westminster Parlia­
ment. Moreover, the Assembly itself was originally a corporate body where, 
at least in theory (the practice evolved otherwise) the executive and parlia­
mentary functions were combined. According to the Government of Wales 
Act 1998,32 the Welsh Assembly had powers to make secondary legislation. 
The basic framework of the law was set down in primary legislation in Acts 
of Parliament, within which the Secretary of State for Wales previously made 
rules and regulations in secondary legislation. The Assembly possessed no 
powers over taxation, macro-economic policy, defence and foreign policy, 
social security, or police and legal affairs. Following a review of the powers 
and operation for the National Assembly for Wales (“NAW”),33 the resultant
ing the Union. Devolution and British Politics in the 1990s, eds. H. Elcock, M. Keating, London-Portland 
1998, p. 195-218.
30 Scotland Act 1998, c. 46.
31 A. Sherlock, Wales - The Establishment of the National Assembly for Wales, "European Public Law" 1999, 
No. 5, p. 42.
32 Government of Wales Act 1998, c. 38.
33 A. Sherlock, Wales - Reviewing the Welsh Devolution Settlement, “European Public Law” 2004, No. 10, 
p. 237.
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Government of Wales Act 200634 formally separated the NAW as a legisla­
ture and the Welsh Assembly Government as an executive. In addition, it en­
hanced the powers for the NAW through a streamlined procedure, enabling 
the Westminster Parliament to give the NAW powers to modify legislation 
or make new provision on specific matters or defined areas of policy within 
fields in which the NAW formerly exercised functions. Moreover, the 2006 
Act allows the NAW to gain primary legislative powers following a post-leg­
islative referendum. This could be triggered first by a two-thirds majority of 
the NAW members and secondly be a vote in the Westminster Parliament.
34 Government of Wales Act 2006, c. 32.
35 A. Evans, UK devolution and EU law, “European Law Review” 2003, No. 28, p. 475.
36 Scotland Act 1998, Sch. 5, Part I, para. 7.
37 Scotland Act 1998, s. 29 (2) (a).
38 Scotland Act 1998, s. 29 (2) (d). Cf. Government of Wales Act 1998, c. 106 (7).
3S Scotland Act 1998, Sch. 5, Part I, para. 7 (1); Welsh Office, A Voicefor Wales: The Government’s Proposal 
for a Welsh Assembly, Stationery Office, Cardiff (1997), Cm. 3718, para. 3.46.
40 C. Carter, The Formulation of UK-EU Policy Post-Devolution: A Transformative Model of Governance?, 
“Manchester Papers in Politics: Devolution and European Policy Making Series” 2002, No. 3, p. 3.
UK-EU policy universe: Post-devolution Scottish and Welsh input
(a) Devolved administrative and executive input
Importantly from the point of view of EU policy-making, about 80% of the 
competences that have so far been devolved to the Scottish and Welsh insti­
tutions - including fisheries, agriculture, environmental policy and economic 
development - are policies for which the EU has a competence.35 Although 
observation and implementation of EU law are devolved, relations with the 
EU and its institutions are “excepted” from devolution.36 The devolved institu­
tions may not adopt legislation dealing with an excepted matter37 or legislate 
contrary to EU law.38 As a result, the UK Government has kept the right to ne­
gotiate in all matters (including devolved policies) at the EU level39 and its le­
gal power to issue secondary legislation for both Scotland and Wales in order 
to implement or transpose EU law were this to prove to be necessary.
Consequently, while devolution has radically altered the policy-making 
universe for EU matters in the UI< - with a much greater number of actors 
jostling for position to provide inputs into that system - nevertheless the 
British model for handling EU business between the central and devolved in­
stitutions arguably remains one defined by an a priori state-driven UK Gov­
ernment agenda40: thus Whitehall may “control” the devolved institutions in 
accordance with its own policy preferences.
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Problems associated with the preservation of effective parliamentary sov­
ereignty in relation to EU matters are prominent in political agreements be­
tween London on the one hand, and Edinburgh and Cardiff on the other, 
known as the Memorandum of Understanding and the Supplementary 
Agreements (“MoU”).41 These agreements delineate a clear role for the de­
volved institutions and make it clear that their relation with the UI< Govern­
ment is to be one of good communication, cooperation and open information 
exchange. Such relationship rests on a high degree of goodwill at the political 
level and a high degree of coordination at the level of officials.
41 Cabinet Office, Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements Between the United 
Kingdom Government, Scottish Ministers, the Cabinet of the National Assembly of Wales and the Northern 
Ireland Executive Committee, CM 4444, HMSO, London (1999); a revised version appeared in CM 5240 
(2001). Reference is hereinafter made to the revised Memorandum of Understanding as “2001 MoU.”
42 2001 MoU, Part I, para. 3; Part II, Section A (Agreement on the Joint Ministerial Committee).
43 C. Carter, Making Multi-Level Governance work?, “Manchester Papers in Politics: Devolution and Eu­
ropean Policy Series” 2003, No. 5, p. 8.
44 R. Rawlings, Concordats of the Constitution, “Law Quarterly Review” 2000, No. 116, p. 257.
45 Concordat on Co-ordination of European Policy Issues, Scotland-. 2001 MoU, Part II, Section B.l; Concordat 
on Co-ordination of European Policy Issues, Wales: 2001 MoU, Part II, Section B.2. A Common Annex to each 
bilateral EU Concordat for all three peripheral nations is also provided: 2001 MoU, Part II, Section B.4.
46 These Concordats are not legally binding: 2001 MoU, Part I, para. 2.
The Memorandum of Understanding covers the establishment of a Joint 
Ministerial Committee42 on Europe (“JMC(E)”) which is chaired by the For­
eign Secretary. It is intended as a forum for Scottish and Welsh executive 
members to be able to discuss EU-related issues with Whitehall colleagues 
and as a vehicle for resolving any conflicts of interest between the UI< Gov­
ernment and the devolved institutions.
In such circumstances, the Secretaries of State for Scotland and for Wales, 
still members of the British cabinet, may play an important mediating role. 
Through the JMC(E), the Scottish and Welsh executives have an opportunity 
to express a view on EU matters and help shape the overall UI< position on 
EU issues. This Committee now regularly meets before a European Council 
meeting.43
The Supplementary Agreements include bilateral Concordats44 on Co­
ordination of European Policy Issues between the UK Government on the 
one side and, inter alia, the Scottish Ministers and the Welsh Cabinet, on the 
other.45 Each EU Concordat46 covers the provision of information; the for­
mulation of UI< policy; attendance at the Council of the EU and related meet­
ings; the implementation of EU obligations and infraction proceedings.
379
EUROPEAN UNION AND STATE POLITICAL SYSTEMS
From the beginning, each Concordat states that the UK Government47 - 
wishes to involve the Scottish Executive [or Welsh Assembly Cabinet] as di­
rectly and fully as possible in decision-making on EU matters which touch on 
devolved areas (including non-devolved matters which impact on devolved 
areas and non-devolved matters which will have a distinctive impact of im­
portance in Scotland [or Wales]).
47 Scotland EU Concordat: 2001 MoU, Part II, para. Bl.3; Wales EU Concordat: 2001 MoU, Part II, para. 
B2.3.
48 2001 MoU, Part II, para. B4.13.
49 2001 MoU, Part II, paras. B4.12-B4.15.
50 2001 MoU, Part I, para. 11.
These EU Concordats emphasise the necessity for information exchange 
and consultation between the UK Government and devolved authorities with 
respect to UK participation in EU decision-making: “In reaching decisions on 
the composition of the UK team, the lead [UK] Minister will take into account 
that the devolved administrations should have a role to play in meetings of the 
Council of Ministers at which substantive discussion is expected of matters 
likely to have a significant impact on their devolved responsibilities.”48
Scottish and Welsh Government members can,49 where appropriate, par­
ticipate in Council meetings as part of the UK delegation and even speak 
in the Council, albeit only on behalf of the United Kingdom as the Mem­
ber State. Such Scottish and Welsh Government members may only partici­
pate in Council meeting by invitation, with the lead UK Government Minis­
ter making decisions on attendance on a case-by-case basis. The UK Minister 
consequently retains overall responsibility for the negotiations and deter­
mines the optimum way of securing the pre-agreed and unified “UK line” in 
EU policy-making. The EU Concordats also underline the need for inter-in­
stitutional confidentiality during the formulation of the UK line, referring to 
a “duty of confidence” and “legal requirements of confidentiality.”50 The Scot­
tish and Welsh executive members are accordingly constrained by the oper­
ation of the MoU, the Concordats, the devolved legislation and EC Art. 203 
(that impliedly requires adoption by a Member State of a single policy line in 
the Council) to follow the UK negotiating position without deviation or ad­
verse comment.
(b) Scottish and Welsh parliamentary input
One of the main institutional innovations achieved through devolution 




occur at the devolved level.51 Both the Scottish Parliament52 and the National 
Assembly of Wales (“NAW”)53 - particularly through their respective Euro­
pean and External Relations Committees (“EERCs”) — have sought to develop 
a more democratic and legitimately-informed Scottish or Welsh UK-EU pol­
icy in those fields of especial importance to the two peripheral nations - e.g. 
agriculture, fisheries, and economic development.54
51 2001 MoU, Part II, paras. B4.31-B4.33. See C. Carter, Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation State: 
Third-Level Assemblies and Scrutiny of European Legislation, "European Public Law” 2000, No. 6, p. 429.
52 A. Cyngan, Scotland's Parliament and European affairs: some lessons from Germany, “European Law 
Review” 1999, No. 24, p. 483.
53 H.C. Jones (chair), The National Assembly for Wales and the European Union, European Strategy Group, 
Welsh Office, Cardiff 1998.
54 C. Carter et al., Scotland and the European Union, “Devolution Briefings” 2005, No. 27, March, Eco­
nomic and Research Council Research Programme on Devolution and Constitutional Change, ESRC, Ed­
inburgh 2005, p. 6.
55 A. McLeod, The Scottish Parliament and Europe, “SPICe briefing” 2003, No. 03/44,4 June, Scottish Par­
liament, Edinburgh 2003, pp. 14-18.
56 On the operation of these subject committees, see P. Cairney, The analysis of the Scottish Parliament 
committee influence: Beyond capacity and structure in comparing West European legislatures, “European 
Journal of Political Research” 2006, No. 45, p. 181.
57 C. Carter et aL, Scotland and the European Union, “Devolution Briefings” No. 27, Economic and Research 
Council Research Programme on Devolution and Constitutional Change, ESRC, Edinburgh 2005, p. 7.
58 C. Carter, Making Multi-Level Governance work?, “Manchester Papers in Politics: Devolution and Eu­
ropean Policy Series” 2003, No. 5, p. 4.
The EERC of the Scottish Parliament (and to a lesser extent that of the 
NAW) has developed a vigorous scrutiny and accountability system of the 
Scottish Government on EU matters as well as influencing Scottish UK-EU 
decision-making. Through its focus on transparency, the Scottish EERC has 
opened up parliamentary processes and mainstreamed its scrutiny of Scot­
tish UK-EU affairs across the subject committees of the Scottish Parliament.55 
Increasingly, the subject committees56 are recognising EU elements in their 
work and so increase the need for their cooperation with the EERC in fulfil­
ment of its scrutiny role.57 A similar process is discernible in respect of the 
Welsh EERC in relation to its more limited scope for scrutiny in the NAW:58 
nevertheless, with the 2006 Government of Wales Act such scrutiny powers 
and pan-parliamentary committee cooperation is set to intensify.
However, in performing their work, one issue remains central that usually 
has little impact on the functioning of the executive and administration in EU 
matters, viz., financial resources. Only with sufficient funding and a concom­
itant support of necessary legal advisers and other specialists (like econo­
mists, and experts in fisheries and agriculture) can any European Affairs par­
liamentary committee seek to exercise its functions effectively.
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Future prospects
The open-ended nature of devolution, the absence of a final defined end­
stop, leaves a broad area within which the devolved authorities in Scotland 
and Wales will be able to articulate their own policy preferences. One major 
stimulus in this55 *9  follows from the implications of EU membership, more par­
ticularly the formulation of EU policy and its implementation:60
55 The Scottish Constitutional Convention had specifically identified European affairs as one major part of
the Scottish Parliament’s function: Scottish Constitutional Convention, Scotland’s Parliament. Scotland’s
Right, SCC, Edinburgh 1995, p. 16.
60 S. Bulmer, M. Burch, British Devolution and European Policy-Making: A Step-Change towards Multi­
Level Governance?, “Manchester Papers in Politics: EPRU Series” 2002, No. 2, p. 19.
61 A.F. Tatham, The Sovereignty of Parliament after Factortame, “Europarecht” 1993, No. 188.
62 C. Tarleton, Symmetry and asymmetry as elements of federalism: a theoretical speculation, “Journal of Pol­
itics” 1965, No. 27, p. 861.
63 R. Simeon, Recent trends in federalism and intergovernmental relations in Canada: lessons for the UK?, 
“The Round Table” 2000, No. 354, p. 231, at 237.
Devolution is also altering the elite political culture on European matters. 
The discourse on Europe in the UI< is becoming more territorially diverse 
and has begun to take on more evident sub-national/regional dimensions. As 
noted earlier, the perceptions of Europe in Wales and Scotland have always 
been somewhat different from that articulated in London. What devolution 
has done is to allow the further articulation of these differences and it has 
provided Scotland and Wales with the resources and opportunities to do this. 
Decision makers in both these countries are well aware of the strategic poten­
tial of devolution enabling them to engage in the UK European Policy process 
on the one hand as well as lobbying Whitehall and Brussels on the other.
The articulation of these differences, currently championed most partic­
ularly by the Scottish devolved authorities, may in due course lead to a re­
vision of the understanding of parliamentary sovereignty in a way in which 
EEC membership and the 1972 European Communities Act led to a previous 
réévaluation.61 It has been argued62 that asymmetrical or dissonant constitu­
tional solutions are inherently unstable and are liable to promote tensions be­
tween central government and the devolved authorities.63 What was not ap­
parently intended was the fédéralisation of the British polity:
The differential standing of the nations of the union under devolu­
tion and the predominance of bilateral relations between the nations 
and the centre reduces the likelihood that the devolution project 
will promote fédéralisation in the UK. A fédéralisation of the system 
would imply the development of formal horizontal channels of com­
munication between the constituent units of the polity in addition to 
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formal vertical linkages. In the UK, central government is not keen to 
foster links which do not operate through Whitehall. Any direct links 
and contacts between the devolved authorities remain largely con­
fined to informal, ad hoc measures made on the initiative of the de- 
volveds themselves.64
64 P. Hogwood, Devolution in the UK: A Step Towards Fédéralisation ?, “Manchester Papers in Politics: Dev­
olution and European Policy Series” 2003, No. 4, p. 8.
65 British North America Act 1867, c. 3, 30 & 31 Viet.
66 Commonwealth of Australia Act 1900, c. 2, 63 & 64Vict.
But whether or not intended, the potential for fédéralisation remains. The 
evolution into proportionally-elected representative bodies in Scotland and 
Wales will allow for continuous popular vindication of the devolution settle­
ment, post the 1998 referenda. They also create an impetus and expectation for 
further extension of powers thereby expanding the policy universe partially or 
jointly occupied by the devolved authorities with the central authorities.
British Government’s attempts to limit these developments and to con­
trol their evolution by providing for ad hoc and informal agreements between 
Whitehall and the devolved authorities and by retaining the ultimate power 
to legislate in all areas at Westminster may be ultimately doomed to failure, 
given time. Under the British North America Act 186765 and the Common­
wealth of Australia Act 190066 (each dominion’s founding constitutional 
charter), the Westminster Parliament retained ultimate power to legislate for 
Canada and Australia respectively. Due to the effluxion of time, such provi­
sions fell into practical disuse although they remained in force and theoret­
ically exercisable. Only in the 1980s did both nations “repatriate” their con­
stitutions and ask the Westminster Parliament to repeal the relevant statutes 
which it duly did. It is not inconceivable that the relevant devolved legislation 
may come to be considered as an anachronistic relic of British constitution­
alism and eventually lead not just to a creeping fédéralisation of the UK sys­
tem but rather to its ultimate de-merger.
The transformation of informal administrative structures pre-devolution 
to increasingly more formal institutional power relations, partially centred 
on the devolved legislative assemblies post-devolution, has enhanced active 
participation at the sub-national level in the formation and implementation 
of EU law and policy. The development of a nation-specific European pol­
icy by the devolved authorities marks a step in the direction of assumption 
of constitutional executive powers in respect of foreign-policy type compe­
tences formerly reposing at the national unitary State level alone. Admittedly, 
the current devolved legislation provides that international and European re-
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lations are “excepted” from the sphere of business of the devolved authori­
ties at the EU level. Yet, within the powers already conferred, representatives 
of both the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales are evolving 
their own agendas vis-à-vis EU matters, whether in inter-institutional coopera­
tion with other national or sub-national legislative assemblies in the UI< or the 
EU or more importantly their increasingly effective scrutiny over EU policy for­
mation, adoption and implementation. Moreover, the recent 2006 Govern­
ment of Wales Act has commenced a process of rendering the Welsh devo­
lution settlement more consonant with the Scottish one. The parliamentary 
dimension is also converging with the Scottish EERC striking out and being 
emulated by its Welsh counterpart
Through these means, there exists the potential for evolution to consti­
tutional identification of the Scots and Welsh for their own devolved insti­
tutions at the ultimate expense of the central UK institutions. This disso­
nant federalism (or, for some critics, preferably dissonant devolution) of the 
United Kingdom will be exacerbated over time, the consonant constitutional 
nationalism of each of the constituent nations of the UI< is proceeding at 
their own pace, the stronger the identification of the Scots and Welsh oc­
curring at different paces commensurate with the level of devolved powers 
and, in itself, reflecting the longstanding relations between the peripheral na­
tions and England within the UK. It is therefore strongly arguable67 that for 
the devolved authorities, the ad hoc and dissonant nature of the devolution 
settlement may prove itself to be a means to achieving new powers through 
their active participation in EU policy-making at the national and sub-na­
tional levels.
67 P. Hogwood, Devolution in the UK: A Step Towards Fédéralisation?, “Manchester Papers in Politics: 
Devolution and European Policy Series” 2003, No. 4, p. 5.
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National Constitutions and the Common Good of the 
European Union
The first stage of integration, when there was at first one Community, and 
then three Communities, was characterised by limited areas of cooperation in 
selected aspects of economic and social policy. Therefore, it generated no need 
for significant changes in the political systems of the member states and in their 
constitutions. This kind of need only arose as the process of integration pro­
ceeded and various aspects of internal and external policy began to be covered 
by it, and most importantly, as various forms of administration and various in­
struments were introduced with the aim of pursuing the goals of integration. 
These brought changes in the legal orders of the member states. The key stimu­
lant of the changes in the internal legal order of the member states was the de­
gree of integration, and the resulting adoption of legal and organisational solu­
tions conducive to achieving the Communities’ goals.
The progress of integration so far is however no predictor for the future of 
the Communities and the Union. The developments so far suggest in no way 
that the progress will continue according to one trend which can be defined 
a priori. To the contrary, the experience so far shows that there have been pe­
riods of stagnation and prolonged search for consensus as to further progress 
and means of achieving it. From the very beginning of the integration, there 
has been the need to reconcile national and community interests. The pe­
riod of institutional stagnation related to the difficulties in ratifying the Con­
stitutional Treaty (finally overcome during the Lisbon summit in 2007 in the 
adoption of the Reform Treaty1) is a clear symptom of national interests prevai­
ling over community interests.
1 Assume here that the Lisbon documents which reform the legal order of the Union are not binding yet 
and thus cannot serve as a basis for deliberation here.
Such a conclusion can be supported by declarations of representatives of 
certain member states who questioned the need for further integration, favo­
ured a solution consisting in assigning “privileged partner” status to candida­
tes for integration, and felt the need to define in final terms the outer limits 
of united Europe. In the area of cooperation within the Union, there is a dist­
inction between generally formulated aims and particular initiatives which 
can be perceived as unfavourable to specific national interests. Fifty years af­
ter Europe began uniting, questions as to its future still abound, due in par­
ticular to the extended area of cooperation, increased number of member 1
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states and enlarged territory. These are only selected factors which hinder fo­
recast concerning the European Union.
Integration in its present form is not an expression of systematic realisa­
tion of any dominant concept, neither the federal one nor the “Europe of ho­
melands”. Apart from these two visions, other visions of the future of inte­
gration are also possible. Choosing one of them will determine the degree of 
unification of the member states. Links between the states may remain at the 
current level, may be tightened or may be loosened. Therefore, if we are to 
take a position as to whether Poland's constitution is adequate to the challen­
ges of integration, it appears sensible to do so based on the current stage of 
integration, as defined by the Treaties, jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Justice, and the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland re­
lated to Poland’s membership in the European Union.
Should the Union, with the approval of the member states, transform it­
self into a federation, it is likely that a constitutional change would not be im­
mediately necessary. Instead, adoption of an act which would have supre­
macy over national constitutions would be crucial. This act would have to 
regulate internal and external relations of the newly created institution.2 One 
can therefore consider hypothetically both a passive mechanism of accep­
tance and, under extreme circumstances, dissolution of the European inte­
gration project. Neither of these options however is likely to cause changes in 
national constitutions, including Polish. The futurological method of deter­
mining the future of the Union is not reliable, since the existence of the Union 
depends currently on a large number of member states whose present and fu­
ture are widely varied, as well as on numerous factors, both internal and ex­
ternal, that are too numerous to render results of such forecasts feasible.
2 According to B. Banaszak, „in the future a new act might be adopted which would contain a new type 
of a social agreement, shared by all EU citizens (adopted by the newpouvoir constituant)’’ which would re­
place national constitutions and have the character of an international agreement. B. Banaszak, Konstytucja 
europejska a Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, “Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze” 2004, Vol. 12, p. 17.
Just like nations organised into states perceive in this shared form of living 
a benefit expressed in the pursuit of the good of individuals, so do the states 
accept the process of integration under the condition that it will be beneficial 
to them and that it will not diminish their sovereignty without their consent. 
The evaluation of costs and benefits in the area of international cooperation 
is not quantitative. It depends on the preparedness of nations to cooperation, 
on the level of social awareness, on shared cultural values and a number of 
other predictors.
When considering the relationship between the Communities and the 
Union (perceived as a system shaped by certain legal acts) and member sta­
tes, whose internal legal order is shaped by their constitutions, one must take 
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into account the fact that the founding Treaties and other similar legal acts 
belong to a different legal order than national constitutions. From a formal 
point of view, the Treaties and the national constitutions are fully autono­
mous. The founding Treaties are international agreements and as such are 
subject to the international law regime, while the constitutions are elements 
of internal legal orders of the member states. The legal order which constitu­
tes the Communities and the Union is established on the basis of the shared 
will of the member states, and amended according to this will. The creation 
and amendment of national constitutions can only be affected by the mem­
ber states, independently and autonomously.
The Treaties do not stipulate directly that the constitutions of member 
states must be harmonised with the Treaty regulations. Such a requirement 
however can be derived both from the well established principle of pacta 
sunt servanda and from the Vienna convention on the law of contracts, which 
provides that a state which has undertaken international obligations must 
perform them in good faith and shape its legal order in a manner conducive 
to the performance of such international agreements. This principle is reflec­
ted in the community law in Article 10 of the Treaty Establishing the Euro­
pean Community, which provides that member states should implement any 
measure, both of general and specific character, in order to fulfil their obli­
gations resulting from the Treaty and from the activities of community in­
stitutions. This Treaty provision emphasises that the member states should 
facilitate the achievement of community goals and also should refrain from 
undertaking any measure which might hinder the fulfilment of goals resul­
ting from the Treaties.
The experience of the relations between the Union and the member states, 
as well as the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, shows that Ar­
ticle 10 has shaped the model attitude of member states towards shared go­
als which are the fundament of integration.3 This attitude is characterised by 
the mandatory character of actions undertaken by the member states in or-
3 In a number of cases (including Flaminio Costa v. Enel, Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt), the Court has 
ruled on the relationship between community law and laws of the member states. The Court has expressed 
its opinion as to the enforcement by the states of the principle of effective actions in view to achieve com­
munity goals (effet utile). The Court stressed that as long as there is no contradiction between the legal sys­
tem, national authorities are free to choose measures contained in the national law. However, if such meas­
ures might hinder the functioning of community law, such decisions would be in breach of Article 10 of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community. The Court also ruled that primacy of Community law must 
be observed, even if this necessitates a departure from constitutional principles. The Court noted that the 
fundamental condition for the realisation of community goals is enforcement of community law in all mem­
ber states. This means that national regulations cannot be cited in opposition to community regulations. 
In the enforcement of community law conflicts between legal systems must be eliminated, and only when 
this is impossible, the national law must be repealed. Member states are also obliged to refrain from any 
activities which would hinder the achievement of Treaty goals. See Prawo Wspólnot Europejskich. Orzecz­
nictwo, eds. W. Czapliński, R. Ostrihansky, P. Saganek, A. Wyrozumska, Warszawa 2001, pp. 37-51.
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der to achieve Treaty goals, as well as the quasi-facultative character of mea­
sures undertaken to do so. Such measures must be appropriate and effective 
in relation to the goals presented in both primary and secondary legislation. 
It is also not permitted to introduce measures which might hinder or render 
impossible the achievement of the shared goals.
This problem can be discussed in the perspective of relations between 
achieving community goals (understood as the common good of the member 
states) and achieving national goals (understood as the common good of a gi­
ven member state). The common good of the member states is not a notion 
introduced into the legal order by the Treaties, nor does it have a legal defini­
tion. The common good as a category can be reconstructed not on the basis of 
the provisions of the Treaties, but on the basis of preambles and declarations 
outlining the goals of the Communities, the European Union and its mem­
ber states. Importantly, the European Union understood as the common good 
cannot be perceived as an institution which is abstract, external and unfrien­
dly towards the states, nations and individuals that constitute it.
The “One Europe” declaration4 of the Athens summit in 2003 stipulates 
that the shared goal of the member states is to make Europe a continent of 
democracy, freedom, peace and progress. The Union is determined to avoid 
new divisions in Europe and to support stability and development within its 
new borders and beyond. The shared goals will be achieved through working 
together. The goal is one Europe. The fifty years of integration demonstrate 
that integration itself is a common good, one that makes it possible to strive 
towards the shared values through cooperation of states and nations.
5 OJ. C 97. 340.173.
The preamble to the Treaty of Rome (now the Treaty Establishing the Eu­
ropean Community) emphasised the desire for economic and social progress 
in the member states achieved through cooperation.5 This leads to the obser­
vation that the common good is (in the teleological sense) a dynamic cate­
gory: it evolves as integration proceeds, as the number of goals increases and 
as the states unite around shared goals. Materially, then, the common good 
may result from the goals of integration. Since integration requires states to 
act together, one of the important factors influencing its development is the 
extent to which the interests of particular countries overlap with the sha­
red interest which constitutes the common good. The greater this extent, the 
more certainty there is that the common good will be pursued.
4 Declaration One Europe is one of the documents included in the Act on the conditions of accession of 
new member states which is an integral part of the Treaty signed in Athens on 16 April 2003 between the 
fifteen member states and the ten acceding states (Polish version - Journal of Laws 90/2004 item 864).
390
PART 1
The scope of the common good is difficult to define. It may be determined 
not only by Community goals but also by principles shared by the member 
states, freedoms and rights of individuals, acquis communautaire, the unified 
institutional system as well as the material wealth of the Union. The common 
good cannot be perceived as simply the sum of interests of particular states, 
since this would mean that the common good could only be pursued through 
the satisfaction of each separate national interest. In fact, the common good 
is pursued when the totality of interests of the member states is taken into 
account, and the individual interests are considered in proportion to the go­
als of integration.
Therefore, the common good in relations between the member states 
is not a unilateral category, one that generates only duties imposed by cer­
tain states or by the EU institutions. The common good is generated on the 
strength of the will of the member states and of the citizens of the Union, who 
are able to express their opinions as to the shared goals and the system of in­
tegration both directly6 and through their representatives in the European 
Parliament.
6 In Poland, on the basis of a Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of April 17, 2003 the Ac­
cession Treaty was ratified following a popular referendum (M.P. 19/2003 item 291). The referendum took 
place on June 7-8, 2003. 77,45% of voters were in favour of accession.
The fact that the goals and methods of the Union are widely accepted does 
not however mean that there are no conflicts of interests, either between the 
majority of member states and other member states or between the indivi­
dual member states. Such conflicts of interests require an adjustment of the 
shared goals and their reconciliation with national interests. The duty to take 
national interest into account in the achievement of the common good does 
not mean that each and every national interest must be considered. There is 
a certain limit, which results from the essence of the idea of integration. It is 
expressed in how the member states accept the common good and reconcile 
their national interest with it.
Alternative solutions are located beyond this limit. These include either 
a modification of the goals of integration so as to make them universally ac­
ceptable or the decision of certain member states to leave the Union. The con­
cept of a “hard core” consisting in lose cooperation between a small group of 
states which impose a faster pace of development on the others cannot be 
perceived as a good model of enforcing the principle of the common good 
and non-discriminatory progress of integration.
Following the principle of the common good via negationi excludes both 
self-willed actions and self-centred attitudes expressed in a desire only to 
draw benefits from the integration. To the contrary, its should be manife­
sted in an attitude of responsibility for the achievement of goals which serve
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not just the national interest but the common good.7 The member states have 
a degree of freedom in how they pursue the shared goals. The freedom is li­
mited chiefly through the condition that the measures must be effective in 
achieving such goals. The provisions of the Treaties do not describe such me­
asures in detail. The above-mentioned Article 10 lists general and specific 
measures; these terms are very flexible and suggest that both constitutional 
acts as well as statutes and lower-level acts can be employed.
7 See also W.J. Wołpiuk, Dobro wspólne a interes publiczny, “Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Infor­
matyki, Zarządzania i Administracji w Warszawie” 2006, No. 1 (4), pp. 15-16.
Based on the provisions of the founding Treaties, it is possible to recon­
struct the relation between the legal order of the Communities and the con­
stitutions of the member states, as well as to define the functions of the na­
tional constitutions within the area of realisation of community goals and 
application of community law.
Assuming that Article 6 section 1 of the Treaty on the European Union 
establishes the principles and values common for the whole integrated le­
gal order (freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamen­
tal freedoms, rule of law), one must note that these principles and values, 
while constituting a Treaty norm, at the same time stem from the consti­
tutional tradition of the member states (of which the same Article makes 
mention in section 2). The content of the provision, interpreted in toto, gi­
ves rise to a principle of mutual influence of the Community system and con­
stitutional systems of the member states. The community system derives 
the values on which the Union’s existence is based from the democratic sy­
stem of the members states and make them its own. They become binding 
on the member states at the moment of accession. Considerable infringement 
of the above-mentioned principles and values may result, on the basis of Ar­
ticle 7 of the Treaty on the European Union, in suspension of certain rights of 
a member state. Article 49 of the same Treaty stipulates that only a state 
which respects the principles and values of Article 6 may apply for accession. 
The requirement that the member states must respect the principles and va­
lues within their legal order does not eo ipso mean that they must be proclai­
med in a prescribed way in their constitutions. One should assume therefore 
that the member states are obliged to respect these principles and values, but 
that they are free to choose in which form these principles will be incorpora­
ted into their legal systems.
In terms of goals and legal bases of the integration process, constitutional 
systems of the member states are autonomous in relation to the community le­
gal order. Therefore, primary legislation of the Union in no way interferes with 
the institutions of the member states; the states are free to ensure by any me­
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ans they choose that their constitutions comply with community law. This is 
reinforced by the fact that the national constitutions, as elements of national 
identities, are protected by Article 6 section 3 of the Treaty on the European 
Union. The Treaty’s provision that “the Union respects the national identity 
of the member states” may be understood both as an obligation of the Union 
not to interfere with the constitutions (which reflect the national identity and 
determine the functions of the state) and as an obligation to respect the di­
versity of the states (i.e. each state’s right to shape its laws as it wishes).
The founding Treaties make references to national constitutions in three 
types of cases. Firstly, when the subject matter of the regulation is the man­
ner in which the community regulations can be amended which must be ra­
tified by the member states;8 secondly, when the Treaty provisions relate to 
the manner in which community institutions make laws or decisions that 
the member states must accept,9 and thirdly, when regulating the manner 
in which agreements or conventions can be made which need acceptance 
and ratification of the member states.10 However, no Treaty provision requi­
res that member states introduce an a priori specified amendment into their 
constitutions. The general Treaty instruction according to which the states 
should introduce appropriate changes to their legal orders so as to harmonise 
them with EU law uses the wording “in accordance with their respective con­
stitutional requirements”. This may be understood twofold. Firstly, as manife­
station of respect towards the constitutional order of the member states and
8 For instance, Article 48 of the Treaty on the European Union stipulates that the amendments to the 
founding Treaties come into force once they have been ratified by all member states in accordance with 
procedures provided for in their constitutions.
9 Article 22 of the Treaty on the European Union contains the principle according to which the Council 
(unanimously, following a motion by the Commission and having consulted the Parliament) may pass leg­
islation in order to supplement the laws pertaining to EU citizenship which the member states are recom­
mended to adopt in accordance with procedures provided for in their constitutions. A similar procedure 
for adopting legislation and decisions of the EU is provided for in Article 17 section 1 of the Treaty on the 
European Union, Article 42 of the Treaty on the European Union, Article 190 section 4 of the Treaty Es­
tablishing the European Community, and Articles 229a and 269 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community.
10 Each of the founding Treaties, according to its final provisions, is subject to ratification in each member 
state according to procedures provided for in that member state’s constitution (Article 52 section 1 of the 
Treaty on the European Union, Article 313 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Article 
224 of the Euratom Treaty). Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union regulates contracts between 
member states and candidate states. Each such agreement must be ratified by all contracting parties, ac­
cording to the procedures provided for in their constitutions. As far as the matters of the 3rd pillar are 
concerned, Article 34 section 2 point d of the Treaty on the European Union provides the option of draft­
ing a convention which will be recommended to all member states, again according to the procedures pro­
vided for in their constitutions. States are free as far as agreements are concerned whose aim is to further 
the policies and cooperation within the EU. As far as agreement are concerned which are related to the 
2nd and 3rd pillar, Article 24 section 5 of the Treaty on the European Union stipulates that such an agree­
ment is not binding on the member state whose representative claimed that it must fulfil the requirements 
of the procedures provided for in its own constitution.
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the fact that the Union refrains from interfering with these orders (according 
to the principle with autonomy of national legal orders), thus allowing the 
member states the freedom of choice of measures implementing the chan­
ges. Secondly, as acknowledgment of the need for changes to be introduced 
into national legal orders in an appropriate manner (following the principle 
of constitutional legalism and proper procedures) and using appropriate in­
struments, i.e. constitutional regulations.
Moreover, amendments to Treaties are not always effective in the legal 
orders of member states. This is the case if the subject matter of the amen­
dment is related purely to the European level of integration, where no aspect 
of the national constitutional order is affected.11 Thus, one may conclude that 
the Treaty provisions point only to a very general need to use constitutional 
measures in order to regulate the relationship between the community legal 
order and the national legal order, and the said provisions only refer to ca­
ses where the member state must express its acceptance of community legis­
lation.
11 A good example is the declaration concerning Article 191 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community which is apart of the Treaty of Nice. Since the Treaty of Nice amended Article 191, giving the 
Council a new competence (according to the procedure of Article 251) to decide on the status of politi­
cal parties at the European level, and in particular on the manner of their financing, it was deemed neces­
sary to give this Article 191 an interpretation in the form of a separate declaration. The declaration stipu­
lates that party financing at the European level using funds of the European Communities cannot be used, 
directly or indirectly, to finance parties at national level. Therefore - as the declaration stipulates - the 
provisions of Article 191 do not create a transfer of competencies to the European Community with re­
gard to parties at national level, and have no bearing on the application of appropriate provisions of na­
tional constitutions.
Since the Treaty regulations include no mandatory mechanisms for the 
inclusion of community provisions into the constitutions of the member sta­
tes, one may consider whether there are models stemming from European 
constitutional practice which could be considered a standard in the area of 
harmonisation of national constitutions with community requirements and 
in the area of ensuring their effectiveness in the internal legal order of the 
member states.
This is a complex problem, because the character of community law is 
complex. Some of its norms are subject to the regulations of international 
public law, while others - generated by community institutions - come into 
force either upon the completion of appropriate procedures, or by becoming 
an element of internal legal orders. The member states therefore must open 
their legal systems both to the universal norms of international law (e.g. due 
to their membership in the United Nations) and to regional law (e.g. due to 
their membership in the Council of Europe and the jurisdiction of the Euro­
pean Court of Human Rights), and on top of that must regulate the relation­
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ship between their internal legal order and primary and secondary commu­
nity law.12
For many years in European constitutionalism the dominant tendency re­
quired that the relationship between national law and international law be 
determined normatively. Openness towards international norms was inter­
preted as openness also towards community norms, without paying respect 
to its dual character. It was believed that if the founding Treaties are assigned 
an appropriate position in the political system of the member state, this eo 
ipso will solve the problem of effectiveness of community law in the given le­
gal order. The situation changed in some states under the influence of cases of 
collisions between norms of national constitutions and norms of the commu­
nity law, connected with the progress of the integration project reflected in 
the community legislation.13 Some states, for instance Germany and France, 
decided that this type of constitutional formula (where the constitution sti­
pulates primacy of international law or international agreements and adop­
tion of international law as a part of the internal legal order) is insufficient
12 E. Łętowska calls the legal system of a state which consists of elements of its own legislation and legis­
lation generated by external decision-makers a multicentric system. See E. Łętowska, Między Scyllą i Cha­
rybdą. Sędzia polski między Strasburgiem i Luksemburgiem, “Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” 2005, No. 1, pp. 
3-4,9. Multicentric law is characterised by heterogeneity and the fact that it is generated by subjects who are 
not directly subordinate to the state. This kind of law is in force in the state which has agreed for this mul­
ticentric system to operate on its territory. One must remember that, firstly, there are shared interests and 
goals which are being pursued by means of such an arrangement, and secondly, that mutatis mutandis the 
states are not without impact on the law generated by the external centres (community institutions). In this 
sense this law cannot be perceived as imposed from outside; on the contrary, it serves the purpose of pursu­
ing shared goals. See also A. Wyrozumska, Prawo międzynarodowe oraz prawo Unii Europejskiej a konsty­
tucyjny system źródeł prawa, [ i n] Otwarcie Konstytucji RP na prawo międzynarodowe i procesy integracyjne, 
ed. K. Wojtowicz, Warszawa 2006, pp. 31-108.
13 W. Czapliński notes correctly that for a long time courts of the member states did not treat the commu­
nity legal system as a system separate from international law; on the contrary, they were willing to claim 
that this order was subject to the same regulations as the norms of international law introduced into the na­
tional order. According to Czapliński, conflicts between national constitutional laws and community laws 
only occurred with regard to constitutional laws regarding fundamental rights. In those cases, both the Eu­
ropean Court of Justice and the courts of the member states avoided stating that such conflict actually oc­
curred. As far as it was possible, an interpretation technique was applied which required that community 
laws were interpreted in a manner friendly towards the constitutions of the member states, while constitu­
tions were interpreted in a manner friendly to community laws. W. Czapliński, Członkostwo w Unii Europej­
skiej a suwerenność państwowa, in: Konstytucja dla rozszerzającej się Europy, ed. E. Popławska, Warszawa 2000, 
pp. 129,130-131. The Treaty on European Union was a milestone, because the constitutional courts of Ger­
many and France became involved in the decision as to the degree to which EU laws were compliant with 
national laws. (More on this: B. Pawlowski, Konstytucyjne aspekty integracji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z Unią 
Europejską, “Przegląd Sejmowy” 2003, No. 5, pp. 78-83). The rulings of the French and German constitutional 
courts, stating that the national constitutions of the respective countries were not compliant with proposed 
EU laws, was the chief reason why the two constitutional acts were amended. On the jurisprudence of the Fed­
eral Constitutional Court see R. Arnold, Orzecznictwo niemieckiego Federalnego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego 
a proces integracji europejskiej, “Studia Europejskie” 1999, No. 1, pp. 95-106.
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due to the progress of European integration.14 Consequently, these countries 
changed their constitutions so as to regulate clearly their participation in the 
European Communities.15
14 The German constitution includes, in its Article 25, the principle that common principles of interna­
tional law constitute a part of the federal law and have supremacy over statutes and are a source of rights 
and duties of citizens of the Federation. Article 55 of the French constitution stipulates that treaties or 
agreements, once duly ratified, at the moment when they come into force have supremacy over statutes, 
under the condition that the remaining parties to this treaty or agreement have applied the same principle 
in their legal system.
15 To the German constitution, Article 23 (European Union) has been added, which outlines the basis for 
the membership of the Federal Republic of Germany in the European Union. To the French constitution, 
Chapter XV (On the European Communities and the European Union) has been added, in which the four 
new Articles 88-1, 88-2, 88-3 and 88-4 outline the basis for the membership of France in the integration 
process, in particular the manner of participation in the economic and monetary union, implementation of 
the Schengen acquis, execution of electoral rights by EU citizens resident in France and manner in which 
the parliament may express its opinion on community laws implemented as statutes. The French constitu­
tion of 1958, even though it was adopted after the ratification of the founding Treaties, until 1992 included 
no regulations related to France's membership in the integrating organism. See K. Kubuj, Miejsce prawa 
wspólnotowego w wewnętrznym porządku prawnym Francji, “Studia Prawnicze” 2001, No 3-4, p. 185.
16 In literature on constitutional law one may find claims that national constitutional laws are being Euro­
peanised, which is manifested in the search for and conformity with a shared system of European standards 
as well as a shared European constitutional culture. See H. Suchocka, Jaka konstytucja dla rozszerzającej 
się Europy?, [in:] Konstytucja dla rozszerzającej się..., as cited, p. 32. It would be irrational to question this 
tendency, considering that there is a trend to introduce into constitutions principles demonstrating the 
adherence to democratic values, such as for example the rule of law, freedoms and human rights. Ger­
many raised this issue of inadequate regulations in this area (in comparison to regulations in German law), 
which resulted in the Amsterdam Treaty containing a list of fundamental rights. However, it would be dif­
ficult to agree that Article 6 section 1 of the Treaty on the European Union (freedom, democracy, respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, rule of law) or the entire Article 6 is a catalogue of necessary
Two issues must be raised in connection with the examples of Germany 
and France. First, the inspiration for the changes which resulted in harmoni­
sation of the national legal order with the community legal order came from 
within; it was the internal need of the states rather than external influence 
(such as for example Treaty provisions or a ruling of the European Court 
of Justice). The amendments had the positive legal consequence of placing 
in the constitutions legal bases for application of community laws, and also 
of allowing the states to confirm the position of their constitutions as au­
tonomous from community laws and as the highest laws of the state (with 
which any norms applied in the territory must be in compliance). Secon­
dly, in amending their constitutions, each of the states individually chose the 
form and scope of the amendment, thus combining the traditions typical to 
the given country with progressive, pro-integration regulations.
The examples cited above do not give sufficient ground for claiming that 
constitutionalism of the member states demonstrates a clear tendency to­
wards regulating the relationship between national law and community law 
in a manner which might be considered to constitute a standard.16 The man- 
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ner in which this relationship is regulated certainly deserves separate analy­
sis.17 However, just looking at the most superficial aspects, we find that the 
constitutions of the member states include a variety of regulations in terms 
of the subject mater of the regulations, manner of regulations, degree of de­
tail of regulations and wording of regulations. Some of the constitutions are 
characteristic in that they regulate the matters related to the European Com­
munities an the European Union in a manner clearly separated from the uni­
versal order of international law; other constitutions contain no clear norms 
with regard to the integration.
The fact that some constitutions contain only implicit norms relating to 
community law is no ground for conclusions that this kind of regulations 
has a lesser value than the regulations which refer clearly to community law. 
Constitutions of the “oldest” member states (Belgium, the Netherlands, Lu­
xembourg, Italy) have weakly developed regulations relating to integration. 
In Italy, in contrast to France and Germany, until now no amendments have 
been introduced due to the membership in the European Union.18 From 
among the states which joined the Union in 1994, only Austria (renowned 
for its pro-legalist traditions) has amended its constitution by introducing to 
it a new sub-chapter entitled “European Union.”19 Interesting pro-integration
standards which are repeated in national constitutions. One must note that various constitutions contain 
the principles which might be considered European standards in a variety of manners and scopes of regu­
lation. Moreover, the notion of a standard may be applied not only to general principles but also to princi­
ples which regulate the functioning of a state as a member of the integrated organism.
17 See more in M. Kruk, Konstytucja narodowa a prawo europejskie: czy Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polsk­
iej wymaga zmiany?, [in:] Konstytucja dla rozszerzającej sięas cited, pp. 178-180; B. Pawłowski, Konsty­
tucyjne aspekty integracji..., as cited, pp. 76-84; E. Kamińska, Konstytucyjno-prawne aspekty integracji eu­
ropejskiej. Wpływ prawa wspólnotowego na porządki konstytucyjne wybranych państw członkowskich Unii 
na przykładzie Niemiec, Francji i Wielkiej Brytanii oraz jego implikacje dla Polski, “Radca Prawny“ 2003, 
No. 4, pp. 116-122; R.M. Małajny, Constitutio suprema lex? (Unia Europejska a ustawy zasadnicze państw 
członkowskich), [in:] Prawo a wartości. Księga jubileuszowa Profesora Józefa Nowackiego, ed. I. Bogucka, 
Z. Tobor, Kraków 2003, pp. 206-212; M. Muszyński, Podobieństwa i różnice. Normy integracyjne w konsty­
tucjach państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej, “Rzeczpospolita” 2002, 7 May.
18 K. Działocha calls the amendment of Article 117 of the Italian constitution “cosmetic” because other than in­
troducing the name of a new form of cooperation, it introduced no substantive changes. See K. Działocha, Pod­
stawy prounijnej wykładni Konstytucji RP, “Państwo i Prawo” 2004, No. 11, p. 33. According to Z. Witkowski, 
all important consequences of legal and pragmatic character stemming for the Italian membership in the Un­
ion are regulated by dynamic interpretation of the constitution. Konstytucja Włoch, translation and introduc­
tion Z. Witkowski, Warszawa 2004, p. 46. According to Annibale Marini, president of the constitutional court 
of Italy, community law has primacy over national law. However, in case of conflicts, the primacy goes to fun­
damental human rights and the Italian constitution. The constitution was never amended due to such a con­
flict. See: Pół wieku w obronie praw człowieka, “Rzeczpospolita” 2006,1 April.
19 Subchapter B in Part 1 of the Federal Constitution of the Republic of Austria entitled “General provisions. 
The European Union” contains six articles (23a, 23b, 23c, 23d, 23e and 23f). The provisions relate to: elec­
tions to the European Parliament (23a), problems under Austrian law due to the holding by certain catego­
ries of persons a seat in the European Parliament (23b), manner of appointment by the federal government of 
officers of Union and Community institutions and bodies, (23c), manner of informing the federal countries 
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changes were made in 2003 in the constitution of Romania, despite the fact 
that the country was not at the time a member of the European Union. The 
amendments related to matters of joining the Union, of the relationship be­
tween the national legal order and community laws, and of selected aspects of 
performing the state’s duties resulting from its membership in the European 
Union.20 The constitution of Romania also regulates the relationship between 
national law and international law, and these regulations apply to commu­
nity Treaties as well.21 The makers of the Romanian constitution drew from 
the experience of other countries in introducing to their constitution provi­
sions relating to active and passive electoral rights of EU citizen in local elec­
tions in Romania, active and passive electoral rights of Romanian citizens in 
the elections to the European Parliament, and norms preventing collision be­
tween constitutional regulations and the regulations of primary and secon­
dary community law.22
On the basis of these examples it seems legitimate to claim that certain 
“newer” member states, as well as some states of candidate status, are more 
concerned with adjusting their constitutional norms to the situation of fun­
ctioning within the integrated structures. This however cannot be generali-
of legal initiatives in the Union as well as the consultation procedure in this respect, and measures available 
to the federal countries in order to implement EU laws (23d), procedures of informing the federal legislative 
bodies on legal initiatives of the Union and consultation procedures related thereto (23e), performance by 
Austria of its obligations in the area of common foreign policy and security policy as well as judicial and po­
lice cooperation in criminal matters (23f). Articles 23e and 23f also pertain to the distribution of powers in 
the area of performing the tasks connected with the realisation of Treaty goals and Union law.
20 The amendment did not change the norm of Article 1 section 1 which describes Romania as a national 
state, sovereign and independent, homogenous and indivisible. A new Title VI "Euro-Atlantic Integration” 
was added, in which one of the two provisions, Article 148 (Integration with the European Union) regu­
lates the manner in which Romania may accede to agreements “founding the European Union, in order 
to transfer certain competencies to community institutions, as well as in order to perform together with 
other member states the competencies regulated by such agreements” Section 2 of Article 148 contains 
the principle of primacy of Treaty regulations and community law of mandatory character “over provi­
sions of national law which are contradictory to them”. Section 4 of Article 148 stipulates that “the Par­
liament, the President of Romania, the government and the judiciary ensure the performance of obliga­
tions stemming from the agreement to join.. Section 5 or Article 148 provides that the government must 
present to both chambers of the Parliament draft “acts of mandatory character, before they are presented 
for acceptance to the institutions of the European Union” See J. Falski, “Euroatlantyckie” zmiany w Kon­
stytucji Rumunii, “Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Informatyki, Zarządzania i Administracji w Warsza­
wie” 2006, No. 1, pp. 123-124.
21 In Article 11 of the Romanian constitution Section 3 was added which stipulates that, in case an agree­
ment to which Romania wishes to become a party contains provisions which are in contradiction to the 
Constitution, this agreement may only be ratified upon prior change of the Constitution. Article 147 Sec­
tion 3 provides that and agreement or international treaty which is deemed contrary to the Constitution 
cannot be ratified. Ibidem, p. 125.
22 The amendments to the Romanian constitution include also provision such as Article 137 Section 2, 
which makes it possible to replace the national currency with the currency of the European Union, and 
Article 19 (Extradition and relegation) which makes it possible for Romanian citizens to be extradited. Ibi­
dem, pp. 125-126. 
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sed, particularly in a manner which would suggest that a certain type of con­
stitutional regulation has the characteristics of a standard. This is because 
even though “old” member states who have made no constitutional changes, 
there are nevertheless exceptions to this rule. On the other hand, the degree 
of openness to the integration varies very much among the “newer” states. It 
appears that the particular states have selected their own methods of adjust­
ing their constitutional orders to the needs of membership in the Union, and 
therefore their constitutions have preserved their specific national character. 
Regardless of the degree of adjustment of the national constitutions to the re­
lationship between the state and the community structures, the constitutions 
remain the key instruments regulating internal legal orders.
Constitutions are legal acts which top the hierarchy of legal acts in a sy­
stem, and whose norms may be used as models in legislative, executive and 
judiciary proceedings. No constitution contains a regulation which would 
explicitly give primacy to community law.23 In some cases (for example in 
France) there is the requirement of a prior constitutional amendment in or­
der to ensure compliance of community laws with the constitution and in or­
der to prevent conflicts between constitutional and community regulations. 
It must be therefore stressed that at the present stage of European integra­
tion, constitutions of the member states have preserved their character of 
acts which are adopted and amended following special procedures, which 
have the highest position in the national legal systems, and which regulate 
national maters and, as far as it is necessary, also matters resulting from the 
achievement of goals of international and intergovernmental cooperation.
23 S. Biernat, W. Czapliński and K. Działocha correctly point out that the principle of primacy of commu­
nity law is not the principle of supremacy of this law over national laws, and in particular over the consti­
tution. Its essence is the primacy of application of the community law within the national legal order. See 
S. Biernat, Prawo Unii Europejskiej a Konstytucja RP i prawo polskie - kilka refleksji, “Państwo i Prawo” 
2004, No. 11, pp. 20-21; W. Czapliński, Pierwszeństwo to nie nadrzędność, “Rzeczpospolita” 2004, Septem­
ber 6; K. Działocha, Podstawyprounijnej wykładni..., as cited, p. 31. However, according to B. Banaszak, 
“only the Irish constitution gives community law supremacy” B. Banaszak, Konstytucja europejska..., as 
cited, p. 9. According to M. Muszyński, the Irish constitution also no more than suggests primacy of com­
munity law. The Irish constitution also provides that it must be amended if its regulations are contrary to 
community regulations. However, it includes no explicit mention giving community law supremacy. See 
M. Muszyński, Podobieństwa i różnice..., as cited.
24 See P. Winczorek, Kilka uwag w kwestii dostosowania Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do wymogów 
prawa europejskiego, [in:] Konstytucja dla rozszerzającej się..., as cited, pp. 187-188; S. Biernat, Czy konieczne 
są zmiany w Konstytucji przed przystąpieniem Polski do Unii Europejskiej, [in:] Czy zmieniać konstytucję? 
Ustrojowo-konstytucyjne aspekty przystąpienia Polski do Unii Europejskiej, ed. J. Barcz, Warszawa 2002, 
p. 42; Pytania o konstytucję. Opinia zbiorowa, “Studia Prawnicze” 2003, No. 3, p. 13; M. Kruk, Konsty­
tucja narodowa a prawo..., as cited, p. 175; B. Banaszak, Konstytucja europejska..., as cited, p. 12; K. Wójto-
Considering the above, it seems useful to discuss the notion of “adjusting 
the constitution” to the requirements resulting from European integration. It 
tends to be a synonym for amending the constitution.24 It must be noted that
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some countries have not deemed it necessary to amend their constitution, 
or have done so to a minimal extent, while other countries have implemen­
ted deep changes. However, in their decisions, all countries have based their 
decision on their own evaluation of needs, resulting from their political sy­
stems, traditions and legal cultures, as well as from the fact that community 
laws, although directed at achieving cooperation, will nolens volens also be 
applied in the national legal orders. “Adjusting the constitution” seems to be 
rather inadequate a notion, considering both the rank of the constitution in 
a legal order and the aims of this “adjustment” All changes in the constitu­
tions flow from the free will of the state. In some countries the procedure of 
amending a constitution is very complex, in some cases requires permission 
from a sovereign, often also necessitates an appropriate “political moment” 
for it to be viable. Such an “adjustment of constitution” should not be per­
ceived as just a legislative change, similar to an amendment to any other sta­
tute. Nor should it be considered in the perspective of primacy or supremacy 
of community law, which generates certain models, where the constitution is 
perceived as an act of national law which is expected to be adjusted to these 
models. The community legal system (with its complex and heterogeneous 
character) is separate from the national legal systems and from the constitu­
tion both in terms of purposes and in terms of legal force.
The systems are autonomous, but at the same time the relationship be­
tween them should be based on the principle of subsidiarity, which means 
that the national system should only be changed insofar as it is necessary 
to pursue the common good. Similarly, requirements towards constitutions 
should be limited to those that are necessary to pursue the goals of the Union 
understood as the common good. The minimal requirement on the basis 
of which the constitutional norms should be shaped is therefore the lack of 
contradictions between the constitution and the community laws, and the es­
tablishment of a mechanism which makes it possible for the state to perform 
its obligation stemming from community laws.
Considering that differences between the two systems do exist, a sim­
ple adjustment of the constitution to community law (consisting in a transfer 
of community norms into a constitution) is not possible. The postulate of “ad­
justment” can however be understood as an oversimplification, relating to 
a legal operation which will make it possible to apply community law within 
a national legal order in accordance with constitutional norms. It is the mem­
ber state that decides whether (and if so, how) to conduct such an operation. 
The necessity to introduce changes is determined by the need to perform ef-
wicz, Otwarcie Konstytucji RP na prawo międzynarodowe i procesy integracyjne, (in:] Podstawowe problemy 




fectively the obligations undertaken by the state and aimed at achieving com­
mon good. According to S. Biernat, changes to a constitution “should be de­
emed necessary when there is a discrepancy between constitutional norms 
and EU legislation.”25 This suggests that a constitution - which by definition 
is an act which is supposed to be stable and last for generations - should not 
react spontaneously to innovations in the community legislation which cause 
no discrepancy between the two systems. Examples of many member states 
which have preserved their constitutions (relatively) intact demonstrate that 
these states strive to maintain the character of their constitutions as chief re­
gulatory instruments of domestic legal orders rather than executive acts of 
community law.
25 S. Biernat, Czy konieczne są zmiany w Konstytucji..., as cited, p. 43. According to S. Biernat, discrepancy 
between norms occurs when two or more norms of the constitution and community law cannot be exe­
cuted at the same time, and all of the norms in question are applicable. This suggests that no discrepancy 
between norms generates no need for amendments.
26 A particularly comprehensive analysis of the legal problem following Poland’s accession to the Euro­
pean Union is contained in: Polska w Unii Europejskiej, ed. M. Kruk, J. Wawrzyniak, Kraków 2005.
27 See J. Barcz, Członkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej a Konstytucja z 1997 r., [in:] Czy zmieniać konstytucję? 
Ustrojowo-konstytucyjne aspekty przystąpienia Polski..., as cited, p. 40 , and references to this text; P. Win- 
czorek, Konstytucja RP a prawo wspólnotowe, “Państwo i Prawo” 2004, No. 11, pp. 3-17 and references to 
this text: S. Biernat: Prawo Unii Europejskiej a Konstytucja RP i prawo polskie - kilka refleksji..., as cited, 
p. 18 and other; K. Działocha, Podstawy prounijnej wykładni..., as cited, p. 28; Pytania o konstytucję..., as 
cited, pp. 12-14 and other; J. Jaskiernia, Członkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej a problem nowelizacji Kon­
stytucji RP, Warszawa 2004, pp. 38-60. Analysis of proposed amendments to the constitution in the perspec­
tive of their compliance with community laws may provide another research topic.
The issue of a constitutional amendment was raised in Poland in the aca­
demic (and, to some extent, public) debate during the preparations for acces­
sion, before the referendum on accession, before Poland actually joined the 
European Union, before elections to the European Parliament were held, and 
finally, during the first stages of the ratification procedure of the Constitution 
for Europe. Before the accession, the main focus was on examining whether 
the constitution was ready for accession and for the adoption of acquis com­
munautaire. After the accession, the compliance of constitutional regula­
tion with community law is mostly analysed, in connection with the need to 
amend certain provisions. Also, analyses are carried out as to the compliance 
of certain provisions with the community legal order de lege ferenda.26 A ca­
talogue of postulated changes has been drafted; depending on the academic 
orientation of scholars it is being expanded to a moderate or large degree.27 
However, neither before nor after the accession was the constitution signifi­
cantly amended. Despite this, there have been no difficulties in application of 
community law, and no collisions between Polish constitutional norms and 
community law. It was decided that amendments were not necessary, and
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the existing “loopholes” in the law could be remedied by means of statutes28 
as well as pro-community jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal.29 From 
among the rulings of the Tribunal issued before and after accession, only in 
once case was the compliance of the constitution with the community law 
questioned.30 In a ruling pertaining to the framework decision of the Council 
of the European Union on the European Arrest Warrant, the Tribunal poin­
ted to the limits of pro-community interpretation of the constitution, explai­
ning that the limit is set at a right of an individual citizen.31 This was the only 
case when the constitution was amended; its Article 55 is now worded so that 
it allows the European Arrest Warrant to operate in Poland.
28 The system of issuing opinions by the Sejm and the Senate with regard to EU laws was established on the 
basis of one of these laws (see Law of 11 March 2004 on the cooperation between the Council of ministers 
with the Sejm and the Senate in matters related to Poland’s membership in the European Union, Journal 
of Laws 52/2004, item 515, as amended). The system functions on the basis on specialised committees in 
the Sejm and in the Senate, and it provides the opportunity for the legislative to present its opinion with 
regard to draft laws of the European Union. See W.J. Wołpiuk, Opiniodawcza funkcja parlamentu w za­
kresie współtworzenia prawa wspólnotowego, [in:] Stosowanie Konstytucji RP z 1997 roku - doświadczenia 
i perspektywy, ed. Z. Maciąg, Kraków 2006, p. 248. Issuing opinions by these institutions was not provided 
for in the constitution. The need for it resulted from the need for cooperation between the executives of 
the member states with their national parliaments. After the above-mentioned law was passed, detailed 
regulations as to the procedure were included in the Working Regulations of the Sejm and the Senate (MP 
12/2004, item 182 and MP 18/2004 item 302). The involvement of national parliaments in the community 
law-making process is a sui generis remedy to the democratic deficit in this process.
29 The Tribunal has issued rulings which were formulated in accordance with the principle of friendly in­
terpretation towards the integration process. A clear expression of this can be found in the justification to 
the ruling of 24 October 2000 (K 12/00). Also, in the justification to the ruling of 27 May 2003 (K 11/03) 
as to the compliance with the constitution of the popular referendum the Tribunal noted that current laws 
should be interpreted in accordance with the constitutional principle of openness towards the process of 
European integration and international cooperation, tracing this principle back to the preamble to the 
constitution and Article 9 of the constitution.
30 More on this: J. Barcz, Europejski nakaz aresztowania - konsekwencje braku transpozycji lub wadliwej 
transpozycji decyzji ramowej w państwie członkowskim UE, “Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” 2005, No. 1, 
pp. 11-22; A. Grzelak, Europejski nakaz aresztowania - orzeczenie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z punktu 
widzenia prawa Unii Europejskiej, “Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” 2005, No. 2, pp. 24-33.
31 See B. Banaszkiewicz, Prawo polskie a prawo Unii..., as cited, p. 54.
32 See K. Działocha, Podstawy prounijnej wykładni..., as cited, p. 33.
It is noted in the literature that a pro-community interpretation of natio­
nal laws and a pro-national laws interpretation of community law is a sui ge­
neris remedy for doubts and conflicts between the two systems. Therefore, 
there is no justification for feverish activity and hurried attempts to amend 
national constitutions.32 I fully support the view that, where conflicts do oc­
cur, a remedy must first of all be sought within the constitutional order. Sta­
bility of the constitution is, in my opinion, a very important value in the per­
spective of the trust in the law, trust of the citizens in state, identity of the 
state and promoting attitudes of constitutional patriotism. At the same time, 
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one must remember (bearing in mind the casus of the European Arrest War­
rant) that there are limits to the flexibility of interpretation of constitutional 
provisions, and that this method may fail, particularly if the constitutional 
norm is not conducive to interpretation. The attempt to settle cases of colli­
sion between the two systems by means of friendly interpretation gives the­
refore no grounds for excessive optimism: the constitution is not always ca­
pable of compliance with community norms, and certain postulates resulting 
from the progress of the integration project and related to the functioning of 
the state may not be fulfilled without a constitutional amendment.
The doubts as to the usefulness of the current Polish constitution may be 
justified: there are postulates in the literature for it to be expanded to include 
new regulation (some of them - regulations concerning subject matters which 
so far have not been regulated by it).33 New ideas are constantly being gener­
ated with view to achieving a better regulation of the relationship between Po­
land and the European Union.34 Compared to older constitutions, the Polish 
constitution is in a sense encouraging to such activity, because its provisions 
are very detailed.35 It was drafted as a result of a painstaking compromise,36 and 
therefore its makers (in the belief that the values they held dear needed to be 
constitutionalised in order to be protected from abuse) chose to be very spe­
cific in the provisions they drew up.37 Ten years after the constitution has been 
adopted, it is clear that the level of detail makes application of the constitu­
tional provisions difficult and that the details, instead of eliminating doubts, 
rather tend to intensify them.38 It seems justified to claim that the current 
constitution, both formally and materially, is not conducive to being harmo­
nised with community laws.
33 Ibidem, p. 30.
34 Ibidem, pp. 30-31.
35 See M. Kruk, Konstytucja narodowa a prawo europejskie,.., as cited, p. 184; M. Kruk, Konstytucja Rzeczy­
pospolitej Polskiej z 1997 r. a integracja europejska - trzy płaszczyzny rozważań, [in:] Prawo, społeczeństwo, 
jednostka. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Leszkowi Kubickiemu, Warszawa 2003, p. 119.
36 See J. Jaskiernia, Konstytucja RP jako efekt kompromisu politycznego, [in:] Stosowanie Konstytucji RP 
z 1997..., as cited, p. 69.
37 See. W. J. Wołpiuk, Zasady tworzenia ustawy zasadniczej - tryb przygotowania i uchwalenia Konstytucji 
RP z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r„ “Studia Prawnicze” 2001, No. 3-4, p. 363.
38 The opposite opinion is sometimes expressed, to the effect that in a society where not very many shared 
fundamental values exits, there is a need for detailed constitutional provisions. See for instance A. Strzem­
bosz, speech during a conference Konstytucja - prawo - sprawiedliwość, Batory Foundation, 16 May 2006.
Small-scale amendments to the constitution are not likely to eliminate the 
need for further amendments as the integration process progresses. A debate 
would seem useful which would result in suggestions of solutions that are 
not contrary to the constitutional order but that can create long-term mech­
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anisms of Poland’s participation in the integration process and of application 
of community law in the national legal order.39 In this context, one must con­
front the issue that possibly, attempts to introduce such solutions might not 
be limited to EU-related subject matter. In other words, is there a possibility 
that the postulate of pro-community changes in the constitution will give rise 
to postulates of a change of the whole constitution?
39 The debate is driven both by certain practical solutions, such as legge La Pergola in Italy, and by opin­
ions expressed by jurists. For example, M. Kruk insisted that in the constitution a separate chapter should 
be created which would contain all regulations pertaining to the relationship with the European Union. 
See M. Kruk: Konstytucja narodowa a prawo europejskie..., as cited, pp. 184-185. According to A. Zoll, it 
would be rational, in order to solve the problem of constitutional amendments, to introduce into the con­
stitution a provision stipulating that a statute should be adopted which would regulate the matters of Po­
land’s relationship with the European Union. See: Czy zmieniać konstytucję? Ustrojowo-konstytucyjne as­
pekty przystąpienia Polski do Unii Europejskiej, ed. J. Barcz, Warszawa 2002, p. 133.
Based on the experience of other member states, it seems recommendable 
to introduce only such changes which are inevitably necessary, and only to 
the degree which is necessary without disturbing the specific national char­
acter of the constitution. The criterion of the common good justifies that Po­
land’s constitution in its current form gives due consideration to the funda­
mental principles and values of the European Union, and that the provisions 
of the constitution allow for the application of primary ad secondary commu­
nity law in the national legal order. It can therefore serve well the common 
good of the European Union.
404
Professor MANFRED WEISS, PhD - Frankfurt University
The Interrelationship between European Law 
and the German Constitution
You all may have heard that during the weekend, the Prime Minister of the 
Czech Republic announced that there are serious doubts whether the Reform 
Treaty is compatible with the Czech Constitution, and that therefore it will be 
brought to the Czech Constitutional Court to check whether it is in line with 
the Czech national constitution. This shows how important it is to have a close 
look at the powers of national constitutional courts, in reference to European 
law. What I want to do is very modest: I simply want to illustrate this prob­
lem by taking the German example and the relationship between the Consti­
tutional Court in Germany and the European law, or more precisely, the Euro­
pean Court of Justice. Much of what I say will be very familiar to you, but I have 
to put it in context in order to make my point.
1. Introduction
European law may mean different things: law in the context of the Euro­
pean Union and law in the context of the European Council. The relation­
ship between the national Constitution and the supranational entity known 
as the European Union is totally different from the relationship between the 
national Constitution and the European Council which is not a supranational 
entity but must to be treated according the rules for international treaties. 
If international treaties are ratified in Germany they have the status of stat­
utory law, ranking in the hierarchy of legal sources below the Constitution. 
This also refers to the European Convention on Human Rights. This leads to 
the effect that judgments of the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany 
and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights may differ and oper­
ate in parallel one next to the other. However, in order to overcome the result 
that a ratified international treaty is overruled by the German Constitution, 
the Federal Constitutional Court has developed an approach to interpret the 
Constitution in the spirit of the international treaty, thereby bringing both 
sources closer to each other and minimizing the danger of conflicts. How­
ever, this very interesting and rather complicated problem of the relation­
ship between the German Constitution and international treaties will be ne­
glected in this paper.
In order to minimize the confusion and not to exceed the available space 
the paper will focus exclusively on the relationship between European Union 
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law and the German Constitution or - more precisely - on the relationship 
between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court 
of Justice. Due to the supremacy of European Law there is an implied conflict. 
In analyzing the Federal Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction the different ap­
proaches to the solution of the implied conflict in the course of the history of 
the European project will be shown.
2. The international openness of the German Constitution
The Basic Law, passed in 1949 as Constitution for the Western part of 
Germany and several times amended afterwards, became also the Constitu­
tion for the unified Germany in 1990. From the very beginning, eight years 
before the start of the European Economic Community in 1957, the Consti­
tution had been based on the idea of integration in a broader European con­
text. This is expressed by the text of the preamble which reads: “...Inspired 
by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united 
Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have 
adopted this Basic Law.” In addition art. 24 par. 1 empowers the Federal re­
public of Germany to transfer by law “sovereign powers to international orga­
nizations”. By an amendment of 1992 this power has been extended to the in­
dividual States of the Federal Republic, the Laender: “Insofar as the Laender 
are competent to exercise state powers and to perform state functions, they 
may, with the consent of the Federal Government, transfer sovereign powers 
to trans-frontier institutions in neighbouring regions” (par. 1 a).
The general entitlement to transfer sovereign powers is specified in art. 23 
which has been amended several times, the latest in 1993. The first two sen­
tences of the decisive par. 1 of this article nowadays read as follows: “With 
a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall 
participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to 
democratic, social, and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the prin­
ciple of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of fundamental 
rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law. To this end 
the Federation may transfer sovereign powers by a law with the consent of the 
Federal Council.” (The Federal Council in Germany is the body representing 
the interests of the Laender whereas the interests of the Federal State are rep­
resented by the Federal Parliament.) As will be shown later, this text is based 
on the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court which is acting as the 
guardian of the Constitution.
3. Fundamental Rights as most important pillar of the Constitution
The first and most important chapter of this Constitution contains a cat­
alogue of fundamental rights which is of utmost importance. These funda­
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mental rights are probably the strongest pillar on which the Federal Repub­
lic of Germany is built. Only if it is explicitly allowed by the specific provision 
referring to a fundamental right this right may be restricted to a certain ex­
tent by legislation. But “in no case may the essence of a fundamental right be 
affected” (art. 19 par. 2). The Constitution can be amended by a two thirds ma­
jority in the legislative bodies. But amendments by which the principles “laid 
down in articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible (art. 79 par. 3). Art. 1 not only 
guarantees human dignity as a fundamental right (par. 1) but stresses that “the 
German people ... acknowledge inviolable and inalienable fundamental rights 
as the basis of every community, of peace and justice in the world” (par. 2) and 
finally states that “the following fundamental rights shall bind the legislature, 
the executive, and the judiciary as directly applicable law” (par. 3). According 
to art. 20 Germany is “a democratic and socially oriented Federal State” (par. 1) 
in which all state authority is derived from the people (par. 2) and in which “the 
legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the ju­
diciary by law and justice” (par. 3). This safeguard against the abolishment of 
fundamental rights and other essential pillars of the Constitution is a reaction 
to the experience made in the Nazi period where it became clear that major­
ity vote does not prevent the perversion of the rule of law. The already men­
tioned art. 23 in the 3rd sentence of its par. 1 makes sure that the transfer of 
powers to the European Union (EU) does not undermine this so-called “eter­
nity rule”: “The establishment of the European Union, as well as changes in its 
treaty foundations and comparable regulations that amend or supplement this 
Basic Law, or make such amendments or supplements possible, shall be subject 
to paragraphs 2 and 3 of art. 79”
As already mentioned, according to art. 1 par. 3 of the Constitution, all the 
three State powers - the legislature, the executive and the judiciary - shall be 
bound by the fundamental rights. Art. 1 par. 3, however, does not give a full pic­
ture of the scope of application of fundamental rights. It is much too narrow 
and therefore misleading. It only refers to the vertical application in the relation­
ship between citizens and State. This reflects the traditional understanding of 
fundamental rights as a defence against State power, thereby guaranteeing the 
citizens an area of freedom in which the State cannot interfere. In the mean­
time, this traditional understanding is considered to be the starting point only. 
Fundamental rights nowadays are considered to be the expression of values on 
which the legal order as a whole is based. Therefore, they can no longer be ig­
nored in the relationship between private actors. Inequality of power is not 
only characteristic of the relationship between State and citizens, but is a grow­
ing phenomenon also between private actors, as for example employers and 
employees. This insight has led in Germany to the concept of indirect hori­
zontal application of fundamental rights. This is a soft way of introducing the
407
EUROPEAN UNION AND STATE POLITICAL SYSTEMS
fundamental rights into relationships between private actors. The fundamen­
tal rights are not applied strictly in the same way as in the relationship between 
State and citizens but the general clauses of the law governing relationships be­
tween private actors are to be interpreted in the light of the values expressed by 
the fundamental rights. This of course gives the judiciary a broad leeway of in­
terpretation in adapting the fundamental rights to the specific situation.
The Federal Constitutional Court as guardian of the Constitution has great 
merits in developing and step by step improving the concept of fundamental 
rights. By way of monitoring the legislative, judicial and executive powers this 
Court not only has made sure that none of these powers undermine or ignore 
the fundamental rights but has also specified the vague notions of the text of 
the Constitution, thereby strengthening the effects of fundamental rights.
4. The Interface between the Federal Constitutional Court
and the European Court of Justice
4.1. The two "as long as" judgments
The development of the supremacy of European law over national law, in­
cluding constitutional law, by the European Court of Justice inevitably led to the 
question whether national Constitutional Courts still are entitled to examine 
European secondary law in the light of national Constitutions or whether only 
European law is decisive, to be exclusively monitored by the European Court 
of Justice. When the Federal Constitutional Court in 1974 was confronted with 
this question1 it stressed that the European Economic Community is obliged 
“to do everything in searching for rules which are compatible with the consti­
tutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany.”2
1 Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 29 May 1974, BVerfGE 37, 271 etseq.
2 Ibidem, 279.
3 Ibidem, 280.
However, it expressed doubts whether the European Economic Community 
has already developed a generally binding standard of fundamental rights com­
parable with the one contained in the German Constitution. Even if the juris­
diction of the European Court of Justice was in the spirit of fundamental rights, 
it considered this not to be sufficient.3
Therefore it concluded: “As long as the process of integration is not ad­
vanced to an extent that the Community law also contains a catalogue of fun­
damental rights which is on the same level as the catalogue of fundamental 
rights in the German Constitution” the Court continues to examine the com­
patibility with the fundamental rights of the German Constitution, even if the 
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European Court of Justice has already decided on the matter.4 This meant 
nothing else but an open conflict between the two courts. Twelve years later 
the German Federal Constitutional Court used the opportunity to revise this 
position.5 In the meantime it became evident that the Court’s fears expressed 
in the judgment of 1974 were unjustified. It still stressed that art. 24 entitling 
the Federal Republic to transfer souvereign powers is not without limits but 
requires a framework which leaves the identity of the constitutional order 
untouched.6 However, the Court recognized that in the meantime the Com­
munity had developed a standard of fundamental rights which in its effects 
may be considered equal to the fundamental rights as contained in the Ger­
man Constitution. “All main institutions of the Community in the meantime 
have declared that in executing their powers and in pursuing the Communi­
ty’s goals they are guided in a legally binding way by the respect for funda­
mental rights as contained in particular in the Constitutions of the Member 
States and in the European Convention of Human Rights. There are no in­
dications that the achieved standard of fundamental rights in the Commu­
nity is not sufficiently stable and only of a temporary nature.”7 Therefore, the 
Court concluded: “As long as the European Communities, in particular the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, guarantee an efficient protec­
tion of fundamental rights which essentially equalizes the protection by fun­
damental rights as contained in the German Constitution”8 the Court will no 
longer continue to examine the compatibility of European law with German 
Constitutional Law, thereby leaving the monitoring of European Law and its 
transposition into national law exclusively to the European Court of Justice. 
These two judgments became well known in Germany as “as long as I” and 
“as long as II”
4 Ibidem, 285.




4.2. The Maastricht Judgment
However, only a few years later in 1993 the position developed in “as long 
as II” has been questioned in the course of the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty. At the outset, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty never seemed to 
be a problem in Germany. Hence it was not surprising that the Federal Parlia­
ment in the final reading of the Act on Ratification on 2 December 1992 passed 
almost unanimously (543 votes in favour out of the total of 568). The Federal 
Council, only two weeks later backed this Act unanimously. Thus after the nec­
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essary procedural steps to be taken this legislative measure finally was enacted 
on 28 December 1992. Everything seemed routine. The document of ratifica­
tion merely had to be signed by the President of the Federal Republic to fulfill 
the last necessary step. When, however, the constitutionality of this Act on Rat­
ification was questioned by involving the Federal Constitutional Court the so 
far quick and uncomplicated process came to a stop. In due respect to the au­
thority of the Federal Constitutional Court, the President refused to sign the 
ratification document before the Court delivered its decision. Thus with a de­
lay of more than ten months the signature was put under the document after 
the Court’s (unanimous) decision of 12 October 1993.9 Thereby Germany was 
the last of the twelve member States ratifying the treaty of Maastricht.
9 Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 12 October 1993, BVerfGE 89,155 etseq.
The interesting aspect of the Court’s judgment is not that it considered 
the Maastricht Treaty to be compatible with the German Constitution, even 
if this was - quite naturally - the politically decisive result. In the context of 
this paper, however, it is much more important that the judgment redefined 
the relationship between the German Constitution and European law. It is 
not very easy to specify clearly this relationship. This difficulty is due to the 
fact that the judgment is written in a rather diplomatic and sometimes am­
biguous language. At least in parts it reads more like a political essay than like 
a legal text. By sticking to diplomacy the judgment succeeds in putting for­
ward the European Union on the one side and in giving the opponents the 
feeling that their concerns were taken very seriously. Due to the ambiguity of 
the judgment’s language it seems to be necessary to reproduce the reasoning 
of this judgment in more detail.
The focus of the judgment was on the already mentioned art. 79 par. 3 ac­
cording to which the principles as stated in articles 1 and 20 (for their content 
see above) cannot be amended, modified or abolished. As already indicated, 
this so called “guarantee of eternity" in 1949 was embedded into the Consti­
tution as a reaction to the Nazi period. Never again should it be possible to 
change the essential principles of the Constitution and pervert them as it hap­
pened after 1933. And as already indicated above, these principles which nei­
ther can be amended, modified or abolished have to be respected in engag­
ing in international Treaties. As also indicated above one of the principles in 
article 20 is the democratic structure. This principle is specified in article 38 
which reads: “The members of the Federal Parliament are elected in a general, 
direct and free election by equal and secret vote. They are representatives of 
the people as a whole, not bound by orders or directives, only responsible to 




According to the plaintiff’s view art. 38 is violated by the Maastricht Treaty 
since it guarantees each citizen a right to a representation in the Federal Par­
liament legitimized democratically. The citizen participates in the execution 
of the powers of the Federal State by way of this Parliament. The violation 
- according to the plaintiff - consists in the fact that the Maastricht Treaty 
transfers essential powers of the German Federal Parliament to the organs 
of the Community. Consequently the members of the Federal Parliament as 
elected representatives of the German people are no longer able to execute 
their powers granted by the Constitution. Hence these powers are no longer 
performed by the German people. In addition the plaintiff was referring to 
the democratic deficit on Community level. According to the plaintiff’s view 
this deficit is not compensated by an adequate participation of the Parlia­
ments of the Member States in legislating on Community level.10
10 For the plaintiff’s view see ibidem, 165 etseq.
The Court started with the assumption that theoretically art. 38 could be 
violated if the powers of the German Parliament would have been transferred 
to a body consisting of the Governments of the member states of the Com­
munity to such an extent that the minimum requirements of democratic le­
gitimacy as guaranteed in articles 20 and 79 of the Constitution were no lon­
ger existent. However, after careful analysis of the Community structure and 
of the text of the Maastricht Treaty the Court denied such a violation. In this 
context it especially stressed the fact that it was the intention of the Constitu­
tion from the very beginning to be open for European integration. In drawing 
the conclusion it stated that by ratifying the Maastricht Treaty Germany is not 
subjected to an automatism which could no longer be controlled. According 
to the Federal Constitutional Court the Treaty merely opens the way to fur­
ther integration of the European Community step by step. Each further step 
would depend on the agreement of the German Government on which the 
Federal Parliament would exert its influence. But at the same time the Court 
insists that at least presently the national Parliaments remain to be the deci­
sive bodies to provide democratic legitimacy.
Therefore, it states that the peoples influence on the representative bod­
ies and their legitimacy has to be secured also in a confederation of States. 
This mainly means that the German Federal Parliament has to retain powers 
and tasks of substantial importance. Therefore it is necessary to determine as 
clearly as possible the transferred rights and the intended program of integra­
tion. If it were not clear to what extent the German legislator has agreed to 
a transfer of powers it would be possible for the Community to take over pow­
ers which are not specified. Such a general empowering of the Community 
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would be incompatible with art. 38 of the Constitution.11 In arguing that the 
Maastricht Treaty remains within these borderlines the Court offers its in­
terpretation of the Treaty which it considers to be binding for Germany and 
for whoever acts on its behalf. At the same time it insists that future alter­
ations of the Maastricht Treaty would not be covered by the present Ger­
man Act on Ratification. It draws a clear demarcation line between interpre­
tation of the Treaty and alteration of the Treaty, ending up by the warning 
that interpretation may not result into alteration of the Treaty. If that would 
be the case it would not have binding effect in Germany. And most impor­
tant in reference to the topic discussed here: it is the Federal Constitutional 
Court’s task to examine whether measures taken by Community institu­
tions and organs remain within the power frame as granted by the Treaty. In 
this context the Court stresses that the generous approach to article 235 of 
the original EEC Treaty as experienced in the past has to be understood in 
a more restrictive way in the future. The same — in the Court’s perspective — 
applies to the concept of “implied powers“ and to the interpretation method 
focusing on the “effet utile.“12
11 For this reasoning see ibidem, 182 et seq.
12 For this reasoning see ibidem, 188 et seq.
In its effort to keep the Community organs within the borderlines of spec­
ified powers granted to them it especially stresses the importance of the prin­
ciple of subsidiarity as formulated in the Maastricht Treaty. For the Court this 
principle limits the execution of powers granted by the Treaty. In the Court's 
view the Community legislator can only act after having carefully checked 
whether the goals of the specific measure to be taken could not be sufficiently 
achieved by regulations on the level of the member States. The Court explicitly 
stresses that the principle of subsidiarity is a legal principle to be monitored 
by the ECJ. According to the Federal Constitutional Court the German Fed­
eral Government has a constitutional obligation to exert its influence in the 
Council on Community level to assure a strict application of the principle of 
subsidiarity. As far as the German Federal Parliament according to the Con­
stitution has the power to influence the practice of the Council it is bound by 
the same constitutional obligation. And it will always be the Federal Consti­
tutional Court’s task to examine whether these bodies have properly fulfilled 
this constitutional obligation.
In the Federal Constitutional Court’s perspective also the principle of pro­
portionality as stated in art. 3 b par. 3 of the Treaty plays an important role. 
It mainly sees its function in preventing an overregulation by Community 
measures, thereby preserving the identity of the member States and conse­
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quently the powers of the national parliaments.13 The consequence of all this 
reasoning is simple: the Federal Constitutional Court retains the possibility 
to monitor whether too many powers are transferred to the European Union 
and whether acts of secondary legislation remain within the borderlines of 
the transferred powers.
13 For the reasoning on subsidiarity and proportionality see ibidem, 210 et seq.
14 Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 7 June 2000, BVerfGE 102,147 et seq.
15 Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organization of the market 
in bananas, OJ1993, L 047.
16 Federal Constitutional Court (FN 14) 161.
The second and in the context of this paper most relevant part of the judg­
ment refers to the control of fundamental constitutional rights as guaranteed 
by the Constitution. As indicated above, according to the judgment “as long 
as II” the examination of Community law was left exclusively to the European 
Court of Justice since European law was considered to contain the same stan­
dard of protection by fundamental rights as the German Constitution does. 
Now in the Maastricht judgment the Federal Constitutional Court at least 
uses a different language. As far as the power to examine secondary Commu­
nity law is concerned the Court saw itself in a “relationship of cooperation“ 
with the European Court of Justice. In this relationship it understood its part 
as limited to a “general guarantee of the unchangeable standard of fundamen­
tal rights". This is not exactly an illuminating example of clarity of judicial 
language. But it suggested that the German Federal Constitutional Court was 
intending to take again a more active role in monitoring Community acts.
4.3. The impact of the Maastricht Judgment
It was not at all clear whether and in how far the Maastricht judgment 
meant a new approach compared to the “as long as II” judgment. In particu­
lar the meaning of the obscure notion “relationship of cooperation” was rather 
nebulous and needed clarification. In the meantime the Federal Constitutional 
Court has helped to clarify the situation.
An important step in this direction is the Federal Constitutional Court’s 
judgment14 on measures taken by German authorities based on the revised 
EC-regulation on bananas.15 It did not accept the claim against these mea­
sures. It considered the examination of secondary European law only to be 
possible if it can be proved “that the present development of the law on pro­
tection by fundamental rights, in particular the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice, does generally not guarantee the inadmissible protection 
of fundamental rights.”16 This, however, was denied by the Court. It stressed 
that the development of protection by fundamental rights in European law 
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has not changed since the “as long as II” judgment. Therefore, in reference 
to the Maastricht judgment it clarified that the “relationship of cooperation” 
does not change the perspective of the “as long as II” judgment. “The Euro­
pean Court of Justice is also competent for the protection by fundamental 
rights in the relationship between citizens of Germany and measures of pub­
lic authorities based on secondary European law.”17 In short and to make the 
point: at least in reference to monitoring fundamental rights the fears im­
plied by the Maastricht judgment seem to be unjustified. The perspective de­
veloped in 1986 is maintained in spite of the confusing formula “relationship 
of cooperation”.
17 Ibidem, 163.
18 Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 17 February 2000, NJW 2000, 2015.
19 Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 18 July 2005, NJW 2005, 2289.
The question, however, still remains whether this also applies to conflicts in 
which the EU is accused to have exceeded its powers or whether these powers 
were not transferred in line with the German Constitution. Here it seems, 
that the Federal Constitutional Court is determined to execute its monito­
ring task. This can be deducted from the reasoning in the “Alcan” judgment 
of the Federal Constitutional Court.18 In a preliminary ruling the European 
Court of Justice had confirmed that Community Law requires repealing the 
unjustified subsidies and that the powers executed by the Community are in 
line with European Community law. The Court states that there is no indi­
cation for “an act exceeding the transferred powers in the sense of the Maa­
stricht judgment”. This statement can be read as a confirmation that if there 
were such an indication the Court would consider itself to be empowered to 
monitor this question. Thus at least in this respect there is still the possibi­
lity of a judicial conflict between the German Federal Constitutional Court 
and the European Court of Justice. In the Federal Constitutional Court’s re­
cent judgment on the constitutionality of the Act on the European Warrant 
of Arrest19 the Court examined only whether the German legislator had used 
the leeway left by the European framework decision - in the area of the Eu­
ropean Union’s third pillar - in a way which respects the constitutional re­
quirements. The legality of the European framework decision as such was not 
questioned at all.
5. Conclusion
Supremacy of European law meant a big challenge for the German Fede­
ral Constitutional Court. In the beginning it considered this dogma as a dan­
ger for the standard of protection by fundamental rights as contained in the 
German Constitution. Only when it became evident that fundamental rights 
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are respected in European law the Court changed its attitude. However, in the 
Maastricht judgment it became evident that there is still a fair share of ambi­
guity in the Court’s approach. Follow up judgments finally did away with this 
ambiguity at least in reference to fundamental rights. The Court still claims 
to examine whether and in how far powers can be transferred to the Euro­




• Professor Ryszard Małajny, PhD - University of Silesia
I can infer from these four lectures, those of professor Carby-Hall, profes­
sor Wolpiuk, professor Weiss and that of mine, that there is a slight difference 
between professor Carby-Hall and the rest of us. Namely I think that you and 
I are inclined to have the position that in general, European law has suprem­
acy over national constitutional laws - in general, with some small reserva­
tions. But as far as the rest of us are concerned, we maintain that these con­
stitutional systems of particular countries on the one hand and that of the 
European Union are equal or equiponderant, because as I have mentioned in 
my speech two days ago, the EU is not a federation. If it were, the case would 
look quite different. For example, Article 6 of the United States constitution 
says that US constitution and properly ratified treaties and statutes passed by 
the Congress are the supreme law of the land, and they prevail even if they 
are contradictory to any state constitution or statute. In no European funda­
mental acts can you find such a norm. In my opinion it is not only up to the 
European Court in Luxembourg, which will develop or elaborate the concept 
of the supremacy, but it is also up to national constitutional tribunals. For ex­
ample, as I have also mentioned, our specialist in European law makes a dif­
ference between supremacy on the one hand and primacy on the other. Well, 
for me, it is a tautology. Because this difference is very sophisticated, and nu- 
anced. So I am curious about your comments in this matter.
• Ewa Popławska, PhD - Polish Academy of Sciences
I have a question to Professor Tatham. Thank you very much for the inter­
esting information on devolution. You said that the devolution reform con­
cerned Northern Ireland too, but later you gave no details on this matter. Was 
that because the reform is still quite new, or is it because the Irish representa-
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tive body has such small competencies that they do not warrant discussion? 
This is my first question, and the second question is addressed to both today’s 
British speakers. For some time now, Britain has also been implementing a re­
form of the judiciary, and as far as I know, this is en element of the Labour 
manifesto. But in the French literature of the subject I have also encountered 
the claim that the chief impulse for the implementation of this reform was 
the McGonnell case in the European Court of Human Rights. I would like to 
know your opinion on that.
• Professor Kazimierz Dzialocha, PhD - Professor Edward Lipinski
University College of Economics and Administration in Kielce
Have the participants of this conference noticed that among the topics of 
the speeches and in the debate, the notion of the sovereignty of the nation, sov­
ereignty of the state has disappeared somehow? Only Professor Carby-Hall, 
spoke of sovereignty in its specific British form, i.e. the sovereignty of the Par­
liament from which we can trace, following a certain method of interpretation, 
the sovereignty of the British nation on the basis of the constitution. Yet this is­
sue has generally been absent from our discussion.
We are talking today about the EU, the legal systems of the member states, 
where the underlying principle, the source of the constitution, which we al­
ways take into consideration, is the principle of the supremacy of the na­
tion, especially here in the new or reborn democracies of Central Europe 
and South-Eastern Europe. Which is not surprising, given that it is a reaction 
to limited independence, I am not going to say limited sovereignty, because 
I have reservations to this term. Only yesterday, and quite shyly, with no ac­
centuation, we spoke - and I took a good note of this - about the classic un­
derstanding of sovereignty, and post-modern understanding of sovereignty, 
but that was the end of it.
So therefore I would like to raise this question: how is this sovereignty of 
the nation related, in the external aspect, with the sovereignty of the state? 
Does it exist or does it not? You realise that there are many theories in this 
respect, because the legal doctrine cannot be constructed without taking this 
into account, so the topic keeps resurfacing. We speak, and the everyday lan­
guage uses this phrase too, of limited sovereignty. Membership in the EU 
limits the sovereignty of the member states. But the problem is, the notion 
of limited sovereignty is contradictory to the essence of this term. If some­
one is sovereign, if we understand that as having unlimited power, both in­
ternally and in terms of external relations, then the notion of limited sover­
eignty is not acceptable.
There is the concept of divided sovereignty as a relationship, as reflect­
ing the consequences of certain states joining the European Community.
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But here too significant reservations must be made. Sovereignty is not a sum 
of competencies. It is a whole. You cannot arithmetically divide the compe­
tencies between EU competences and member state competencies. This ap­
proach has met with doubts both in the study of constitutional law and inter­
national law.
Finally, there is another concept, one which would require a closer look, 
the concept of shared exercise of sovereignty: exercise of it by the state, the 
primary holder of sovereignty, and the EU through its institutions. Here how­
ever another obstacle appears: some competencies are exclusive and belong to 
the Union only. They are therefore not exercised in a shared manner. Should 
we therefore not say, especially in the light of today‘s discussion, that the sov­
ereignty of nations and the sovereignty of member states is expressed in what 
can be called sovereign constitutional power of the member states? I am go­
ing to use the term “unlimited“ as far as constitution-making and amending 
a constitution is concerned, even if those amendments are made under the in­
fluence of integration processes or at the insistence of the Strasbourg court?
What I mean to say is that it seems to me that this is all that is left to us, 
one could say that it is a lot, or on the contrary, rather little: sovereignty of 
a national constitution, taking into account the fact that the state belongs to 
a certain community. Our conference as well as the news from Lisbon seem 
to suggest that the name and notion of the European Constitution have been 
deposed, all that we now have is a Reform Treaty. National constitutional 
courts, as presented for instance by Professor Weiss on the example of Ger­
many, show resistance against European rulings based on their Constitutions 
and try to interpret the Treaties - the Maastricht Treaty in the example - on 
the basis of the principles of the national constitutions. So I would like to ask 
whether you agree that what we are dealing here with is sovereignty which is 
expressed though the sovereignty of nations to have their own constitutions, 
and sovereignty of states to have their own constitutions.
• Professor Carby-Hall, PhD - The University of Hull
I will try to be as brief as I can, because there are some very interesting 
concepts which the two learned professors have suggested. I shall not answer 
your questions, for the simple reason that I think you are better qualified than 
I am. I shall apologise for being here under false pretences: I am not a consti­
tutional lawyer at all. I am a labour lawyer, like my friend Manfred Weiss, and 
I apologise for him as well for taking the guise of constitutional lawyers. But 
I think we know enough about constitutional law to be able to answer briefly 
the questions which you raised.
First of all, when we talk about sovereignty of the states, I agree with you, 
sovereignty in a particular state in a particular situation, and I agree that all 
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states, in my humble opinion, are sovereign, each state in the EU is sovereign. 
There is no doubt at all about it. But I think we should distinguish between 
sovereignty and supremacy, because I think there are two distinct meanings 
to this. And that is the very reason why, when I was talking earlier on, I was 
not talking about sovereignty, I was talking about supremacy. Sovereignty is 
a totally different concept in my opinion to supremacy. And what I was talk­
ing about was the supremacy of European law over national laws. Why do we 
need that? The reason why we need that is, I agree with you Professor, the EU 
is not a federation. But we need to have certain rules which are common for 
every single member state, and the only way we can do this is to give part of 
our sovereignty to the EU in very limited field, fields to do with EU law: di­
rectives, regulations, decision, charters, and all the bazaar. So I see a distinc­
tion between sovereignty and supremacy. And what we have seen now when 
we were talking about the supremacy of European law, we are seeing not a cod­
ification, but a consolidation of cases.
Plenty of authors I have read in constitutional law talk about our European 
law being codified. It is not, in my opinion, and I would be glad to argue this 
with anybody. It is not a codification, it is not a law that you have in all the EU 
member states apart from Great Britain, where we have our common law, we 
do not have a codified law. So, of course, do Malta and Cyprus, because they 
are ex-colonies. So we have therefore this distinction, and I think this distinc­
tion should be made from the very beginning.
Now, the question was asked about the agreement of national laws with 
EU laws. Yes, of course. When we look at our courts, in the EU, you will find 
that the courts themselves seem to try to interpret what EU law is, and if 
not, they ask the European Court of Justice for an opinion. This to me seems 
a sensible and common-law solution to the problem.
• Associated Professor Allan Tatham - ESSCA, Budapest
I can give you the answers very briefly. To question number one, on 
Northern Ireland: there was no time, no space, and there are exceptional cir­
cumstances on Northern Ireland because the Assembly has only just started 
working again after the agreement between the Sinn Fein an the Democratic 
Unionist Party, but I will be happy to talk to you about that later.
As regards the reforms, the judicial authority, yes, it is a case concerning 
Guernsey, because of the position of the Law Chancellor which as you know 
under the British Constitution and the Constitutions of Guernsey and Jersey, 
and I think the Isle of Man as well, had no understanding of what the separa­
tion of powers is according to continental theory: the Law Chancellor had ex­
ecutive, judicial and legislative roles. Therefore cutting him out of the system 
and turning him into the highest judge meant that, if that happened in little 
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Guernsey for which the UI< is responsible, it was going to happen to Britain, 
so in fact that is what we have to design - a supreme court which will be based 
in Middlesex Guild Hall, because if it is based in the Houses of Parliament, then 
the Scottish courts do not have to recognize its authority, according to the Act 
of Union of 1707.1 will be happy to talk to you later about any other issues you 
may want to raise.
• Professor Rolf Grawert, PhD - University of Bochum
Just two sentences. To return very briefly to sovereignty: I think the dis­
cussion of sovereignty was implied in what we discussed. If there was no par­
tial transfer of sovereignty, we would not have to discuss what kind of rules 
we need to make sure that we distribute the sovereignty properly between the 
two blocks: between the European Union and the member states. So I think, 
whether we call it limited sovereignty or something else, the real discussion 
is on how much sovereignty remains in the member states, and of course it is 
a different situation than before we had the EU. And one more sentence: some­
times it is good not to be only constitution lawyers, but to be a labour lawyers 
as we are. We should not only talk about formal sovereignty, we should also 
talk about substantial sovereignty, and if we look to substantial sovereignty, 
we will find out that it is diminishing day by day not because of the European 
Union, but because of the multinationals and many other factors, and we take 
all this together, then we start to worry about what remains as sovereignty in 
individual states.
• Professor Waldemar Wolpiuk, PhD - Helena Chodkowska
University College of Management and Law
First of all, I would like to say that I agree with Professor Weiss. The issue 
of sovereignty is of great importance, but it is the subject matter sufficient 
for another conference. But precisely the way in which I agree with Professor 
Weiss is that I think the sovereignty factor was included in the speeches here, 
for example also in my speech about the common good. I have participated 
in a large number of conferences where sovereignty was the central matter, 
and myself I have even written a book on the issue of sovereignty. This is all 
in statu nascendi, just being developed.
If we are to do something together, then of course the problem of sover­
eignty will be shaped differently. If the cooperation within the EU leads us to­
ward a federal state, then of course the problem of sovereignty will be differ­
ent than in a traditional state.
But what I was talking about somehow also meets with what Professor 
Dzialocha said about the constitution being a certain background to sover­
eignty, in that it is not the role of constitution to closely follow and closely re­
421
EUROPEAN UNION AND STATE POLITICAL SYSTEMS
fleet the changes taking place in reality, but that it is in the constitution that 
the sovereignty of the state is preserved.
The issue of what we need to talk about as far as sovereignty is concerned 
depends on the will of those states, nations and individuals, who are jointly 
constructing our future within the EU.
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ANNA PATEREK, PhD — Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow 
University College
Axiology of the Future European Union as Opposed to the 
German Constitution - Debate in the German Parliament
The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the decisions of the Consti­
tutional Treaty,1 particularly those which are going to consolidate values of 
the European Union as an organisation. These values are then compared with 
the ones expressed in the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.1 2  
Analysed are the debates which took place among German political parties 
represented at Bundestag during XIV and XV terms (1998-2005): SPD, Al- 
liance’90/Green, CDU/CSU, FDP and PDS.
1 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, “Official Journal of the European Union” 2004, C310, Vol. 
47,16 December, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN.
2 The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz GG), In the version promulgated on 23 
May 1949 (first issue of the “Federal Law Gazette” dated 23 May 1949), http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/stat- 
utes/GG.
7. The Charter of Fundamental Rights
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the political debate about axiology of 
the European Union was carried out at the time when the Charter of Funda­
mental Rights of the European Union was being prepared. This act was pro­
moted by many German politicians. They tried to show it as a key part of the 
future European Constitution and a way of solving future problems which co­
uld appear in the European Union particularly as the effects of its extension. 
Including this document into the Constitutional Treaty was a great opportu­
nity to consolidate the European Union one more time and to give citizens an 
opportunity to identify with this organisation.
The idea of preparing The Charter of Fundamental Rights appeared in 
Germany at the time of Intergovernmental Conference 1996/1997. This po­
stulate was formulated by an MP of opposition SPD - Jurgen Meyer. He said 
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most emphatically that there was a need to carry out an open public discus­
sion on the European Catalogue of Fundamental Rights.3
3 Debatte zur Reform des Vertrages von Maastricht und zur Europapolitik 22. Juni 1995, Verhandlungen des Deut­
schen Bundestages, ‘Stenographische Berichte“, XIII. Wahlperiode, 44. Sitzung, 22. Juni 1995, p. 3562-3563.
4 At the time of Convention there were three debates and the subject was the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: 8th May, 7th July i 12th October 2000 r., [in:] Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, “Stenog­
raphische Berichte” XIV. Wahlperiode, 105. Sitzung, 18. Mai 2000, p. 9839-9860; Verhandlungen..., 115. 
Sitzung, 7. Juli 2000, p. 11022-11050; Verhandlungen..., 124. Sitzung, 12. Oktober 2000, p. 11903-11923; 
and common session Bundestag and Bundesrat European Committee Bundestag: Öffentliche Anhörung 
zu der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union. Gemeinsame Sitzung des Auschusses für die An­
gelegenheiten der Europäischen Union des Deutschen Bundestages mit dem Auschuss für Fragen der Eu­
ropäischen Union des Bundesrates am 5. April 2000. Texte und Materialen. Berlin, Juni 2000.
5 BT-Drucksache 14/3368.
6 Ibidem. „The Charter of Fundamental Rights would be [...] untrustworthy if it wanted to work on every 
fundamenta right [...] so the problem of rehousing and minority protection remains out of inner concern­
ing.” P. Altmaier, [in:] Verhandlungen..., 105. Sitzung, 18. Mai 2000, p. 9846.
Creating the Charter of Fundamental Rights was very important for every 
German parliamentary factions. They all said this document would be the main 
part of the future European Constitution. And what was very important, many 
politicians hoped it would help to support the process of integrating the Euro­
pean Union’s citizens into the organisation, especially facing the increasing de­
ficiency of decisions which were made by the European Union. Many German 
Members of Parliament were totally committed to their work on the subject 
of fundamental rights.4 They agreed about the core and the main message and 
meaning of this act. They accepted that the document should guarantee pro­
tection of fundamental rights in the European Union in a comprehensive and 
consolidating way. The politicians meant both classical personal, political free­
doms and also new rights, namely, social and economic and ones that were the 
result of scientific and technological development.
Controversies concerned the substance of the Charter: the meaning of so­
cial rights, right to ask for asylum, homosexual partnership status and the 
problem of interference in authority of members the European Union. CDU 
and CSU wanted to include into the Charter “European human vision, which 
is based on Christian-western tradition.”5 Christian Democratic Party de­
manded to write down in this act “the right to protect homeland, protection 
against re-housing and guarantee for resolutions maintaining ethnic, natio­
nal and language rights.”6
The canon of fundamental rights was approved formally by the National 
Convention on 2nd October 2000. To sum up the work on the Charter parlia­
mentary debate took place on 12th October 2000 and every Bundestag par­
liamentary faction accepted the text. The preamble of the act reads: “The pe­
oples of Europe (...) are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common 
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values.”7 Among these common values, which create philosophy of European 
Union there are: human dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, democracy, and 
the rule of law. The preamble recalls spiritual and moral inheritance of the 
European Union. What is interesting, in the document dated on 20th Sep­
tember 2000, there was also a mention of religious heritage of the European 
Union. It caused protests in France, and that is why the expression “religious” 
was withdrawn. Ingo Friedrich from the CSU, MEP, demanded to include 
into the preamble sentences concerning Christianity and responsibility before 
God. These demands were supported by Convent chairman Roman Herzog and 
states such as Austria and Luxemburg, and of course the Churches.8 Finally the 
parties found out the best solution, and settlement was achieved. Only in the 
German version of the act there was the expression “spiritual-religious”9 (ge­
istig-religiös), in the other ten languages versions, including English, the wor­
ding was “spiritual”.
7 The Charter of Funadamental Rights of the European Union. The Text. Positon of Advisory Committee 
of the European Union to Fundamental Right..., p. 11.
8 Kein Bezug auf Gott in EU-Grundrechtecharta, “Süddeutsche Zeitung“, 29.09.2000, p. 2; R. Chimelli, Ein­
igkeit über EU-Grundrechte-Charta, “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, 7.10.2000, p. 9.
9 It was approved primarily CDU/CSU factions, see: Hintze, Altmaier, EU-Grundrechtecharta ist großer 
Erfolg für Europa. Pressedienst. CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, 2. Oktober 2000.
10 BT-Drucksache 14/4269.
11 BT-Drucksache 14/4584; J. Meyer, Verhandlungen..., p. 124. Sitzung, 12. Oktober 2000, p. 11904-7.
SPD/Alliance’90/Green put particular emphasis on the importance the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights in creating good relationship between citizens 
of the European Union and the European organization as the institution. Their 
politicians emphasized the integrity of human rights, not only civil and libe­
ral but also basic social ones.10 1  Human dignity is inviolable and it is written in 
the first article of the Charter. And according to the Social Democratic Party 
it is the basis of the whole Charter.11 What is more, this right is also written in 
the first article of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany which re­
ads: “Human dignity shall be inviolable” The second title, “Freedoms” is writ­
ten in compliance with Bundestag. The article 11-70 (“Freedom of thought, con­
science and religion”), 2nd section reads: “The right to conscientious objection 
is recognised, in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of 
this right” Quoting this passage, the citizens could refuse the service in the 
army because freedom of faith, conscience and creed is guaranteed. It is ex­
pressed clearly in 4th article section 3 in the Basic Law: “No person shall be 
compelled against his conscience to render military service involving the use 
of arms. Details shall be regulated by a federal law.” Also important for Ger­
man representatives was including into the Charter freedom of arts and scien-
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ces (article 11-70). Discussing this matter they referred to Article 5 section 3 
the Basic Law: “Art and scholarship, research, and teaching shall be free. The 
freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the consti­
tution.” The solution concerning the right to property written in the Charter 
according to SPD politicians is more progressive than Article 14 of the Basic 
Law. The law should protect, secure and guarantee “lawfully acquired posses­
sions” and also “intellectual property shall be protected”. Article 11-83 stipulates 
that “equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas” and it was 
accepted enthusiastically as a modern solution. In addition, the Charter exclu­
des the possibility of extension of competencies and tasks which are included 
into the European Treaties. Another important achievement in the Charter is 
assurance of the protection written in national constitutions.
The German SPD/Alliance’90/Green representatives believed that the 
main advantage of the Charter was its modern and holistic way of showing the 
matter of fundamental rights. And that is why it was so important for them 
that the Charter stipulated inviolability of human rights. Also, the Charter 
specified modern rights such as: protection of personal data, environmental 
protection, consumer protection. Thirdly, it included new generation rights: 
bioethics and ban on discrimination. And finally the Charter included the 
right not to be discriminated against on the basis of gender.12
12 BT-Drucksache 14/4269.
13 BT-Drucksache 14/4584.
Alliance’90 and Green representatives believed that the Charter of Funda­
mental Rights was an extraordinary act which would consolidate the Euro­
pean Union. They pointed however to the fact that many German postulates 
were not realized. The politicians showed many weak points, such as insuffi­
cient regulations related to environmental protection, bioethics, right to asy­
lum, minority protection and animal rights. But the faction appreciated some 
subjects which they called “progressive”: ban on discrimination, family and 
marriage protection, guarantee of equal rights, social and political advance­
ment, women’s rights. Talking about the future status of the Charter, the po­
liticians wanted to make this act law as soon as possible. They also appealed 
to the government to create forceful methods of executing rights by citizens. 
The representatives agreed the idea of referendum on the Charter was good 
and useful, but were afraid of reaction the other states. Yet the most impor­
tant is that the faction also accepted the Charter of Fundamental Rights as 
“the milestone in process of European integration.”13
CDU/CSU fraction also considered the Charter as a very important part 
of the future Constitutional Treaty, as “soul of the European Union”. It was 
said this act should become the foundation of common values and the tool 
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used in democratic states. It also ought to guarantee legal verification of Eu­
ropean institutions and decision they made. One on the faction’s require­
ment was achieved: they managed to persuade the others to include into the 
Charter the “European vision of human being" founded on Christian and En­
lightenment tradition as unequivocal recognition of human dignity and also 
the subsidiarity rule. What is more the Charter had to - according to German 
Christian Democratic Party - not only be just a tool of the European iden­
tity but it also had to become “an important political sign for states which 
will be going to become members of the European Union and for organisa­
tions protecting human, civic and democratic rights all over the world”. The 
politicians believed that the Charter would become “a godfather” of many 
future constitutions East European and Third World states. Furthermore 
the politicians wanted to show they meant the European Union not only as 
a free market space but first of all as a community of common values founded 
on democratic ideas. The politicians emphasized that the Charter guaranteed 
legal protection of rights within the European Union.
But there was another problem to solve. The rules which were going to 
be written in the Charter were incoherent. That is why the way of acquiring 
the prerogatives by the Union should be defined very strictly. The ratification 
process was the time of dividing tasks and competences among the Union 
and its members. The faction was in favour of making the Charter binding. 
They persuaded the others it would be a very useful tool for the European cit­
izens to control Union institutions (especially the right to complaint). There­
fore it had to be vouched that only these rights could be the subjects of com­
plaint which were given to European authority by its members. CDU/CSU 
faction discussed this matter because they were certain that it had not been 
expressed clearly and precisely, especially in terms of division of competences 
between the Union and its members.
In their opinion the Charter should be just a starting point to further de­
bate about the division of competences in the European Union. They clai­
med it could become another great step towards making the Union more de­
mocratic. The Christian faction demanded the national government to take 
steps forward and to include the Charter into the European treaties. CDU/ 
CSU also pointed the advantages of the Charter: unequivocal recognition 
of human dignity, taking into consideration new tendencies in medicine 
and biology, freedom of conducting business, right to asylum, protection in 
the event of removal, (collective) expulsion.
According to CDU/CSU the main disadvantages was lack of the right 
to homeland, and groups and minorities rights which were mentioned by 
Christian parties. In spite of these deficiencies the Charter was thought to 
be an accelerator of the future European integration process. This act allo­
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wed the European Constitution to be discussed.14 FDP representatives also 
perceived the Charter as a cornerstone in creating the European Constitu­
tion. It could be said it was the first step towards creating the Federation of 
the European Union. But the politicians emphasized the need to decide about 
division of competences and stronger democratic authorization of the deci­
sion processes. They agreed that both constitution and the Charter should be 
accepted by European societies. To this aim, the politicians stressed that Eu­
ropean citizens ought to have an opportunity to create the catalogue of fun­
damental rights (they should have an influence on corrections and ratifica­
tion process ending with referenda). The faction required the government 
to start actions aimed at incorporation of the Charter into the European Trea­
ties and engage the societies in debates on the Charter and its final adoption. 
In additions, it was important to point to the incoherence in jurisdiction of 
Court of Justice of the European Communities and European Court of Human 
Rights.15 FDP representatives believed that Convent would lose its battle about 
not giving the European Union new prerogatives which were not mentioned 
by the European members in the international treaties. It was important for 
them because many subjects such as environmental protection, consumer pro­
tection and health policy had already been included into the Charter. What is 
more, the faction were against using the phrase “rule of the law” (“Achtung von 
Rechten”). They wanted to change it into “protection/guarantee” (“Gewähr­
leistung”), believing that the former one gives less protection to some rights.16 
There was debate on the Article 11-71 section 2: „The freedom and pluralism of 
the media shall be respected” while Article 5 section 1 of the Basic Law reads: 
“Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts 
and films shall be guaranteed”.
14 BT-Drucksache 14/4246.
15 BT-Drucksache 14/4253; You can read more in: E Jasiński, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Eu­
ropean Union, Warsaw 2003, p. 223-239.
16 BT-Drucksache 14/4253.
17 BT-Drucksache 14/4654.
According to PDS representatives, the Charter was a foundation of the 
European Union. They said that its main advantages was the holistic attitude 
to protection of human rights, including personal rights and freedoms and 
also political, social end economic ones.17 Thinking about the Charter of Fun­
damental Rights as “the sine qua non of the future European constitution”, 
PDS disagreed with the other politicians who wanted to see the Charter do­
cument as “the way to the essential extension of prerogatives of the European 
Union” or the beginning of “European superpower”. This rule was written 
very clearly in Article II-11 section 2 in the Charter: “This Charter does not 
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extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union 
or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and ta­




In addition PDS demanded to define in the Charter the notions of “per­
son” and “everyone.”19 The question was about Article 11-62 and 11-63 which 
is talking about “everyone” (German translation “jede Person”). PDS repre­
sentatives said that it should not be worded in this way, because protection 
of “everyone” is “controversial and unacceptable”. According to PDS the right 
to “be a person” is not inherent, the consequence is that this right can be ac­
quired and also there is a possibility to lose it. It means that newborn and the 
old who are not “conscious of their history, in some circumstances become 
no-everyone and that is why they have no right to protection”. This interpre­
tation brought about the “danger of excluding the disabled and mentally han­
dicapped from under basic rights (...)”. PDS representatives called for federal 
government to support an amendment, changing “everyone” into “person”. 
Fortunately these apprehensions were not necessary, because the Basic Law 
in its Article 2 section 2 provides for the right to life and physical integrity 
and this act describes “every person”. But in the Article 1 it uses the word “hu­
man”, so the conclusion is that the state of consciousness has no reason. Ex­
pression “jede Person” is used in German translation of the Charter because 
it must be shown that one of the advantages of the Charter is the belief it ex­
presses that any discrimination based on gender is not acceptable. In the opi­
nion of PDS faction, the Charter was a necessary “answer” to economic and 
monetary consolidation. And it was also an “invitation” for the Union mem­
bers. The catalogue was going to counterbalance too strong a belief in the free 
market.20 In addition, the politicians wanted to write down into the Charter 
absolute prohibition of cloning, not only “the prohibition of the reproductive 
cloning of human beings” (Article II-63d). There were also claims that free­
dom and pluralism of media and right to education had not been guaranteed 
in an appropriate way.
German parties (SPD/ Alliance’90/Green, CDU/CSU, FDP and PDS) be­
lieved that incorporation of the Charter into the Constitutional Treaty is the 
condition sine qua non of consolidation of the civil society on the way to Eu­
ropean unity. They were sure that European identity is important in building 
“a community of values” among the Union citizens. It was said that constitu­
tion should be adopted in European referenda. Christian Sterling on behalf 
of Alliance’90/Green emphasized there is a certain need for writing this right
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(to referenda) in the Constitutional Treaty. In his opinion “referenda (...) are 
necessary both for European democracy and European identity.”21 According 
to the finance minister Hans Eichel, debates about the meaning of European 
values would continue until “people identify themselves with their own his­
tory.”22 The Prime Minister of Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber (CSU) was also sup­
portive of referenda on European Constitution. For him this matter was very 
important, and he expressed it during his speech at the Humboldt University. 
He said that this act was so significant that therefore it should not be decided 
without participation of European citizens. The matter of referenda caused 
lively public discussion. What is interesting, these actions strengthened the 
need for referenda.23
21 Verhandlungen..., 236. Sitzung, 16. Mai 2002, p. 23579.
22 Ibidem, p. 23582.
23 See: N. Fried, Stoiberfiir Referendum zur EU-Reform, “Siiddeutsche Zeitung” 9.11.2001, p. 6.
24 S. Holl, Union will Referendum Uber EU-Verfassung, “Siiddeutsche Zeitung“, 27.11.2001, p. 7.
25 BT-Drucksache 14/9044.
26 BT-Drucksache 15/2998.
27 Verhandlungen..., XV. Wahlperiode, 112. Sitzung 28. Mai 2004, s. 10211; The German Basic Law says 
that handing over authority of Federal Government to Union Institutions needs a bill approved by 2/3 ma­
jority of Bundestag deputies. (Art. 23, p. 1, “The establishment of the European Union, as well as changes 
in its treaty foundations and comparable regulations that amend or supplement this Basic Law, or make 
such amendments or supplements possible, shall be subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 79” and 
art. 79, p. 2, “Any such law shall be carried by two thirds of the Members of the Bundestag and two thirds 
of the votes of the Bundesrat”). It involves the condition to accept by Bundestag and Bundesrat ratification 
act for every treaty signed by German government, especially a treaty which considers changes in treaties 
about the fundamental rules connected to European Committees and the European Union.
Despite differences of opinions, Christian Democratic parties wanted to 
represent similar attitudes to constitutional referenda. CSU was in favour of 
federal referenda but CDU was against this idea24. FDP representatives also 
emphasized the relationship between building the European society and the 
European public opinion. That is why they suggested that it would be better 
to organise European referenda on Constitutional Treaty and its future modi­
fications.25 The Liberals applied to Bundestag for an amendment to Article 23 
the Basic Law on the opportunity of running referenda on the European Con­
stitution among German citizens.26 But this project was not supported by any 
of parties in the Bundestag.27
The requirement for including the Charter into the Constitutional Treaty 
has also been expressed in SPD’s manifesto from November 2001. Taking 
into consideration different constitutional traditions and meaning of funda­
mental rights of the Union member states, it has to be said that creating the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights was a very important contribution towards 
establishing an identity among citizens of the European Union. The Charter 
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defined values held and expressed by members of the European Union. Pre­
paring this act was a great opportunity to start another debate on European 
Constitution. Social Democratic parties stressed that the Charter was one of 
important conditions which had to be made in the name of European con­
solidation of the European civil society. It was achieved not only by including 
the catalogue of fundamental rights into the Constitutional Treaty, but also 
by giving a chance to European citizens to participate and have benefits (the 
right to complain to Court of Justice of the European Communities).28
28 Verantwortungfilr Europa..., p. 8-10.
29 Verhandlungen..., XIV. Wahlperiode, 207. Sitzung, 12. Dezember 2001, p. 20452-20453.
30 BT-Drucksache 14/9046.
31 Verhandlungen..., 236. Sitzung, 16. Mai 2002, p. 23581-23582.
Moreover, according to PDS “constitutions will be strong only if citizens 
have a chance to vote for them (...), and then Europe will find its place in cit­
izens’ hearts” (Uwe Hiksch, PDS).29 In addition PDS demanded to guarantee 
citizens more rights to participate in making decisions and creating Union 
policy, inter alia creating referenda.30 Referenda on the European Constitu­
tion would be a chance to “integrate the European project with real human 
expectations concerning European policy” (Uwe Hiksch, PDS).31
2. Preamble and the title of the First Chapter Creating 
the Constitution for Europe
Besides resolutions included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
are the important part of Constitutional Treaty (Article 1-9, section 1), and 
the part of Chapter II (Articles 11-61 to 11-114), great value in providing axio­
logy of European Union must be given to the preamble and resolutions writ­
ten in the Title (Definition and Objectives of the Union). The values speci­
fied in the preamble of the Constitution are much broader than the ones in 
the preamble of the Charter. Because the first one speaks of the cultural, reli­
gious and spiritual heritage of Europe, from which the universal values of the 
inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, 
equality and the rule of law have developed. The “religious heritage” is a result 
of compromise reached between these representatives who did not want to 
mention it at all, and the others who desired to show the Christian influence 
on European history and write it into the Constitutional Treaty.
In Germany, a need to have an invocation to God written into the Con­
stitution was emphasized by Christian parties. Invocatio Dei is also mentio­
ned in the German Basic Law: “conscious of their responsibility before God 
and man”. And that is why CSU quoted the Basic Law and demanded to write 
the same rule (invocation of God and Christian heritage) in the Constitutio­
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nal Treaty. If it were not included, they would not support the ratification 
of the act.32 According to Angela Merkel (CDU/CSU) including Judaic and 
Christian roots of Europe and unequivocal invocation to God would make 
a chance to define the indefinite European identity in a very clear way.33 All 
the same, Edmind Stroiber (CSU) gave emphasis to the fact that including the 
Charter in the Constitutional Treaty obliged the European Union to respect 
“values which stem from the Christian-Western culture.”34
32 EU-Verfassungsvertrag nachbessern, Beschluss des 68. Parteitages am 18.-19.07.2003, Die EU-Reform­
konvent - Analyse und Dokumentation, ed. C. Giering, CD-ROM, Gütersloh-München 2003.
33 See. Angelas Merkel speech during the parliamentary debate 12 May 2005, [in:] Verhandlungen..., XV. 
Wahlperiode, 175. Sitzung, 12. Mai 2005, p. 16352.
34 See. Edmund’s Stoiber speech at the parliamentary debate 12 May 2005, [in:] Verhandlungen... XV. Wah­
lperiode, 175. Sitzung, 12. Mai 2005, p. 16363.
35 BT-Drucksache 15/1694,15/1695; 15/4206; see Peter's Hintze (CDU/CSU) Statement at the parliamen­
tary debate on 11 December 2003, [in:] Verhandlungen..., XV. Wahlperiode, 82. Sitzung, 11. Dezember 
2003, p. 7146.
36 BT-Drucksache 15/1695.
37 See. Anna Lührmann statement (Alliance’90/Green) at the parlimantary debate 11 December 2003 r. [in:] 
Verhandlungen..., XV. Wahlperiode, 82. Sitzung, 11. Dezember 2003, s. 7144; also the Statement of the min­
ister for Europe Hans Martin Bury [in:] Verhandlungen..., XV. Wahlperiode, 82. Sitzung, 11. Dezember 2003, 
s. 7158; also Anlagen zum Stenografischen Bericht, [in:] Verhandlungen..., XV. Wahlperiode, 82. Sitzung, 11. 
Dezember 2003, p. 7265-7267.
Christian Parties at Bundestag pursued the same postulates.35 CDU/CSU 
representatives in petition on 14 October 2003 claimed that invocation to 
God in the Constitutional Treaty was suggested in the preamble text: “Be­
ing aware of responsibility before God, man and spiritual-religious inherit­
ance of Europe, the European Union has developed the universal values of 
the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democ­
racy, equality and solidarity”. Christian Democratic parties demanded also 
(the same attitude they represented during debate on the Chapter of the Fun­
damental Rights) invocation to Christian-Western tradition.36 The represent­
atives of the other factions emphasized that favouritism in the preamble to­
wards one particular religion was against secular constitutional rules some 
European states (France, Belgium), and it could discredit equality, one of the 
most important European values. That is why it could be said that reaching a 
compromise between different constitutional traditions member of the Euro­
pean Union was a great achievement.37
The European Union respects various legal systems of its members, and 
the law defines the relationship between state and the churches. Article 1-52 
says: “1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national 




The Union equally respects the status under national law of philosophical 
and non-confessional organisations. 3. Recognising their identity and their 
specific contribution, the Union shall maintain an open, transparent and reg­
ular dialogue with these churches and organizations”. Therefore the Constitu­
tional Treaty obliges the European Communities to maintain an open, trans­
parent and regular dialogue with these churches. This settlement was taken 
by CDU as an unquestionable achievement and novelty in regulations be­
tween the Union and Church.38
38 See: Peter's Almeier (CDU/CSU) statement at the parliamentary debate 26 June 2003, [in:] Verhandlun­
gen... XV. Wahlperiode, 53. Sitzung, 26. Juni 2003, s. 4334; Angela’s Merkel statement at the parliamentary 
debate 12 May 2005, [in:] Verhandlungen... XV. Wahlperiode, 175. Sitzung, 12. Mai 2005, p. 16352.
39 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz GG), Appendix to the Basic Law. Extracts 
from the German Constitution of 11 August 1919 (Weimar Constitution), p. 63-64, “(1) There shall be no 
state church. (2) The freedom to form religious societies shall be guaranteed. The union of religious societ­
ies within the territory of the Reich shall be subject to no restrictions. (3) Religious societies shall regulate 
and administer their affairs independently within the limits of the law that applies to all. They shall confer 
their offices without the participation of the state or the civil community. (4) Religious societies shall ac­
quire legal capacity according to the general provisions of civil law. (5) Religious societies shall remain cor­
porations under public law insofar as they have enjoyed that status in the past. Other religious societies 
shall be granted the same rights upon application, if their constitution and the number of their members 
give assurance of their permanency. If two or more religious societies established under public law unite 
into a single organization, it too shall be a corporation under public law. (6) Religious societies that are cor­
porations under public law shall be entitled to levy taxes on the basis of the civil taxation lists in accordance 
with Land law. (7) Associations whose purpose is to foster a philosophical creed shall have the same sta­
tus as religious societies.”
Article 140 of the German Basic Law (previously Article 137 of the We­
imar Constitution section 1-7)39 stipulates that the state is secular and re­
spects the independence and autonomy and guarantees freedom of faith, 
conscience, creed and worship. Both state and churches are open to cooper­
ation. The Constitutional Treaty (article 11-70) confirmed these rights which 
are also written in the Basic Law. Article 4: “(1) Freedom of faith and of con­
science, and freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed, shall be 
inviolable. (2) The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed.” It is 
said very clearly that the Constitutional Treaty does not restrict the meaning 
of freedoms which are guaranteed by the Basic Law. What is stressed, the Eu­
ropean Union does not interfere with how the national law defines the rela­
tionship between the state and church. The Constitutional Treaty just legiti­
mizes all these freedoms.
Article 1-2 defines the foundation of the common values which are held by 
the European Communities: “The Union is founded on the values of respect 
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 
These values are common to the Member States in a society in which plural­
ism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between
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women and men prevail”. The Constitutional Treaty confirmed that “the Un­
ion shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Un­
ion’s competencies as defined in the Constitution” It was also the postulate 
of all factions which were represented at Bundestag during terms XIV and XV. 
Peter Hintze (CDU/CSU) at one of the debates quoted the first federal presi­
dent, Teodor Heuss, who said that Europe derives from three sources: Acrop­
olis in Athens, Capitol in Rome and Golgotha in Jerusalem. The spiritual foun­
dation of Europe is defined by Greek philosophy, Roman law and Judaic and 
Christian inheritance. And these roots were also in the minds of the people 
who were working on the text of the Constitutional Treaty for Europe.40
40 Verhandlungen..., XV. Wahlperiode, 175. Sitzung, 12. Mai 2005, p. 16379.
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Poland's Position Towards the Reform Treaty
The position of Poland in the debate concerning the reform of European 
institutions has evolved considerably in recent years. Poland has abandoned 
the idea of “Nice or death” and other demands, such as: the objection to limi­
ting the number of commissioners in the European Commission, the idea of 
group presidency in the Council of the EU, the guarantee to all members of 
the European Union to participate in making decisions in the issue of deter­
mining mechanics of cooperation within the framework of the European Se­
curity and Defence Policy (ESDP), and finally the introduction of reference to 
Christian tradition to the preamble of the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe. However, the issue of maintaining the system of reaching deci­
sions as close as possible to the one provided by the Treaty of Nice has rema­
ined the unshakable priority.
Polish demands towards the Reform Treaty
Compromise reached at the session of the European Council (21-22 June 
2007) and based on arrangements included in the Reform Treaty created so­
lid grounds for continuation of activities undertaken at the Intergovernmen­
tal Conference (IGC) in 2007. Agreed institutional changes are not revolutio­
nary in comparison with the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe, 
and to a high extent concern names only (the so-called “deconstitutionaliza­
tion”). Poland clearly presented its priorities while negotiating the final version 
of the new Reform Treaty within the framework of the IGC 2007. These are:
♦ Entering into the Treaty, rather than into a separate declaration, the clause 
which will make it possible to postpone disadvantageous decisions in the 
Council of the EU (the Ioannina mechanism);
♦ Increasing the number of advocates general in the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities from 8 to 9;
♦ Excluding Poland from being subject to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights;
♦ Requirement of unanimity in some votings in the European Central 
Bank.
The inclusion of the Ioannina compromise in the Treaty which Poland 
demands will result in the requirement of unanimity on any amendments, 
rather than approval by the majority of EU member states. Additional me­
chanism that allows delaying a vote has been agreed (on the grounds of the 
so-called “Ioannina compromise” of 1994). In this way, a certain “safety brake” 
was won. It will make it possible, in case of particularly difficult and contro- 
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versial issues, to postpone a decision and take it within a “reasonable time.”1 
In fact, this is an instrument not included in the Treaty which constitutes 
a tool for “forcing” the member states to reach compromise.2
1 Pursuant to the Council regulations, voting is organized upon a motion of the Chairperson of the Coun­
cil, who holds the voting upon demand of the ordinary majority of the Council Members.
2 Compare: Traktat reformujący UE. “Mapa drogowa”, forma traktatu, propozycje zasadniczych zmian in­
stytucjonalnych, [in:] Traktat reformujący Unię Europejską. Mandat Konferencji Międzyrządowej. Analiza 
prawno-polityczna. Wnioski dla Polski, ed. J. Barcz, [2007], p. 23.
3 At the Intergovernmental Conference IGC 2003/2004, in the Declaration No. 5, attached to the Consti­
tutional Treaty, Ioannina formula mechanism was modified by introducing the following condition: if the 
Council members, that constitute at least 1’ of the Union population or at least I of the member states, re­
quired to form a blocking minority, object against adopting a given legal act by the Council then the Co-
The power to prevent action in TN, TI< and Polish proposal
Source: UKIE.
It will come into force in 2014. However, compared to the 2004 formula, 
decreasing - from 1st of April 2017 (when “double majority” will be fully in­
troduced) - the threshold of blocking minority votes needed for using this 
instrument was a novelty. The threshold was lowered from 75% to 55% of sta­
tes or votes, indispensable for forming the so-called blocking minority (Art. 
1-25, item 2). In 2014-2017, in the transition period, this formula would work 
as defined in the Declaration No. 5, attached to the Constitutional Treaty.3 
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Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms Fotyga, suggested the possibility of 
using the Ioannina mechanism in the same matter again, which would auto­
matically prolong the negotiations for another few months.
Within the framework of the Intergovernmental Conference IGC 2007 Po­
land is expecting to increase the number of advocates general in the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities from 8 to 9. Poland argues that accor­
ding to the unwritten decision of the Council of the EU, Germany, France, the 
UK, Italy and Spain each have one permanent spokesperson. Other states, 
Poland included, fill three positions left based on the principle of rotation. 
According to the Polish government this is a chance for Poland to increase its 
influence on the Council’s decisions.
Poland also requests exclusion from being subject to the Charter of Fun­
damental Rights of the EU. Poland (like Ireland) intends to follow the exam­
ple of Great Britain (opt-out concerning social rights), and reserve the right 
to obtain the exclusion from coming under the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. By the end of the IGC Poland will have deci­
ded whether to ask for it as well.
Moreover, Poland insists that investments in non-Community countries, 
financed by the European Investment Bank, should be approved unanimo­
usly and not with the majority of the votes. In this manner, blocking the fun­
ding of the Baltic Sea gas pipeline which does not go through the territory of 
Poland would be possible, should the investors ask the Bank for preferential 
loans.
The Polish government has considered the addition of the so-called so­
lidarity clause in the field of energy to the contents of the Treaty a success. 
What is significant, the clause was proposed by Poland in Article III-256 of 
the EU Constitution and Article 100 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (the means of economic assistance will be used according to the 
decision of the Council of the EU, which will function in the spirit of solida­
rity among the EU member states).
Voting system as determinant of place and position of a state 
in the European Union
Most of controversies in Poland have been caused by the issue of changing 
the mechanics of making decisions in the Council of the EU. Polish proposal,
until shall be obliged to discuss this issue and make all endeavors (“within reasonable time limit") to reach 
a “satisfying solution” of the problems, raised by the Council members that object against adopting a given 
legal act. Therefore, up to the 31st of March 2017, the mechanism shall be applied if the Council members, 
representing at least 75% of the Union population or at least 75% of the member states, needed to form 
a blocking minority, stipulated by the Art. 1-25, item 2, announce their objection against adopting, by qua­
lified majority, a given legal act.
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presented at the European Union summit on the 21st and 22nd June 2007 
in Brussels, was based mainly on the concept of replacing “double majo­
rity” voting system, provided for in the Euroconstitution, with counting vo­
tes according to the square root of each nation’s population. Introducing such 
a system would allow for strengthening small and medium-sized states and 
decreasing the unjustified advantage of the biggest countries in Europe.
The percentage of population member states towards the percentage of votes 
in Treaty of Nice: EU power configuration
Country Population Population 
(%}
Votes Votes Population / weight votes
Germany 82.038 17.05 29 8.40 0.493
France 59.247 12.31 29 8.40 0.682
Italy 58.966 12.25 29 8.40 0.685
U.K. 57.612 11.97 29 8.40 0.702
Spain 39.394 8.18 27 7.82 0.956
Poland 38.667 8.03 T1 7.82 0.973
Source: R. Trzaskowski, Dlaczego bronimy Nicei?, "Międzynarodowy Przegląd Polityczny” 
2004, No. 4, p. 29.
Desire for a voting system that would be favourable for Poland is a desire 
to belong to the group of the most significant European countries. In fact, it 
is a struggle for future position of Poland in the EU. In the long run, it will be 
favourable for Poland to join the group of the largest states, whose votes are 
significant in the process of working out compromise solutions. At the same 
time, Poland tries to speak out for equality within the European Union which 
consists of T1 countries and for strengthening positions of small and me­
dium-sized countries, whose opinion should be considered as important as 
the opinion of larger states.
In the opinion of Polish negotiators introduction of the double majo­
rity system is not favourable for Poland from purely mathematical point of 
view. Double majority principle (member-states and population) will result 
in changes in individual countries’ strength of votes in the decision-making 
system in the EU. Compared with Nice arrangements, the initial proposal of 
the Convent resulted in a decrease of Polish strength of vote in the Council of 
Ministers from 8.13% (acc. to Banzhaf index) to 6.72% with decrease of possi­
bility of blocking for Poland (acc. to Coleman index4) at the same time. It resul­
ted in pushing Poland out of a group of the largest states and decreasing its ac- 
4 K. Smyk, Zasady podejmowania decyzji a pozycja Polski w Radzie Unii Europejskiej, “Analysis Bulletin of 
the Office of the Committee for European Integration” [2003], No. 11, p. 171.
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tuai impact on decision making process in the Council of the EU. Therefore, 
modifying or simplifying a complex Nice system, but keeping, however, par­
ity of votes unchanged, was in the interest of Poland. Poland presented two 
versions of voting formula change (to so-called “square root” formula): in the 
first version, number of votes (weight) would be counted according to the 
square root of each nation’s population and decisions would be taken with 
qualified majority of votes at the level of 61.6% of the total number of votes. 
In the second, slightly modified version, votes counting and decision thresh­
old would be the same, however, majority coalition will have to consist of at 
least 50% of member states.5
5 J. Kranz, Traktat reformujący UE - podejmowanie decyzji w Radzie większością kwalifikowaną, [in:] 
Traktat reformujący Unię Europejską. Mandat Konferencji Międzyrządowej..., p. 42.
The percentage of population member states towards the percentage in a draft 
of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe: EU power configuration:
Source: R. Trzaskowski, Dlaczego bronimy Nicei?..., p. 30.
Country Population Population1%) Votes Votes (%)
Population / 
weight votes
Germany 82.038 17.05 170 17 0.997
France 59.247 12.31 123 12.3 0.998
Italy 58.966 12.25 122 12.2 0.999
U.K. 57.612 11.97 120 12 1.002
Spain 39.394 8.18 82 8.19 1.001
Poland 38.667 8.03 80 8 0.995
Distribution of votes within the “square root” system significantly elim­
inated differences between population potential of member states and was 
conducive for keeping balance of interests in European institutions. Yet, Con­
vent’s arrangements and “double majority” system, corrected afterwards, re­
sulted in strengthening the votes of the four largest European states.
Double majority voting system in the Council of the EU in the present 
government’s opinion will be less favourable for Poland, and Poland’s impact 
on decision making process will be much weaker. Not only does the fact that 
(compared with the Nice system) the strength of French or German votes 
grew significantly seems worrying, but so does the decrease of importance 
of Poland, a desirable partner in the process of building coalition in decision­
making process. Abandoning Nice arrangements and presenting “square 
root” system, by Poland expressed willingness to compromise.
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On the other hand, the double majority system has plenty of advantages. 
First of all, it is simple, clear, understandable and it renders the making deci­
sion process more flexible. Secondly, it makes further enlargement of the Eu­
ropean Union possible (which is, by the way, supported by Poland). A new 
country will be able to access the EU without necessity of negotiating distri­
bution of votes, since its voting strength will be directly conditioned upon its 
population.
Finally, the double majority system is democratic, since a vote of each cit­
izen of the EU is equally significant regardless of which country they come 
from. Therefore, double majority takes into account the fact that the Euro­
pean Union is the union of sovereign countries and majority of citizens. For 
the supporters of limiting the democratic deficit it is an argument which 
makes the EU more democratic.
However, this thesis seems incorrect in the specific context of international 
relations. It is just not true that allocating number of votes in proportion to 
population to each member State will result in elimination of the deficit. In in­
ternational organizations such cases have not been noted. Democracy in inter­
national relations is not identical to democracy in a state. What would be the 
position of India or China in international organizations if number (strength) 
of votes was proportional to population?
Furthermore, criteria for weighting votes were established as the result of 
political compromise, although previous vote weighting formulas in the Coun­
cil of Ministers based on informal principle of balance between groups of 
large-, medium- and small-sized countries (initially, in the European Economic 
Community, Germany, France and Italy had four votes each, Belgium and the 
Netherlands had two votes each and Luxemburg had one vote).6 Demographic 
index (population majority) appeared only at the Nice Treaty. However, it does 
not mean that the previous system was less fair.
6 Ibidem, p. 44.
It is also enormously important that Poland has never questioned the prin­
ciple of double majority and the demographic criterion in particular. To the 
contrary, it has always acted to obtain a different vote distribution based on the 
population criterion. While assessing the strength of votes, compared to the 
Constitutional Treaty, “square root” formula weakened position of Germany 
(and three other large countries), although this position was strengthened in 
comparison with the formula presented in the Nice Treaty.
However, within “square root” system, the position of Poland was weaker, 
compared to the Nice Treaty and stronger in comparison with the Constitu­
tional Treaty. Given the above, “square root” formula has been quite rational. 
Still, the question arises whether it was pursued in a rational and realistic man- 
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ner. It cannot, however, be denied that the “square root” system was a compro­
mise solution between Nice concept and double majority system.
Making decisions by qualified majority in the Council of the EU 
in the Reform Treaty
Difficult negotiations at the European Council meeting which took place 
on 21st and 22nd June 2007 resulted in the qualified majority formula for the 
decision making process in the Council of the EU. According to this com­
promise solution, decisions will be made with the use of the double majority 
principle, considered as the qualified majority (Constitutional Treaty, Art. I- 
25), which is defined by the threshold referring to the number of states (55%) 
and the threshold relating to the number of votes (65%), resulting from pop­
ulation criterion provided for in the Constitutional Treaty.7 Transition peri­
ods when the Nice system will be in force, up to 1st November 2014 and from 
1st November 2014 to 31st March 2017, have been agreed. Then, each mem­
ber state will have a right to demand the application of the Nice formula in 
case of a given decision made in accordance with the qualified majority prin­
ciple. For Poland, such a compromise is both rational and acceptable. Fur­
thermore, it will make the decision-making mechanism more flexible and 
ensure evolutionary transition to the new double majority system. The Re­
form Treaty provides also for minimum number of four states that will create 
the so-called “blocking minority”. In this way, the possibility of forming the 
blocking minority by three largest states is excluded.8 However, the problem 
still remains as to the issue of Ioannina compromise.
7 If the Council does not form it, upon a motion of the Commission or a Minister for Foreign Affairs, then 
at least 72% of the Council members, who represent the member states (20 out of 27) that comprise at least 
65% of the Union population, constitute a required qualified majority.
8 Compare: J. J. Węc, Spór o kształt instytucjonalny Wspólnot Europejskich i Unii Europejskiej. 1950-2005, 
Kraków 2006, pp. 401-402.
Degressive proportionality in the European Parliament
For blocking a decision, it will be much more efficient to focus on degres­
sive proportionality principle than on Ioannina formula. Pursuant to Presi­
dency conclusions from European Council meeting (21st-23rd June 2007), 
the European Parliament is supposed to submit up a draft of a document that 
would define a composition of the European Parliament in the future and 
specify the upper limit of the number of its members (not more than 750), 
its minimum number (6 members) and the maximum number (96 persons) 
of members by whom, respectively, the smallest and the biggest state would 
be represented by October 2006. It is not understandable that the issue of 
new distribution of seats in the European Parliament, while discussing deci­
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sion-making strength of a member state, totally slipped the attention of Po­
lish negotiators, who did not take this opportunity to strengthen the Polish 
presence in the European Parliament9 on the grounds of compromise and 
approval of the so-called double majority. It would have effectively build up 
the position of Poland in the decision making process in the EU and it would 
have been much more significant than the so-called Ioannina formula.
9 Ibidem, p. 31.
10 In April, the European Union allocated €50 billion to foreign policy, that is 29% more than in 2000-2006.
The attitude of Poland towards Common Foreign and Security 
Policy/Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP)
Poland remains sceptical on the issue of strengthening cooperation in mat­
ters related to defence. In Warsaw, the aspect of a military wing of the Euro­
pean Union stirs a lot of controversies. Although Poland supported the deci­
sions involving Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU together with 
its military background in the form of CESDP, if is sceptical about the idea 
of structural cooperation.10 Many experts reckon that accepting the mechan­
ics of the structural cooperation in the Reform Treaty is disadvantageous in 
the light of Polish interests since the execution of this policy means division 
in the EU according to the diversity of the degree of integration. In addition, 
the attitude to NATO and the USA should be taken into account. From the 
perspective of Polish interests, rendering security policy of the EU too com­
mon as well as building the European security beyond NATO is a very risky 
undertaking which could lead to challenging the coherence and structure of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Poland is afraid of building a union 
within the Union by some states, particularly France and Germany. Despite 
the fact that in the New National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 
(2007), Poland officially supports further development of ESDP, taking into 
account geopolitical and geostrategic interests of Poland, it would be defi­
nitely better to improve the European security system within the framework 
of NATO.
Conclusions
1. Strong-arm policy towards European Union institutional reforms in the 
Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe and the Reform Treaty which 
is promoted by the present government should be treated as a tactical activ­
ity aiming at maximising the political profits in the country rather than as 
a long-term strategy for shaping mutual relations. However, this policy will 
soon end and will be replaced by the policy of compromise if the present go­
vernment becomes stronger. Poland will thus be interested in improving re­
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lations with Brussels on the one hand, and in emphasising its national inte­
rests and internal policy goals on the other. Sooner or later rational premises 
will take the lead as positive relations with European Union emerge from the 
Polish raison d’État. Poland cares deeply about financial support from the EU 
funds and this is a strong argument of Brussels in shaping mutual relations.
2. Poland has remained distanced from the new Reform Treaty, in which 
it was the label rather than the essence that was changed in comparison with 
the Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe. For a long time Warsaw 
aimed at starting the project of drawing up the Constitutional Treaty anew 
and thus to try to “smuggle” favourable mechanisms of the Nice Treaty, espe­
cially the mechanism of weighting of votes. A compromise was reached in the 
matter of extending the time of using the Nice system of voting and the de­
laying brake after 2017. Poland demands specifying the Ioannina mechanism 
before the end of IGC 2007.
3. Reforming the European Union is not only about shaping its future in­
stitutions, but most of all it is a “game” in which a role and significance of 
a given state in Europe is at stake. One can say that, in a way, a struggle for re­
forms is a struggle for a status of a given country in the EU. The Treaty of Nice 
strengthened the position of Poland in the EU. Poland obtained not less than 
27 votes while the largest states of the EU, namely, France, Germany, Great 
Britain and Italy acquired 29 votes each. Abandoning the Nice Treaty arrange­
ments increases the impact of France and Germany, which would still hold 
a "control packet” and weakens the status of Poland (and Spain).
4. Furthermore, implementation of the double majority system that pro­
motes the strongest states of the EU will result in deterioration of political po­
sition of Poland in the European institutions. Significance of this issue grows 
as the strength of vote and impact on decision taken by the EU become more 
and more important - most of decisions, including distribution of financial 
means for agriculture (Common Agricultural Policy) or structural funds, will 
be taken by qualified majority. Therefore, possibility of having impact on ar­
eas of actual advantages seems most important, since it determines the posi­
tion of Poland in the EU in the future.
5. It should not be surprising that Poland defended the Nice system, which 
was more favourable for us. However, not wanting to follow the formula “squ­
are root or death” on its own, Poland abandoned the concept. It seemed to be 
a good decision, since further works over reforming the EU could be stopped 
otherwise. However, a very inflexible position, and in a result, the entire ne­
gotiation strategy, was a mistake. This way, a previously agreed solution was 
chosen, since picking out one of the problems would automatically dismantle 
the entire institutional packet.
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6. It is true that none of these systems ensures hegemony of a few states. 
However, the situation directly influences building decision coalitions. In the 
double majority system, importance of Poland as a partner decreases signifi­
cantly, while building decision coalitions by the largest states - Great Britain, 
Germany and France - is facilitated.
7. For Poland, prolongation of the so-called “Nice voting system” is the 
most significant result of the conference that closes the presidency of Ger­
many. Delay mechanism remained in force, but thresholds of its implementa­
tion are to be lowered after 2017. However, it was a mistake of Polish negoti­
ators to focus on the voting issue only, and forget about that fact that decision 
making process in the EU is not limited to governmental factor (the Coun­
cil of the EU), but it also includes the Commission and the European Parlia­
ment.
8. Poland has remained balanced in the question of building both the At­
lantic and the European strategy. In the foreseeable future, Poland is going to 
continue this strategy; to execute the plan of bringing the US closer together 
and to promote the concept of moderate development of security and de­
fence of the EU in terms of transatlantic cooperation.
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Harmonisation of Polish Law with EU Law
1. Introduction
Based on the Accession Treaty of Poland to the European Union1 of 16 
April 2003, the Republic of Poland assumed the obligation to observe the 
Treaties which form the basis of the European Union. According to Article 2 
of the Treaty Establishing the European Union,2 the aim of the European Un­
ion is to support harmonious, sustainable and steady development of eco­
nomic activity, high level of employment and social protection, equality of men 
and women, steady and non-inflationary growth, high competitiveness and 
convergence of economic achievements, high level of environmental protec­
tion as well as high quality of the environment, increasing the level and qual­
ity of life, economic and social cohesion, as well as solidarity between member 
states through the establishment of a common market, an economic and mon­
etary union, and implementing common policies in this area.
1 Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, 
the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(Member States of the European Union) and the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cy­
prus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Re­
public of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, 
the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic 
of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to 
the European Union, signed in Athens on 16 April 2003, “Journal of Laws” 2004, No. 90, item 864.
2 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, “Official Journal” 2006, C 321 E/01.
The development of the Community’s (now European Union’s) legislation, 
as well as the need to implement the European directives into the legal orders 
of the member states, is conducive to establishing a certain common stand­
ard of development. The obligation to harmonise national laws with EU law 
applies mostly to those acts of community legislation which are not imple­
mented directly and therefore need implementation into the national orders 
in order to be effective.
EU law can be divided into primary and secondary, supplemented by the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. Primary law is constituted by 
the Treaties establishing the Union, as well as general principles of EU law. 
Secondary legislation includes regulations, directives, decisions, recommen­
dations and opinions. Regulations are binding fully and directly on the mem­
ber states, and have supremacy over national law. Directives are addressed 
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to member states and only outline the goals which must be achieved by the 
member states within a specified timeframe; the states may choose the best 
means of achieving such goals. Thus in the case of directives the problem 
appears of harmonising national legislation with EU recommendations. It is 
important also because in certain cases the Court deems directives to be di­
rectly effective: even if the member state failed to implement a directive, an 
individual is able to base his or her claims on it. Decisions again are binding, 
while recommendations and opinions are not. The problem of harmonisa­
tion concerns therefore mostly directives. It is a rather serious problem, since 
according to Article 49 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 
the directives serve the purpose of approximating legislative, executive and 
administrative provisions of the member states which have direct influence 
on the functioning of the common market, i.e. the realisation of one of the 
fundamental tasks of the EU.
This paper aims to present the institutions which are in charge of ensur­
ing full harmonisation of Polish law with EU law. In Poland, it is the duty of 
the Council of Ministers and other bodies functioning within its framework, 
such as the European Committee of the Council of Ministers and the Com­
mittee of European Integration. Other institutions involved include Sejm’s 
and Senate’s European Union Affairs Committees, as well as experts of the 
Office of Sejm. It is the duty of these bodies to ensure proper implementation 
of EU law into the Polish legal order.
2. Role of the Council of Ministers in the process of harmonisation 
of Polish law with EU law
In Poland the duty to ensure the harmonisation of Polish law with EU law is 
placed chiefly with the Council of Ministers. According to Article 3 of the law 
on the cooperation between the Council of Ministers and the Sejm and the Sen­
ate in matters related to the membership of the Republic of Poland in the Eu­
ropean Union,3 the Council of Ministers is obliged to present to the Sejm and 
the Senate information on the participation of the Republic of Poland in the ef­
forts of the European Union. Presenting the information consists in handing 
over to the Sejm and the Senate: draft legal acts of the European Union, draft 
international agreements to which the Union or its member states are to be 
a party, draft decisions of representatives of governments of member states 
gathered in the Council of the European Union, draft acts of the European Un­
ion which are not to be binding, as well as legal acts which are significant in 
3 Law of 11 March 2004 on the cooperation between the Council of Ministers, the Sejm and the Senate 
in matters related to the membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union, “Journal of Laws” 
2004, No. 52, item 515, as amended.
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terms of interpretation or application of EU law (Articles 6 and 7). The Council 
of Ministers is also obliged to request the opinion of the appropriate bodies in 
the Sejm and the Senate with respect to legal acts which the Council of the Eu­
ropean Union is working on (Article 9). On the basis of Article 11 of the above- 
mentioned law, the Council of Ministers is obliged to present to the Sejm bills 
implementing EU law. The timeframe for the submission of such bills depends 
on the timeframe provided for the implementation of the EU law at issue. Al­
though the law obliges the Council of Ministers to present such bills, it does 
not exclude other subjects and bodies from presenting competing bills of their 
own. Such subjects and bodies include for example the MPs and the Senate. 
However, due to the fact that the Council of Ministers is the organ whose pri­
mary responsibility is the presentation of such bills, special institutions have 
been created within the Council to watch over the harmonisation process. At 
the stage of drafting the bill implementing EU law, two bodies are responsible 
for this process: the European Integration Committee and the European Com­
mittee of the Council of Ministers.
The European Integration Committee is the chief body of the governmen­
tal administration in charge of planning and coordinating policy in matters 
related to the integration of Poland with the European Union, as well as mat­
ters related to planning and coordinating actions aimed at adapting Poland to 
European standards. It has been called into being on the basis of the law on 
the European Integration Committee.4 The Committee carries out its tasks 
by means of: initiating and coordinating efforts to approximate Polish legal 
institutions to EU law, issuing opinions on bills in terms of their compliance 
with EU requirements, providing appropriate information, concepts and per­
sonnel for the integration processes, coordinating adaptive and integrative 
processes, as well as initiating actions to shape these processes. The Com­
mittee is also obliged to present to the Council of Ministers the premises of 
approximation programmes, opinions as to draft legal acts in terms of their 
compliance with EU requirements, and draft legal acts aimed at harmonising 
Polish law with EU law.
4 Law of 8 August 1996 on the European Integration Committee, “Journal of Laws” 1996, No. 106, item 
494, as amended.
The Committee is expected to participate in the harmonisation process 
at two stages: at the stage of initiation of harmonising measures (where it 
presents to the Council of Ministers draft legal acts harmonising the legal 
systems) and at the stage of preparation of bills presented by the Council of 
Ministers (where it issues opinions as to their compliance with EU require­
ments). Thus, the Committee is the body which on the one hand is supposed 
to initiate measures aimed at harmonisation, and on the other, watches over 
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the implementation of EU directives and over the observance of EU require­
ments in other legal acts.
The second body which is active within the Council of Ministers in the 
area of harmonisation is the European Committee of the Council of Minis­
ters (ECCM), established on the basis of ordinance of the Prime Minister of 
23 March 2004.5 ECCM is a permanent committee of the Council of Minis­
ters. It is an advisory body to the Council of Ministers and to the Prime Min­
ister in areas connected with Poland’s membership in the European Union. 
Its tasks include: drafting decisions and positions, and issuing opinions as to 
draft decisions and positions of the Council of Ministers or the Prime Minis­
ter in matters related to Poland’s membership in the European Union, as well 
as issuing opinions and recommendations with respect to draft documents 
which the government is to present to the Council of Ministers or the Prime 
Minister. ECCM examines draft documents in which the Council of Minis­
ters presents information on Poland’s participation in EU efforts, schedules 
of legislative work connected with implementation of EU laws in Poland, in­
formation on the progress of implementation of such schedules, bills imple­
menting EU laws into the Polish legal system, and positions with regard to 
draft EU laws. Thus the ECCM participates in the process of harmonisation 
mostly at the stage of drafting the acts which will approximate Polish laws to 
EU laws.
5 “Polish Monitor” 2004, No. 14, item 223, as amended.
6 Resolution No. 49 of the Council of Ministers of 19 March 2002 Working Regulations of the Council of 
Ministers, “Polish Monitor” 2002, No. 13, item 221, as amended.
As for the procedure of drafting bills approximating the Polish law to the 
EU law by the Council of Ministers, it is regulated by the Working Regulations 
of the Council of Ministers.6 Drafts of normative acts presented by the Coun­
cil of Ministers should comply with the principles of legislating technique and 
with the Working Regulations of the Sejm. Each bill must be accompanied by 
a justification which includes the aim and need of the provisions, indication 
of differences between current legal situation and the stipulations of the bill, 
and an evaluation of the consequences of the implementation of the bill. The 
bill must also be accompanied by a table presenting EU regulations that the 
bill implements, as well as an explanatory note concerning the date of entry 
into force of the bill or its selected provisions, with information whether this 
date is in line with the accession strategy and the requirements of the approx­
imation process (§ 10 of the Working Regulations). Moreover, the bill must 
be accompanied by a preliminary opinion on its compliance with EU require­
ments, prepared by the presenting body. This body must also consult the gov­
ernmental bill with the members of the Council of Ministers and the Head 
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of the Office of the Prime Minister, and in terms of legal and formal require­
ments - with the Governmental Legislative Centre. Bills of particular social, 
economic or legal importance are also sent to the Legislative Council asso­
ciated with the Prime Minister so that it could issue its opinion (§ 12 of the 
Working Regulations). It is mandatory that all drafts of normative acts and 
other legal acts which are presented by the Council of Ministers are exam­
ined for compliance with EU laws during consultation proceedings. The pre­
senting body which submits the draft law for consultation must first send it to 
the European Integration Committee which issues its opinion. The opinion 
is attached to the draft which is then subject of deliberations in the Council 
of Ministers (§ 16 of the Working Regulations). According to the regulations, 
draft legal acts on which the Committee has not yet issued an opinion should 
not be included on the agenda of the Council of Ministers.
Even though the European Integration Committee issues opinions on gov­
ernmental drafts of legal acts assessing their observance of EU regulations, 
such drafts (and in particular, drafts of acts connected with Poland’s mem­
bership in the EU, including draft approximation acts) are additionally sent 
to the ECCM, which issues its opinion too (§ 19 of the Working Regulations). 
Theoretically it is therefore possible that at this stage of proceedings, two 
contradictory opinions might be presented, one issued by the European Inte­
gration Committee and the other by the ECCM. Under such circumstances, 
the procedure of clarification and approximation of positions described in 
Chapter 3 of the Working Regulations can be employed. According to this 
procedure, inter-ministerial conferences are held in order to find common 
positions. Representatives of the body which prepared the draft as well as of 
the bodies which have issued opinions are present at the conferences. Partic­
ipation is mandatory if a large number of substantive comments have been 
made. Based on the outcome of the conference, the body which prepared the 
draft is obliged to amend or re-draft the proposed legal act. If this procedure 
fails to produce satisfactory results, the draft document with a protocol of 
differences is sent to the permanent committee of the Council of Ministers.
The committee is not bound by the outcome of the above-mentioned pro­
cedure, and it may accept the issue for investigation. If the committee fails 
to find satisfactory solutions, the chair of the committee may submit a mo­
tion to have the draft legal act submitted for the consideration of the Coun­
cil of Ministers. Drafting the document together in a session of the Council 
of Ministers is the final opportunity to prepare a draft legal act under such 
circumstances, which is justifiable, given that it is going to be presented as a 
governmental draft, i.e. one for which the government takes responsibility.
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3. Mechanisms ensuring compliance of Polish law with EU law 
during the legislative procedure in the Parliament
Procedures aimed at ensuring effective harmonisation of Polish law with 
EU law are also operational at the stage of the legislative procedure which takes 
place in the Parliament. The legislative procedure commences in the Sejm. Ac­
cording to the Working Regulations of the Sejm,7 the Speaker of the Sejm is in 
charge of initiating procedures connected with draft documents presented in 
connection with Poland’s membership in the EU. The bodies responsible for 
harmonisation of Polish law with EU law are mostly two committees: the Leg­
islative Committee and the European Union Affairs Committee (EUAC).
7 Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 30 July 1992 Working Regulations of the Sejm of the 
Republic of Poland, “Polish Monitor” 2002, No. 23, item 398, as amended.
The Legislative Committee is in charge of issuing legislation and ensuring 
its coherence. In execution of its tasks, the Committee participates in issu­
ing opinions on draft documents sent to it in terms of their compliance with 
laws, including EU laws. The EUAC is the most specialised committee among 
those investigating matters relating to Poland’s membership in the EU. In ex­
ecution of its tasks, EUAC issues opinions and takes positions with reference 
to draft EU acts, notes issued by the Council of Ministers with regard to the 
Council’s positions, and draff Polish laws in terms of their compliance with 
EU laws. Moreover, EUAC issues recommendations to the Council of Minis­
ters as to the positions which the Council of Ministers intends to take while 
considering draft EU acts in the Council of the European Union.
Verification of a bill or another draft law begins as soon as it is presented. 
Each draft law must be accompanied by a justification which includes first an 
explanation of the aim of the law and the need for its introduction, and sec­
ond a declaration that the draft law is in compliance with EU laws or alterna­
tively, that it regards an area to which EU regulations do not apply (Article 34 
section 2 point 7 of the Working Regulations of the Sejm). If the draft law is 
presented by the Council of Ministers, and if its purpose is to enforce EU law, 
the draft must additionally be accompanied by draft executive acts which the 
draft law deems necessary (Article 34 section 4a of the Working Regulations of 
the Sejm). If the drafts presented to the Speaker of the Sejm raises doubts as 
to their compliance with law, including EU law, the Speaker of the Sejm, hav­
ing requested the opinion of the Presidium, i.e. the governing body of the Sejm, 
may send the draft to the Legislative Committee, requesting its opinion. The 
Committee conducts a preliminary examination of the bill and, in case it finds 
faults with it, may (with a 3/5 majority of votes) deem it unacceptable (Article 
3 section 8 of the Working Regulations of the Sejm). If no examination of the 
bill by the Committee took place, the Committee may nonetheless select from 
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among its members representatives who take part in the meetings of com­
mittees which are to work on the bill. Such representatives may present mo­
tions and suggest amendments, but have no vote in the committees (Article 
81 of the Working Regulations of the Sejm).
The next stage is mandatory: the bill must obtain the opinion on its com­
pliance with EU law from the experts from the Office of the Sejm. The Speaker 
of the Sejm requests such an opinion after receiving the bill but before sending 
it for the first reading (Article 34 section 9 of the Working Regulations of the 
Sejm). Bills presented by the Council of Ministers and by the President of Po­
land are not subject to this procedure. EUAC is another body that is entitled to 
issue its opinion on compliance of bills or draft resolutions of the Sejm with EU 
laws. Its opinions are delivered to the MPs together with the bills at issue.
The next stage where the compliance of draft legal acts with EU law is ex­
amined in the committee after the first reading of a bill. The committee which 
is working on the bill is obliged to request the opinion of the European Inte­
gration Committee as to the compliance of the provisions at issue with EU 
law. The committee itself decides on the timeframe for this procedure (Ar­
ticle 42 section 4 of the Working Regulations of the Sejm). If during work in 
the committee amendments were suggested, these amendments too must re­
ceive the Committee’s opinion.
The committees which worked on a bill produce a report on their efforts. 
Attached to the report is the opinion on the bill issued by the European Inte­
gration Committee. The report is sent in for the second reading which is held 
in the Sejm. If amendments or motions are presented, the bill is returned to 
the committees which had worked on it previously (Article 47 section 1 of 
the Working Regulations of the Sejm). If the committees are unsure as to the 
compliance of the amendments and motions with EU law, they are obliged to 
request the opinion of the European Integration Committee. The amended 
report produced by the committees, together with the Committee’s opinions, 
is then sent for the third reading (Article 47 section 2 of the Working Regu­
lations of the Sejm).
Once the bill is passed, it is forwarded to the Senate. It should be noted 
that the entire passage of the bill is watched over by a representative of the 
legislative service of the Office of the Sejm, who participates in the proceed­
ings and has the rights to present motions and comments with regard to legis­
lative and legal aspects, also with respect to the compliance of the bill with EU 
law (Article 70 of the Working Regulations of the Sejm). If these motions and 
comments are not taken into account, and if they pertain to significant legis­
lative faults of the bill, including compliance with EU law, the Speaker of the 
Sejm may address the committee, asking it to take a position with respect to 
such motions and comments. Moreover, representatives of the European In­
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tegration Committee participate in the meetings of committees if the work 
conducted there is related to issuing opinions on compliance of bills with EU 
law (Article 153 of the Working Regulations of the Sejm).
The situation in the Sejm is different in case of draft legal acts whose di­
rect aim is the implementation of EU regulations. The Council of Ministers 
is obliged to present bills implementing EU laws. In case of bills presented by 
other bodies, such as the Senate or the President, the Speaker of the Sejm, 
before sending them for the first reading, must decide whether the bill is 
aimed at implementing EU law (Article 95a section 3 of the Working Regula­
tions of the Sejm). Modifications of legislative procedure with regard to bills 
implementing EU laws is related to the necessity of staying within the time­
frame scheduled for such projects, and they consist mainly in the scheduling 
of deadlines for the subsequent stages of the legislative procedure (schedul­
ing of the procedure by the Speaker of the Sejm, scheduling by the commit­
tee of its own work, date of the second reading, analysis of amendments sent 
in by the Senate), as well as specific regulations concerning the possibility of 
suggesting amendments (by a group of at least three MPs, in writing).
4. Mechanisms ensuring compliance of Polish law with EU law
in the legislative procedure in the Senate
The next stage in the legislative procedure takes place in the Senate. The 
Working Regulations of the Senate8 stipulate that the Marshal of the Senate 
is in charge of initiating the procedure with regard to documents forwarded 
from the Sejm, documents expressing the Senate’s own statutory initiative, 
as well as documents presented to the Senate with regard to Poland’s mem­
bership in the European Union. The body in the Senate which is responsible 
for issues related to Poland’s membership in the EU is the Senate’s European 
Union Affair Committee. It can submit motions to include on the Senate’s 
agenda notes from the Council of Ministers informing the Senate of matters 
related to Poland’s membership in the EU. The Senate’s European Union Af­
fair Committee has the right (Article 67b of the Working Regulations of the 
Senate) to pass resolutions expressing opinions on draft acts of EU law, on the 
position of the Council of Ministers taken during the work on such acts, and 
the position to be taken during such work in the future.
8 Resolution of the Senate of the Republic of Poland of 23 November 1990 Working Regultions of the Senate, 
“Polish Monitor” 2002, No. 54, item 741, as amended.
The Marshal of the Senate sends Sejm’s resolutions to relevant commit­
tees on the basis of their subject maters. The committees prepare reports on 
the outcomes of their work, in which they can recommend to the Senate that 
it should adopt the bill as is, reject the bill as is, or amend the bill. The reports 
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are send in for the second reading in the Senate. The Senate votes first on the 
motion to reject the bill, second on the motion to accept the bill, and third on 
the motion to amend it as suggested by the committee. A resolution express­
ing the position of the Senate is then sent to the Speaker of th Sejm.
In the Senate as well the situation is different in case of draft legal acts 
whose direct aim is the implementation of EU regulations. The Marshal of 
the Senate sends the bill to the relevant committee. The committees which 
are examining such a bill may approach the Senate’s European Union Affair 
Committee with requests for opinions as to the bill or its part (Article 68 sec­
tion la of the Working Regulations of the Senate). This opinion is taken into 
account during work on the bill. The relevant committees prepare reports on 
the outcomes of their work, in which they can recommend to the Senate that 
it should adopt the bill as is, reject the bill as is, or amend the bill. If amend­
ments are suggested, the Marshal of the Senate, before submitting them for 
voting during the second reading - should be there be doubts as to the scope 
of the amendment, may request an opinion from Senate’s European Union 
Affair Committee (Article 54 section 4a of the Working Regulations of the 
Senate). This opinion, together with the report of the relevant committees, is 
sent for the second reading in the Senate, where the Senate’s position is de­
cided. The position is then forwarded to the Speaker of the Sejm.
When exercising its right of statutory initiative, the Senate also needs 
verification of its bill in terms of its compliance with EU law. When present­
ing a bill, the person or body presenting it must attach a declaration on its 
compliance with EU law or a declaration that EU laws do not apply to the 
subject matter of the law (Article 77 section 2 of the Working Regulations 
of the Senate). After the bill is presented, the Marshal of the Senate directs 
the bill to a relevant committee, as well as the Legislative Committee.
In this case the task for the Legislative Committee is to coordinate the 
legislative work in the Senate as well as to examine the bill in terms of its 
compliance with existing binding laws. The committees which examined 
the bill produce a report, which should include information on the com­
pliance of the bill with EU law or on its subject matter being beyond the 
application of EU laws (Article 80 section 3 of the Working Regulations 
of the Senate). Once the procedure is completed, the Marshal of the Sen­
ate forwards to the Sejm the resolution on the commencement of the Sen­
ate’s statutory initiative. A declaration on the proposed bill being in com­
pliance with EU law or on its subject matter being beyond the application 
of EU laws must accompany the resolution (Article 83 of the Working Reg­
ulations of the Senate).
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5. Sejm procedure related to a resolution of the Senate 
including amendments to a bill
In case the Sejm receives from the Senate a resolution including amend­
ments to a bill previously passed by the Sejm, the Speaker of the Sejm sends 
it to the committees which had previously worked on the bill. If there are 
doubts as to the compliance of the suggested amendments with EU law, the 
committees must approach the European Integration Committee with a re­
quest for opinion (Article 54 of the Working Regulations of the Sejm). The 
committees then produce a report for the Sejm in which they move to have 
all or some of the amendments accepted or rejected. The report is discussed 
in the Sejm which may - by an absolute majority of votes, with at least half 
of statutory membership present - reject the suggested amendments. On 
completion of the procedure, the Speaker of the Sejm forwards the bill to the 
President for his signature.
6. Conclusions
A number of mechanisms were established to ensure the compliance of 
newly established Polish law with EU laws and to ensure proper harmonisa­
tion of the two legal systems. The mechanisms however are not faultless.
First of all, the relation between the European Integration Commit­
tee and the ECCM seems problematic. Even though the regulation on the 
ECCM stipulates explicitly that it is competent in matters related to Euro­
pean integration not assigned to other bodies, the areas of activity of these 
two institutions seem to overlap. This tendency is most clearly visible in ref­
erence to drafting government positions or issuing opinions on such posi­
tions in matters related to the EU.
The European Integration Committee has certain a similar competence, 
consisting in the right to present drafts of legal acts in the area of approxi­
mation and integration. The strong connection between the European Inte­
gration Committee and the ECCM is also expressed through a personal un­
ion: ECCM by definition is headed by the Head of the European Integration 
Committee. This overlap may result in the responsibility for the harmonisa­
tion process becoming blurred. Therefore, the head of the two bodies must 
carefully coordinate the functioning of the two institutions.
Moreover, doubts arise as to the appropriate course of action if, when 
working on a bill, the government fails to take into account the opinions of 
the European Integration Committee and the ECCM. The problem is signif­
icant, since it is imaginable that the Council of Ministers, despite negative 
opinions, will present a bill which does not comply with EU laws.
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Problems may also arise in the course of the legislative procedure in the 
parliament. The Working Regulations of the Sejm include a number of pro­
visions which oblige relevant bodies to obtain opinions from the European 
Integration Committee, as well as provisions which allow representatives of 
the legal service of the Office of the Sejm to issue comments on compliance 
of regulations with EU law. However, the Regulations include no provisions 




• Diane Ryland - University of Lincoln
I have a question for Dr Młynarski. It is to do with the negotiating posi­
tions that Poland put forward after (to my knowledge) the German presidency 
conclusions of June this year for the draft reform treaty. It is not in connection 
with the voting mechanism in the Council, but this is in connection with the 
issue of the number and weighting of the advocates general in the European 
Court of Justice. And it interests me that this issue appears to be raised in be­
tween June and October, and I have not heard of any outcome. It was an issue 
I had an interest in when the Treaty of Nice was finalised, the fact that the 
number of the advocates general did not increase from 8, but apart from that 
we still have 5 advocates general who come from the large member states, with 
3 rotating advocates general from the rest of the member states. This was dear 
to Poland’s heart and I wondered whether any progress has been made.
• Professor Rolf Grawert, PhD - University of Bochum
I was very impressed by the panel we had today. I am convinced that the 
process of European unification not only depends on old men like me, but 
also young participants, who will come when I am no longer alive. I will ask 
my questions to all of you.
First of all, to Dr Paterek. I will make a remark as a question. You discussed 
the relationship between the Charter and the Convention. I think the prob­
lem is a problem of sovereignty of the Union, if I may say so, or supremacy, 
because if the Union accedes to the Convention, the Court in Luxembourg 
will dominate the Court in Strasbourg. Another remark. In Germany we have 
a special problem with the very old right of freedom of religion - in Germany, 
there is a theory that all the freedoms derive from the freedom of religion, 
and you spoke of this invocation of God, etc. Nowadays we have the problem 
with the Christian history and a little bit of the rest of the Christian culture. 
We have secular freedom of religion, and we have Islamic groups who take 
this religion to a very far extreme. So we discuss: is it not necessary to con­
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centrate on God and the Christian culture, and so on? Maybe on one sort of 
God, but which sort of God? What do we mean by this? To be open in a sort 
of globalisation, that would be another solution.
To Dr Młynarski, do you think that in the European Parliament the MEPs 
vote in a national sense, as representatives of their state, or have they voted 
and will they vote in accordance with common sense, with prejudices they 
have from the background?
And to Dr Surówka, do you think, and I would take it as my thesis, but 
I will form it as a question, do you think that the process of harmonisation 
you described very well, and I respect it very much - I was very impressed by 
this - but do you think that the processes of harmonisation does not change 
the national constitutions, not only the national constitutions, but the func­
tions of the constitutions? Does it not change who has something to say in 
Poland? The parliament, any group in the parliament, the administration, or 
the courts? And I think all these functions, which form the whole of sover­
eignty nowadays, are their own sources of harmonisation and relationship to 
the Union, and therefore the national state will not remain an entity, will be­
come a combination of functions which all have something to do with Eu­
rope, and not only with the nation state on its own.
• Alexandra Hennessy - University of Rochester
I have a question to Dr Młynarski. I think your argument is very provoc­
ative but also very insightful, and the implication of your argument seems to 
be that after the double majority principle will come into effect in 2017, or 
before that, the formal voting rules will become actually less important than 
the informal deliberations prior to formal decision-making. It seems that for 
the less populous countries like Poland it will be more important to build co­
alitions with other states, and thereby gang up on the big countries. And I am 
wondering whether this is in fact an implication of your argument and if you 
have any ideas how this will affect the democratic deficit, so is there an inher­
ent trade-off between getting things done, efficiency, and democratic trans­
parency?
• Professor Jo Carby-Hall, PhD - The University of Hull
I have got a short question for Dr Surówka. You gave us a very clear pres­
entation of the safeguards and the procedures in the Sejm and the Senate 
about the interpretation of European law in connection with Polish laws. 
Now we have a similar system in Great Britain, not identical, but similar, but 
we have had problems, and this is basically what I am trying to ask you, with 
the interpretation of a European law in a national law which has been misin­
terpreted at court level. I will give you a practical example. For 12 years we 
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have been following a law which has never been the intention of the Euro­
pean laws. It happened also in Germany, Professor Weiss is not here, in a la­
bour law case in connection with the transfer of undertakings. That is when 
one company takes over from another company. And because we had, and 
the Germans had, this sub-contracting of labour from one employer to an­
other, we have been following like the Germans the wrong law until there was 
a pronouncement from the ECJ to say that our laws were not in accordance 
with EU laws. Have you got any comment on this? Has it happened n Poland? 
And if it has, I would be interested to hear your views.
• Professor Rolf Grawert, PhD - University of Bochum
This conference has been very interesting for me, although as I go away 
I am very unsure of what we should think about the state and the Union. 
We lose the distinctness of all our terms. We do not know what sovereignty 
means, all these terms derive from the 16th and 17th century, we do not know 
exactly what a constitution is nowadays, we do not know what the parliament 
is, and so on. We all had an impression about it. Maybe we were never sure. It 
cost us 300 years to know this. Nowadays when I leave here I am very unsure, 
I do not know what to say - the constitution is this or that. I only learned that 
everything is a process. And I do not know the aim and the powers and the 
end of this process. I do not know exactly what this Europe we are going into 
is. Does it reach to Vladivostok, as de Gaulle said, does it reach to Morocco 
and Tunisia, according to Sarkozy? Does it sit on religion, as the Turkish try 
to make in their state, and we are fearing that they will come here with funda­
mentalist Islam? I think we are in a very interesting time because we see how 
all things are changing. And therefore I think, it is my hope, we must have 
a mentality to bring all these things to a better future. We do not know the 
forms of this future, but we must try and try again, and therefore I am very 
glad at last to be unsure and to be hopeful for the future.
• Anna Paterek, PhD - Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow
University College
I shall begin then. As for the first question about the relationship between 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Convention. This is slightly be­
yond my competence, as I mentioned earlier I am not a lawyer. But what I can 
say is that the Convention includes all the underlying principle of the Char­
ter, the Convention is the basic instrument of protection in Europe. The in­
consistency of jurisdiction may be a problem, indeed, because of inconsist­
ent rulings of the two Courts. I apologise, but this is beyond my knowledge 
to elaborate on that. But of course we will all have the opportunity to observe 
the shaping of the mutual relations between these two instruments.
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As for the second question on the religious heritage of Europe and its 
place in either the Charter itself, in the preamble to the Charter, or in the 
Treaty, of course there have been justifiable controversies: what should we do 
about Turkey, for example, if we include the Christian heritage? However, it 
must be noticed that such a provision itself would not make it impossible for 
Turkey to join. On the other hand, any definition which includes religion is 
potentially controversial, and we must remember to include secular, neutral 
countries such as France or Belgium. At the same time, this preamble to the 
Treaty refers to the spiritual and religious heritage, and the word “religious” 
is supposed to express the variety and differentiation too. And there is also 
one more article, a novelty of sorts, which was introduced after negotiations 
between the EU and the churches, and it is Article 1.52 of the Treaty, which 
stipulates that the EU does not interfere with relations between the state and 
the churches, and at the same time the Treaty of course confirms the freedom 
of confession and somehow provides for the undertaking by the EU of open 
dialogue with churches or other confessional organisations, which was also 
perceived as an achievement in term so the relations between the EU and re­
ligious organisations. I hope that this answers your question.
• Tomasz Młynarski, PhD - jagiellonian University
As for the first question regarding advocates general, as far as I know Po­
land has obtained a guarantee of permanent position for one attorney gen­
eral. This of course depends on the independent decision, independent will, 
of the Court to actually want to have a greater number of advocates general, 
but it is a question of politics too. A very interesting question.
As far as the question about the European Parliament is concerned, of 
course the MEPs vote in accordance with what is best for Europe. This is the 
basic principle. One may of course pose the question whether the interest of 
Europe is perceived by everyone in the same way. It appears that it might be 
understood differently by different people. My point however was different. 
I was talking about Article 215, which focuses on the role, the codecision 
procedure in the legislative process, and here until the end of the summit 
it remained unclear whether the possibility to renegotiate the number of 
MEPs existed, and of course the impact that countries have varies with the 
number of MEPs coming from that country. Poland negotiated a compromise 
as to the voting system, but our negotiators somewhat overlooked this mat­
ter, where possibly negotiation might have been undertaken.
And the third question, the double majority principle and the democratic 
deficit. The double majority principle directly increases democracy in Eu­
rope. It is a simple principle: each vote, or the vote of each citizen, is equal. 
Moreover, the principle of a qualified majority vote now applies to a greater 
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number of areas, meaning that progress is being made. Adding more and 
more areas to the majority voting system is also an expression of a certain will 
to include the parliament more and more in the decision-making processes, 
alleviating the democratic deficit. And here I believe that coalition-building 
has always existed and will always exist and is a natural process and an ex­
pression of a subtle skill to cooperate on the European platform, and I find 
this to be perfectly natural.
• Anna Surówka, PhD - Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow
University College
As to the first question, whether the harmonisation of the Polish and EU 
law does not change the constitution and the authority of official bodies. In 
the Polish doctrine, there are two kinds of opinions as to whether Poland 
has transferred a part of its sovereignty to an international organisation, or 
whether it is simply exercising certain rights connected with its sovereignty. 
Attention is often drawn to Article 90 of the Polish constitution, which fully 
regulates the arrangement regarding the transfer of competencies to an inter­
national organisation or body. Article 90 says explicitly that the Republic of 
Poland may, by means of an agreement, transfer a part of its authority to an 
international organisation or body. A part, not the entire authority.
The second issue which needs to be considered here is that the same con­
stitution in Article 8 point 1 provides that the Constitution of Poland is the 
highest legislative act in the territory of Poland. So here we should classify 
the Accession Treaty and EU law just under the Constitution. This law has 
priority over national law, but it does rank below the Constitution. An ar­
gument that supports this point of view is the ruling of the Polish Constitu­
tional Tribunal of 11 May 2005, which concerned the Accession Treaty and 
which pointed out that, in case the Tribunal believed that the Treaty was in­
deed above the Constitution, that it was of extraordinary importance, that it 
was somehow of greater force than the Constitution (and one might think so, 
given that its ratification procedure is stricter than the procedure of a poten­
tial constitutional amendment), then the Tribunal would have to refuse to in­
vestigate the matter. However, the Tribunal rules that the Treaty was in fact 
an international agreement regarding the transfer of competencies, but we 
were bound by the highest source of law which in Poland is the Constitution. 
So this is the interpretation we need to apply.
Moreover, it is a widespread belief in the doctrine that Poland may not trans­
fer the entire range of competencies of an organ, because the Constitution stip­
ulates that this transfer must be partial. If we opened up, so to say, to too large 
an extent, and in the process of integration we were considering a transfer of all 
competencies of a given body, then this might infringe the constitution.
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This is somewhat related to the other question that was asked, relating to 
interpretative difficulties, and what happens if Polish courts misinterpret the 
law and consequently infringe EU law. And here again the Constitutional Tri­
bunal comes to the rescue, and its ruling regarding the European Arrest War­
rant. This is a ruling of T1 April 2005. Fundamentally, the Tribunal was inves­
tigating the provisions of the Polish act on criminal procedure, so an act of 
national law. However, the Tribunal noted that we must pay attention to the 
Article 9 of our Constitution, which provides that Poland must observe inter­
national laws that bind it. This is an instruction for the legislature as well as 
the executive and the judiciary that of all the potential interpretations of le­
gal provisions they should chose these that most fully enforce EU law. Thus 
the Court took the position that national laws should be interpreted in such 
a way as to attempt to ensure its coherence with EU law, to act as much as 
possible in enforcement of EU regulations. So at this stage we may say that 
an attempt took place to find a solution to a conflict of the sort that you men­
tioned. And naturally if Polish courts continuously infringed citizens’ rights 
by interpreting laws contrary to EU treaties, then of course the Treaties them­
selves provide mechanisms for opening procedures which are aimed at re­
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Professor Jo Carby-Hall is a renowned and acknowledged authority in the 
fields of British, European, international and comparative labour law and so­
cial law. He is the author and co-author of many books and monographs, en­
tries in encyclopaedias, and articles. Edited and published numerous books 
and research journals. The high quality and significance of his works are ev­
idenced in the fact that they have been translated into seven languages and 
published in several countries.
Born in Palestine, Jo Carby-Hall, was educated at a French Jesuit College 
and King’s School Sherborne, in England, and then studied Italian, French, 
and Law at the University of Aberdeen and the University of Hull. He was 
awarded a PhD at the elitist Pembroke College of the University of Camb­
ridge for a thesis entitled The Juridical Nature of the Collective Agreement. 
For his numerous scholarly publications he was honoured with the degree of 
a Doctor of Letters.
Professor Carby-Hall has connected his academic career with legal prac­
tice. Professionally qualified as a lawyer, he practiced for six years as legal ad­
viser to David Brown Industries in Huddersfield, a world-known manufac­
turer of engineering products.
Since 1970, he has served the University of Hull, where he started his ed­
ucational career as a lecturer, was quickly promoted to a senior lecturer and 
subsequently to professorship and given a chair. He is currently Director of 
International Legal Research in the Centre for Legislative Studies at the Uni­
versity of Hull.
Professor Carby-Hall’s interest in Poland can be seen in his intensive co­
operation in the educational, didactical and organisational areas while collab­
orating with the Universities in Toruń and Łódź. High quality of his contribu­
tion was acknowledged by the Polish authorities, which became the basis for 
appointing him the Honorary Consul of the Republic of Poland in the United 
Kingdom. He now runs a busy Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Bev­
erley as well as its branch in the University of Hull. This function, especially 
in the recent years, is connected with the responsibility of taking care over 
the increasing number of Polish citizens who are studying and working in the 
United Kingdom.
In connection to this, Jo Carby-Hall has prepared for the Polish authori­
ties a comprehensive research on the situation of economic immigrants from 
Poland and new member states in other member states. In his report, he has 
made recommendations suggesting the need to undertake appropriate ac­
tions in Poland as well as in the EU.
Long-lasting and extraordinarily fruitful activities carried out for the wel­
fare of Poland and Polish citizens staying in England were ample reasons for 
awarding him by the President of the Republic of Poland, first, with the title 
of Knight of the Cross of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland and, 
then, with the title of Officer of the Cross of the Order of Merit of the Repub­
lic of Poland.
It is worth mentioning that Professor Jo Carby-Hall has frequently been 
honoured with medals by the British authorities. As a mark of recognition for 
his services to legal education Her Royal Highness Queen Elizabeth II has in­
vested him with the title of Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the Brit­
ish Empire.
Looking for new creative areas of activities for the Polish cause, Jo Carby- 
Hall has developed multilateral contacts with Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Kra­
kow University College. As a result of the actions that he undertook, an agree­
ment on cooperation with the University of Hull has been signed. It serves 
the purpose of establishing student and teacher exchanges, conducting joint 
research programmes, the results and summaries of which are presented at 
international conferences organised together by the two institutions. It is well 
worth mentioning at this point that the International Academic Conference 
on “Poland in the European Union: Social Dimension” organised in 2005 as 
well as the current conference on “European Constitution and National Con­
stitutions” served such a purpose.
It was thanks to Professor Carby-Hall’s actions that the Library of Andrzej 
Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University College received over 10,000 volumes 
of academic publications in English, moreover, the organisation of the confer­
ence on “European Constitution and National Constitutions” has been finan­
cially supported by the Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Beverley.
Professor Jo Carby-Hall is an excellent teacher. His lectures have invaria­
bly been popular in many universities around the world. As a visiting profes­
sor he has taught at the universities in Geneva, Paris, Nantes, Thrace.
He was granted the title of an Honorary Professor of the University of 
Bordeaux, and in the Universities in Toruń and Łódź he conducted lectures 
within the framework of Jean Monnet Programme.
The multifaceted activities undertaken by Professor Carby-Hall imple­
ment the idea of creating understanding between nations, European inte­
gration, strengthening and fostering cooperation with academic societies in 
different countries, which is extremely important for Poland where society 
based on knowledge is being developed. Professor Jo Carby-Hall has fully de­
served to be awarded the title of Honorary Professor of Andrzej Frycz Mo­
drzewski Krakow University College.
Professor Michal Seweryński
Krakow, 22nd October 2007
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Professor Rolf Grawert, as an eminent representative of state law and val­
ued constitutionalist, ranks among the outstanding authorities of great re­
nown both in Germany and abroad. He owes this recognition not only to 
the significant academic achievements and university functions which he had 
held but also to the abundant international contacts, including his long-term 
cooperation with the Jagiellonian University as well as the Andrzej Frycz Mo­
drzewski Krakow University since its inception.
Professor Rolf Grawert began his scholarly career by graduating from le­
gal studies in Heidelberg and Münich in 1960, and being granted a doctorate 
of both laws in 1966 at the University of Heidelberg following a doctoral the­
sis entitled Administrative Agreements between the Federation and the States 
(Bundesländer). On those grounds, he was granted employment as an assist­
ant at the universities in Heidelberg and Bielefeld. Worthy of praise is his ex­
tensive academic activity, manifested even as an assistant, which resulted in 
six praiseworthy academic works on different subjects published in various 
magazines. We should also mention that the scope of subjects that the future 
professor found interesting included the cases of conflicts between the bind­
ing federal law and constitutions of the states as well as historical trends in 
the development of modern legislation. He obtained the habilitation in 1972 
on the basis of his likewise original dissertation entitled State and State Cit­
izenship. Constitutional and Historical Research in the Development of State 
Citizenship. As a result, he was entrusted with the post of assistant professor. 
Two years later (1974) he became professor and was appointed the Head of 
the independent Chair of Public Law and History of Constitution at the Fac­
ulty of Law of the Ruhr University Bochum.
Worth mentioning, among the university functions that prove the fact 
that university authorities noticed and appreciated Professor Grawert’s spe­
cial propensity, are the functions of Dean of the Faculty of Law of the Ruhr 
University Bochum (1979-1980) and Deputy Rector of the Ruhr University 
Bochum (1990-1994). After the system transformation in Germany - he be­
came the founder and Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Pots­
dam as well as Deputy Rector of this university (1991-1994). Most notable 
is an array of other functions held by the Professor, including that of Judge 
at the Higher Administrative Court in Münster for North Rhine-Westphalia 
(1974-1983) and Director of the Musical Centre of the Ruhr University Bo­
chum (1984-1990).
Professor Grawert’s exceedingly intensive academic activity commands 
attention, the more so as it has enjoyed general recognition. It has brought 
about five vast monographic works and a body of scholarly papers and re­
views numbering 230 altogether. The extremely broad scope of the subjects of 
the Professor’s academic interest is surprising, as may be his frequently criti­
cal opinion on the legal regulations applied and the actions undertaken by or­
gans of the federation, while the high level of his published scholarly works 
has found expression in countless extremely positive reviews. Beyond doubt, 
an expression of special recognition for the scholarly work of Professor Rolf 
Grawert was the honorary doctorate awarded by the Faculty of Law of Pots­
dam University in 1994.
It is to be emphasised that the Professor’s retirement in 2002 has in no way 
curtailed his scholarly activity; on the contrary, he turned to new, current sub­
jects, as can be seen in the titles of his publications, including How Should Eu­
rope be Organised?, The Constitutional Future of Europe According to the Nice 
Treaty, Human Rights vs the States’ Raison d’etre, The Democratic Society of 
the EU, On the Responsibility of Members of the Government and The German- 
Polish Dialogue.
Among the Professor’s earliest academic output, noteworthy are two re­
markable works published in the Polish language. These are Z problematyki 
zgodności orzecznictwa sądowego z Konstytucją (Selected Problems of Con­
stitutionality of Court Decisions published in Przegląd Zachodni 1987), and 
Prawne i etyczne granice eksperymentów biologicznych (Legal and Ethical 
Limits of Biological Experiments published in Księga pamiątkowa Profesora 
Witolda Zakrzewskiego, Krakow 1989). These works are all the more worth 
quoting as in a sense they initiated the long-term cooperation of Professor 
Grawert with Krakow universities, which continues to this day. This cooper­
ation found expression in his two, highly fruitful visits to Krakow as a visiting 
professor in 1991 and 1998. They were both prepared with the utmost care, 
and with the Polish academic staff and their students in mind.
Let testimony to the great significance attached by Professor Rolf Graw­
ert to this cooperation - with time, assuming the form of friendship - be 
his participation in conferences and the interesting lectures he delivered. 
Further proof that the Professor approached his contacts with Krakow with 
great heart is his extremely fascinating work, written with Krakow academ­
ics in mind, namely Konstytucje Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w świetle niemieckiej 
literatury (Constitutions of the Republic of Poland in the Light of German 
Literature). This publication, which incidentally contains a number of personal 
themes, is accompanied by a valuable bibliography of works on Polish con­
stitutional law in German and covering the span of six decades, prepared es­
pecially for the authors representing the younger generation. Its drafting cer­
tainly required a major effort as it comprises 450 items, including works by 
Polish authors from Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University, notably 
professors Stanislaw Grodziski and Zbigniew Maciąg.
After this brief presentation of the achievements and merits of Professor 
Rolf Grawert, on behalf of all of us, I would like to express my heartfelt con­
viction that words of exceptional gratitude and recognition are due to Profes­
sor Grawert for what he has done with so much devotion for Polish legal stud­
ies and for all of us.
Professor Apoloniusz Kostecki
Krakow, 22nd October 2007
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Professor Harald Kundoch is a recognised and valued specialist in eco­
nomic and European law. He combines scholarly and academic activity with 
broad practical experience, having held a number of responsible posts in the 
structures of the state administrative apparatus, business authorities and in le­
gal counselling.
Born in northern Germany, he completed secondary school in Cologne, 
and studied law in Freiburg im Breisgau, Bonn, Cologne and Kiel. Furthering 
the cause of German-French reconciliation, he managed a programme for 
cooperation between the youth of the two states. At the same time, he honed 
his knowledge of French and English, studying in those countries as a holder 
of a DAAD scholarship.
Having passed the first degree examination in law at the Higher State Court 
of Schleswig-Holstein, he held his court internship at the regional and state 
court in Cologne, and later completed a course in international law at the 
Academy of International Law in the Hague. At the same time, he became an 
assistant at the Institute of International Law in Kiel. His interest in interna­
tional and European law led to the doctoral dissertation entitled The Establish­
ment of European Parliament: the Question of Reforming the Process of Dep­
uty Nomination, which was defended in 1972 at the University of Cologne.
Following the completion of his internship, the future Professor passed 
the second-degree examination in law, which opened to him a career in high 
posts in the Ministry of the Interior of Schleswig-Holstein in Kiel, the Federal 
Ministry of Economy in Bonn, the Municipal Association of the Ruhr Area and 
the General Coal Mining Union in Essen. He later worked at the Treuhand 
Agency in Erfurt, the global professional services firm KPMG, and also as a bar­
rister and tax adviser in Düsseldorf, Dresden, Erfurt, Leipzig and Magdeburg. 
This long-term legal practice as well as intensive scientific involvement pro­
vided the grounds for his nomination as professor at Gelsenkirchen Univer­
sity of Applied Sciences.
Almost from the earliest days of Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow Uni­
versity, the Professor maintained regular contacts, delivering special lectures 
in English, holding seminars and also lecturing. Both lectures and meetings 
concerned mostly the questions of European economic law against the back­
ground of legal practices and rulings of the European Court of Justice. It must 
be added that they enjoyed great interest among the students.
Professor Kundoch strongly contributed to the expansion of the interna­
tional contacts of the AFMKU. He organises study visits for Polish, German, 
and Dutch students to numerous European institutions within the framework 
of the Jean-Monnet Europa-Zertifikat programme. Thanks to his initiative, 
a very fruitful cooperation between Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow Univer­
sity and the University of Applied Sciences in Ludwigshafen am Rhein began.
Always brimming with initiatives and ideas for international cooperation, 
Professor Kundoch has personally helped to broaden Andrzej Frycz Modrze­
wski Krakow University’s resources with valuable academic literature in English, 
German and French. This is a reason why we are glad to express our gratitude, at 
the same time being convinced that the Professor will not let his past activity 
die down, but continue working towards European integration based on edu­
cation and academic learning.
Professor Erhard Cziomer
Krakow, 22nd October 2007
